Liferay, an enterprise portal and content management system, uses an open-source development model. Its flagship portal (also named Liferay) is distributed under a Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) licence. This licence allows users to access, modify and distribute Liferay’s source code, and to re-license their derivative work. Open-source licencing has significant implications for Liferay’s adoption process. Organizations simply download the Liferay portal for free, try it out for different business requirements and engage the vendor for dedicated service-level agreements for more advanced usage support. Several developers and users outside Liferay participate in the software development process and make significant contributions. However, unrestricted access and liberal distribution norms allow other software organizations to make free use of Liferay’s efforts. These organizations slightly modify Liferay’s source code (particularly Liferay’s core system) and repackage the software. By 2010, this scenario has become particularly difficult. Liferay’s recent adoption of a platform strategy is based on preserving the uniformity and stability of the core system. Due to unconstrained modifications to the source code, the core system could soon become fractured and non-standardized. The CEO has to select a suitable licencing framework that will align with the newly adopted platform strategy but at the same time retain Liferay’s adherence to open source. Alternately, Liferay could abandon open source altogether.
Flipkart.com is one of India’s best known online retailers. Founded in 2007, with the ambitious dream of becoming India’s Amazon.com, Flipkart.com started out selling books and quickly expanded its product portfolio to include laptops, computer peripherals, consumer durables, consumer electronics, fashion accessories, media and games. Flipkart’s products were competitively priced, its customer service was exemplary and it offered innovative solutions to enhance the customer experience such as its cash on delivery service. These factors, coupled with a smart marketing mix and catchy advertisements that sensitized the Indian consumer to the online shopping experience, contributed to its rapid growth. While the customer viewed the company with rose-tinted glasses, all was not well within Flipkart. It was plagued by a multitude of issues, including a business model that swallowed cash faster than it was generated, increasing constraints on its operational and supply chain capabilities and deteriorating investor confidence. Indeed, Flipkart found itself in trouble in late 2012. With competitors hot on its heels and the imminent entry of Amazon.com into the Indian market, Flipkart had to evaluate its options carefully and make some smart moves if it was to survive and regain investor confidence.
In 2013, after years of success, Samsung, a manufacturing conglomerate based in Korea but with offices, research and development divisions and factories worldwide, is established as a global powerhouse in the smartphone industry. But success has revealed opportunities and challenges that need to be addressed as the company navigates the competitive landscape. Samsung has sold more phones than rivals such as Nokia and Apple and is also a major player in the increasingly popular tablet computer market. Given the volatility of the industry and the market, in addition to the dynamic relationships between suppliers, manufacturers, technology providers, application developers and operating systems, Samsung needs to think carefully about its next competitive steps. Specifically, it has to think about one very important issue: should it continue to rely on Google’s Android operating system, or should it seriously consider an in-house software ecosystem?
A newly appointed state program manager for a non-governmental organization (NGO) has been given the responsibility of managing several health centres in rural India. The state program manager quickly found that his new business environment was full of interpersonal difficulties and unprofessional conduct, which were threatening to derail the organization’s goals. Despite being a newcomer to a well-established and structured NGO, the manager knew that he would have to find a way to persuade his staff to work as a team and to focus on the tasks at hand: the question was, how?
In 2013, the chief executive officer of South Africa’s fourth largest bank, the Nedbank Group Limited, is considering the past and future of his organization. The company is in the process of transformation from a low point in 2003 of poor staff morale and falling share prices, with the threat of losing its licence because of poor capital liquidity, to the best bank in Africa, winning praise for its efforts in environmental sustainability and promoting the post-Apartheid government’s broad-based black economic empowerment policy. Through acquisitions and joint ventures, the company is expanding into neighbouring countries with the result that, after a period of retrenchment, the number of branches and staff has grown. Clearly, his and his predecessor’s clear vision, measurement and focus on culture have enabled the turnaround and subsequent organizational transformation. Yet, in the midst of the global financial crisis, the company is facing increasing competition not only from other banks throughout Africa but from telecommunications companies and retailers that operate financial services. The question now is: Can these transformation efforts be sustained?
This case is about the response of the US government to the excessive compensation of executives following the market collapse of 2008. In particular, the case focuses on the special committee that was formed to oversee and regulate any financial companies that had borrowed money from the US government to stay afloat. The protaganist is Kenneth Feinberg, who is appointed as Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation and who has the challenging task of negotiating compensation amidst all of the many competing interests.
The bulk of the case consists of background material, explaining why the Bush Administration favored the negotiation of such a pact, though it reversed 30 years of US foreign policy with respect to nuclear weapons proliferation. It summarizes several important topics, crucial to understanding the issues involved in the negotiation of the joint statement: the history of US-Indian relations, India's history with respect to nuclear weapons, and issues in the international nuclear non-proliferation agreements. It gives an example of the kind of word-smithing Burns and Saran would have to engage in, to complete the joint statement. And it explains, in brief, five areas of particular difficulty that the two diplomats would have to address in some fashion. A brief sequel describes an 11th hour crisis in the negotiation and its resolution, provides the text of the final joint agreement, and very briefly summarizes the final outcome of the three-year negotiation that followed. Case Number 2023.0 A 12.5-minute video short, featuring U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns and Indian Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran, two of the protagonists of the early negotiations that resulted in the India-U.S. Joint Statement of July 2005, provide a behind-the-scenes look at the process that led to that groundbreaking agreement. From the initial distrust between the U.S. and India to the way in which compromises were found to address the two countries' seemingly irreconcilable priorities, Burns and Saran vividly recall the many tense moments and intricate wordsmithing that characterized the meetings and the down-to-the-wire conclusion of the first round of negotiations.
Molycorp, the western hemisphere's only producer of rare earth minerals, was in the middle of a $1 billion capital expenditure project in its effort to become a vertically integrated supplier of rare earth minerals, oxides, and metals. Yet it had just reported lower than expected revenues and earnings for the second quarter of 2012. In response to the announcement, its stock price fell 29% (its stock price had fallen from $77 to $11 in the past 18 months). The weakening financial performance was due in large part to falling prices for rare earth minerals. With less internally-generated cash flow available to fund the project, management had to decide: how much capital to raise, what kind to raise, and when to raise it. These decisions would determine its capital structure, at least in the short term, as well as its ability to implement its business strategy.
A newly appointed state program manager for a non-governmental organization (NGO) has been given the responsibility of managing several health centres in rural India. The state program manager quickly found that his new business environment was full of interpersonal difficulties and unprofessional conduct, which were threatening to derail the organization's goals. Despite being a newcomer to a well-established and structured NGO, the manager knew that he would have to find a way to persuade his staff to work as a team and to focus on the tasks at hand: the question was, how?
In 2013, the chief executive officer of South Africa's fourth largest bank, the Nedbank Group Limited, is considering the past and future of his organization. The company is in the process of transformation from a low point in 2003 of poor staff morale and falling share prices, with the threat of losing its licence because of poor capital liquidity, to the best bank in Africa, winning praise for its efforts in environmental sustainability and promoting the post-Apartheid government's broad-based black economic empowerment policy. Through acquisitions and joint ventures, the company is expanding into neighbouring countries with the result that, after a period of retrenchment, the number of branches and staff has grown. Clearly, his and his predecessor's clear vision, measurement and focus on culture have enabled the turnaround and subsequent organizational transformation. Yet, in the midst of the global financial crisis, the company is facing increasing competition not only from other banks throughout Africa but from telecommunications companies and retailers that operate financial services. The question now is: Can these transformation efforts be sustained?
Flipkart.com is one of India's best known online retailers. Founded in 2007, with the ambitious dream of becoming India's Amazon.com, Flipkart.com started out selling books and quickly expanded its product portfolio to include laptops, computer peripherals, consumer durables, consumer electronics, fashion accessories, media and games. Flipkart's products were competitively priced, its customer service was exemplary and it offered innovative solutions to enhance the customer experience such as its cash on delivery service. These factors, coupled with a smart marketing mix and catchy advertisements that sensitized the Indian consumer to the online shopping experience, contributed to its rapid growth. While the customer viewed the company with rose-tinted glasses, all was not well within Flipkart. It was plagued by a multitude of issues, including a business model that swallowed cash faster than it was generated, increasing constraints on its operational and supply chain capabilities and deteriorating investor confidence. Indeed, Flipkart found itself in trouble in late 2012. With competitors hot on its heels and the imminent entry of Amazon.com into the Indian market, Flipkart had to evaluate its options carefully and make some smart moves if it was to survive and regain investor confidence.
In 2013, after years of success, Samsung, a manufacturing conglomerate based in Korea but with offices, research and development divisions and factories worldwide, is established as a global powerhouse in the smartphone industry. But success has revealed opportunities and challenges that need to be addressed as the company navigates the competitive landscape. Samsung has sold more phones than rivals such as Nokia and Apple and is also a major player in the increasingly popular tablet computer market. Given the volatility of the industry and the market, in addition to the dynamic relationships between suppliers, manufacturers, technology providers, application developers and operating systems, Samsung needs to think carefully about its next competitive steps. Specifically, it has to think about one very important issue: should it continue to rely on Google's Android operating system, or should it seriously consider an in-house software ecosystem?
The "Promotion Process at Chung and Dasgupta, LLP" set of cases explores the roles of general and firm-specific human capital in employee performance measurement, feedback, and promotion/compensation decisions. In the cases, a leading law firm must decide whether to match an outside partnership offer to one of its leading litigators, when the litigator is not yet eligible for partnership according to the existing rules by which the firm elects partners. A second non-litigator at the firm has performed just as well as the star litigator, but has no outside partnership offer, because her role and skills are specific to the firm, and not as valuable to the outside market. The case can be taught via a role play, where one student plays the role of the non-litigator, and a second student plays the role of a formally-assigned mentor from the law firm's partnership group. (If using the role play option, instructors should use the general information case "The Promotion Process at Chung and Dasgupta, LLP," 914-044, and the roles: "Chung and Dasgupta: Information for Jordan Ramirez," 914-046, and "Chung and Dasgupta: Information for Casey Clark," 914-047.) It can also be taught as a traditional case, without a role play, by using general information case "The Promotion Process at Chung and Dasgupta, LLP" (914-044) and "Chung and Dasgupta: Supplemental Information on Jordan Ramirez and Casey Clark" (914-045). The cases provide a rich backdrop to explore issues around firm-specific human capital, and can also be used to discuss subjective performance evaluation, best practices when giving employee feedback, and careers at professional service firms.
The "Promotion Process at Chung and Dasgupta, LLP" set of cases explores the roles of general and firm-specific human capital in employee performance measurement, feedback, and promotion/compensation decisions. In the cases, a leading law firm must decide whether to match an outside partnership offer to one of its leading litigators, when the litigator is not yet eligible for partnership according to the existing rules by which the firm elects partners. A second non-litigator at the firm has performed just as well as the star litigator, but has no outside partnership offer, because her role and skills are specific to the firm, and not as valuable to the outside market. The case can be taught via a role play, where one student plays the role of the non-litigator, and a second student plays the role of a formally-assigned mentor from the law firm's partnership group. (If using the role play option, instructors should use the general information case "The Promotion Process at Chung and Dasgupta, LLP," 914-044, and the roles: "Chung and Dasgupta: Information for Jordan Ramirez," 914-046, and "Chung and Dasgupta: Information for Casey Clark," 914-047.) It can also be taught as a traditional case, without a role play, by using general information case "The Promotion Process at Chung and Dasgupta, LLP" (914-044) and "Chung and Dasgupta: Supplemental Information on Jordan Ramirez and Casey Clark" (914-045). The cases provide a rich backdrop to explore issues around firm-specific human capital, and can also be used to discuss subjective performance evaluation, best practices when giving employee feedback, and careers at professional service firms.
The "Promotion Process at Chung and Dasgupta, LLP" set of cases explores the roles of general and firm-specific human capital in employee performance measurement, feedback, and promotion/compensation decisions. In the cases, a leading law firm must decide whether to match an outside partnership offer to one of its leading litigators, when the litigator is not yet eligible for partnership according to the existing rules by which the firm elects partners. A second non-litigator at the firm has performed just as well as the star litigator, but has no outside partnership offer, because her role and skills are specific to the firm, and not as valuable to the outside market. The case can be taught via a role play, where one student plays the role of the non-litigator, and a second student plays the role of a formally-assigned mentor from the law firm's partnership group. (If using the role play option, instructors should use the general information case "The Promotion Process at Chung and Dasgupta, LLP," 914-044, and the roles: "Chung and Dasgupta: Information for Jordan Ramirez," 914-046, and "Chung and Dasgupta: Information for Casey Clark," 914-047.) It can also be taught as a traditional case, without a role play, by using general information case "The Promotion Process at Chung and Dasgupta, LLP" (914-044) and "Chung and Dasgupta: Supplemental Information on Jordan Ramirez and Casey Clark" (914-045). The cases provide a rich backdrop to explore issues around firm-specific human capital, and can also be used to discuss subjective performance evaluation, best practices when giving employee feedback, and careers at professional service firms.
The "Promotion Process at Chung and Dasgupta, LLP" set of cases explores the roles of general and firm-specific human capital in employee performance measurement, feedback, and promotion/compensation decisions. In the cases, a leading law firm must decide whether to match an outside partnership offer to one of its leading litigators, when the litigator is not yet eligible for partnership according to the existing rules by which the firm elects partners. A second non-litigator at the firm has performed just as well as the star litigator, but has no outside partnership offer, because her role and skills are specific to the firm, and not as valuable to the outside market. The case can be taught via a role play, where one student plays the role of the non-litigator, and a second student plays the role of a formally-assigned mentor from the law firm's partnership group. (If using the role play option, instructors should use the general information case "The Promotion Process at Chung and Dasgupta, LLP," 914-044, and the roles: "Chung and Dasgupta: Information for Jordan Ramirez," 914-046, and "Chung and Dasgupta: Information for Casey Clark," 914-047.) It can also be taught as a traditional case, without a role play, by using general information case "The Promotion Process at Chung and Dasgupta, LLP" (914-044) and "Chung and Dasgupta: Supplemental Information on Jordan Ramirez and Casey Clark" (914-045). The cases provide a rich backdrop to explore issues around firm-specific human capital, and can also be used to discuss subjective performance evaluation, best practices when giving employee feedback, and careers at professional service firms.
In 2014 Time Warner announced its intention to spin off Time, Inc.'s family of print titles, thought to hold limited profit potential. As Time Warner Entertainment Company, it would face a worldwide marketplace with increasing amounts of discretionary time that could be spent on entertainment that was accessible from an ever-wider variety of distribution media. However, some industry observers questioned whether this was a strategic divestiture or simply an attempt to raise the value of Time Warner's shares. This case asks students to consider the motives behind this move and its implications for Time Warner.
Billy Beane and the Oakland A's have 'changed the game' in terms of talent identification, analytics, and player investment in Major League Baseball (MLB). Cases A and B are designed to provide and inspire learning on these topics by recounting Billy Beane's success as the Oakland A's General Manager over the past 16 seasons (1998 to 2013). The case, through analysis of performance and financial data over this time period, establishes Beane as the most efficient GM in MLB and shares concepts, information and data to allow for improved understanding of the barriers and drivers to the adoption of new and disruptive innovations in the sport business.
Billy Beane and the Oakland A's have 'changed the game' in terms of talent identification, analytics, and player investment in Major League Baseball (MLB). Cases A and B are designed to provide and inspire learning on these topics by recounting Billy Beane's success as the Oakland A's General Manager over the past 16 seasons (1998 to 2013). The case, through analysis of performance and financial data over this time period, establishes Beane as the most efficient GM in MLB and shares concepts, information and data to allow for improved understanding of the barriers and drivers to the adoption of new and disruptive innovations in the sport business.