個案總覽

Describes the actions taken by HP's CEO Mark Hurd in his first two years leading the company.

Acumen Fund was founded in 2001 to provide modest amounts of capital, together with business expertise, to help build thriving enterprises that would serve large numbers of poor people. In 2004, Acumen Fund invested in the Series B round of WaterHealth International (WHI), a company that was developing approaches for providing clean water to the poor worldwide. In 2006, WHI planned to launch a major initiative in India. It also planned a new round of fundraising to support the company's continued growth. Provides background information on venture philanthropy, and on Acumen Fund. Also describes the problems associated with safe drinking water in developing countries, and WHI's approach to addressing those problems.

A brief exercise to reinforce elements of manufacturing accounting and depreciation.

The founders of Lynx Solutions have survived tensions within the founding team, the firing of Lynx's founder-CEO, and a crisis sparked by media allegations that it had been spying on its users. Now the founders are considering a proposal from one of their directors to make a dramatic shift in the venture's strategy and have to decide how to react.

Lone Star Power was a midsize power-generation and power-distribution company. The company's new chief investment officer must evaluate a number of financial-reporting issues raised by an outside analyst. Those issues relate to (1) revenue recognition, (2) consistency of accounting policies, (3) expense timing, (4) classification of reported line items, (5) supplemental interpretive guidance from management, and (6) interim voluntary disclosures. Using a very simple setting, the case blends issues of financial transparency, financial accounting, SEC reporting requirements, and Reg. FD disclosures.

Incoming and outgoing foreign direct investment in an environment of politics, geography, globalization, and history. Since the end of apartheid, South Africa had undertaken substantial economic reforms in order to attract more foreign direct investment, but it was slow in coming. At the same time, South African firms had become major players in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond. Collectively, these investment decisions could have a major long-run impact on South Africa's economic growth and political stability. South African policymakers needed to decide what they wanted from the private sector, and how to achieve it.

Describes how the "Moonshine Shop," a group of plant-savvy creative generalists, is helping a great industrial company become more innovative. Chronicles the history of the Moonshine Shop, its successes and failures, and describes innovations they've helped put in place. The group routinely creates savings equal to multiples of their own budge through front-lines process innovation and support of staff on-the-floor.

The founding entrepreneur of Honey Care Africa (Honey Care) revitalized Kenya's national honey industry by focusing on small-holder farmers across the country. Central to the success was an innovative business model: a synergistic partnership between the development sector, the private sector, and rural communities that drew on the core competencies of each party as well as their complementary roles. This tripartite model was combined with local manufacturing of beehives, effective beekeeping training and community-based extension service provision, and the provision of a guaranteed market to small-holder farmers through forward contracts as well as prompt payments. Four years later, Honey Care has achieved 68% market share in Kenya, distributes several brands of organic, fair-trade honey internationally, and is a lead distributor of beeswax. The business model has been successfully replicated in neighboring Tanzania, with expansion plans to Uganda and Sudan.

Two managers attending a week-long executive education course are working on an assignment which requires them to estimate the cost of capital for EnCana Corporation, a leading North American oil and gas producer. The two managers disagree about which costs need to be taken into account to complete the assignment. They are not sure about the costs of different sources of capital, the overall cost of capital and the appropriate use of the hurdle rate.

Galvatrens, a consumer products company in Houston, has a whistle-blower's lawsuit on its hands. Mike Fields, a former divisional sales manager, claims that he was wrongfully terminated for trying to report an illegal scheme designed by a colleague to inflate numbers. He'd left the company's COO a confidential voice mail about it, but the COO referred the matter to Mike's boss rather than following up on it himself. Mike says his boss subsequently told him his performance wasn't up to snuff and he'd have to accept a demotion and a transfer if he wanted to stay with the company--knowing that Mike, a divorced father with joint custody of his kids, couldn't leave town. How could all of this have happened? Chip Brownlee, the CEO of Galvatrens, had taken steps a while back to upgrade the company's procedures for uncovering misconduct and solving conflicts. He and the general counsel had instituted a number of changes, including a new open-door policy for raising workplace concerns. Although the policy encouraged employees to go to their immediate supervisors, it emphasized that they could approach any manager at any level for assistance, and it included a ban on retaliation against whistle-blowers. Chip and the board need to figure out why, with all those channels in place, only one person came forward with information about the sales scheme--and why that person ended up suing the company. How should Galvatrens strengthen its system for uncovering misconduct, and what roles should the board and management play? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0704A and R0704Z are Stephen R. Hardis, the nonexecutive chairman of Marsh & McLennan; Hal Shear, the managing director of Board Assets; Mary Rowe, an ombudsperson for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Jackson W. Robinson, the founder and president of Winslow Management.

Galvatrens, a consumer products company in Houston, has a whistle-blower's lawsuit on its hands. Mike Fields, a former divisional sales manager, claims that he was wrongfully terminated for trying to report an illegal scheme designed by a colleague to inflate numbers. He'd left the company's COO a confidential voice mail about it, but the COO referred the matter to Mike's boss rather than following up on it himself. Mike says his boss subsequently told him his performance wasn't up to snuff and he'd have to accept a demotion and a transfer if he wanted to stay with the company--knowing that Mike, a divorced father with joint custody of his kids, couldn't leave town. How could all of this have happened? Chip Brownlee, the CEO of Galvatrens, had taken steps a while back to upgrade the company's procedures for uncovering misconduct and solving conflicts. He and the general counsel had instituted a number of changes, including a new open-door policy for raising workplace concerns. Although the policy encouraged employees to go to their immediate supervisors, it emphasized that they could approach any manager at any level for assistance, and it included a ban on retaliation against whistle-blowers. Chip and the board need to figure out why, with all those channels in place, only one person came forward with information about the sales scheme--and why that person ended up suing the company. How should Galvatrens strengthen its system for uncovering misconduct, and what roles should the board and management play?

Galvatrens, a consumer products company in Houston, has a whistle-blower's lawsuit on its hands. Mike Fields, a former divisional sales manager, claims that he was wrongfully terminated for trying to report an illegal scheme designed by a colleague to inflate numbers. He'd left the company's COO a confidential voice mail about it, but the COO referred the matter to Mike's boss rather than following up on it himself. Mike says his boss subsequently told him his performance wasn't up to snuff and he'd have to accept a demotion and a transfer if he wanted to stay with the company--knowing that Mike, a divorced father with joint custody of his kids, couldn't leave town. How could all of this have happened? Chip Brownlee, the CEO of Galvatrens, had taken steps a while back to upgrade the company's procedures for uncovering misconduct and solving conflicts. He and the general counsel had instituted a number of changes, including a new open-door policy for raising workplace concerns. Although the policy encouraged employees to go to their immediate supervisors, it emphasized that they could approach any manager at any level for assistance, and it included a ban on retaliation against whistle-blowers. Chip and the board need to figure out why, with all those channels in place, only one person came forward with information about the sales scheme--and why that person ended up suing the company. How should Galvatrens strengthen its system for uncovering misconduct, and what roles should the board and management play? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0704A and R0704Z are Stephen R. Hardis, the nonexecutive chairman of Marsh & McLennan; Hal Shear, the managing director of Board Assets; Mary Rowe, an ombudsperson for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Jackson W. Robinson, the founder and president of Winslow Management.

Health insurer IFA and grocery chain ShopSense have formed an intriguing partnership, but it threatens to test customers' tolerance for sharing personal information. For years, IFA's regional manager for West Coast operations, Laura Brickman, had been championing the use of customer analytics--drawing conclusions about consumer behaviors based on patterns found in collected data. She came away from a meeting with the grocer's analytics chief, Steve Worthington, convinced that ShopSense's customer loyalty card data could be meaningful. In a pilot test, Laura bought ten years' worth of data from the grocer and found some compelling correlations between purchases of unhealthy products and medical claims. Now she has to sell her company's senior team on buying more information. Her bosses have some concerns, however. If IFA came up with proprietary health findings, would the company have to share what it learned? Meanwhile, Steve is busy trying to work out details of the sale with executives at ShopSense. Many have expressed support, but COO Alan Atkins isn't so sure: If customers found out that the store was selling their data, they might stop using their cards, and the company would lose access to vital information. Though CEO Donna Greer agrees, she knows that if things go well, it could mean easy money. How can the two companies use the customer data responsibly? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0705A and R0705Z are George L. Jones, the CEO of Borders Group; Katherine N. Lemon, an associate professor of marketing at Boston College; David Norton, the senior vice president of relationship marketing for Harrah's Entertainment; and Michael B. McCallister, the president and CEO of Humana.

The Sulzberger family owns 20% of the New York Times Co. (NYT) but controls 70% of the board through a dual-class share structure. At the company's April 2006 annual shareholder meeting, Morgan Stanley Investment Management (MSIM) and other investors, holding 28% of the company's stock altogether, withheld their votes for the 30% of directors that they could vote on as a sign of protest against the management of Arthur Sulzberger, Jr. and the dual-class structure that protects him. MSIM later submitted a proposal urging the NYT to subject the dual-class structure to a vote. In evaluating the proposal, Sulzberger feels torn by his responsibilities to three different constituencies: his readers, his family, and all other NYT shareholders.     

Describes a series of three vignettes confronted by a fast-growing extended warranty services company, Extended Service Plans of America (ESPA). Doug Tudor had become the company's president after completing its acquisition for Asurion Corporation in June 2006, after a two-year search and negotiation process. Ninety-four days later, three situations occur simultaneously: one of Tudor's two top managers improperly leaks confidential information to the company's former owners; a terminated employee threatens to badmouth the company to its highest-profile customer; and new information regarding a VP's drinking and performance problems seems to call for urgent action. Allows students to understand how to deal with typical issues faced by small companies, including the dynamics of family-owned businesses, barriers faced when trying to professionalize management, and challenges faced by a new manager trying to build credibility in such an environment.

Deals with approaches to alleviating poverty and how firms, governments, and NGOs are able to work together to accomplish these goals.

Faurecia is a world-class player in the automotive components sector, active in four main areas: automotive seating, vehicle interiors, exhaust systems and front-end module. With some 60,000 employees, 160 industrial sites and presence on four continents, Faurecia, is the third largest car seat supplier worldwide and among the twenty largest suppliers to the automotive industry. The ESMT case study focuses on the passenger car seating business unit (its largest in terms of revenues), analyzing the evolution of the supply chain for car seats, its market demand, the evolving business model imposed by carmakers and the impact it has on sourcing and manufacturing. The central issue of the case is how Faurecia should organize its new product development process in order to increase its performance and involve its customers and its suppliers earlier in the process. The case provides an opportunity to discuss how a large multinational company can leverage a changing market demand by tuning its business model and adapting its product offering while staying abreast of competition with increasingly innovative solutions.

Why do so many corporate initiatives, such as mergers and acquisitions, downsizings, or re-engineerings, look good on paper and turn out so poorly? This case offers the beginnings of one example of a corporate initiative: General Mills' acquisition of the Pillsbury subsidiary from Diageo PLC. Although General Mills financial advisors seemed to think that the balance sheets and products of the two corporations complemented each other and made a perfect match, the organizations were very different. Any shift in corporate control meant things were going to change. Kevin Wilde, the vice president and chief learning officer for General Mills, was part of the transition team responsible for helping the postacquisition integration go smoothly. The B case identifies several issues relevant to managing the integration and includes human resource and organizational information, marketing initiatives, strategy statements, plant closings, and operational changes. Together these cases were meant to motivate students with regard to the importance of understanding human systems and developing people management skills. As an introductory case to Leadership and Organizational Behavior courses, these cases encourage students to think about the skills required of them to be effective in human systems.

With Method standing at number seven on Inc. magazine's list of the 500 fastest-growing companies in 2006, cofounder Adam Lowry is searching for a biodegradable cleaning cloth to expand Method's line of "green" household products. Sustainable design principles have been a guiding force in Method's strategy, and being biofriendly is critical. So is sourcing in the United States. But only China can manufacture the corn-based cloth Lowry has in mind, and there is no way to certify that the product is free of genetically modified organisms. Lowry has to balance his firm's fundamental commitment to environmental sustainability against the fact that some retailers refuse to carry products containing GMOs.

Will Harvey hopped onto his road bike and began pedaling up Old La Honda Road, the famously steep and windy street in Portola Valley, California. As the climb became more arduous, Harvey, the co-founder and CEO of IMVU, a company that developed 3D avatar-based instant messaging, began thinking through the three term sheets that were lying on his desk at the office. He and co-founder Eric Ries had to make a decision within a week about who to partner with on IMVU's current round of financing. Harvey and Ries had adopted an unconventional approach to growth for their startup. While the typical early-stage technology company delayed entering the market until its product had been perfected, IMVU sold its chat service to customers right away, even when it was incomplete, bug-ridden, and carried a beta label. The IMVU development team then made continual modifications to the application based on consumer feedback captured through emails, surveys, and online chat forums. Within eight months of launching the beta product, Harvey and Ries believed that they clearly understood many of the features desired by their "earlyvangelists." IMVU's strategy produced rapid enough revenue growth (on a small scale) to attract offers from several Sand Hill Road venture capital firms, as well as a large strategic acquirer. However, each potential partner had a different perspective on how to ramp the company going forward. Harvey and Ries weighed whether they should continue adhering to the methodology that enabled them to get IMVU off the ground or to shift gears in pursuit of a more aggressive expansion. That decision was the first step in choosing the source of capital best aligned with the company's strategy and goals.