Companies shouldn't involve outside firms in their innovation efforts when product complexity is very low or high. When it's somewhere in the middle-that's another story.
Imitation is vastly underappreciated, says Oded Shenkar, a professor at Ohio State University's Fisher College of Business. Nearly 98% of the value of innovations is captured by copycats. Look at McDonald's, Visa, and Wal-Mart, which all far outran the path breakers they followed. Successful imitation, however, requires as much discipline as innovation does. To improve their odds, imitators need to understand "true" imitation, develop the capabilities that enable its effective use, and learn to deploy the right strategies.
If you're like most brand managers, you're unaware of or turned off by "extreme consumers"-people so crazy about the brand that they spend more than 10% of their lifetime income on it. But they can be your most powerful marketers.
Benchmarking best practices allows enterprises to catch up with the competition, but it won't turn them into market leaders. Organizations become winners by spotting big opportunities and inventing next practices. Executives can unearth opportunities by identifying big problems that their companies will benefit by tackling. They must ask six questions: (1) Is the problem widely recognized? (2) Does it affect other industries? (3) Are radical innovations needed to tackle the problem? (4) Can tackling it change the industry's economics? (5) Will addressing the issue create a fresh source of competitive advantage? (6) Would tackling this problem prove to be a big opportunity for us?
Companies pay amazing amounts of money to get answers from consultants or rely on focus groups, a dozen people riffing on something they know little about, to set strategies. What companies won't do is experiment to find evidence of the right way forward. Why? One reason is that experiments require short-term sacrifices for long-term gains. Companies (and people) are notoriously bad at making those trade-offs. Another is that there's the false sense of security that heeding experts provides. When we pay consultants, we want an answer from them and not a proposal for what experiment to conduct. As human beings, we tend to value answers over questions because answers allow us to take action, while questions mean that we need to keep thinking to work things out.
At the end of 2009, The Dannon Company was considering pro actively communicating its CSR efforts to consumers. With the strong connection between Dannon's production of health foods and its commitment to health and nutrition-based CSR activities, communicating these activities to consumers could enhance the company's success, but risked tainting its deeply ingrained CSR as a marketing ploy. Dannon wanted to maintain its holistic approach to social responsibility and commitment to social values. Dannon's CSR focused on three areas: Nutrition and Health, People and Nature. The case follows the perspectives of various stakeholders within the organization, including members of the Marketing, Human Resources and Corporate Affairs departments. Some of the specific questions examined are: Should we communicate Dannon's CSR activities? What would be the best means to do so? Should it be a corporate or brand level campaign? How would the parent company, Danone, respond? Can CSR remain sincere when being leveraged for PR purposes?
School of One was a start-up with a new approach to learning. Instead of one teacher delivering the entire math curriculum to a class of 20-25 students, School of One utilized a technology platform that allowed several teachers to collectively oversee the learning of a larger group of students. Each student followed a personalized pathway to mastery of a set of math concepts through a mix of teacher-led instruction, live and virtual tutoring, and online lessons and games. Teachers could specialize in the concepts and instructional approaches they were best at and work with students who were ready to learn new material. The case explores the model and questions about growth and scalability.     
In a January 2010 public statement, Google threatened to stop censoring its search results on its Google.cn website, as required by Chinese authorities. Should Google exit China? Or attempt a compromise with the Chinese government?
A senior Blackstone director is deciding how aggressively to bid for Travelport, a travel distribution business containing several key services and platforms. Travelport's most important properties were Galileo, one of the top 3 global distribution systems (GDSs), CheapTickets and Orbitz, two online travel agencies. Blackstone was competing in an auction against several other large private equity firms with multi•billion dollar investment funds. The auction was about to enter its final round of bidding, with bids having reached $4 billion in the prior round. The Blackstone director (Schorr) and his team have to make three key judgments regarding Travelport. First, they need to develop a point of view on the structural attractiveness of the travel GDS industry. Secondly, they need to decide whether Travelport was a good business to own and identify the key sources of its value. The Travelport business is composed of many different sub•businesses that play in different parts of the travel value chain and some of these sub•businesses are more strategic than others. Thirdly, like most leveraged buyouts, Travelport will need to support a significant amount of debt as a result of the transaction. Chip and his team need to make a judgment on the stability of Travelport's businesses and its ability to generate consistent, predictable cash flows to service its debt obligations.
This short case presents the epilogue of The Auction for Travelport (A). Blackstone decided to bid on its own, acquired Travelport for $4.3 billion and subsequently went on to acquire another GDS, Travelspan, for $1.4 billion. It then merged the two GDSs and partially spun off in an IPO its online travel businesses, re-named Orbitz Worldwide; it retained the GDS and wholesale travel businesses. By the end of that year (2006), Blackstone had generated cost savings of $270 million. In 2007 Blackstone also undertook a major capital market transaction with Travelport, issuing a new $1.1 billion Senior Unsecured PIK Term Loan, which allowed Blackstone to take back all of its equity in the transaction. Subsequently, during the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, Blackstone and Travelport repurchased the majority of the $1.1bn PIK loan and other debt in the open market at prices ranging from 18% to 57% of par value, generating a $610 million gain.
After Hurricane Katrina devastated the city in August 2005, the state had taken over 102 of the 118 public schools in New Orleans and shifted the management structure from a "single school system to a system of schools." Entrepreneurs from the region and around the country had flocked to New Orleans to run schools and provide the talent those schools needed to help their students succeed. State superintendent Paul Pastorek knew the system had a long way to go to achieve excellence, but he also knew the state never intended to govern local schools permanently. As he considered his options for the recommendation to the state board about future governance, his overarching goal was to position the "system of schools" for long-term success.  
Danaher's 25-year history of acquisition-driven expansion had produced healthy stock prices as well as above-average growth and profitability for more than 20 years; however, since mid-2007, Wall Street questioned the scalability of the company's corporate strategy and its reliance on acquisitions. Prudential Equity Group had downgraded Danaher to underweight status, citing concerns over its inadequate organic growth. In March 2009, its CEO wondered how to keep growing a company that faced changing world-wide economic circumstances, pressure from low-cost manufacturers, new competitors, flat or declining demand for company products, price increases for certain raw materials, and criticism from market analysts. Should he consider changing Danaher's growth strategy, or should he be confident that past successes were sustainable? Should he consider changes to the way Danaher made acquisitions or attempt aggressive organic growth? Should Danaher make larger acquisitions or increase the pace of deal making or would the answer lie in tighter integration of targets within each platform, where additional value could be created?
This case is suitable for students just beginning to learn finance principles but is also appropriate to use in courses with experienced students and executives. The challenges facing the auto industry and the unique involvement of GM makes the case rich in discussion opportunities about how best to restructure a company. In January 2008, Delphi Corporation (Delphi) had been in Chapter 11 bankruptcy for more than two years but appeared to be on the brink of approving a plan of reorganization (POR) that would allow it to emerge from bankruptcy with a significantly improved balance sheet. Like most such plans, Delphi's POR called for a reduction of the company's leverage by exchanging the debt of the unsecured creditors for a mixture of new debt and new equity. The resulting reduction in interest expense was projected to return Delphi to profitability and make the restructured company a viable going concern. Students take the position of various claimants to explain why that claimant class would or would not vote for the plan. The case presents the legal fundamentals of Chapter 7 liquidation and Chapter 11 reorganization, which play key roles in understanding the economic incentives of the various claimants.
Tessera Technologies has been very successful developing technologies for the semiconductor and mobile device industry, and then licensing them broadly to manufacturers. In addition to licensing patents, it also supplies know-how to help manufacturers move into high volume production. But the changing environment for patent enforcement, in particular the use of injunctions post eBay v. MercExchange, has brought new challenges to the company's licensing model. "Patent holdouts," companies who chose to litigate rather than license, created pressure from existing licensees. Further, as the company advanced one of its newest technology developments, a cooling technology for portable devices, it had to contend with markets where there were not strong property rights regimes. Would the company be able to get paid for its innovations, or was its model doomed?
What is next for healthcare IT provider American Well, whose innovative Online Care technology allows physicians to deliver care to patients online in real time? Using American Well's platform, patients with non-emergency health concerns can communicate with physicians online or by phone and receive advice or even a diagnosis without having to visit the physician's office. American Well's co-founders, Ido Schoenberg and Roy Schoenberg, believe this platform will reduce the cost of care delivery; create new revenue-earning opportunities for providers; and contribute to a more efficient, convenient healthcare delivery system. While the platform could benefit insurers, providers, employers, and patients alike, the company has only marketed to a few health insurance companies to date. In November 2009, 3 insurers have adopted the technology, and American Well expects several more to do so over the next 12 months. As the company plans to accelerate adoption by health insurers, it is also considering other growth options. Is it too early to commit resources to developing and marketing American Well's second-generation product, which facilitates real-time connectivity between primary care physicians and specialists? Should American Well pursue new markets in the U.S., such as hospitals, chains of clinics, and pharmacies, or even expand internationally? In a broader sense, American Well's technology solves the economic obstacle of time and place by connecting excess supply (of physician capacity) with excess demand (for patient care). Could this model be adapted to other industries, such as legal and accounting services? Alternatively, should American Well continue to focus solely on its primary product and on becoming the leader in the Online Care Industry?
Founded as a for-profit microfinance company, Equitas had acquired nearly a million clients in the short two years since it was founded. The founder, Vasu, and his management team wished to accelerate the already impressive spurt to 3 million clients in the next two years. The case describes the company's business model, which attempts to integrate microfinance with social development, and provides students with the opportunity to discuss the scaling options and challenges facing the founder.
In 2008, Andres Velasco, Chile's Finance Minister, was under mounting criticisms over his fiscal policy. As the world's largest copper producer, Chile was benefiting from the rise in copper prices, which had more than tripled since 2003. Copper revenues translated into greater income for the government as Chile's biggest copper producer, Codelco, was a state-owned enterprise. Velasco had chosen to save the bulk of the copper revenues into two stabilization funds; by the end of August 2008, the collective amount represented more than 20% of Chile's GDP. Several critics wanted the funds to be used to improve the poor public education system, income gap, and other impending social issues. After all, Chile had one of the most unequal distributions of wealth in the world. Productivity was stagnant and economic growth had slowed down significantly since the 1990's. What should Velasco do amid growing public discontent? Was it really in Chile's best interest to keep saving the copper wealth?