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In early 2021, PepsiCo Inc. (PepsiCo), one of the world’s largest food and beverage companies, was undergoing immense criticism for its role in global health issues including obesity, diabetes, heart disease, malnutrition, and cancer. As far back as 2010, executives at PepsiCo had recognized that “society, people, and lifestyles have changed” and that PepsiCo had no choice but to move in healthier directions. Although PepsiCo had made impressive strides in reducing the negative health impacts of some of its products, criticism persisted that it was not going far enough.

Seattle-based Dropbox Inc. (Dropbox) was a leading provider of cloud storage and online collaboration tools. The company had successfully grown a global user base by combining digital channels (user-driven viral growth) with investments in physical assets (offices and infrastructure) overseas. However, in 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic forced individuals and organizations worldwide to work remotely and created an unprecedented growth opportunity, the company found itself outflanked by more aggressive rivals. Dropbox needed to reassess its existing strategy and find a way forward.

In late 2020, Wendy’s was an iconic North American fast-food chain with a history of innovation. The corporation’s inventive approach to its promotions was particularly apparent in its use of social media, even more so in its unique management of the company’s Twitter account. In addition to using Twitter to provide customer support and advertise its products in an online setting – two traditional activities conducted by many a business on Twitter – Wendy’s had used the platform to regularly make fun of users and competitors, as well as respond to teasing and other playful challenges issued by Twitter users. Evaluating the company’s Twitter strategy proved difficult, however. How could Wendy’s chief executive officer determine whether the company’s approach on Twitter positively affected sales? How could he improve the company’s future social media strategy?

As a leading short-video social and livestreaming app in China, Kuaishou Technology’s Kuaishou application (app) was facing various challenges, including fierce competition from ByteDance Ltd.’s Douyin. In June 2018, to sustain its long-term growth, Kuaishou needed to evaluate the possibility of entering the livestreaming e-commerce market, as livestreaming was becoming one of the hottest ways to sell to Chinese consumers. The co-founder and chief executive officer of Kuaishou Technology needed to decide whether Kuaishou should launch a livestreaming e-commerce business. If so, should Kuaishou cooperate with an existing e-commerce platform or build its own e-commerce ecosystem? What potential challenges might Kuaishou face in its livestreaming e-commerce business expansion?

Following its official launch on April 6, 2020, Quibi, a mobile-only short-form video streaming platform that had raised over $1.7 billion had failed to gain the traction it was expecting and fell well short of its first-year growth projections. The company ultimately announced that it was shutting down after just six months in October 2020. Exactly where had Quibi gone wrong, and what lessons could investors learn from their failed investment in the company?

On July 29, 2020, Jeff Bezos, the founder and chief executive officer of Amazon.com Inc. (Amazon), testified before a United States House Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law that was investigating the company for engaging in anti-competitive practices. Although the company offered low prices and did not distort consumer welfare principles despite its large market size, the Committee questioned whether it had exploited its sellers on both Amazon Marketplace and the Amazon Web Services Marketplace. The company was accused of not only exploiting sellers but also using their sales data for developing its private-label brands. As committee members were looking to redefine monopolistic practices, it was also recommended that Amazon should be split to avoid anti-competitive practices. Was it time for Bezos to proactively split Amazon and avoid antitrust actions against his company owing to its market dominance? What could he do to manage antitrust issues against his company?

JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPMC), one of the world’s largest banks, was confronting the advent of open banking in its retail banking business. In late 2020, policy makers and regulators were advocating movement toward open banking with growing enthusiasm as a way to stimulate competition in the financial services sector and thus, encourage greater value creation for consumers. JPMC, however, seemed to embrace open banking while also resisting it, aggressively building out the technical infrastructure required for open banking while also blocking some third-party financial services companies from accessing customers’ Chase bank accounts, citing data security and privacy concerns. Open banking seemed fraught with risk, but might it represent new and significant opportunities for banks? In either case, what should the approach to open banking be for an established bank like JPMC?

In early 2021, an investor wanted to invest in Bitcoin. However, because of the high volatility of the currency, she wanted to know when to buy and sell Bitcoin to avoid the price fluctuations caused by various short-term phenomena. Her main objective was to generate the maximum profit possible based on the moving average strategy. How could she use this strategy to profit from Bitcoin’s price movement?

In late January 2021, Robinhood Markets Inc. (Robinhood), the California-based start-up that had upended the securities brokerage industry with its zero-commission trades, faced legal and market challenges. The US Securities and Exchange Commission had imposed a hefty fine on the company for its inadequate disclosure of payments to market brokers. In addition, a state regulator had filed an administrative complaint about the start-up's "gamification" of investing that had arguably led unwitting customers to lose money. A huge run-up in the stock of GameStop Corp. had put the spotlight on Robinhood and its business practices. On the competitive front, both traditional brokers such as Charles Schwab Corporation and Webull Financial LLC, a China-based start-up, were challenging Robinhood for the millennial investor customer base. Robinhood’s co-founder and chief executive officer, Vladimir Tenev, and his team needed to respond to these challenges so the company could file papers in March 2021 for a mid-2021 initial public offering.

In May 2018, US-based multinational retail giant Walmart Inc. (Walmart) took control of India’s biggest e-commerce platform Flipkart Internet Private Ltd. (Flipkart). Despite being the industry leader, Flipkart had been continuously losing market share to Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon) and was looking for support from a deep-pocketed investor. This created an opportunity for Walmart to enter the Indian e-commerce industry, bypassing regulations governing foreign direct investments. However, the unprecedented growth of Amazon, new foreign direct investment rules in India, Reliance Industries Ltd.’s entry into e-commerce, and challenges due to COVID-19 all created unexpected turbulence for the new partners. How would the Walmart–Flipkart duo overcome these challenges? Would Walmart divest its investment in Flipkart and end its aspirations to become one of the largest e-commerce companies in India? Or would the duo overcome these challenges together and emerge as winners?

A 2010 global event had far-reaching effects on the Indian energy sector, when a change in Indonesian law affected the commercial viability of power plants in India that were based on imported Indonesian coal. There were serious implications for private participation in the electricity sector, which was slowly moving toward liberalization and privatization. The issue was convoluted and became all the more serious when, in 2017, a compensatory tariff allowed by regulatory bodies to provide relief for the increased coal prices was disallowed by the Supreme Court of India within the contractual framework.

Royal Enfield, the motorcycle division of Eicher Motors Limited, saw its unit sales increase a multiple of 16 times from 2008 to 2018. By 2019, the company controlled 96 per cent of the 250–750 cc motorcycle market segment in India. However, sales growth slowed considerably in financial year 2018–19, when the first three quarters seemed to indicate continuing slow growth for the company. Year-to-date sales for the first nine months dropped 15 per cent compared to the same period the year before. Two major new competitors were having a considerable impact of Royal Enfield’s ability to retain market dominance: Mahindra & Mahindra’s successful Jawa motorcycle line and US motorcycle giant Harley-Davidson, which was contemplating extending its portfolio in India into the 250–750 cc motorcycle segment. Having reached the pinnacle of the market, Royal Enfield was eager to retain its position in the 250–750 cc motorcycle segment. What strategic choices and growth options did it have to maintain market dominance, and what competitive advantage was its most viable growth option?

In May 2020, Usha Martin Limited (Usha Martin), a diversified engineering group based in India, was debating strategies for continued future growth. In April 2019, the company had divested its steelmaking and related operations to reduce its debt load. Though the divestment meant a large decline in the company’s sales for the year ended March 2020, the company managed to reverse the trend of losses incurred in several recent quarters and years to earn positive profits. However, attaining future growth remained a challenge for the smaller, focused company, especially given the economic disruption caused by the COVID-19 crisis. It was critical that Usha Martin’s management made the correct strategic choices so that the company could achieve good, long-term, profitable growth.

On May 12, 2020, Vedanta Resources Limited, representing the London, United Kingdom company Vedanta Group, expressed its intention to buy all public shares of its Indian subsidiary Vedanta Limited and to delist it from all stock exchanges in India and New York. The chair of Vedanta Group explained that the decision to delist was largely driven by a strategy to simplify the group structure. The indicative offer price of ₹87.5 per equity share represented a premium of 9.9 per cent over the closing market price of ₹79.6 on the previous day. However, there was some doubt that minority shareholders would find the offer attractive. The final exit price, which would be determined through the reverse book-building process, was likely to increase. Exactly what amount Vedanta Resources Limited was willing to pay was a key factor in the quest for a successful delisting. Two other important considerations were the additional amount of borrowing required and future debt servicing constraints.

Innovative US apparel retailer Everlane Inc. (Everlane) employed "radical transparency," disclosing detailed information about the costs it incurred and the factories that manufactured its clothes. The company also claimed to prioritize ethics and sustainability. For example, Everlane committed both to supporting its suppliers by addressing their needs and to eliminating virgin plastics from its entire supply chain by 2021. The company's approach had been successful: since its founding in 2010, Everlane had seen growth in its customer base and revenues. However, in 2020, the company faced a public relations crisis, encountering backlash after laying off a number of employees. While these layoffs were purportedly due to the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, they coincided with employees’ unionization efforts. In addition, many former employees reported that the company was not, in fact, ethical but was anti-Black and anti-union and had a toxic internal culture. As the company had built its business on its image and its promise of ethics, transparency, and sustainability, the crisis called into question the foundation of the organization. How could Everlane move forward according to its stated values and continue to both meet the needs of its customers and to earn a profit?

In 2016, Reliance Jio Infocomm (R-Jio) was a late entrant in India’s overcrowded but growing telecommunications (telecom) market. By 2019–20, the wholly owned subsidiary of Reliance Industries Limited (RIL) was India’s number-one telecom company in terms of both profits and market capitalization. The industry’s incumbents were expected to retaliate against the new entrant; however, they could not compete against R-Jio’s heavily discounted offerings. Within six months, R-Jio had achieved its goal of attracting a subscriber base of 100 million. Although R-Jio intended to remain a leading player in India’s digital future, could it sustain its run of success? Would R-Jio be able to leverage its present and future investments and manage risk sufficiently to achieve its optimistic objectives? India’s telecom industry faced a dynamically changing and technology-driven future. How could R-Jio ensure it continued to play a leading role in India’s telecom industry?

In October 2020, Google LLC (Google) found itself involved in a controversy with both the Indian government and the country’s developers of mobile applications (apps). Google announced that it would be enforcing its global policy that required app developers to pay a 30 per cent commission on all in-app purchases of digital goods bought on Google Play, the company’s digital distribution platform for app purchases. Google’s announcement drew particular opposition in India. With 500 million smartphone users in India, of which 95.85 per cent operated on Google’s Android operating system, the app market was heavily skewed in favour of Google. In its goal to dominate the Indian app market, Google had to resolve several key issues. What advantages to users and developers could the company emphasize to justify imposing what India’s start-ups and app developers were calling a Google tax? Could a new competitor, such as the proposed platform from India’s government or from the technology start-ups, replicate those same advantages? How should Google respond to the complaints against the policy and the threats of antitrust action against the company?

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Jeff Bezos, the chief executive officer of Amazon.com Inc. (Amazon), became the world’s richest person by adding US$6 billion to his net worth by the end of March 2020. While the worth of other billionaires was decreasing because of the unprecedented market volatility created by the pandemic, retail sales surged to a record level for Amazon. To meet the additional workforce requirements created by the sudden rise in demand, Bezos announced a new hiring drive for Amazon’s warehouses and delivery network. The announcement came when Amazon’s labour practices were under the scrutiny of New York State and New York City authorities for the disputed “wrongful termination” of a warehouse worker. Amazon’s conduct was vehemently condemned by labour unions, labour supporters, the media, and New York City authorities. At the same time, Amazon employees expressed their concerns about the hiring of additional workers, as more workers could further aggravate the workplace safety issues at the company’s warehouses. Bezos vehemently claimed to be committed to workers’ health and safety and announced new paid sick leave and hazard benefits policies for workers who were not working from home. Was the authorities’ scrutiny of Smalls’ termination and the workplace safety measures at Amazon’s facilities a signal of legal battles looming for Amazon? Was Bezos protecting the wellness of his employees? Did the new policies and safety measures point toward a change in Bezos’s crisis management strategy? How could Amazon move from a greed/profit perspective to a profit with purpose perspective? How should Amazon manage in an almost permanent crisis-like situation?

The Vancouver Coastal Health Authority (VCHA), with guidance from the British Colombia (BC) Provincial Health Services Authority, had been responsible for organizing and executing an effective COVID-19 response. Its approach for testing capacity and supply chain management had been influenced by several factors: lack of supply, lack of labour, lack of testing expertise, and provincial government mandates. Although these factors had constrained the VCHA’s ability to control the virus, BC’s projected case increases posed serious concerns within the current management. The head of the VCHA wondered how she could better position the VCHA to combat COVID-19 in the long term while securing enough supplies. As she was concerned that COVID-19 cases would continue to surge, she knew this strategy had to be effective and time-sensitive.

The chief executive officer and co-founder of DoorDash was facing various challenges. Based in San Francisco, California, DoorDash was the market leader in the US food delivery services industry. In December 2020, despite ongoing losses, the start-up launched the largest initial public offering of the year in the United States. Market observers believed that intense competition in the US food delivery services industry and DoorDash’s questionable business model fundamentals would make profitability difficult to achieve. Restaurants were raising objections to food delivery platforms, seeing profits shrink due to commissions paid to the platforms. Consumers were paying at least 40 per cent more on orders made through an online delivery platform compared to self-pickup. However, during the COVID-19 pandemic, consumer demand for food delivery services increased and DoorDash reported a profit for the second quarter of 2020. DoorDash was expanding rapidly, after several rounds of funding. Could the co-founder prove critics wrong about the business fundamentals of his food delivery platform? How could he create a sustainable profit for DoorDash?