Angel investors Ram Shriram, Mike Maples, Eric Paley, James Geshweiler, and Jim Southern discuss their investment philosophies and the changing landscape of angel investing. Questions include: • How has angel investing changed in the last few years? • How do you evaluate a prospective investment's attractiveness? • How do you think about risk and reward in angel investing? • Is it possible for Angel funds to be too big?
The competing narratives of the founders of Alantec, Inc. and the venture capitalists who funded the company are explored in the context of Kalashian v. Advent VI Ltd. a California Superior Court case. The founders of the company, which produced switches for computer networks, raised several rounds of financing from venture capital firms that ended up controlling the company's board. After the company continued to fall short of its sales projections, the board ousted the founders and brought in new management. The company subsequently raised two new rounds of financing which resulted in dilution of the interests of the founders from about 8% to less than .01 %. Alantec then launched a new product, "the Power Hub," which became highly successful, and the company ultimately went public. The founders sold their remaining shares shortly after the IPO. Two years later, Alantec was acquired for the equivalent of $70 per share. Following the sale, the founders sued, alleging that the venture capitalists had committed fraud and breached their fiduciary duties as controlling shareholders of Alantec. The case presents actual excerpts from the trial briefs of both the founders and the venture capitalists, and presents competing views on how and why the dilution occurred.
Five year old Matty died at Children's Hospital Boston as a result of elective neurosurgery to "cure" his epilepsy. The organizational system, not the surgery, had failed. During post-operative recovery, he experienced a prolonged seizure that resulted in his death. Confused leadership, organizational differentiation, structurally induced silence, and organizational mis-alignment contributed to the death. How could this happen in such a world class medical facility?
This case analyzes Dow Chemical Company's proposed acquisition of Rohm and Haas in 2008. The $18.8 billion acquisition was part of Dow's strategic transformation from a slow-growth, low-margin, and cyclical producer of basic chemicals into a higher-growth, higher-margin, and more stable producer of performance chemicals. Simultaneously, Dow had signed a joint venture agreement with Petrochemical Industries Company (PIC) of Kuwait, a deal that would generate $7 billion in cash that could be used to finance the all-cash offer to buy Rohm and Haas. Dow and Rohm announced the Rohm merger on July 10, 2008, just before the financial crisis in September 2008. The focus of the case is on what happened after the financial crisis turned into a global economic crisis. Dow, like all chemical producers, suffered as the global economy fell into recession during the second half of 2008, and as financial markets froze. To make matters worse, PIC cancelled the joint venture with Dow in December 2008. As a result, Dow was hurt on three fronts: first, it lost an important funding source for the proposed acquisition; second, Dow's financial condition and internal cash flow deteriorated dramatically (its stock price was down more than 70% during 2008); and third, Rohm's forecast sales, earnings, and value declined precipitously thereby reducing its attractiveness as an acquisition target. Given this confluence of events, Dow sued to cancel the merger agreement with Rohm in January 2009. Rohm responded with its own lawsuit to force consummation of the deal. As of February 2009, Dow's board of directors and its CEO Andrew Liveris have to decide what to do first and foremost about the Rohm acquisition and the pending lawsuits, but also about the firm's declining financial performance and the PIC joint venture.
Nine Dragons Paper (NDP) is the largest paperboard manufacturer in China and one of the largest in the world. Led by Mrs. Cheung, CEO, chairman, and founder, it has successfully grown to the top of the industry through a "grow at all costs" strategy. But in the spring of 2009, the company's rising debt levels had combined with declining margins to send the company's share price tumbling. The market was increasingly worried that Mrs. Cheung's strategy was putting the company at risk.
In December 2003, the Pacific LNG Consortium feared it was nearing an end to its long-term effort to develop Bolivian natural gas for export. Three companies--Repsol YPF (Spain, 37.5%), BG Group (United Kingdom, 37.5%), and Pan-American Energy, a unit of BP (United Kingdom, 25.0%)--comprised the Pacific LNG Consortium. The Consortium's objective, in short, was to develop Bolivian gas, build a pipeline to the Pacific coast, construct a liquefied natural gas (LNG) liquefaction facility, and export the LNG to California via pipeline from a port in Mexico. The project's economic viability was based on two critical factors: ready access to Bolivian natural gas for at least thirty years, and a long-term sales agreement for the gas. Although Pacific LNG had a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for the contractual sale of the gas, the MOU was about to run out, and the Bolivian government was still debating the political and economic issues related to the export of its most precious natural resource-natural gas. The Consortium needed to make a last-ditch effort to save the project.
In early June 2008, Belgian-based InBev NV launched an unsolicited $46.4 billion bid to acquire Anheuser-Busch Co., owner of the 132-year-old Budweiser brand. If completed, the combination would create the world's largest brewer, with sales of about $36 billion annually. The initial response from Anheuser was noncommittal and said, "The company will pursue the course of action that is in the best interests of Anheuser-Busch's stockholders." On June 26, Anheuser's board formally rejected InBev's original proposal of $65 a share, saying it substantially undervalued the company. In mid-July, InBev raised its offer to $70 a share, and the Anheuser board voted to accept the deal, recognizing that a better offer was unlikely. The $70 price represented a substantial premium for Anheuser shareholders. InBev management now has to prove to their shareholders that the premium was justified.
The Computerized Provider Order Entry at Emory Healthcare case presents one hospital system's efforts to implement computerized provider order entry (CPOE) across all of its hospitals and the challenges they faced in doing so. Issues such as standardization of care, how to handle medication reconciliation, and unexpected challenges (e.g., changes to the post-op ordering process, lack of a human gatekeeper to monitor order flow, increase in lab orders). Dr. Bill Bornstein, Chief Quality and Medical Officer of Emory Healthcare in Atlanta is responsible for the smooth implementation of CPOE at Emory Healthcare, which is a vital part of their $50 million electronic medical record initiative. By June 2009, CPOE had gone "live" at Emory University Orthopaedics and Spine Hospital, Emory University Hospital, and Wesley Woods Hospital in a staged rollout. While Dr. Bornstein felt good about how the implementation had gone thus far, as he looked ahead next month to July 13, 2009, the fast approaching go-live date for Emory University Hospital Midtown (EUHM), he was concerned about the challenges and possible perils that lay ahead. He considered what additional actions he should take to prepare for go-live at Midtown, and if Midtown was ready for CPOE at all. One thing was certain; this hospital was different. The Computerized Provider Order Entry at Emory Healthcare case presents one hospital system's efforts to grapple with the challenges of implementing CPOE and the reactions that result. Issues such as how to deal with a workforce that has mixed views about the value of implementing such systems, the pros and cons associated with standardization of care, as well as how to deal with unexpected changes to work processes are brought out in the case. The case also allows for discussion of how to plan a phased implementation with adequate time for organizational learning to occur between the time that various sites "go live."
Two young attorneys found and begin to build the Indego Africa Project, an NGO partnering with women's cooperatives in Rwanda. Indego connects the cooperatives to the international retail market for handmade artisan products, helps the cooperatives build their business capacity, and develops and delivers classroom training in life and business skills for the cooperative members. At the time of the case, Indego is partnering with three cooperatives. The NGO is staffed mostly with volunteers and the founders are stretched to the limit, between managing the growing organization and all of the necessary fundraising activities. The organization hopes to partner with more coops and increase its impact in Rwanda and beyond, but the path to sustained growth and impact is not clear.
The last years' rather adventurous journey from 2004 to 2009 had taught the fifth-largest toy-maker in the world - the LEGO Group - the importance of managing the global supply chain effectively. In order to survive the largest internal financial crisis in its roughly 70 years of existence, the management had, among many initiatives, decided to offshore and outsource a major chunk of its production to Flextronics. In this pursuit of rapid cost-cutting sourcing advantages, the LEGO Group planned to license out as much as 80 per cent of its production besides closing down major parts of the production in high cost countries. Confident with the prospects of the new partnership, the company signed a long-term contract with Flextronics. This decision eventually proved itself to have been too hasty, however. Merely three years after the contracts were signed, LEGO management announced that it would phase out the entire sourcing collaboration with Flextronics. This sudden change in its sourcing strategy posed LEGO management with a number of caveats. Despite the bright forecasts, the collaboration did not fulfill the initial expectations, and the company needed to understand why this had happened. Secondly, what could LEGO management have done differently?
Esquel Group, leading manufacturer of quality shirts, sought to negotiate long-term partnerships with often-exploited farmers in Xinjiang (western China) to procure a superior cotton variety. Seeking to secure a large supply of specialty cotton in an ethical and socially responsible fashion, Esquel undertook a major 2002 initiative to negotiate value-creating contracts among itself, local Xinjiang municipal governments, and cotton farmers. Aware that contract enforcement in China can be challenging, Esquel offered the region's poor, often-suspicious farmers attractive advanced financing, guaranteed minimum pricing, and other generous terms in return for an agreement to sell their crop exclusively to Esquel. The case concludes with the specialty cotton harvest shaping up as very good while demand for the premium cotton fiber appears to be stronger than ever.
Details and evaluates results in Esquel's 2002 initiative to negotiate long-term partnerships with often-exploited farmers in Xinjiang (western China) to procure a superior cotton variety.
In June 2010, Naser Tavazo, one of the three owner/manager brothers of both Tavazo Iran Co. and Tavazo Canada Co., was considering the company's future expansion opportunities, including further international market entry. Candidate cities of interest were Los Angeles, Dubai and other cities with a high Iranian diaspora. Another question facing the owners was where to focus on the value chain. Should the family business use its limited resources to expand its retailer business into more international markets, or to expand their current retailer/wholesale activities within Canada and Iran?<br><br>The objectives of this case are: (A) to discuss the typical problems that small companies confront when growing internationally and the implication of being a family business in this transition; (B) to provide a vehicle for developing criteria for market selection; (C) to highlight the importance of focus in the value chain regarding horizontal vs. vertical integration.<br><br>This case can be used in international business, strategic management or family business (entrepreneurship) courses. In international business, it may be used as an internationalization case and positioned early in the course. In a strategic management course, it might be positioned in sections dealing with managerial preferences, or diversification.
Chiquita Brands International and its leaders learned a very hard lesson about paying off terrorist groups to protect their employees. Over the past 25 years, no place has been more perilous for companies than Colombia, a country that is finally beginning to emerge from the effects of civil war and narco-terrorism. In 2004, Chiquita voluntarily revealed to the U.S. Justice Department that one of its Colombian banana subsidiaries had made protection payments to terrorist groups from 1997 through 2004. The Justice Department began an investigation, focusing on the role and conduct of Chiquita and some of its officers in this criminal activity. Subsequently, Chiquita entered into a plea agreement that gave them the dubious distinction of being the first major U.S. company ever convicted of dealing with terrorists, and resulted in a fine of US$25 million and other penalties. To make matters worse, the industry was facing pressure from increasing retailer purchasing power, major changes in consumer tastes and preferences, and Europe's imposition of an "onerous tariff" on companies that sourced bananas from Latin America. With this in mind, Fernando Aguirre, Chiquita's CEO since 2004, reflected on how the company had arrived at this point, and what had been done to correct the course so far. He faced major challenges to the company's competitive position in this dynamic industry. What would it take to position the company on a more positive competitive trajectory? Would this even be possible in this industry and in the business climate Chiquita faced?
A direct-selling cosmetics company involved in emerging markets exhibits significant foreign exchange risk exposure and profitability swings in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Students must review the company's use of derivative instruments and other hedging techniques to establish whether it pursues the right FX risk mitigation strategy.