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Snowman Logistics Ltd was publicly listed in 2014 at a huge premium to the issue price. The company was the first pan-Indian player in the temperature-controlled logistics industry, which was largely unorganized and fragmented. Changing consumer preferences and increasing demand for processed food were expected to drive the business’s growth rates and profitability. However, India updated its accounting standards in 2019, which impacted Snowman’s financial statements. Even after six years of listing, the company had failed to meet expected growth in revenue and profitability, and an assessment needs to be made about why it failed to meet investor expectations.

Concise Industries Private Limited (Concise Industries), a small enterprise operating in the material handling and control equipment sector, manufactured fixed cranes and undertook annual maintenance contracts for its clients scattered across India. In the face of the uncertainty posed by COVID-19, the owner was contemplating whether to stick with the company’s current strategy or to expand to take advantage of the benefits of growth in this industry. As the economy continued to improve, he believed that demand for these goods would rise. He was considering project expansion but was unsure whether this move would bring value to his company. Hence, he was investigating several project expansion proposals and associated expected cash flow projections to make an investment decision.

"AMB and ProLogis: A Momentous Proposition" provides a sequel to the story of AMB's experience in the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) that is outlined in case RE134: AMB Property Corporation: Navigating Treacherous Waters. It is now October 2010, the world economy is recovering from the GFC, and AMB Property Corporation (AMB) encounters an unusual opportunity. It has the chance to acquire ProLogis (PLD), AMB's top (and much larger) competitor. Ahead of the GFC, PLD had borrowed heavily to fund risky speculative development; now, post-GFC, the consequences of PLD's hunger for return persist, and the company is no longer the darling it once was among REIT investors. PLD's ailing stock price has created a possibility that the top two industrial REITs could merge (together ""NewCo"") to become the world's largest industrial REIT. NewCo would control over $44 billion of assets, boast a global footprint of nearly 600 million square feet of real estate, and own a significant presence across the world's prime logistics corridors. Hamid Moghadam, AMB's co-founder and Chief Executive Officer, sees significant benefits from a merger. He believes savings in corporate G&A, coupled with lowered financing costs, can exceed $100 million per year, and anticipates the deal to generate further synergies by deepening NewCo's customer relationships and providing a valuation boost for PLD's fund management business. However, Moghadam also recognizes the complexities to executing a successful deal. AMB would need to absorb PLD's lower credit rating, higher debt load (which came with a higher interest rate), and assets in lower quality markets that AMB had long avoided. Moghadam also knows that the starkly different cultures at AMB and PLD would make the integration process challenging, while also complicating the negotiation of deal parameters-especially whether to pursue a ""merger of equals"" or a traditional acquisition. Moghadam knows that AMB needs to pursue an opportunity with

It was September 2022, and, despite a long day at the office, Stephen Price had a lot to consider. He had just finished a meeting with the development and sales team at Graywood Developments (Graywood), during which they had discussed one of the latest developments in Graywood’s pipeline—the Centricity project. With a zoning bylaw amendment (ZBA) in hand, kicking off sales for the project was the next step in the process. However, with a looming recession and an anticipated cooling of the real estate market, Price had to decide whether to proceed with a sales launch in the first quarter of 2023, or shelve the launch until market conditions improved. Graywood could ultimately launch sales in January 2023 in the hope of achieving an average selling price of CA$1,650 per square foot, or it could delay the launch until January 2024 and hopefully sell at $1,700 per square foot or higher—though there was no guarantee that the market would improve. He wondered what impact his decision would have on Graywood’s plans to launch its tenth real estate fund in 2023. This case includes a complex merchant developer Microsoft Excel model, whereby students can adjust inputs and observe how key metrics change.

Student Spreadsheet to accompany product W34120.

Instructor Spreadsheet to accompany product W34121.

In May 2022, Rohan Jain, the second-generation entrepreneur of an Indian family-managed carpet design firm, TexCarp Consulting, had to decide whether to enter a new vertical with one of their biggest clients, American Carpets. The opportunity involved using technology and personnel to carry out virtual reality rendering for American Carpets so that the US-based company could showcase its products to clients in virtual space. Jain tried to convince his father to invest. But the technology involved high costs, and Jains’s father was opposed to the idea, since it would involve tying capital to fixed costs. But Jain could also convert the fixed costs into variable costs by either hiring technology or outsourcing the project. Should Jain go ahead with the VR rendering project? And if so, which of the three options should he select: buy, hire, or outsource the required technology and personnel?

Spreadsheet to accompany product W34204.

Lisa Jackson, vice president of Environment, Policy and Social Initiatives at Apple Inc. (Apple) and, previously, the first African American administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, was preparing for questions that might arise in relation to Apple's upcoming 10-year $1 billion green bond issue, Apple's second such offering. The case explores the economics of bond pricing in general, and green bonds in particular, by describing the results of the first issue, focusing on possible reactions to the second issue, and surfacing concerns that arise in connection with green bond markets. The possible positive impact on the environment from green bond issues is contrasted to concerns about greenwashing and the stark reality that Apple's first green bond exhibited at best a very small reduction in yields relative to comparable conventional bonds (a very small so-called greenium). The case provides a basis for discussion of green bond markets and enough information to estimate a yield for the new bond. Case data allow a yield estimate based on the yield curve of Apple's outstanding issues, bonds of comparable firms, and Apple's bond rating. All comparable yields are provided so the case discussion can focus on the underlying drivers of yields: a baseline risk-free rate that can vary by time to maturity, an added risk premium, and adjustments based on other characteristics that might affect supply and demand. While not central to the case, sufficient information is provided to critically evaluate Apple's bond rating at the time and comment on Apple's growing use of debt financing. This case has been used successfully to generate a discussion of green bond markets in an elective course and as an introduction to bond pricing in a core finance class. It has also been used successfully in an Executive Education program to explore the advantages and disadvantages to a firm of employing green bonds in financing investments.

Spreadsheet Supplement for Case UV8644

In 2021, the investment bank Credit Suisse Group AG lost an estimated US$6.4 billion from exposure to two hedge fund implosions that occurred within a month. Archegos Capital Management lost US$4.7 billion and Greensill Capital lost US$1.7 billion. Various arrangements between Credit Suisse Group AG and Archegos Capital Management, as well as structural factors at Credit Suisse Group AG, may have contributed to the bank having a higher level of exposure to these collapses than its industry peers. Underlying these miscues were recent changes in leadership, strategy, and tone at Credit Suisse Group AG. All three of these changes appeared to have collectively impaired the skepticism and voice exercised by its risk management group. In July 2021, Credit Suisse Group AG replaced its chief risk officer in an attempt to reshuffle its risk and compliance leadership. The task of the new chief risk officer was to reshape Credit Suisse Group AG’s risk management framework and internal controls, from the top to the bottom.

When announcing their agreement to merge in December 2021, creating a clear leader in global pest control, UK-based Rentokil and Tennessee-based Terminix described extensive benefits of the cross-border combination. The companies touted the advantages of their combined scale, their complementary portfolios of products, regions and technologies, and the significant cost synergies. Yet, the markets seemed entirely unimpressed, with Rentokil's share price down 9% in the hours after the deal was announced. While the boards of both companies had recommended the merger, it would now be up to shareholders to decide. Was this deal a lifeline for long-suffering Terminix investors, who were increasingly apprehensive about the company's ability to improve performance? Was this the right moment for Rentokil to pursue such a large deal rather than continue with its historical approach of gradually consolidating the market? In short, would this proposed combination create value, and if so, for whom?

The stock market isn't always rational; often it's swayed by superstitions. A case in point is the bump the market gets when Punxsutawney Phil doesn't see his shadow.

Unhappiness is at a record high. According to Gallup, people feel more anger, sadness, worry and stress than ever before. And global misery was rising well before the pandemic hit. After studying the 20 per cent of people who reported having a great life, Gallup found they had five things in common, while the 20 per cent who rated their lives the worst had very little of any of these things. Business leaders who believe their organization has a purpose beyond making money, he argues, should put that purpose in writing and then start collecting data to help build the world's official statistics on that topic. This data will not only help the organization understand if it is achieving its purpose, it will help inform public sector leaders who badly need it to turn the tide on unhappiness.

With shocking turns of events such as the FTX fiasco, market participants need to be fully aware of the risks and opportunities that Blockchain-based trading presents. The author, who studies financial innovation for a living at the University of Toronto, presents what everyone should know about centralized and decentralized trading platforms. Defining everything from wallets to crypto-wash-trading and tax-loss harvesting, he argues that there are two possible futures: One is that some immensely popular non-financial applications emerge. The other is that, over time, most traditional financial assets - including fiat money and property registries - are either tokenized or directly re-issued as new vehicles on blockchains so that they can be listed, used and transferred without borders. For all of the issues he identifies, he maintains that blockchain-based trading holds enormous promise.

In this field-based case, the founders of udu, Inc. (udu-pronounced "you-do"), a company whose proprietary technology helped private equity clients source deals by identifying target companies and overlooked opportunities, and by shortening the business-development cycle. Clients who had found success with udu's help raved about the technology, but despite their product's promise, the founders were still struggling to find a scalable and profitable application for it, and to grow revenue for the company. The founders eventually sought funding in the amount of $5 million to boost udu's growth potential, but Jay Sarcone, a general partner at Brotherhood Park Ventures, had said udu wasn't ready for that amount because it would not result in a desirable company valuation, and made a far lower offer: $1.3 million in convertible note financing. All three founders agreed that $1.3 million fell far short of their hopes, and that udu would need another fundraising round in a year. But any money, at this point, would help udu progress. Should the founders accept Sarcone's offer, or risk alienating a trusted ally by seeking $5 million elsewhere? And if they did seek $5 million, would it result in a low valuation for udu?

Spreadsheet Supplement for Case UV8900.

In January 2021, the co-founder of Mystery Books Co. (Mystery Books) was evaluating the company’s 2020 performance under the leadership of his daughter as the new chief executive officer. His daughter had ambitions of securing Walmart Inc. as a key client, so the co-founder had promised her an additional performance bonus of 5 per cent of his 30 per cent ownership of common stock if she grew the company’s net income by 20 per cent over the previous year. Throughout his thirty years of managing the company as chief executive officer, the co-founder had maintained very conservative accounting policies, some of which had been modified under his daughter's management. After reviewing the 2020 financial information, the co-founder harboured several concerns: Should he have specified more conditions for his daughter's performance incentive? Would the accounting policy changes pass the scrutiny of the company’s external auditors? And how should he proceed with regard to the suspicious sales activity he noticed? With these questions at the front of his mind, the co-founder of Mystery Books thought that perhaps he should have somehow left more reporting guidance for the company prior to leaving.

After Wirecard AG (Wirecard) collapsed in 2020, the financial technology (fintech) company, revealed as an elaborate fraud, came to be known as Germany’s Enron as investigators confirmed many of the concerns that had been raised by whistle-blowers and journalists. For instance, they confirmed that the company was using round-tripping to inflate revenues and that escrow accounts in Southeast Asia did not exist. Auditors had raised concerns for years, but then signed off on the company’s financial statements. What were the responsibilities of regulators and auditors with regard to the company, and what red flags should they have paid attention to?