Cross Country (renamed Agero in 2011) operated call centers that coordinated with thousands of small, independent towing companies-Cross Country's "service provider network"-to deliver roadside assistance services, such as vehicle towing and tire changes, to motorists covered by automakers' warranties and insurers' policies. The case describes Cross Country's evolution from 1972 to 2012 in three phases. This allows students to, at various stages, grapple with defining Cross Country's business (what business is it, and should it be, in?) and its primary customer (vehicle makers and insurers? motorists? service providers?). The answers to these questions have important implications for organization design. During the first phase, from 1972 to 1998, founder Sidney Wolk built the business through personal relationships with clients. A passionate entrepreneur, his approach to growth-secure customers first, figure out how to make money later-was remarkably successful, if sometimes chaotic. Facing an increasingly commoditized marketplace, in 1998 Wolk hired professional managers who implemented formal performance management systems and invested in sophisticated data analytics. From 1998 to 2007 (phase two), these investments allowed Cross Country to quantify service providers' impact on motorist satisfaction, monitor service providers' performance, and introduce programs to strengthen top-performing service providers' loyalty to Cross Country. Concurrently, the company undertook a two-step organization redesign to focus more resources on service providers (the new primary customer?), improve market-focused innovation and increase client satisfaction. In phase three, from 2008 to 2012, Cross Country entered the high-tech telematics/connected-vehicle business, invested in additional innovations to strengthen its service provider network, and rebranded itself as "Agero." Wolk and his team believed Cross Country had "more driver information than any other company."
Recorded Future is a "big data" startup company that uses Internet data to make predictions about events, people, and entities. The company primarily serves government intelligence agencies, but has some private sector clients and is considering taking on more. The CEO, Christopher Ahlberg, is wrestling with several key decisions about where to take the company in the future.
Privately held city development promoters decide whether to partner on next phase or go it alone in 20 year, 4000 acre project. Set outside of Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, this decades long project led by two Taiwanese families reshaped and built the economic environment of Vietnam's financial capital. The promoters had a long term vision and left very substantial capital invested for a very long time. This allowed them to follow a master plan that was resource efficient, economically attractive, and environmentally friendly (largely due to major up front investments in power and water infrastructure). This project was promoted by industrialists with a system view and patient capital, as compared to governments with limited execution capability or real estate investors with limited capital and a shorter time horizon. The dilemma in the case is about whether or not to partner with an outside retail real estate firm in order to reduce execution and lease-up risk in a proposed new shopping mall; or whether to go it alone with the promoters's own capital doing it the promoter's own way. This expands into a discussion of the same historic choices in the project, and whether the promoters realized a below market return for their methodology. The project is quite successful and transformational today, so the opposite question can also be drawn out: is this the preferred means for promoting multiple new sustainable and competitive cities around the world, with long view private promoters in lieu of government alone and in lieu of real estate developers alone?
On February 2, 2012, the Supreme Court of India cancelled all 122 second-generation (2G) telecom licences issued on or after January 10, 2008 by the Department of Telecommunication (DoT). This judgment, along with the announcement of the National Telecom Policy-2012, forced the DoT to rethink the issue of pricing spectrum, which was earlier bundled with 2G licences. First, was re-auctioning required? If so, what should be the minimum reserve price? Should DoT follow a uniform pricing strategy for all the incumbents, including those whose licences were cancelled? How could it strike a balance between investor apathy and the government’s objective of increasing rural tele-density, given the possibility of a tariff hike after the refarming of spectrum?
On February 2, 2012, the Supreme Court of India cancelled all 122 second-generation (2G) telecom licences issued on or after January 10, 2008 by the Department of Telecommunication (DoT). This judgment, along with the announcement of the National Telecom Policy-2012, forced the DoT to rethink the issue of pricing spectrum, which was earlier bundled with 2G licences. First, was re-auctioning required? If so, what should be the minimum reserve price? Should DoT follow a uniform pricing strategy for all the incumbents, including those whose licences were cancelled? How could it strike a balance between investor apathy and the government's objective of increasing rural tele-density, given the possibility of a tariff hike after the refarming of spectrum?
This case highlights the journey of an organization that was set up in Hyderabad, in southern India, to provide affordable maternal care services to women from low-income urban families. LifeSpring Hospitals grew from a single hospital into a chain of nine hospitals, all in Hyderabad, in only five years. The chief executive officer has spent this initial period trying out new methods, continuously fine-tuning the model and learning from this process of experimentation. As the company seeks to scale the business to 200 hospitals, the chief executive officer must decide whether or not the business model is defined clearly enough to warrant the start of a rapid scaling process. The case is unique because it juxtaposes a commitment to high-quality health care service delivery through processes and protocols with a commitment to making maternal care affordable to low-income urban women. LifeSpring Hospitals tries to achieve these seemingly disparate objectives by attempting to create a financially sustainable business model.
At the end of 2001, the senior partners of an investment management firm were concerned. The bear market was going on two years, and, worse, the firm's performance over that time had been less than that of the index. Clients, more than disappointed, were starting to vote with their feet. The firm, a top-10 player in Canada's institutional investment business, had claimed client assets under management of more than $15 billion in 1998, but was now under serious threat. Without some change in the fortunes of the business, a continued loss of revenue would endanger its viability.<br><br>In the previous few years, the two senior partners had been working behind the scenes on an idea that they thought could return the business to success. The hitch was that the idea involved a radical transformation of the firm. While the senior partners had seen some success with the small steps they had taken with this new business model, they needed to ask their partners to commit to a still largely unproven strategy - a business model that not only had no known comparable model but that also ran contrary to contemporary views of how an asset management firm should be structured. Would their partners commit to the unproven plan?
Tony Lee is preparing to present a project to the invesment committee of Howard Street Capital. He will be recommending an investment in Project Sun Devil, a high-quality 225-unit student housing rental property near Tempe, Arizona. Tony Lee will compete for capital against the other project on the investment committee's agenda, Project Paris. Project Paris, a very different type of real estate transaction, is a hybrid mezzanine investment in the acquisition of a residential real estate services firm headquartered in France. The case provides overview of the two projects.
Monique Leroux led a major transformation, overcoming resistance, at a large Canadian financial cooperative based in Quebec that competed with top Canadian banks. Leroux was elected in 2008 as Chairman, President, and CEO of Desjardins Group. In order to compete effectively in a demanding and changing financial services industry and survive the global financial crisis, Desjardins needed to integrate, consolidate, and determine how to preserve traditional values while preparing for the future and emerging as a less provincial financial group. In 2012 she reflected on the change efforts and the opportunities and challenges ahead.
The case tells the story of Synthroid from its development in 1958 as the first synthetic thyroxine molecule to its competition against generic equivalents in 2004. The case introduces students to the pharmaceutical industry, its practices, and some of the complexities of pricing and drug choice, with drug manufacturers, insurance companies, physicians, pharmacists, and patients all playing a role. It also provides a primer on hypothyroidism, its symptoms, and its treatment. Because Synthroid was developed and introduced before FDA regulations and drug standards of identity were fully established, it was difficult for competitors to get their drugs certified as identical to Synthroid. Through a series of efforts with physicians, especially endocrinologists, Synthroid's owners were able to maintain the perception for forty-six years that Synthroid was uniquely effective. In 2004, however, the FDA declared several competitive products to be bioequivalent to Synthroid, which posed a significant challenge to its owner, Abbott Laboratories. Students are challenged to consider options to maintain the drug's unit volume, revenue, and/or profit in these difficult circumstances. The case is written in two parts. The (A) case provides background on the history of the drug, the pharmaceutical industry and its marketing practices, and hypothyroidism and its treatment, and it concludes in 2004 as Abbott's marketers face the impending challenge of defending the Synthroid business against generic competition. The (B) case describes what Abbott actually did to maintain its share in the United States and outlines its strategy in India, a market without patent protection for pharmaceuticals.
The case tells the story of Synthroid from its development in 1958 as the first synthetic thyroxine molecule to its competition against generic equivalents in 2004. The case introduces students to the pharmaceutical industry, its practices, and some of the complexities of pricing and drug choice, with drug manufacturers, insurance companies, physicians, pharmacists, and patients all playing a role. It also provides a primer on hypothyroidism, its symptoms, and its treatment. Because Synthroid was developed and introduced before FDA regulations and drug standards of identity were fully established, it was difficult for competitors to get their drugs certified as identical to Synthroid. Through a series of efforts with physicians, especially endocrinologists, Synthroid's owners were able to maintain the perception for forty-six years that Synthroid was uniquely effective. In 2004, however, the FDA declared several competitive products to be bioequivalent to Synthroid, which posed a significant challenge to its owner, Abbott Laboratories. Students are challenged to consider options to maintain the drug's unit volume, revenue, and/or profit in these difficult circumstances. The case is written in two parts. The (A) case provides background on the history of the drug, the pharmaceutical industry and its marketing practices, and hypothyroidism and its treatment, and it concludes in 2004 as Abbott's marketers face the impending challenge of defending the Synthroid business against generic competition. The (B) case describes what Abbott actually did to maintain its share in the United States and outlines its strategy in India, a market without patent protection for pharmaceuticals.
In its 100th year of existence in 2009, Borussia Dortmund (BVB) was the only German soccer club listed on the stock exchange. With three days to go before the annual shareholders' meeting on November 24 of that year, the club's managing directors, Thomas Tress and Hans-Joachim Watzke, went through the year-end figures one more time. Although the situation had improved since 2005, when the club was on the brink of insolvency, the closing accounts once again showed a negative net income. After nine years as a publicly traded company, the BVB had to report its fifth loss, this time for 5.9 million Euro, which added up to a cumulative loss of more than 145 million euros. After the passing of a century, many stakeholders were concerned about the way forward. What was the organization's purpose? What was more important, finally making a profit and meeting shareholders' expectations, or playing for the fans and the club's honor? What could the managing directors offer to their shareholders, who had seen the value of their shares drop from 11 euros at the IPO to less than 1 euros in November 2009?
In the spring of 2012, the executive team at Midwest Electronics decided to manufacture its products in Asia for the Asian market. That was a challenging new direction for the company, and subsequent difficult decisions-where to situate the factory, whether to build a new facility or acquire an existing one, and how to finance the project-would also need to be made. This case presents students with the company's summary financial statements, as well as labor, real estate, and cost of capital information, in order to assess the myriad of financial, cultural, and political questions that arise when a company considers relocating some of its manufacturing abroad.
In the spring of 2012, the executive team at Midwest Electronics decided to manufacture its products in Asia for the Asian market. That was a challenging new direction for the company, and subsequent difficult decisions-where to situate the factory, whether to build a new facility or acquire an existing one, and how to finance the project-would also need to be made. This case presents students with the company's summary financial statements, as well as labor, real estate and cost of capital information in order to assess the myriad of financial, cultural, and political questions that arise when a company considers relocating some of its manufacturing abroad.
This case highlights the journey of an organization that was set up in Hyderabad, in southern India, to provide affordable maternal care services to women from low-income urban families. LifeSpring Hospitals grew from a single hospital into a chain of nine hospitals, all in Hyderabad, in only five years. The chief executive officer has spent this initial period trying out new methods, continuously fine-tuning the model and learning from this process of experimentation. As the company seeks to scale the business to 200 hospitals, the chief executive officer must decide whether or not the business model is defined clearly enough to warrant the start of a rapid scaling process.<br><br><br><br>The case is unique because it juxtaposes a commitment to high-quality health care service delivery through processes and protocols with a commitment to making maternal care affordable to low-income urban women. LifeSpring Hospitals tries to achieve these seemingly disparate objectives by attempting to create a financially sustainable business model.
At the end of 2001, the senior partners of an investment management firm were concerned. The bear market was going on two years, and, worse, the firm’s performance over that time had been less than that of the index. Clients, more than disappointed, were starting to vote with their feet. The firm, a top-10 player in Canada’s institutional investment business, had claimed client assets under management of more than $15 billion in 1998, but was now under serious threat. Without some change in the fortunes of the business, a continued loss of revenue would endanger its viability.<br><br>In the previous few years, the two senior partners had been working behind the scenes on an idea that they thought could return the business to success. The hitch was that the idea involved a radical transformation of the firm. While the senior partners had seen some success with the small steps they had taken with this new business model, they needed to ask their partners to commit to a still largely unproven strategy — a business model that not only had no known comparable model but that also ran contrary to contemporary views of how an asset management firm should be structured. Would their partners commit to the unproven plan?
In 2012, Gazprom was widely believed to be on the verge of a steep decline. It had witnessed meteoric growth from its early days as an experiment in privatization of oil and gas following the rapid break-up of the Soviet Union. The case documents the growth strategies that the company has followed, i its global aspirations, and the impact of its political lineage, and discusses how the winds of change heralded the decline of the company. It discusses in detail the role of government policies toward national companies, the influence of politics and power, as well as the management of state-owned entities in emerging markets. The case offers a rich mix of insights into the contextual forces at work in shaping the destiny of Gazprom, the political pressures it faces as Russia's largest company and its stutter-step approach to globalization. The material in the case allows for a comprehensive analysis and discussion on central themes such as the origin of competitive advantage for NOCs (National Oil Companies), the unique governance conflicts that they have to navigate in setting strategic direction, and the viability of their globalization strategies.