This case enables students to gain insights in two areas of control system design: transfer pricing and how a myopic view of control systems can create problems; in two instances the company considered a specific behavioral aspect of a measurement scheme, but neglected to recognize the possibility of undesirable side effects of its approach.
This case focuses on the compensation system for a primary care physicians group at a large physician-hospital organization (PHO). Apogee comprised a diverse group of practices and was in the process of modifying a compensation system that it had developed and implemented one year earlier in a largely fee-for- service environment. The physician leaders need to decide how to change the system, given that a major payer, representing about 30% of its revenue, was switching from fee-for-service to capitation.
This case lends itself to the use of a rather simple spreadsheet, which can be used to both build a budget and to examine opportunities for increasing the budgeted surplus.
This case lends itself to the use of a spreadsheet, that is related to the one developed with Bandon Medical Associates (A). This spreadsheet is a bit more complicated, however, in that it requires computing several variances. It also allows students to assess the impact of responsibility center design on physician behavior.
Superior Savings Bank was a small community bank that had been operating in Superior, Wisconsin, since 1924. Its corporate office was located downtown and two nearby branches were opened-one in a prominent grocery store, SuperOne Foods, and one in a big-box supercenter, Walmart. The Board of Directors and top management were content with the bank's size and performance. However, in 2012, another growth opportunity presented itself, and a decision had to be made whether to maintain the status quo or add a third branch. The bank had the option of offering services in a soon-to-be-constructed SuperOne Foods in the east part of town (3 miles from the corporate office). The bank's President and CEO, David H. Stack, needed to determine whether to expand or keep the bank's operations at its current level.
The case opens with Paul Cope's excitement and optimism about the future possibilities of the library-automation industry. His optimism was tempered by the fact that the library market was very mature and libraries in both Canada and the U.S. were confronted with shrinking budgets. Although Paul Cope was hopeful about the future possibilities of the library-automation industry, A-G had to find a way to increase revenues in its North American business in the face of declining library budgets. The case describes the library-automation industry, the market segments served, the products offered by the firms in the industry, the trends affecting the industry, and the challenges faced by incumbents in the industry. It then describes competition in the PAC segment, which was intense throughout the 2000s. Competing technologies included SaaS (Software as a Service) and open-systems software. Markets were also changing. One ongoing issue was that library patrons belonged to a generation accustomed to Google-like search engines and the latest and greatest technologies, so held high expectations for a library's ease of use and breadth of content. Libraries needed to make radical changes to redefine their relevancy with their community of users and to keep up with changes in technologies including eBooks, eJournals and other online resources. The case then describes A-G itself-how it innovates, its product line, and its financial statements over the past five years. The case ends with the challenges facing Paul Cope and A-G. The case will challenge students to integrate industry and competitive dynamics with market demands and technological trends and devise a set of worthy strategic alternatives commensurate with its financial resources to help A-G continue to grow in the future.
In 2011 Nespresso, the premium single-serve coffee brand of the multinational Swiss company Nestle, found itself at a crossroads. Between 2006 and 2010 Nespresso had managed to nearly triple sales - from CHF 1.16 billion to well over CHF 3 billion. But despite its meteoric growth in recent years, competitors were moving to try to challenge Nespresso's dominance of the premium single-serve coffee market by launching their own single-serve concepts. Some of these competitors had developed capsules compatible with the Nespresso system, and had aggressively pushed into the supermarket channel where Nespresso itself remained completely absent. Nespresso had to understand the degree to which it could sustain its competitive advantage in the premium single-serve coffee market in the face of growing competition, and develop strategies to address the growing threat of competitors who were offering Nespresso compatible capsules. The case helps students to develop a deeper understanding of the concepts of innovation, branding, business system fit, sustainable competitive advantage and responding to low-cost competitors. It is intended for MBA courses in Strategic Management, Innovation and Marketing. It can also be used in executive education programs, for example as part of a competitive strategy program to discuss issues related to strategy, competitive advantage and responding to low-cost rivals.
This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. In many companies, pricing receives surprisingly little attention. Following work that included a study of pricing at 15 small and medium-sized companies, the authors conclude that most companies can improve their pricing capabilities -and thus their profitability -over time by taking a disciplined approach. The authors identify two key elements of pricing -price orientation and price getting -and five levels of pricing capabilities. They observe that the companies they studied that achieved better pricing had top managers who championed the development of pricing skills. While competition, costs and price sensitivity within a market affect the parameters within which companies set prices, superior pricing is almost always based on skill, the authors maintain. Companies differ substantially in their approach to price setting, but most fall into one of three buckets: cost-based pricing, competition-based pricing or customer value-based pricing. Customer value-based pricing uses data on the perceived customer value of the product as the main factor for determining the final selling price, and many scholars consider customer value-based pricing often to be a preferable approach to price setting for existing products. The authors argue that according to their research many companies can improve their pricing capabilities by cultivating their understanding of the value they bring their customers. But implementing customer value-based pricing is not easy, the authors caution. They find that developing and implementing a sophisticated, customer value-based pricing program is a multiyear project that demands a high degree of executive attention and requires substantial changes in processes and thinking within the company.
"High sustainability" companies significantly outperformed their counterparts over an 18-year period in terms of both stock market and accounting criteria, such as return on assets and return on equity. They also exhibited lower performance volatility. Currently, organizations that exhibit a broad-based commitment to sustainability on the basis of their original corporate DNA are few and far between. For most companies, becoming sustainable involves a conscious and continuing effort to build long-term value for shareholders by contributing to a sustainable society. The authors studied the organizational models of companies that they refer to as "sustainable" by comparing them with companies that they call "traditional." They focused on two primary questions: (1) How do sustainable companies create the conditions that embed sustainability in the company's strategy and operations, and (2) What are the specific elements of sustainable companies' cultures that differentiate them from those of traditional companies? The authors have developed an identity and cultural model for how to create a sustainable company. While the model is straightforward, implementation is by no means easy, because it is grounded in largescale change - something that few companies seek out or do well. The first stage involves reframing the company's identity through leadership commitment and external engagement. The second stage involves codifying the new identity through employee engagement and mechanisms of execution. Both are ongoing processes. Once the second stage begins, the two stages reinforce each other. Employee engagement enables even more sophisticated external engagement, since a broader range of employees will be able to effectively engage with outside stakeholders. Mechanisms of execution bind leadership commitment, since these organizational-level attributes continue from one generation of leaders to the next.
Two days before Thanksgiving 2010, Kullman got a call from the CEO of Danisco, a Denmark-based leader in industrial biotechnology and nutritional ingredients, letting her know that his company was for sale. Danisco had been on DuPont's M&A radar screen for several years, but now Kullman had only six weeks to make an offer. DuPont's due diligence teams pushed tirelessly to understand Danisco's two core science-based businesses. Twenty minutes before the final bids were due, on January 7, Kullman and her CFO got a final briefing from all key parties. They made sure no information or opinions had been held back, and then settled on an offer, which Danisco accepted. Then began a long process: Regulatory approvals were needed from the U.S., the European Commission, and China. Meanwhile, hedge funds were trying to drive up the stock price. DuPont also needed agreement from 90% of shareholders to absorb Danisco and delist it from the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. Finally DuPont raised its price and got the deal done. The story offers lessons for any company involved in M&A: First, be prepared to strike. But make sure you don't fall in love with the deal before you have all the data. Stay open to every opinion, be flexible, and plan the integration even as you're working on the transaction. DuPont has achieved its initial target of $130 million in cost savings a year ahead of schedule.
Executives complain, with justification, that meddling and second-guessing from shareholders are making it ever harder for them to do their jobs effectively. Shareholders complain, with justification, of executives who pocket staggering paychecks while delivering mediocre results. Boards are stuck in the middle--and under increasing pressure to act as watchdogs and disciplinarians despite evidence that they're more effective as friendly advisers. Over many years shareholders have gained power but been frustrated by the results. Could the problem lie with them? Perhaps they aren't really suited to being corporate bosses. Their role, write the authors, has been to provide money, information, and discipline. But established corporations tend to finance investments out of retained earnings or borrowed money. Furthermore, high-frequency traders now account for as much as 70% of daily volume on the NYSE. As for information, shareholders communicate through stock prices--but human nature dictates that we pay more attention to simple recent signals than to complex long-run trends. And shareholders have only two major disciplinary tools at their disposal: selling their shares and casting their votes. But institutional investors, which own the lion's share of stock and have widely diversified portfolios, find it difficult to focus on the governance and performance of any one company. Fixing corporate governance, the authors conclude, must be about finding roles for other actors in the corporate equation who can assume some of the burden of providing money, information, and especially discipline.
In recent decades sales reps have become adept at discovering customers' needs and selling them "solutions." This worked because customers didn't know how to solve their own problems. But the world of B2B selling has changed: Companies today can readily define their own solutions and force suppliers into a price-driven bake-off. There's some good news, though, according to the authors, all directors at Corporate Executive Board. A select group of reps are flourishing in this environment--and lessons from the playbook they've devised can help other reps and organizations boost their performance. These star reps look for different sorts of organizations, targeting ones with emerging rather than established demand. Instead of waiting for the customer to identify a problem the supplier can solve, they engage early on and offer provocative ideas about what the customer should do. They seek out a different set of stakeholders, preferring skeptical change agents over friendly informants, and they coach those change agents on how to buy rather than quizzing them about their company's purchasing process. High-performing reps are still selling solutions--but more broadly, they're selling insights. And in this new world, that makes the difference between a pitch that goes nowhere and one that secures the customer's business.
No sales force consists entirely of stars; sales staffs are usually made up mainly of solid performers, with smaller groups of laggards and rainmakers. Though most compensation plans approach these three groups as if they were the same, research shows that each is motivated by something different. By accounting for those differences in their incentive programs, companies can coax better performance from all their salespeople. As the largest cadre, core performers typically represent the greatest opportunity, but they're often ignored by incentive plans. Contests with prizes that vary in nature and value (and don't all go to stars) will inspire them to ramp up their efforts, and tiered targets will guide them up the performance curve. Laggards need quarterly bonuses to stay on track; when they have only annual bonuses, their revenues will drop 10%, studies show. This group is also motivated by social pressure--especially from new talent on the sales bench. Stars tend to get the most attention in comp plans, but companies often go astray by capping their commissions to control costs. If firms instead remove commission ceilings and pay extra for overachievement, they'll see the sales needle really jump. The key is to treat sales compensation not as an expense to rein in but as a portfolio of investments to manage. Companies that do this will be rewarded with much higher returns.
Best-selling author and behavioral science and business thinker Daniel Pink writes in this essay that as sales becomes less formulaic and more about creative knowledge work, extrinsic motivators--commissions and bonuses--are becoming less relevant. The new breed of inventive, insight-selling reps wants challenging, meaningful, intrinsically rewarding work. Dan suggests that having reps work on commission may actually undermine performance--and he proposes that some firms eliminate commissions altogether.
Sophisticated sales organizations now have the ability to combine, sift, and sort vast troves of data to develop highly efficient strategies for selling into micromarkets. While B2C companies are typically adept at mining the petabytes of transactional and other purchasing data that consumers generate as they interact online, B2B sales organizations have only recently begun to use big data to both inform overall strategy and tailor sales pitches for specific customers in real time. Micromarket analyses involve five steps: defining the optimal micromarket size; determining the growth potential for each; gauging market share in each; understanding the causes of variation in market share across them; and prioritizing high-potential markets to focus on. Exploiting new-growth hot spots will be successful only if salespeople have a solid understanding of how micromarkets work and the simple tools for selling into them. Sales leaders must coach their teams in developing sales "plays" for groups of structurally similar micromarkets. That requires cross-functional collaboration--in particular, between sales and marketing. To sustain early wins, companies also need to change their approach to sales force management in three ways: They must rethink performance management, open new channels between sales and marketing, and invest in talent development.
It stands to reason that sales, the most social of business activities, would make use of social media. But few organizations have figured out how to do so in a smart, productive way. The authors--veteran salespeople and now sales trainers--offer insights to help companies and reps get maximum value from sites like LinkedIn, Twitter, and Facebook. Social media's greatest potential, they note, is at the start of the sales cycle, during prospecting, opportunity qualification, and pre-sales-call research. Short messages sent via social media produce a much greater response than cold calling--and, even better, reps don't always have to start the conversation. In addition to building prospecting networks, they can set up keyword alerts and use tools such as HootSuite to pick up signals of need. At the back end of the cycle, social media tools are invaluable for maintaining relationships, which are often neglected in the pursuit of new sales. Organizational support can help, not just with training on mechanics and etiquette but also by providing engaging content to share. Yes, there are risks to using social media. But with clear policies, those risks can be mitigated. And as your customers increasingly come to expect social network engagement, the biggest risk of all is to stay on the sidelines.