This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Established companies in industries as diverse as airlines, media, and banking have seen their markets invaded by new disruptive business models. The newcomers succeed not only by stealing customers from the established firms but also by attracting new customers into the market. As a result, established companies need to decide how to keep their existing customers while taking advantage of the new ones. One options is to use existing business models to cater for both markets. Another is to develop a new business model specifically for the new market. This is not an easy decision because entering a new market can be risky. But if a firm decides to do so, it must decide on what business model to adopt and then make sure that the new business model co-exists peacefully next to its existing business model. Based on research into 65 companies that chose to enter markets created by disruptive business models (including Nestlä, Edward Jones, Waitrose, Reuters, and Tesco), the authors say that established firms should develop new business models that are different from their existing business models and different from the business model of the disruptor. However, designing these business models is not only difficult in its own right but also raises the challenge of how to operate two different and conflicting business models in the same company. The authors argue that the usual prescription of creating a separate unit to house the new business model is not enough. The company needs to achieve a delicate balance: establishing enough separation between the two business models to avoid conflicts, but not so much to take advantage of synergies between the two. To achieve this balance, the company needs to create an ambidextrous organizational environment.
When a crisis strikes, brands can avert backlash from consumers -- and even strengthen the brand -- with well-considered and thoughtfully deployed communication. Based on scientific research on persuasion, the authors present a comprehensive crisis communication framework to help restore consumer trust, illustrating these recommendations using cases of both successful and unsuccessful recovery from brand crises. The authors draw heavily on Toyota's recent experience in responding to the unintended acceleration of some of its vehicles. Toyota's responses provide examples both of what to do, and what not to do, when a company is accused of wrongdoing. The authors contend that there is no one best communications path to follow when a company is in crisis. Rather, they say, the best approach will depend on the answers to three central questions: Is the accusation prompting the crisis true? Is the crisis severe? Has the company established its brand as something that customers closely identify with? Taking these factors into account, a company might best be served by some combination of seven communications strategies. These strategies range from admitting error and apologizing on the one extreme to defiantly denying and wrongdoing and even attacking the accuser on the other. In addition to describing these seven communications strategies, the authors also lay out four lessons on corporate crisis communications that emerge from the Toyota debacle. One, in the Internet age, speed of response is imperative. Second (and a corollary to the need for speed), companies need to be ready for a crisis at all times, and have at hand a step-by-step protocol to follow when bad things happen. Third, it is essential that in a time of crisis, the CEO him or herself -- not lower level management--needs to step forward and publicly articulate the company's responses. And fourth, companies must not delude themselves that they can skate by while ignoring a crisis. Response is essential.
In recent years, much has been written about evidence-based- or fact-based- decision making. The core idea is that decisions supported by hard facts and sound analysis are likely to be better than decisions made on the basis of instinct, folklore or informal anecdotal evidence. And many organizations have invested heavily in data processing infrastructure and analytical tools based on assumption that better evidence-based decision will follow from these investments. But research by the authors suggests that evidence is not as frequent an input to a decision process as managers like to think. Instead, what occurs is decision-based evidence making -sometimes without managers even understanding, that it's happening. The authors address three key questions: Why does decision-based evidence making occur in organizations? Is decision-based evidence making the necessarily bad? And, if decision-based evidence making is inevitable in organizations, what can be done to lessen its negative impacts? To help answer those questions, the authors explain how decision making is affected by the contexts in which problems are presented- and how those contexts can demand different ways of using evidence, depending on whether the evidence is being used to make, inform or support a decision.
After booming for more than five years, the global shipping (maritime) industry experienced a dramatic crash in late 2008 as the global financial system froze and the global economy slid into recession. Ship charter rates (revenue) fell by as much as 90% causing prices of used ships to fall by as much as 80%. As ship prices (values?) fell, ship owners began to default on loans and new purchase contracts while banks holding loans secured by ships faced the possibility of increasing defaults (violations of loan-to-value covenants), foreclosures, and write-offs. In the midst of this crisis, VHSS, the German Shipbroker's Association, introduced a proposal to value ships using discounted cash flow analysis (to determine a long-term asset value, LTAV) rather than market prices from comparable transactions. Thomas Rehder, the Chairman of VHSS, argued this approach was necessary because market prices did not reflect fundamental values in the current environment. After announcing the alternative valuation methodology in September 2009, he must convince industry participants--ship owners, appraisers, and bankers--to adopt the new valuation methodology and bank regulators and auditing firms to approve its use.
With job growth lagging, local communities will be tempted to use tax breaks to attract big employers, but new research by Harvard economist Edward L. Glaeser and William R. Kerr of Harvard Business School indicates that's a misguided approach-growth is highly correlated with an abundance of small firms, not the presence of a few big ones.
A survey by biologist Christoph Randler reveals that morning people are more proactive than evening people. That makes them more likely to succeed, especially since corporate schedules are geared to their peak performance hours. Though evening people may be more intelligent and more creative, when it comes to the business world, morning people hold the important cards.
Powerlessness damages organizations-especially in the middle ranks, says HBR columnist Rosabeth Moss Kanter. Hemmed in by rules and treated as unimportant, people get even with management by overcontrolling their own turf. Kanter urges leaders to give employees opportunities to make meaningful contributions, because small wins along those lines can propel big changes.
Warren Bennis, the pioneering management professor, looks back on his career-and at the events that turned a 19-year-old army lieutenant from a blue-collar background into a university president and a leadership scholar.
This note discusses logistic regression using binomial data. Also discussed is an explanation of how to estimate the parameters from logistic regression using Microsoft Excel (without any add-ins). The note is a follow up to Note on Logistic Regression, product #910E05, which discusses the case with Bernoulli data.
Luxottica, headquartered in Milan, Italy, was the largest eyewear company in the world with sales surpassing €5 billion in 2008. In June 2009, the CEO of Luxottica, met with his management team to review the company's growth strategy for the next five years. The objective was to take Luxottica to the next growth level. Should he stick to the same business model, or adopt a new one? Should he expand retail brand acquisitions? How should the large portfolio of brands be managed? Where should the geographic focus of the company be? Learning objectives: Global strategy, marketing and supply chain management.
Wang Yung-ching, legendary Taiwanese businessman and philanthropist, passed away in 2008. He left behind an estate worth US $5.5 billion, but did not leave a will. The case discusses the potential motivation for Wang, and uses it to study succession planning for family businesses.
This case focuses on the review by the private equity firm ABRY Partners of an opportunity to invest in a film financing vehicle, Legendary Pictures. Before 2004, private equity firms had avoided co-investing with film studios in film productions because of their perception of the industry as highly risky and biased against financial investors. The ABRY team undertook extensive due diligence to determine the risk-reward profile of investments in film slates. The case highlights issues around due diligence, risk assessment, market bias and deal structuring in private equity.
Stephen Engelberg, ProPublica's managing editor, entered the organization's newsroom located in lower Manhattan on September 16, 2008. He knew a historical financial debacle was happening at his doorstep yet that none of his journalists were covering that beat. It would take much effort to get up to speed on the story. Uncovering what caused the recent turmoil in financial markets and Lehman's failure would require skills, knowledge of financial services, and connections within the industry. ProPublica had been created only a year earlier as an independent, non-profit newsroom focused on investigative journalism. It was now fully staffed with close to 30 members, including journalists who had joined partly because of the promise of editorial latitude they were offered. As Engelberg weighed his various options, he knew all the major U.S. newsrooms were heading full speed to allocate resources covering the developing debacle. ProPublica needed to live up to the public's expectations. Should he assign the story to one of his journalists and, if so, whom? Alternatively should he hire new talent? In that case who would be a good fit? Moreover, how might this impact ProPublica's model and culture?
In October 2009, State Grid, the largest utility company in the world, and a pioneer and leader in CSR practices in China, was planning its 2009 CSR Report and long-term CSR implementation. Some of the specific challenges faced at the time include: How could the company balance the different stakeholder expectations and respond to their concerns in a clear and concise way? To what extent should the company reference international standards in its CSR reporting? How could it change the mindsets of 1.5 million employees across diverse geographies to help them abide by CSR principles and management policies on a daily basis? Finally, how could State Grid improve its stakeholder management to establish mutual trust with stakeholders so that they would see State Grid as a responsible company?
In early 2010, cleantech investment pioneer Tsing Capital was planning for the China Environment Fund IV and considering how to maintain its commitment to social and environmental practices. Tsing Capital embraced its philosophy of "Doing Well by Doing Good" and developed a proprietary system to manage social & environmental functions throughout the investment process. Some of the specific questions examined in the case are: with a more diversified investor base, how could the firm balance the different expectations of investors and continue to achieve "Doing Well by Doing Good"? Despite the increasing importance of social & environmental practices, they also had a cost for the firm and its portfolio companies. How could the firm most effectively motivate its portfolio companies to actively integrate social & environmental practices with their strategies?
Scientific Glassware is a fast-growing, privately held company that provides specialized glassware for laboratory and research facilities. Excess inventory is tying up extra capital needed to fund the company's expansion plans. The newly hired Manager of Inventory Planning is tasked with developing an effective strategy for managing inventory without requiring additional capital investment. The company has launched several initiatives, such as adding a dedicated domestic sales force, which directly affect inventory requirements. At the same time, the company has announced a commitment to improve customer responsiveness and reduce the "fill rate," the time it takes to fulfill new orders. These changes may require adding warehouses or outsourcing fulfillment services. This case focuses on the business challenges of inventory control and order processing, particularly the tradeoffs between centralized and decentralized inventories. Students must complete a quantitative analysis of the costs and benefits of several alternatives.