Mauboussin is a French jewelry brand founded in 1827 in Paris. In the 1920's, the company earned a huge notoriety for capturing the aesthetic and emotional dimension of the Art Deco movement in its design and gained a world-wide reputation for innovation and expertise in the realm of colored stones. Known as the designer for royalty and Hollywood stars, Mauboussin was a legendary jeweler but became complacent and lost its clients. Taken over in 2001 by a new leadership team, Mauboussin engaged in a radically different strategy and abandoned its ultra-prestigious and exclusive positioning to embrace a more accessible and affordable approach. The brand experienced several years of phenomenal commercial success in France, Europe and Japan and in 2008, Mauboussin entered the US market, where the brand did not meet the expected success. It eventually closed its flagship store in NYC in 2014. Mauboussin's leadership is nonetheless eager to learn from this experience to re-launch successfully in the US.

The case offers a great opportunity to engage in discussion about major theoretical issues, such as the debate about the benefits of effective governance for the competitiveness of firms vis-à-vis the negative effects of excessive regulation. At the practical level, the case opens a window on the efforts of progressive enterprises in adopting behaviors, and building and establishing processes conducive to their competitiveness. The case provides a platform for considering the strengthening of business competitiveness. It encourages reflection about competitiveness whatever the nature of the organization. The lessons drawn from this case, thus, could appeal to any company because they highlight the challenges and opportunities that the search for competitiveness brings.

GreenWood Resources Inc. was founded in 1998 by Jeff Nuss, a bio-resources engineer. It was a Portland, Oregon, USA-based investment and asset management company with a worldwide focus on high-yield and fast-growing tree farms. In spite of its global vision, value proposition and pursuit of environmental stewardship and social responsibility, GreenWood had struggled for almost 10 years to obtain significant investment funds until 2007-2008. Through persistent effort, GreenWood built the key elements (people, resources and business networks) for a successful venture despite the serious early financial constraints. GreenWood entered and navigated the Chinese market, deciding to establish its China operation with only a fraction of the funds it needed. Jeff seized an opportunity to organize a US$175 million private equity fund through his connections with the timber investment community to acquire a large poplar plantation in Oregon. The expanded scale and personnel resulting from the acquisition enabled GreenWood to become a visible player in the tree plantation industry and facilitated its securing an additional commitment of US$200 million of capital for use in the Chinese market. Notwithstanding the availability of the capital and its cumulative knowledge of the Chinese market, the investment screening and negotiation process in China turned out to be complex due to the differences in business approaches and culturally embedded mindsets. In June 2010, Jeff and his team were weighing the pros and cons of two potential projects. They felt that GreenWood needed to proceed carefully to ensure its criteria of sustainable business (in terms of economic performance, social responsibility and environmental stewardship) were met in China but also realized the company should show some progress to its major investor in China, Oriental Timber Fund Limited. Jeff and his senior management team needed to decide whether they should recommend investing in one of the two projects.

A real estate company in a highly competitive market in Pakistan was the recent victim of employee theft. A fraudulent bank transaction had occurred, which risked the firm’s smooth functioning and future operations, as well as customer confidence. The company had suspicions about an employee who might have been involved in the theft, but the CEO was facing the dilemma of whether to fire him or not. The employee was the only one who could operate the company’s complex financial software. If the CEO decided to replace the employee based on his suspicion, he would be facing major replacement and training costs, and also causing a delay in the company’s upcoming mega project. However, if he did not fire him, it would mean that the company was tolerant of such acts, which could lead to future corruption.

A real estate company in a highly competitive market in Pakistan was the recent victim of employee theft. A fraudulent bank transaction had occurred, which risked the firm's smooth functioning and future operations, as well as customer confidence. The company had suspicions about an employee who might have been involved in the theft, but the CEO was facing the dilemma of whether to fire him or not. The employee was the only one who could operate the company's complex financial software. If the CEO decided to replace the employee based on his suspicion, he would be facing major replacement and training costs, and also causing a delay in the company's upcoming mega project. However, if he did not fire him, it would mean that the company was tolerant of such acts, which could lead to future corruption.

In 1998, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and US manufacturers of heavy-duty diesel engines signed a consent decree which included among other things, pulling forward ("pull ahead") by 15 months a new nitrogen oxide (NOx) emission standard. By early 2002, Caterpillar and Detroit Diesel were requesting EPA to delay the "pull ahead". Cummins was being pressured by its competitors to join in this request. On the other side, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and several environmental organizations wanted Cummins to adhere to the requirements of the consent decree. Cummins was navigating through a very difficult economic time and could not afford to make a mistake. Joe Loughrey, Cummins Engine Business President and his team needed to make a strategic decision. Would they a) agree with the competitors' position asking EPA to delay the consent decree which required the company to pull ahead an expensive environment requirement, thus allowing manufacturers to continue using the established engine technology that had customer support, or b) accept the terms of the consent decree and continue to develop a new engine technology against the wishes of many in the industry and thus face possible market retraction. Both strategic decision options had substantial consequences and needed to be carefully evaluated. Not only was the future of Cummins Engine Business in jeopardy, but as we learn later, this decision impacted the future of the whole industry.

Flying J was a family-owned company that operated travel plazas, oil refineries, a bank for trucking companies, and other related businesses. In early 2009, Crystal Call Maggelet, the majority shareholder and new CEO of Flying J, was tasked with saving the company founded by her father in 1968. In the intervening forty years Flying J had grown from four gas stations to a vertically integrated $18 billion company. Declining crude oil prices, decreased cash reserves, and multiple internal challenges forced most Flying J subsidiaries to file for bankruptcy protection. This came as a surprise to the company's lenders, suppliers, customers, and employees, who did not know the company was in trouble until it was unable to meet payroll just days before Christmas 2008. Maggelet was determined not only to return her family's company to profitability but also to repay all of Flying J's debts, retain as many of the firm's 12,000 employees as possible, and avoid compromising employees' savings (e.g., 401K retirement accounts). All of the company's advisors told her it could not be done. They thought a more likely outcome would be paying creditors nine cents on every dollar owed. If that happened, Maggelet's family's holdings would be almost entirely wiped out according to the "priority of claims" rules in bankruptcy, and the family would end up with only 1.2 percent of a restructured Flying J. However, to the surprise of its advisors and creditors, Flying J paid its debts in full, mostly by cutting operating costs before selling assets. The family was left with a smaller, but still very profitable company.

This document contains updated information on the case study published in 2009 under the title of "Gas Natural BAN´s Strategy for Low-Income Sectors" from data collected during the last quarter of 2013. Upon case discussion closing, this document may prove relevant to familiarize students with the initiative and the relationship between Gas Natural BAN (currently Gas Natural Fenosa or GNF, for its Spanish acronym) and Fundación ProVivienda Social (Foundation for Social Housing, henceforth FPVS, for its Spanish acronym) during the period 2007-2013.

The sustainable investing market was a recent phenomenon in the first decade of the 21st century. However, an increasing number of investors began to integrated Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) issues in investment decisions. At Barclays Capital, Omar Selim had spearheaded the development of Arabesque-a new socially responsible investment firm designed to appeal to all investors wishing to invest according to broadly held environmental and social values, such as limiting environmental externalities and promoting workforce diversity, as well as to investors wishing to align their investments with their faith. Should Selim give up a very successful career to compete in a highly competitive business, in which it could be very hard to build a differentiated offering? Could Arabesque be something different in the world of asset management? And what role, if any, should values and religious faith play in shaping the firm's products and conduct?

In early 2009, the Obama administration and the Democratically-led Congress began working on what would eventually become the Affordable Care Act. The (A) case in this series discusses the legislative strategy in the House of Representatives, where three different committees each had jurisdiction over health care legislation.

"Set in 2014, this case follows John Danner and his team at Zeal as they consider their product development strategy. In February 2013, serial entrepreneurs John Danner and Sanjay Noronha co-found Zeal, an education technology start up providing a web-based, mobile learning platform that helps students from Kindergarten to 8th grade build math and literacy skills based on Common Core State Standards through personalized learning plans. Having been a teacher and founder of a successful network of charter schools, Danner believes learning does not have to be limited to the classroom and wants to create a product that can connect students, parents, and teachers to facilitate individual student learning. Furthermore, he believes that offering a social, personalized learning tool can offer a fun way for students to learn and can also save time for teachers who want to provide differentiated instruction. Based out of the offices of the NewSchools Venture Fund in Palo Alto, Danner and Noronha work to rapidly develop the product with their founding team and their teacher partners at Rocketship Education, a K-5 charter school organization providing blended instruction combining technology and traditional methods. After several iterations, the Zeal team launches the latest version of Zeal in Fall 2014. While reflecting on their process to find product-market fit, Danner and his team wonder where to pivot next and seek an appropriate business model that considers their customer and user base. The case describes the student, parent, and teacher features offered by the evolving Zeal product, and how the team begins with a focus on personalized, peer-to-peer learning and, based on feedback, refines the product to add in-class features and create a teacher product. Students will have the opportunity to explore how an early SaaS start-up in the educational technology space can approach early product development, pilot in classrooms, and connect with different stakeholders."

Set in Fall 2014, the traditional textbook publishing industry is being transformed by technological innovations and new student achievement standards. This case chronicles how Rob Waldron, CEO, and his team bring Curriculum Associates (CA), a traditional supplemental publishing company, up to date amidst the changing publishing landscape. Founded in 1969, CA established a reputation as a pioneering workbook company specializing in helping teachers deliver targeted intervention for students in the classroom. As Waldron stepped into his role as CEO in 2008, he set about leveraging CA's existing educational expertise and relationships with school districts to take it from a traditional supplemental publishing company to a competitive player in the educational technology space. Waldron and the CA team-through innovations in curricular design, investments in technology, and a rigorous understanding of the Common Core State Standards-landed on a hit modular digital assessment and print-based workbook series called Ready®, Ready® Common Core, and i-Ready® Diagnostic and Instruction. In 2014, as sales are booming, Waldron and his team wonder how CA can stay competitive in the rapidly evolving publishing and education technology landscape while growing sustainably and building on its existing competitive advantage. The case gives students the opportunity to explore how a small or medium-sized privately-owned company can leverage its strengths and innovate while grappling with the challenges of providing software-as-a-service in the education sector, a leap for a company used to selling directly to schools and school districts.

This case discusses the situation of Chateau Pontet-Canet in early 2000. Alfred Tesseron was the director and son of the owner of Chateau Pontet-Canet, a red wine producing estate in Pauillac (Bordeaux, France) and member of the fifth class of the ancient grand cru classification of the Medoc of 1855. International competition was mounting and revenues were declining even though Chateau Pontet-Canet delivered higher quality than equally classed peers. Moreover, despite receiving praise for its recent quality efforts, the chateau received criticism from the world's leading critic for being old-fashioned. Alfred Tesseron wondered whether he produced the right level of quality, whether he should follow his young winemaker's unconventional ideas for the work in the vineyard, whether he should modernize Pontet-Canet's style, and whether the institutions of Bordeaux were helping Pontet-Canet or holding it back. Consequently, Alfred Tesseron wondered how to best align his choices along these dimensions and secure Pontet-Canet's prosperity in the new millennium.

By 2017, higher education is expected to be a $2 trillion industry worldwide. Within this huge economic engine, the boards of trustees that provide governance to universities and colleges face a complex challenge in that they must serve a variety of stakeholders. Without effective governance, an academic institution's performance is likely to suffer. Penn State University is plagued by an ineffective board of trustees. As a complement to past work that has documented this board's unwise and costly decisions, we examine how five design issues--board size, board composition, fiduciary responsibility, term limits, and transparency--helped create a culture in which poor choices were more likely to occur. We discuss why the board's recent self-imposed reforms are inadequate. We then offer more substantive reforms that could fix the Penn State board's flaws. In particular, we recommend that academic boards should be (1) small enough to allow full participation of all members, (2) composed such that no one stakeholder group can dominate decision making, (3) designed to eliminate actual and perceived conflicts of interest, (4) governed by term limits, and (5) appropriately transparent in their strategic decision making and communications. We leverage these principles to propose a reduction of the Penn State board from 30 voting members to 19. More broadly, other academic boards might benefit from undergoing a self-analysis based on the Penn State case.

Many managers seek to use existing information in the branding, marketing, and general operations of their business. When that information belongs to another entity, managers risk legal liability unless they obtain the proper permissions or use the information in a way that does not infringe intellectual property rights. Currently, substantial confusion exists regarding when such permissions are required and how to avoid infringing others' rights. This installment of Business Law & Ethics Corner provides managers with basic information about the proper use of copyrighted and trademarked material, including an overview of the doctrine of fair use as applied in the copyright and trademark contexts.

Politics in organizations are a fact of life, and have been regarded as such for decades by organizational scientists and practitioners alike. Unfortunately, far less is known about the skills or competencies needed in order to be successful--and even survive--in such political environments. Although many believe performance, effectiveness, and career success are determined mostly by intelligence and hard work, political perspectives on organizations contend that other factors such as positioning, social astuteness, and interpersonal savvy also play important roles; that is, individuals need to possess political skill. In this article, we describe the underlying features and operation of political skill in organizations, and argue that it allows people to be effective at work by giving them the capacity to more accurately recognize opportunities in the work environment and effectively capitalize on those opportunities. Using the game of chess as a metaphor, we describe how politically skilled individuals strategically employ their competencies in ways that ensure goal attainment. Further, we provide some practical guidance for employees about how to play the organizational politics 'game' to facilitate success.

The traditional branding paradigm involved heavy upfront investment and tightly managing the image via controlled communications in hopes of creating dominant brands that could be leveraged to cultivate loyalty and a long-term, steady stream of profits. However, social media can drastically alter consumers' behavior and their brand preferences. This rapidly evolving landscape has left managers at a loss, and what they are experiencing is likely the beginning of a tectonic shift in the way brands are managed. In this article, we take a close look at the building blocks of branding and also examine the core of social media. After careful analysis of the two, we discuss the likely impact social media will have on the practice of brand management. We conclude that it will extend beyond the narrow confines of the use of social media as a message platform, to the core of how markets are targeted and products are delivered. We make recommendations regarding how companies can manage various facets of branding in this new marketplace.

The selling environment has undergone tremendous transformation over the past 2 decades. Perhaps the greatest change has centered on changes and advancements in technology. The latest dramatic change has been the rapidly increasing use of social media and other related technologies in the business-to-business realm. The sales world began the use of technology through the use of Web 1.0, which was primarily webpage oriented; now we see the world of social media as the paradigm of how firms should implement technology. Although there has been some recent emphasis on how marketing might implement social media into their strategies and how the individual salesperson might implement social media into his or her daily selling routine, no substantive discussion on how social media is affecting the role of the sales manager has appeared in the literature. This article systematically examines how social media is impacting the sales management function and, in fact, may be dramatically revolutionizing the position. To help the marketing and sales organization better understand the changing sales world, we present eight lessons that every sales manager needs to embrace.

Digital technology is increasingly important in achieving business goals, and its pervasive effects have resulted in the radical restructuring of entire industries. Consequently, managers' extensive interest in handling digital innovation is not surprising. Recent research has illustrated how digital technologies give rise to a vast potential for product and service innovation that is difficult to control and predict. Therefore, firms need dynamic tools to support themselves in managing the new types of digital innovation processes that emerge. The nature of these processes forces firms to challenge prior assumptions about their product and service portfolio, their digital environment, and ways of organizing innovation work. In this article, we present a managerial framework that supports firms in this undertaking. The framework, geared at supporting ongoing improvements in digital innovation management, covers five key areas: user experience, value proposition, digital evolution scanning, skills, and improvisation. We also present a diagnostic tool that can be utilized as firms begin the process of implementing the framework. Finally, we conclude with our thoughts on the managerial implications of the framework when going forward in a rapidly changing digital innovation landscape.

In some parts of the world, the impacts of climate change will prove to be relatively manageable, particularly for the rich. In some parts of the world, these will not, particularly for the poor. The only certainty is that humanity's collective actions will force every individual to answer that classic question, "Are you feeling lucky?"