Corporate "lean" programs, often modeled after the Toyota Production System, can be powerful instruments for improving the performance of manufacturing plants. They help to emphasize parts of the production process that add the most value and eliminate those that don't. However, misplaced expectations can make implementation difficult and reduce the benefits. The authors argue that if managers better understood the expected rates of improvement, then implementations would go more smoothly. The authors studied the implementation of the Volvo Group's production system. Volvo Group, a leading maker of trucks and other heavy vehicles. The company introduced the Volvo Production System in 2007, and since then has been implementing it in its factories around the world. The authors visited 44 of Volvo's 67 plants and interviewed 200 managers. They found that there were four distinct stages of change in the rate of performance improvement and that there was a strong relationship between a plant's maturity in a production system implementation and its performance; progress roughly followed the shape of an S-curve: a plant's rate of improvement changes in the shape of a bell curve as the plant becomes more mature in implementing the production system. Performance improves slowly at first, and then at an increasing rate before the improvement rate gradually decreases. To measure the performance of the plants, the authors focused on nonfinancial metrics related to the quality, cost, delivery and safety of the plant's output. They then used statistical methods to find patterns. Volvo's assessment process provides a structure to help local managers compare their plants. It also provides a mechanism for transferring expertise and best practices. The assessments have a strong symbolic impact: They communicate the company's commitment to the production system. Implementing a production system is a long journey, but the authors conclude that it's a worthwhile endeavor.
This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. In May 2013, software giant SAP announced plans to hire hundreds of people diagnosed with autism, with a target of having people with autism represent 1% of its work force by 2020. Companies don't typically seek out people with developmental disorders. But SAP took a different view. The company had discovered that some people with autism were well-suited to performing some vital information technology tasks. SAP's move embodies an emerging management principle - the authors Robert D. Austin and Thorkil Sonne call it "the dandelion principle" - and suggests an alternative way of thinking about human resources management. It turns some of the basic tenets about how to recruit and manage people inside out. The authors use the dandelion as metaphor because, they note, dandelions are actually nutritious - but are seen as weeds. In the industrial economy, companies sought to win by operating more efficiently than rivals, the authors note. But today, that's no longer enough. Faced with lower-cost competition from developing countries, companies also need to innovate, to offer products that are better than what's available from competitors. That involves finding new and better ideas and using new processes. Managing innovation, the authors say, is less about averages and more about understanding outliers and how they can add value. In an innovation-oriented economy, technology companies can benefit from accommodating employees with different perspectives. Traditional HR practices begin with fixed strategies and hiring and developing people to fit defined roles. The dandelion principle calls for hiring people with potentially differentiating skills and talents, assessing the skills carefully, organizing the work context around the people to maximize their ability to create value, and then developing the inherent talents to enlarge the potential for future, unanticipated forms of value creation.
This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Despite China's long and established demand for high-technology products, many leading global companies have become increasingly wary about operating in the Chinese market. They see unfair competitive practices, discriminatory regulation and intellectual property theft as part and parcel of the Chinese experience. Authors Edward S. Steinfeld and Troels Beltoft acknowledge that some of these concerns are valid. However, they focus on a different side of China, one that requires foreign companies to remain actively engaged. Their research describes unique forms of China-based technology innovation, mastery of which is becoming increasingly indispensible for any company aiming to succeed in the global market. The authors concede that China today may not yet be the place to go for path-breaking R&D or radical new invention. But it's becoming the place to go if you want to learn how to make new ideas commercially viable. The authors provide detailed examples involving wind turbine manufacturing and semiconductor design. They group China-based knowledge into four categories: capabilities for rapid tempo operations and speed to market, accommodation of unique customer preferences, world-leading capabilities for cost reduction and capabilities for new forms of networked production. In China, the authors note, many people worry that their society's focus on manufacturing has come at the expense of innovation. Conversely, many in the West believe that the migration of manufacturing to offshore locations has impeded their innovative capacity. But the authors say that both views miss the mark, noting that even the most groundbreaking ideas are devoid of commercial value unless they can be delivered as products in a manner, at a price point and within a period of time that suits the preferences of customers.
Intellectual property protection is the No. 1 challenge for multinational corporations operating in China. According to the U.S. government, China accounted for nearly 80% of all IP thefts from U.S.- headquartered organizations in 2013, causing an estimated $300 billion in lost business. For European manufacturers, the loss of IP in China reduced potential profits by 20%. The effects from IP leakage are visible in counterfeited items including toys, luxury goods and automotive and aircraft parts. But IP violations go beyond products to include pirated operational processes and entire business and service models. For many multinational corporations, IP leakage becomes a barrier to integrating Chinese sites and partners into global activities. IP leakage frequently occurs through staff transfers or shared practices from foreign multinationals to local joint ventures or supply chain partners. For multinationals, this type of IP leakage is often a calculated risk worth taking. However, unintended IP leakage can affect a company's reputation and profitability, and can create powerful local or even global competitors. In studying more than 50 multinational corporations, authors Andreas Schotter and Mary Teagarden identified nine IP protection practices for use in China. Four of the practices are defensive and externally focused; the others are proactive and internal. Together, they create what the authors call the "IP protection web," which allows corporations to (1) expand faster within China and in other emerging markets; (2) improve performance; and (3) enhance local and global innovativeness. Most of the companies the authors studied learned to protect their IP through trial and error. The changing composition of IP risk creates a need for ongoing reconfiguration. Indeed, as Chinese companies become more skillful at absorbing leaked IP, international companies must develop more sophisticated responses and develop new ways to engender loyalty.
As businesses have entered new geographies, developed new products, opened new channels and added more granular customer segments, they have made their offerings more complex with the intention of adding value. But, as a seemingly inevitable consequence, companies also have made it more difficult for customers to interact with them and more unwieldy for their employees to get things done. For organizations, there has thus been a trade-off between good and bad complexity. In the digital economy, however, companies can finesse this trade-off and increase value-adding complexity in their offerings while keeping processes simple for customers and employees. Consider Amazon.com Inc.'s 10 million products, which create value without confusing customers, thanks to simple customer-facing processes that use digital tools such as search, recommendations, customer reviews and seller ratings to help site users choose among the many available products. Another example is Royal Phillips, which uses and reuses digitized platforms -and is able to offer locally differentiated products in 60 categories in more than 100 countries. The authors explain how companies can achieve their "complexity sweet spot"in the digital age -that is, the maximum value from varied and integrated product offerings with the simplest processes. The authors'research suggests that companies operating in this complexity sweet spot outperform their industry competitors on profitability. There are several routes to the sweet spot. One of the biggest decisions is who will lead and manage a company's complexity, as no one executive (save the CEO) really oversees all product and service development and operations. Whoever is leading a company's search for the complexity sweet spot needs to lead a cultural change to embed complexity management into the company's DNA. The good news, according to the authors, is that there are almost always quick wins, and the rewards are, well, sweet.
This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. For most companies, pricing has always been a sensitive, private affair. This article is directed at managers who seek to profit from product differentiation and take maximum advantage of their ability to stand out. Instead of leaving good money on the table and struggling to convert product differentiation into revenue, the authors argue, companies should consider enlisting the pricing help of their customers. Outsourcing pricing isn't an all-or-nothing proposition. Managers can select pricing models ranging from complete oversight to complete delegation. Citing examples from companies including Google, Uber, Orbitz, Volkswagen, Coca-Cola and Humble Bundle, the article integrates classic views on pricing with the latest research and practice to develop a simple framework to help managers decide how much pricing control they should retain and how much they should relinquish to customers. For most businesses, the default approach is having a single fixed price and selling to anyone willing to pay that amount. However, authors Marco Bertini and Oded Koenigsberg argue that this is economically inefficient: Those prepared to pay more in effect receive a discount; those willing to pay less (but an amount that's still profitable) are turned away. For companies interested in interactive approaches to pricing, the authors discuss three collaborative models: auctions, name-your-own-price auctions and negotiations. In the authors'view, asking customers to weigh in on price can have benefits that go beyond promoting greater efficiency. It can promote customer engagement, provide opportunities for customization, allow managers to signal information about their company or product and open up opportunities for increasing market share.
This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Since China began its economic reforms in 1978, it has transformed itself from an economically impoverished and politically unstable country to the second-largest economy in the world. But China faces monumental challenges, both economic and political, in the years ahead, notes author Yasheng Huang. One thing we know about economic growth is that it typically slows down after a period of robust performance. It is much more difficult for a country to grow at a sustainably fast pace when the per capita GDP is high than when per capita GDP is low. Despite more than three decades of reforms, Huang argues, China is still substantially statist in its basic orientation. The result is that for each percentage point of GDP growth, China requires more and more energy and investments, with worrisome implications for its environment and the health status of its population. There is increasing evidence that China is seeing diminishing returns with its existing growth model. Research shows that fast growth at an extremely low income level is relatively easy. However, Huang notes, being able to grow from what is known as "middle-income status" (between $6,000 and $8,000 dollars per capita, a level that China has just about reached) is much harder. Can China avoid the middle-income trap and grow at a sustained rate for another decade or more? Huang believes it can, but only if it undertakes significant reforms, especially political reforms. At GDP of $700, Huang argues, China didn't need to innovate-it could simply copy and transplant the technology and production methods of other countries. But it now needs to transition to a stronger, market-based economic system, a political system that is more open and democratic, and a legal system that is rule-based and offers strong IP protection. In other words, Huang says, China needs political reforms as well as economic reforms to enter the next stage of its growth model.
This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Based on a global executive survey with 2,000+ respondents and interviews with more than thirty executives, MIT Sloan Management Review and SAS Institute Inc. report that analytics has become a common path to business value. Organizations are now being challenged to step up their use of analytics, whether they are just getting started or are seasoned practitioners. The implications for industry competition are coming into focus-companies that incorporate analytics into their culture are finding success in the new digital era.
The author left the Boston Consulting Group to join Ozon in part because she had once been an entrepreneur and missed the excitement--but mostly because she saw the company's potential to become the Amazon of Russia. Russians were going online at an extraordinary rate; if Ozon could figure out how to deliver goods in an e-commerce market, despite the country's shaky distribution systems, its growth would skyrocket. The company's success in e-commerce would hinge on logistics and customer support. It had to persuade people that they could get their goods more quickly and reliably by ordering them online and having them delivered than by hoping to find them in stock at a shop. It needed a way to safely take and process the cash that Russians usually pay with. And it had to provide personal contact with customers and harvest data about their purchases and preferences. This is the story of how Gavet and her team met those challenges.
Corporate America began to really take notice of the looming retirement crisis in the wake of the dot-com crash, when companies in major industries went bankrupt in large part because of their inability to meet their pension obligations. The result was an acceleration of America's shift away from employer-sponsored pension plans toward defined-contribution plans--epitomized by the ubiquitous 401(k)--which transfer the investment risk from the company to the employee. With that transfer has come a dangerous shift in investment focus, argues Nobel Laureate Robert C. Merton. Traditional pension plans were conceived and managed to provide members with a guaranteed income. And because that objective filtered right through the scheme, members thought of their benefits in those terms. Ask a member what her pension is worth and she'll reply with an income figure: "two-thirds of my final salary," for example. Most DC schemes, however, are designed and managed as investment accounts with the goal of accumulating the largest possible pot of savings. Communication with savers is framed entirely in terms of assets and returns. Ask a saver what his 401(k) is worth and you'll hear a cash amount and perhaps a lament to the value lost in the financial crisis. The trouble is that investment value and asset volatility are simply the wrong measures if your goal is to secure a particular future income. In this article, Merton explains a liability-driven investment strategy whose aim is to improve the probability of achieving a desired retirement income rather than to maximize the capital value of the savings.
Though social and digital media are rapidly transforming marketing and new tools emerge daily, in most firms the organization of the function hasn't changed in 40 years. How should marketers revamp their strategies, structures, and capabilities to meet the new realities? To find out, the consultancy EffectiveBrands and its partners conducted a study involving 10,000 marketers from 92 countries, which examined what separated high-performing marketers from the pack. High performers, the study showed, excelled in three areas: integrating data about what customers are doing with an understanding of why they are doing it; communicating a brand purpose (the functional, emotional, and societal benefits of the offering); and delivering a "total experience" to customers. To provide this kind of experience, high performers break down silos and enlist the help of the entire organization. That means they must link marketing strategy tightly to business strategy and to other functions; inspire employees across the company with the brand's purpose; focus and align around a few key priorities; set up nimble, cross-functional teams; and build internal capabilities through extensive training at all levels. Surprisingly, few companies have been able to put all these pieces together. Only half of even high-performing organizations excel on some of these capabilities. But that shouldn't be discouraging; rather, it just illuminates where there's work to do.
The gap between marketers' aspirations and what their organizations can accomplish creates intense pressure to reshape how marketing is done. In recent years some leading companies have developed an innovative approach that focuses on the seams between marketing and the other functions it interacts with--the C-suite, IT, sales, finance, and so on. It is at these seams that communication most often breaks down and processes stall. Typically, three categories of marketing-related decisions cross organizational seams: strategy and planning; execution; operations and infrastructure. When marketing works closely with other units to execute key decisions, it can get things done far more quickly and effectively than in the past. But divergent assumptions or a lack of alignment and shared commitment between functions can get in the way. When the authors asked people in marketing and other relevant units what roles they played in a decision, the answers were all over the map. In a classic example, both marketers and product developers in one automaker's European division believed that they had the final say on which features to include in a new model. The authors provide a tool for revamping the decision process at the boundaries between functions and describe how Target, Nordstrom, and other large companies have identified important decisions at the seams and increased the impact of their marketing organizations.
Despite the $11 billion spent on CRM software annually, many consumer companies don't understand customer relationships at all. They aren't aware of the variety of relationship types and don't understand what kind their customers want. Through research in a wide variety of consumer industries, the authors have identified 29 types of relationships. For example, some customers want to be "best friends" with a brand; others are looking for a passionate "fling"; still others find themselves as "ex-friends" and would welcome a closer bond. To understand the current portfolio of relationships, companies must pick up on signals from multiple sources. Companies can then build a strategic mix of connections by bolstering desired relationships and shifting customers to more-valuable types. There are many issues to consider: For example, some relationship types are more profitable than others. No actions will bear fruit unless a relationship orientation pervades not just the marketing function but every aspect of the company that touches customers or affects interactions with them. Customers don't just represent the next upsell or cross-sell opportunity; they are individuals looking for a certain kind of interaction. Companies need to respond accordingly.
Marketing is rapidly becoming one of the most technology-dependent functions in business. In response, a new type of executive is emerging--the chief marketing technologist. CMTs are part strategist, part creative director, part technology leader, and part teacher. They go by various titles, but they share a common job, intersecting with four key stakeholders in the organization: (1) The CMO and other senior marketing executives. Here, the CMT supports strategy by ensuring technical capabilities and advocating for approaches enabled by new technologies. (2) The CIO and IT. The chief marketing technologist facilitates and prioritizes technology requests from marketing, translating between technical and marketing requirements and making sure that marketing's systems adhere to IT policies. (3) The marketing team. The task here is to ensure that the marketing staff has the right software and training. (4) Software and service providers. The CMT assesses how well outside vendors' technical capabilities meet marketing's needs, helps integrate the systems, and monitors their performance. A thumbnail profile of Mayur Gupta, the global head of marketing technology and operations at Kimberly-Clark, shows just how open-ended the CMT role is and why an executive fully at home in both marketing and IT is essential for the job.
More and more companies recognize the importance of corporate responsibility to their long-term success--and yet the matter gets short shrift in most boardrooms, consistently ranking at the bottom of some two dozen possible priorities. Many years ago labor conditions in Asian contract factories prompted Nike board member Jill Ker Conway to lobby for a board-level corporate responsibility committee, which the company created in 2001. In the years since, the committee has steadily broadened its purview, now advising on a broad range of issues including innovation and acquisitions in addition to labor practices and resource sustainability. A close examination of Nike's experience has led HBS professor Lynn S. Paine to conclude that a dedicated board-level committee of this sort could be a valuable addition to many if not most companies in at least five ways: as a source of knowledge and expertise, as a sounding board and constructive critic, as a driver of accountability, as a stimulus for innovation, and as a resource for the full board. In an accompanying interview with Paine, Conway discusses the committee's creation and provides an insider's perspective on what has made it so effective.
Drawing on the idea that any business model is essentially a set of key decisions that collectively determine how a business earns its revenue, incurs its costs, and manages its risks, the authors view innovations to the model as changes to those decisions: What mix of products or services should you offer? When should you make your key decisions? Who are your best decision makers? and Why do key decision makers choose as they do? In this article they present a framework to help managers take business model innovation to the level of a reliable and improvable discipline. Companies can use the framework to make their innovation processes more systematic and open so that business model reinvention becomes a continual, inclusive process rather than a series of isolated, internally focused events.
Yang assumed the reins at Lenovo (formerly known as Legend) in 2001, when the company's founder, Liu Chuanzhi, moved on to become chairman. He served as CEO for three years before succeeding Liu as chairman, and he and Liu engineered the stunning 2005 acquisition of IBM's personal computer business, which suddenly made Lenovo the world's third-largest computer maker. In 2009, after the company had begun to falter during the global recession, the board asked Yang to return as CEO, a post he's held ever since. Pursuing a strategy the company calls "protect and attack"--defending its core market in PCs (Lenovo is now the world's number one manufacturer) while moving into new growth areas such as mobile and the cloud--Yang has turned things around. Earlier this year Lenovo spent $2.3 billion to acquire IBM's low-end server business and $2.9 billion for Google's Motorola Mobility unit. He talks here with HBR's editor in chief about Lenovo's innovations, competitors, acquisitions, and more.
In March 2011 Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant was devastated by three reactor explosions and three core meltdowns in the days following a 9.0 earthquake and a tsunami that produced waves as high as 17 meters. The world is familiar with Daiichi's fate; less well known is the crisis at its sister plant, Daini, about 10 kilometers to the south. As a result of the storm, three of Daini's four reactors lacked sufficient power to achieve cooldown. To prevent the disaster experienced up north, the site superintendent, Naohiro Masuda, and his team had to connect them to the plant's surviving power sources. In a volatile environment, Masuda and Daini's hundreds of employees responded to each unexpected event in turn. Luck played a part, but so did smart leadership and sensemaking. Until the last reactor went into cold shutdown, Masuda and his team took nothing for granted. With each new problem they encountered, they recalibrated, iteratively creating continuity and restoring order. Daini survived the crisis without an explosion or a meltdown.
We'd like to think that no smart, upstanding manager would ever overlook or turn a blind eye to threats or wrongdoing that ultimately imperil his or her business. Yet it happens all the time. We fall prey to obstacles that obscure or drown out important signals that things are amiss. Becoming a "first-class noticer," says Max H. Bazerman, a professor at Harvard Business School, requires conscious effort to fight ambiguity, motivated blindness, conflicts of interest, the slippery slope, and efforts of others to mislead us. As a manager, you can develop your noticing skills by acknowledging responsibility when things go wrong rather than blaming external forces beyond your control. Bazerman also advises taking an outsider's view to challenge the status quo. Given the string of ethical failures of corporations around the world in recent years--from BP to GM to JPMorgan Chase--it's clear that leaders not only need to act more responsibly themselves but also must develop keen noticing skills in their employees and across their organizations.
An ambitious executive is about to leave his employer in order to launch his own Pan-African venture. Should he start up in a rapidly growing, but already competitive, market or in a series of smaller, untapped markets? Expert commentary comes from Ashish J. Thakkar, founder of Mara Group, and Iqbal Surve, founder and chairman of the Sekunjalo Group.