This undisguised case is appropriate for graduate-level organizational behavior, strategy, and leadership courses. Readers will be put in the shoes of a seasoned change agent hired to transform a publicly owned company on the brink of bankruptcy. With a 50% attrition rate, low employee morale, stock market delisting notice, failed ERP system, bank default, new credit facility search, forbearance agreements, and a going-concern opinion, the new CEO faced a significant crisis. The A case describes the situation and raises questions about the firm's viability when James Leto becomes CEO. Several key leaders in the organization push to move the company's core competency away from the reseller business toward an enterprise solutions and services business.

Brad Powell, the newly hired senior leader of a Christian church, must lead the organization to reverse a three-decade decline and return to fulfilling its mission. Brad spent the first six months assessing the situation, building relationships, and reiterating the longstanding mission of the organization. Now, with an understanding of its history, an intimate knowledge of the immediate challenges, and a clear vision of what the organization should become, Brad is considering his strategy and next steps. As the leader of a nonprofit organization resourced by members and volunteers, Brad must lead change that produces results without compromising the mission. The B case summarizes Brad's actions and the results.

Brad Powell, the newly hired senior leader of a Christian church, must lead the organization to reverse a three-decade decline and return to fulfilling its mission. Brad spent the first six months assessing the situation, building relationships, and reiterating the longstanding mission of the organization. Now, with an understanding of its history, an intimate knowledge of the immediate challenges, and a clear vision of what the organization should become, Brad is considering his strategy and next steps. As the leader of a nonprofit organization resourced by members and volunteers, Brad must lead change that produces results without compromising the mission. The B case summarizes Brad's actions and the results.

Supplement to case LBS116. This is part of a case series. 'Everyone says entrepreneurship is about risk-taking. But it's not: it's about minimising risks and taking careful risks.' Terry Rhodes' own words resonated with him as he reflected on the most critical decision of his career at Celtel International. Since its inception in March 1998, Celtel, a wireless service provider, set out to change the way business was done in Africa and to prove the transformative effects business could have on the continent and its people. Rhodes, Co-Founder and Chief Strategy Officer of Celtel, had successfully mitigated the risks and overcome the challenges that deterred other businesses from investing in and contributing to the region. 'We were lucky that our business - mobile telecommunications - was seen as raising money in the West to bring to Africa and build infrastructure,' he explained. As Celtel expanded and moved into more and more markets across Sub-Saharan Africa, its corporate values were continually tested. Up until now, Rhodes had managed to avert corrupt situations using simple but creative tactics. However, the market entry into Guinea in late 1999 had posed a different story. Despite his multiple efforts, negotiations with the Guinean government were now at a standstill and it had become clear to Rhodes that the government expected substantial bribery payments for the deal to move forward. It was now late September 2001 and to add to the dire situation, Celtel's CFO had informed him that losing the Guinea deal might lead the company towards bankruptcy. Rhodes now sat outside the door of the boardroom, waiting to be called in and present his recommendation to the Board concerning the Guinea deal. As he reflected on his available options, Rhodes knew he would have to defend his decision to the Board and would need their full support.

Irene Fellner owns her family's three-star hotel in Switzerland. Facing decreasing revenues, she undertakes a conjoint analysis that suggests she should take on a brand name. She therefore considers joining the hotel chain Comfort Hotels as a franchisee. Learning objectives: This case is appropriate for teaching at MBA, EMBA or executive levels. In certain instances, it may also be taught in undergraduate courses as a means to illustrate the application of conjoint analysis. In particular, the case would be effective for market research, pricing, segmentation and hospitality courses.

A recent study from Wellington Hospital in New Zealand found that office workers who sat for several hours without getting up were more likely to form a deep-vein thrombosis - that is, a blood clot in a vein deep in the leg - than those who moved about more often. Together, deep-vein thromboses and pulmonary embolisms (which occur when a piece of the clot breaks away and blocks blood flow to the lungs) kill upwards of 100,000 Americans each year, or about as many as die from breast, prostate, and colon cancer combined. In this article, Goldhaber, a professor of medicine at Harvard Medical School, explains the connection between DVTs and prolonged periods of sitting anywhere (not just on airplanes) and offers tips for prevention.

When Chris Knox, a top salesperson at Specialty Fleet Services, volunteers to go after the business of Armadillo Gas & Power, he decides to try a new approach. After all, no one else from SFS has succeeded with Dale Landry, Armadillo's CFO. Knox shows up at Landry's ranch, asks to photograph his beloved bull, presents the photo as a gift to Landry's wife, and engineers several other encounters before Landry learns that Knox is anything more than a charming young man. Not long after he reveals his position at SFS, Knox wins the account. Sales VP Jeremy Silva emails the sales team, praising Knox's maneuvers. But the human resources vice president thinks that Knox breached the company's ethics code. Does Knox deserve a reprimand? Kirk O. Hanson, the executive director of the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, believes that Knox went astray not by trying to share a potential client's passion but by treating the Landrys as a means to an end - deceiving them and violating their personal space along the way. There's a big difference between deceiving competitors and deceiving customers, explain consultants Don Peppers and Martha Rogers. SFS needs to clarify this difference in its ethics code, apologize to Landry, and fire Silva, who demonstrated in hitting the "send" button that he does not understand the policies and behaviors that build shareholder value. James Borg, a business psychologist and author, argues that Knox didn't coerce Landry into buying SFS's services but instead simply got the CFO's attention and let his persuasive techniques do the rest. Whereas coercion and manipulation satisfy the needs of only one party, persuasion is about achieving a positive outcome all around - exactly what Knox accomplished. Armadillo got a superior product, and SFS won a new customer.

Many managers have never before had to shrink their operations or workforces drastically. Now, as they struggle to weather the storm of recession, they risk making what the author says is a common mistake: assuming that they will have to make the tough initial decision but can leave it to others to carry out. Long experience at Corning, Quest Diagnostics, Masonite International, and Accellent taught Freeman the benefits of what he calls a "soft hands" approach, which involves ensuring that employees, customers, suppliers, and communities are treated with consideration and compassion. Such behavior is simply good business. He offers four commonsensical - but frequently ignored - principles. Treat employees with dignity, fairness, and respect. Tell them why they're losing their jobs, what you will do to help them cope, and what you'll need from them during the transition. Communicate fully and often, be visible and personal, and honor company commitments. Treat your customers and suppliers like valued partners. Keep them informed, consider their needs, maintain your focus on quality, and take pains to transfer the business smoothly. Manage the layoff or closure like a project. Appoint an experienced, full-time project leader and a strong team. Define stages of the process, establish criteria for passing through them, and conduct regular reviews. Use judgment and, if necessary, fight back. Don't be pushed by Wall Street or others to move so quickly that the organization ends up suffering. The shutdown of a Corning plant in Indiana, the merger of Quest with SmithKline Beecham Clinical Labs, and the closure of an Accellent factory in Tennessee illustrate successful outcomes of a soft-hands approach.

The author combines his nine years' experience as the CEO of Procter & Gamble with the last writings of the management scholar Peter Drucker to answer the question "What is the work of the CEO?" The chief executive, Lafley says, is held singularly accountable for the performance and results of the company-according not just to its own goals but also to those of diverse and often competing external stakeholders. In other words, he or she is responsible for linking the outside to the inside-a job that consists of four fundamental tasks. Defining the meaningful outside. At P&G this means emphasizing that the consumer is boss. The company has also worked to change what had been win-lose negotiations into win-win partnerships with retail customers and suppliers. Deciding what business you are in (or not in). After a thorough analysis of its strengths, current competitive position, and structural conditions, P&G chose to grow from its core-laundry products, baby diapers, feminine care, and hair care-and also to focus more on low-income consumers and developing markets, where sales have grown from 21% to 31% of the total since 2000. The company has exited food and beverages and is selling its pharmaceutical business. Where to compete and where not to compete remain ongoing questions. Balancing present and future. P&G defines realistic growth targets and uses a flexible budgeting process with complementary short-term, midterm, and long-term goals. Shaping values and standards. The CEO must interpret the organization's values in the context of change and competition and define the standards that will guide decisions. Trust at P&G had come to mean that employees could rely on the company for lifetime jobs. Lafley redefined it as consumers' trust in the company's brands and shareholders' trust in its value as a long-term investment.

The boom years have made business careless with working capital. So much cash was sloshing around the system that there seemed little point in worrying about how to wring more of it out, especially if that might dent reported profits and sales growth. Today, capital and credit have all but disappeared, customers are tightening belts, and suppliers aren't putting up with late payments. It's time, therefore, to take a cold, hard look at the way you're managing your working capital. If you do, say Insead professors Kaiser and Young, you'll very likely find that you have an awful lot of capital tied up in receivables and inventory. In this article, the authors explore six common mistakes that companies make in this area: managing to the income statement, which can encourage executives to tie up capital in stock and receivables because income statements often fail to include important cost items; rewarding the sales force for growth alone, which makes concessions in the terms of trade more likely, as salespeople look for ways to get customers to buy; overemphasizing production quality, which often results in gold-plated and slow production processes; tying receivables to payables, because even an unfortunate and costly change in supplier terms should in no way be a reason for revisiting the customer relationship; applying bankers' current and quick ratios, which tends to increase the likelihood that a company will face a liquidity crisis; and benchmarking competitors, which can make managers complacent when their working capital metrics are in line with industry norms. Simply correcting these mistakes will release a lot of hidden cash.

Few companies are thinking about hiring right now, but that's a mistake. If history is any guide, staffing will become a front-burner issue once the economic upheaval eases. Even now, companies are running into staffing problems in emerging markets, and many will have to find talented replacements for baby-boom retirees. Will they be able to meet their needs? Not likely, say Fernandez-Araoz of Egon Zehnder and Harvard Business School professors Groysberg and Nohria. Their research, conducted with scores of CEOs, HR executives, and recruiters, found current hiring practices to be haphazard at best and inept at worst. And no wonder. Ignorant of their staffing needs, most companies treat hiring top-level executives as an emergency. That leaves them little choice. One study found that nearly a quarter of the time, the executive selected was the only candidate considered. Far too few companies conduct reference checks; far too many rely on gut reactions when judging qualifications and cultural fit. Hardly anyone considers whether candidates will be good team players. And, shockingly, only half of the top managers recruited by the companies studied were interviewed by anyone in the C-suite. The result: About a third of promising new hires depart within three years of being recruited. As a remedy, the authors offer their best thinking about state-of-the-art hiring practices for the top levels of the organization. Their recommendations cover the entire hiring cycle in seven steps: anticipating the need for new hires, specifying the job, developing a pool of candidates, assessing the candidates, closing the deal, integrating the newcomer, and reviewing hire-process effectiveness. Whatever the future brings, firms that follow these practices successfully will have a distinct advantage over their shortsighted competitors.

Despite an abundance of raw data, few organizations have figured out how to parse and analyze all that information to reveal the best opportunities for growth. Even fewer have attempted to structure and manage themselves to match the texture of the markets in which they play. But a fine-grained understanding of company performance and markets is critical, especially during an economic downturn, which calls for a nuanced approach to cutting costs and making long-term investments. Baghai, Smit, and Viguerie urge firms to target narrower market slices and to measure sources of growth - market momentum, mergers and acquisitions, and market share gains - in a more detailed way. When they reviewed growth patterns of global firms from 1999 to 2006, they found that companies can get a much more accurate picture of growth prospects by digging deeply into micromarkets (typically ranging from $50 million to $200 million in value) than by looking at the division-level performance numbers commonly used for measuring, organizing, and managing. The authors examine several companies - including Amazon and Ping An - that have benefitted from greater granularity. For instance, one large European manufacturer of personal-care products went beyond an aggregated view of performance and discovered that some of its higher-growth segments were lurking in the unit with the lowest overall growth rate. Another company, an integrated telecommunications service provider, retooled its marketing mix - making fewer roughly calculated media trade-offs (television versus direct mail versus radio) and instead selecting the right media within narrowly defined regions for specific lines of business. As a result, it boosted sales between 10% and 15% in several regions and increased average lifetime customer value by 15%.

The belief that teams make us more creative and productive - and are the best way to get things done - is deeply entrenched. But Hackman, a professor of organizational psychology at Harvard and a leading expert on teams, is having none of it. Research, he says, consistently shows that teams underperform despite all their extra resources. In an interview with senior editor Diane Coutu, Hackman explains where teams go wrong. Shockingly, most of the time members don't agree on what the team is supposed to be doing or even on who is on the team. The belief that bigger is better also compounds problems; as a team grows, the effort needed to manage links between members increases almost exponentially. Leaders need to be ruthless about defining teams and keeping them small (fewer than 10 members), and some individuals (like team destroyers) should simply be forced off. The leader also must set a compelling direction for the team - but in so doing, may encounter intense resistance that puts him or her at great risk. Hackman explores other fallacies about teams - for instance, that teams whose members have been together a long time become stale. In fact, research reveals that new teams make 50% more mistakes than established teams. To avoid complacency, though, every team needs a deviant - someone who is willing to make waves and open up the group to more ideas. Unfortunately, such individuals often get thrown off the team, robbing it of its chance to be magical. Leaders can't make a team do well. However, by being disciplined about how a team is set up and managed, instituting the right support systems, and providing coaching in group processes, they can increase the likelihood that a team will be great.

Though they have feel-good stories and data on milestones, most ventures that serve the world's poor don't have a systematic way to gauge how well they're achieving their goals. To address that need, London, the director of the University of Michigan's Base of the Pyramid Initiative, has devised a new tool. London's Base of the Pyramid Impact Assessment Framework explores how ventures influence the well-being of local buyers, sellers, and communities. It guides managers through a detailed look at an organization's effects on those constituencies in three areas: economics, capabilities, and relationships. The framework examines negative as well as positive effects - for instance, whether activities that increase the income of the poor also prompt them to mistreat arable land. It helps managers focus success measures on the most likely high-magnitude outcomes. VisionSpring, which trains rural women to provide affordable eye care in India, knew it had improved the economic fortunes of its microentrepreneurs. After applying the framework, however, the venture had an appreciation of its impact on some of its buyers: artisans whose eyesight had deteriorated with age. The nonprofit's glasses boosted the artisans' productivity, income, and dignity. VisionSpring also uncovered negative effects - strife and jealousy in families that weren't used to women's working outside the home. The organization helped ease those tensions by encouraging the women's spouses to become involved in product distribution, thus improving their relationships and reducing the risk that sellers might quit. The more holistic, fact-based view provided by London's framework has helped VisionSpring make better decisions about how to enhance positive effects, mitigate negative ones, and demonstrate clear value to potential funders and partners.

While Western companies struggle with mergers and acquisitions, emerging giants like Indian aluminum producer Hindalco are using M&A as their main globalization strategy. That's partly because developing economies grew at near double-digit rates in the past 15 years, enabling many enterprises to make acquisitions. It's also because, according to the author's research, those corporations create more value from takeovers. To compete, Western multinationals should change their mind-set and shift the locus of their M&A efforts to regional headquarters in developing countries. U.S. and European companies, inhibited by slow-growing home markets, acquire rivals primarily to become bigger and thus create economies of scale. By contrast, emerging giants buy companies - often Western ones - to gain competencies that will help them become global leaders. They acquire only to meet strategic goals; they don't completely assimilate acquisitions; and their CEOs focus on the long term. Using this approach, Hindalco boosted revenues in seven years from $500 million to $15 billion. It acquired companies to expand its aluminum business, manufacture more value-added products, and extend its global reach. Rather than immediately seek targets overseas, the company patiently executed small takeovers, first in India and later abroad, before making a big global play. With each move, Hindalco climbed what the author calls an M&A competency stairway, gaining the skills it needed to pursue other targets. When it was ready, Hindalco bought Novelis, a North American corporation more than twice its size. Because of the global downturn, Hindalco will not realize the benefits of that acquisition as quickly as it had expected. But the fact that the company developed and adhered to a long-term M&A strategy will help it ride out the storm.

When Chris Knox, a top salesperson at Specialty Fleet Services, volunteers to go after the business of Armadillo Gas & Power, he decides to try a new approach. After all, no one else from SFS has succeeded with Dale Landry, Armadillo's CFO. Knox shows up at Landry's ranch, asks to photograph his beloved bull, presents the photo as a gift to Landry's wife, and engineers several other encounters before Landry learns that Knox is anything more than a charming young man. Not long after he reveals his position at SFS, Knox wins the account. Sales VP Jeremy Silva emails the sales team, praising Knox's maneuvers. But the human resources vice president thinks that Knox breached the company's ethics code. Does Knox deserve a reprimand? Four experts comment on this fictional case study in R0905B and R0905Z. Kirk O. Hanson, the executive director of the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, believes that Knox went astray not by trying to share a potential client's passion but by treating the Landrys as a means to an end - deceiving them and violating their personal space along the way. There's a big difference between deceiving competitors and deceiving customers, explain consultants Don Peppers and Martha Rogers. SFS needs to clarify this difference in its ethics code, apologize to Landry, and fire Silva, who demonstrated in hitting the "send" button that he does not understand the policies and behaviors that build shareholder value. James Borg, a business psychologist and author, argues that Knox didn't coerce Landry into buying SFS's services but instead simply got the CFO's attention and let his persuasive techniques do the rest. Whereas coercion and manipulation satisfy the needs of only one party, persuasion is about achieving a positive outcome all around - exactly what Knox accomplished. Armadillo got a superior product, and SFS won a new customer.

When Chris Knox, a top salesperson at Specialty Fleet Services, volunteers to go after the business of Armadillo Gas & Power, he decides to try a new approach. After all, no one else from SFS has succeeded with Dale Landry, Armadillo's CFO. Knox shows up at Landry's ranch, asks to photograph his beloved bull, presents the photo as a gift to Landry's wife, and engineers several other encounters before Landry learns that Knox is anything more than a charming young man. Not long after he reveals his position at SFS, Knox wins the account. Sales VP Jeremy Silva emails the sales team, praising Knox's maneuvers. But the human resources vice president thinks that Knox breached the company's ethics code. Does Knox deserve a reprimand? Four experts comment on this fictional case study in R0905B and R0905Z. Kirk O. Hanson, the executive director of the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, believes that Knox went astray not by trying to share a potential client's passion but by treating the Landrys as a means to an end - deceiving them and violating their personal space along the way. There's a big difference between deceiving competitors and deceiving customers, explain consultants Don Peppers and Martha Rogers. SFS needs to clarify this difference in its ethics code, apologize to Landry, and fire Silva, who demonstrated in hitting the "send" button that he does not understand the policies and behaviors that build shareholder value. James Borg, a business psychologist and author, argues that Knox didn't coerce Landry into buying SFS's services but instead simply got the CFO's attention and let his persuasive techniques do the rest. Whereas coercion and manipulation satisfy the needs of only one party, persuasion is about achieving a positive outcome all around - exactly what Knox accomplished. Armadillo got a superior product, and SFS won a new customer.

For over 25 years, Cristobal Colon, La Fageda's founder and president, had managed this cooperative that primarily produced yogurts and dairy puddings and employed a large share of La Garrotxa's mentally challenged population. Colón had been able to position these yogurts made in a small town far from Barcelona's commercial hub right next to Danone products, the undisputed dairy sector leader in Spain, on supermarket and hypermarket shelves. La Fageda had accomplished this feat by producing a quality yogurt that consumers viewed as a farm product: natural and wholesome. By late 2007, Colón's overriding concern was how to keep La Fageda's yogurts in distribution circuits. On the one hand, large food multinationals had ever-increasing leverage with retailers; on the other hand, some leading chains were prioritizing their own brands. Colón wondered if La Fageda could maintain its competitive positioning while upholding its founding spirit. For him, it was paramount to preserve the jobs that enabled La Fageda to ensure social and labor integration for people with mental disabilities.

In October 2008, Dr. Richard Mgaga, Head of the Malaria Control Programme in Uganda reviewed the monthly malaria statistics report for the district of Apac, which in April of 2008 had undergone a pilot indoor residual spraying (IRS) program using DDT in a campaign to prevent mosquitoes from biting and spreading malaria. The campaign was halted by a court injunction requested by organic farmers, exporters and environmentalists in May 2008, and the injunction was upheld by the High Court in June. In early August, the Uganda Health Ministry began spraying a pyrethroid insecticide in place of DDT. Meanwhile the Ugandan Attorney General was challenging the High Court's decision. Dr. Mugaga was under pressure by the Presidential Malaria Initiative (PMI) to undertake a full program of IRS in 300,000 households in the northern districts of Uganda, including Apac. However, he was unsure whether to proceed, given the opposition and apparent problems that surfaced when the Apac pilot was implemented.

This case provides an introduction to the structure and dynamics of nonprofit hospital governance in the U.S. A hospital CEO two years into her position is grappling with how to make her board a more effective governing body. The hospital's competitive position was eroding due in part to resistance by its independent medical staff to recruiting new physicians into the service area. In addition, some of the physicians had opened freestanding diagnostic and treatment facilities that reduced hospital revenues. But the board was reluctant to take this issue on. At the same time, the CEO felt that too much board attention was spent second-guessing her new hires and other operational decisions that she felt were her responsibility.