When, in 1997, the British Ministry of Defence (MOD) decided to consolidate the Human Resources systems used by its three military services (Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force) into a small number of tri-service ones, it saw the challenge as an IT problem that could be solved through an IT solution. The goal was to increase efficiency and cut costs, and both would be achieved - the MOD thought - by streamlining the more than two hundred customized computer applications developed over time by each of the three services to meet their specific needs. The Texas-based Electronic Data Systems corporation (EDS) was hired to implement the project. But the first effort soon collapsed: the MOD had overestimated how much those systems had in common, and how quickly and easily they could be harmonized. This case describes the unusual partnering approach the MOD and EDS developed in order to make their second attempt a successful one. Realizing that what was needed was a business change, as opposed to an IT solution, the MOD revised the contract to better reflect the more fluid and organic process that would be required. There were a number of essential components to that new workflow: the decision to integrate EDS staff into all management meetings in order to develop mutual trust and a common knowledge base; the establishment of a clear division of labor and responsibilities by which MOD would focus on efficiency and EDS on IT, and an agreement to prioritize the schedule and resolve cost overruns after the fact. HKS Case Number 1900.0

Facing the downturn in late 2008, the partners in a West-Coast venture capital firm are trying to decide how to manage their portfolio companies and whether to make new investments. Not only must they consider the particulars of each company individually, but they must also think about how to manage the entire firm's portfolio.

A variety of services offer consumers discounts when dining at participating restaurants. This case examines four such services: Entertainment Book, Restaurant.com, Rewards Network, and Groupon. Despite key functional similarities, each of the services chooses an importantly different approach-different pricing, different benefits to consumers, different benefits to restaurants, and different underlying technologies.

In April 2008, the owners of the Cambridge, Ontario-based Cerny Hospitality Group (CHG) were considering the purchase and implementation of OpenTable's reservation management software in three of their restaurants, including the Blackshop Restaurant. It was thought that the software could aid in more effectively managing customer demand due to its ability to allow on-line reservations and its data-gathering capability, an improvement over its current manual reservation system. CHG was a family-owned and operated business and had achieved considerable success with its personal touch with clients. When considering the purchase of the software, CHG had concerns about the potential cost and return on investment, in addition to the strategic fit for this company that placed much emphasis on the human-touch and personal interaction with customers.

A member of the integration leadership team must help plan and execute the integration of Delta's information technology (IT) operations into those of Unity. He has been given a time limit of three years and has been charged with removing $60 million of expenses during the process. Half of the savings will come from reducing the number of staff whose roles have been duplicated as a result of the merger. The remaining savings will be achieved through the reduction of associated assets such as hardware, software and property. Irving has many hurdles to overcome, including motivating soon-to-be-made-redundant staff, finding and keeping Delta's star performers, designing the new organizational structure for the technology group, choosing the target IT platform and performing the infrastructure consolidation. This case takes a student through the important decisions in integration projects in order to ensure success in a merger or acquisition, bringing awareness to the execution aspects of these transactions.

From Built to Last to Good to Great and now to Why the Mighty Fall (HarperCollins), Jim Collins has established himself as the leading management thinker of our time. The former Stanford University Business School professor turned mega-selling author and avid rock climber is the driven researcher and thinker whom many leading companies look to for advice on how to grow, how to improve their performance and how to go from merely good to great. He spoke to Ivey Business Journal from his research laboratory in Boulder, Colorado.

Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) is executing a strategy that leverages the desires of municipalities in China to build clusters of high technology companies. By partnering with those cities to build new semiconductor fabs that SMIC would then operate under contract, the company could build scale without necessarily confronting immediate large capital outlays. Unlike the Build-Operate-Transfer model that some municipalities were using to build infrastructure like the new subway in Shenzhen, in the SMIC "Reverse BOT model" a municipality would build a capital intensive fab and SMIC would operate it, sharply lowering its capital costs. This model gave the company a unique level of flexibility in an industry where capital costs were the major driver of product costs.

The Great Moderation is a significant decline in the volatility of fluctuations in most macroeconomic variables that the United States and other developed and developing economies have experienced at least since the mid 1980s. This case describes the basic facts, presents contending explanations and explores the consequences of the Great Moderation for the likely amplitude of future business cycles.

After years of gaming console industry leadership, how should Sony respond to the overwhelming success of competitor Nintendo's user-friendly Wii over Sony's high-tech PlayStation 3? It was August 2008 and Kazuo Hirai, chief executive of Sony Computer Entertainment Inc. (SCEI), was contemplating questions from reporters about how Sony planned to respond to Nintendo's Wii console, which was dramatically leading Sony's PlayStation 3 and Microsoft's Xbox 360 consoles in sales. The Wii's supremacy was especially disconcerting to Hirai, given that Sony had dominated the videogame industry and largely defined its course since 1995. But the tables had turned dramatically in the current generation. Though the Wii was technologically much less advanced than were PS3 and Xbox 360, the Wii's ease of use, innovative motion-sensitive controller, and simple but fun games had made the console a hit with all demographics: nine to 65 years old, male and female. As a result, Nintendo had stolen a march on its two larger rivals by appealing to people who were traditionally not avid videogame users. Microsoft's and Sony's more powerful machines remained targeted at the traditional "core gamer" audience: 18-to-65-year-old males. Hirai was determined to restore that supremacy in the current generation or the next. He knew that whether or not he publicly defined SCEI's strategy as a response to Wii, he had to find a way for his company to deal with the new order of the videogame industry that Nintendo had created. In seeking to do so, Hirai might find guidance in the history of the industry, which had been marked by rapid and frequent changes of fortune.

This case examines the decision of Alibaba Group to diversify from an international business-to-business (B2B) exchange (Alibaba.com) into a B2C and C2C exchange (Taobao.com) for Chinese retailers and consumers. In China, Taobao had managed to displace the once dominant eBay, the world's largest consumer marketplace. However, the company had little revenue because it offered services free of charge. How could Taobao best monetize its services without attracting a new set of competitors?

Customer centricity has been an important part of the culture at Cisco Systems since its inception. While part of this is attributable to values put in place by the founders and retained by subsequent management, it is also closely interwoven with its organizational architecture that reaffirmed those values. Until 2001, Cisco had a decentralized organizational structure with three business units organized around each of its three main customer types: Service Provider, Enterprise, and Commercial. Each unit developed and marketed a complete product line for its specific customer group further reaffirming its belief in the centrality of distinct customers. A number of other systems, structures, and behavioral mechanisms reaffirmed the importance of customer centricity. The 2001 market downturn, however, brought new challenges as Cisco was forced to lay off 18% of its workforce and reexamine its organizational structure that was costly due to duplication of activities across each of the three customer-facing business units. Ultimately, Cisco Systems decided to transform the company from a decentralized to centralized organization. While recognizing that a centralized, functional structure was necessary to avoid product and resource redundancies, it also threatened Cisco's customer-centricity in that the centralization of R & D and marketing made them more distant from Cisco's customers. To overcome the perceived misalignment between its structure and culture, Cisco introduced a number of initiatives like the Customer Focus Initiative (CFI) to ensure that while the structure was turning away from customer centricity, the beliefs and actions of its employees maintained that focus. In doing so, management accepted the likely misalignment between its structure and culture and sought ways to compensate for this perceived gap.

In response to the 2001 market downturn, Cisco Systems implemented a major restructuring that transformed the company from a decentralized to centralized organization. While recognizing that a centralized, functional structure was necessary to avoid product and resource redundancies, it also risked making the company less customer-centric. To mitigate this risk, Cisco implemented a cross-functional system of executive-level councils that would bring leaders of different functions together to collaborate and focus on the needs and issues of specific customer groups. Each council employs a "Three-in-a-Box" leadership model consisting of an executive leader from the engineering or technology business unit, a member of the go-to-market team, and an operations resource director. Each council is also accountable to the Operating Committee, which is chaired by CEO John Chambers and determines the long-term corporate strategy and allocation of corporate resources. Many other companies have failed at facilitating collaboration across functions-particularly large organizations-but Cisco's system has been successful because the company remained committed to the system, required a consistent infrastructure while also allowing for flexibility, gave members decision making authority, and used council leaders who thrive in collaborative environments. The success of the council system led to the creation of 20 boards of "sub-councils" in 2007. The boards are charged with driving development efforts and customer reach further into the organization by addressing specific issues too narrow for the councils to address.

In 2007, an analyst in the derivatives group of investment bank Grenfeld & Co. was asked to devise a hedging strategy for Providence Equity Partners (Providence) in Bell Canada Enterprises (BCE Inc.). Providence was based in the United States and any strategy would involve significant foreign exchange rate risk due to the conversion of returns into U.S. dollars. The analyst needed to consider several long-term hedging strategies that Grenfeld & Co. could recommend to Providence. Her vice-president had asked that she create a hedging strategy by initially assuming a 25 per cent IRR for the investment and its performance, based on two outcomes at the end of the investment (investment horizon = five years): a zero per cent IRR and a 25 per cent IRR.

Rod Calhoun, the head of the Altoona State Investment Board's private equity investment program, considered the communication he had just received. It was from Permira, the leading European buyout fund, and concerned its fourth fund, to which Altoona had made a €100 million commitment. The memorandum offered investors a chance to reduce their commitment to Permira IV. This potential offer was an attractive one, as it would allow the state pension to address its "over-commitment problem," one that plagued many institutional investors. But the terms of the arrangement gave Calhoun pause.

At the time of the case the good enough segment was growing about three times as quickly as the premium segment and Danfoss was thinking about entering this fast growing market. To do this Danfoss had evaluated several of the local Chinese players as acquisitions targets, and had picked Holip as the best potential target. Erhardt Jessen, a vice president of the division, has to recommend whether to acquire Holip and, if yes, the strategy that Danfoss Motion Controls should adopt for Holip. Key issues that he would have to address included the continued use of the Holip brand and the degree to which Holip should be integrated into Danfoss. The (A) case describes the overall Danfoss situation and issues and describes in some detail the history of Holip, its business model and its strategy. It was written with the support of both Danfoss and Holip management teams. Learning objectives: The case gives participants an opportunity to deepen their understanding of the issues a multinational manufacturer of high performance products must address as it faces increasing competition from local players manufacturing good enough products. Participants also have an opportunity to learn how a somewhat typical small, low cost Chinese manufacturer operates. Participants can look at the pros and cons of entering the good enough segment and the advantages and disadvantages of using an acquisition as the entry vehicle. Finally, they have an opportunity to understand the issues that need to be resolved to successfully leverage the acquisition to achieve the company's objectives in the good enough market segment. Depending on the course's learning objectives, the Danfoss-Holip case series can be taught either by using the A case followed by the B case, or by using the A1 and A2 cases followed by the B-case.

On 17 March 2006, Japanese Internet company Softbank Corp announced that it had reached a final agreement with British cellular phone giant Vodafone Group Plc to buy its Japanese unit, Vodafone K.K. for ¥1.75 trillion. To finance the largest business acquisition ever by a Japanese firm, Softbank intended to raise between ¥1.1 trillion and ¥1.2 trillion through leveraged-buyout ("LBO") financing, using Vodafone K.K.'s assets as collateral . With the acquisition of Vodafone K.K., Softbank aimed to build a multilateral communications business, integrating news, video and other online content with Vodafone's cellular and fixed-line services. But first Softbank had to borrow between ¥1.1 trillion and ¥1.2 trillion to finance its purchase. The sum was the largest ever to be raised for a buyout by a single Japanese company.

In 2008, concert producer and promoter Live Nation, faces a decision about its strategy in light of the tumultuous changes in the music industry and the increasing power of the major artists. As the music business once again recreates itself in response to new technologies and consumer needs, this major player is considering focusing on its principal business of concert booking and related revenue, or moving forward with its efforts to take advantage of new opportunities in the music industry by forging comprehensive, and often expensive, relationships with artists and other clients.

In response to new laws governing liability and several food safety scares in the 1990s, European retailers drove the creation of a universal production standard based on Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) for fresh fruit and vegetables and a third-party certification system to monitor compliance. By 2008, the GLOBALGAP standard had expanded to cover coffee, tea, livestock, and aquaculture. Over 90,000 producers in 87 countries had been certified. Looking ahead, GLOBALGAP's board and management were discussing a number of questions, including: should GAP include environmental and social aspects beyond food safety; what was GLOBALGAP's role outside of Europe; and how GLOBALGAP as a 'hidden asset' compared to ethical labels such as Fair trade.