Considers the issues associated with running multiple business models--a private practice and an academic faculty practice--within the confines of the orthopaedics department of a single medical center. Students assume the role of Neela Wilson, Executive Director of Rittenhouse Medical Center, in managing the operational requirements of, and organizational tensions created by, these competing models. In analyzing the case, students have the opportunity to: (1) gain a better understanding of operational focus and the concept of a "focused factory" in health care, (2) consider the concept of a "factory within a factory" in the context of an academic medical center, and (3) build an appreciation of the managerial challenges associated with operating related, and often competing, business units within the same organization.
The new Senior Vice President of Marketing for The Fashion Channel (TFC), a cable television network dedicated to round-the-clock, fashion-oriented programming, is preparing to recommend a change in the company's traditional marketing approach by introducing a market segmentation program. This program is, in part, a response to the intensifying competitive environment for TFC, and it needs to strengthen the company's brand and positioning with viewers and advertisers. At the same time, the program must maintain consumer and distributor satisfaction with the network. Several segmentation options are being considered, each with pros and cons. Consumer research provides insights but does not give a simple answer regarding the best path to take. The reader must evaluate the research results, calculate financial scenarios, and make a recommendation. Also looks at change management issues. TFC has never done a program like this before, and the Senior Vice President of Marketing is new to the job. In addition to making a recommendation, she must manage the change process to insure that the organization and her leadership team peers are fully aligned.
Reed Hastings founded Netflix with a vision to provide a home movie service that would do a better job satisfying customers than the traditional retail rental model. But as it encouraged challenges it underwent several major strategy shifts, ultimately developing a business model and an operational strategy that were highly disruptive to retail video rental chains. The combination of a large national inventory, a recommendation system that drove viewership across the broad catalog, and a large customer base made Netflix a force to be reckoned with, especially as a distribution channel for lower-profile and independent films. Blockbuster, the nation's largest retail video rental firm, was initially slow to respond, but ultimately rolled out a hybrid retail/online response in the form of Blockbuster Online. Aggressive pricing pulled in subscribers, but at a price to both it and Netflix. But a new challenge was on the horizon: video-on-demand. How should Netflix respond?
Dollar General Corporation (DG) operates one of the leading chains of extreme value retailers in the United States. 2006 revenues reached $9.2 billion, making DG the 6th largest mass retailer in the country. With revenues growing at 9% annually over the five-year period up to 2005, DG had the distinction of being only one of three retailers to outperform Wal-Mart in both revenue and profit growth in that time. Life in a Dollar General store paints a vivid picture of the roots and historical focus of the company. Opportunistic buying has given the stores an eclectic merchandise mix. Analysts often referred to this category as "treasure hunt" SKUs. Offers an opportunity to examine a company's business model, particularly since DG has been so successful competing with Wal-Mart where so many other retailers have not. While it started out as a family business in the five-and-dime tradition, it evolved to a close-out retail model where its unique low-overhead operations were advantageous. As it added highly consumable categories its mix shifted, but it managed to retain its low-overhead model. Interestingly, the mix shift was likely more an emergency strategy driven by store level operations than by top-down driven strategy. Frames the growth options available to DG's CEO as he grapples with how to maintain growth.
On Tuesday, August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina battered New Orleans, causing inadequate levees to collapse and flood the city in what came to be widely seen as a man-made disaster. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) calculated that 105,000 of the city's 188,000 housing units were severely damaged or destroyed. It was the worst urban disaster in national memory. However, city leaders were not prepared to accept New Orleans' demise. On September 29, 2005, Mayor C. Ray Nagin appointed a blue-ribbon panel known as the Bring New Orleans Back (BNOB) commission to produce a reconstruction plan by the end of the year. Its volunteer members were leaders in the business and nonprofit worlds. BNOB turned for advice to the Urban Land Institute (ULI), a Washington, DC-based research and educational organization that sought to promote responsible development. ULI's panel of experts urged what it saw as a pragmatic approach. The city lacked the resources to restore services quickly to all of New Orleans. It would have to pick and choose the most promising areas to rebuild first. The hope was that vibrant rebirth in the center would catalyze growth elsewhere. Meanwhile, reconstruction of the lower-lying, poorer sections of town hardest hit by Katrina would have to wait. In fact, it might not make sense to rebuild neighborhoods likely to experience serious flooding in a future hurricane. Two-thirds of the city's pre-Katrina residents were African Americans, disproportionately residents of the poorer, lower-lying, worst damaged areas. Some saw the ULI plan as a conspiracy to get rid of them and make New Orleans whiter. Even many middle-class whites and blacks who did not share the conspiracy theory vehemently opposed the ULI proposal because it seemed to relegate their homes and neighborhoods to oblivion. Meanwhile, city councilors representing lower-lying districts feared that ULI would plan their political base out of existence. HKS Case Number 1862.0
This sequel accompanies the main case (1862.0). On Tuesday, August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina battered New Orleans, causing inadequate levees to collapse and flood the city in what came to be widely seen as a man-made disaster. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) calculated that 105,000 of the city's 188,000 housing units were severely damaged or destroyed. It was the worst urban disaster in national memory. However, city leaders were not prepared to accept New Orleans' demise. On September 29, 2005, Mayor C. Ray Nagin appointed a blue-ribbon panel known as the Bring New Orleans Back (BNOB) commission to produce a reconstruction plan by the end of the year. Its volunteer members were leaders in the business and nonprofit worlds. BNOB turned for advice to the Urban Land Institute (ULI), a Washington, DC-based research and educational organization that sought to promote responsible development. HKS Case Number 1862.1
Herman Miller, an office furniture supplier, decided to implement the cradle-to-cradle (C2C) design protocol during the design of its mid-level office chair, Mirra. The C2C protocol was a set of environmentally friendly product development guidelines created by architect William McDonough and chemist Michael Braungart. The essence of this protocol was to eliminate waste and potentially harmful materials by designing the product so that, at the end of its useful life, the raw materials could be fed back into either a technical or biological cycle and used for the same or other purposes. Therefore, materials remained in a closed-loop, eliminating the need for landfill and other toxic forms of disposal such as incineration. The case describes the C2C protocol, the details of how Herman Miller implemented C2C during the design of the Mirra chair, as well as the impact of the new protocol on their internal processes: design decisions, manufacturing, and supply chain management. The proximate decision point in the case is whether the company should replace the polyvinyl chloride (PVC) material in the arm pads of the Mirra chair. PVC was a highly toxic material to manufacture and dispose of and thus violated the C2C protocol. However, it was the standard material for arm pads and many other parts in the office furniture industry as it was durable, scratch resistant, and inexpensive. To switch to thermoplastic urethane (TPU), a more environmentally friendly material, for the Mirra Chair arm pad required at least modification of a production tool, or possibly a completely new tool. In addition, the cost of TPU was higher than PVC. There was also uncertainty about how consistent the quality of the arm pad would be with TPU.
In its eight quarters of operation, Google's internally developed prediction market has delivered accurate and decisive predictions about future events of interest to the company. Google must now determine how to increase participation in the market, and how to best use its predictions.
The announcement of Porsche's (Germany) intention to take a 20% equity interest in Volkswagen (Germany) in September 2005 was greeted with outright opposition on the part of many shareholders in both Volkswagen and Porsche. Major investment banks immediately downgraded Porsche from a buy to a sell, arguing that the returns on the massive investment, some €3 billion, would likely never accrue to shareholders. Although Porsche and VW were currently co-producing the Porsche Cayenne and Volkswagen Touareg, this ownership interest would take the two companies far down a path of cooperation way beyond the manufacture of a sport utility vehicle. Although Porsche had explained its investment decision to be one which would assure the stability of its future cooperation with VW, many critics saw it as a choice of preserving the stakes of the Porsche and Piëch families at the expense of nonfamily shareholders.
Biocon Limited was facing significant pricing pressure in their cash cow business, that primarily consisted of manufacturing Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs). To combat this commoditization, Biocon's leadership had chosen an innovation-led strategy. This new strategy consisted of licensing and developing proven molecules from strategic partners to leapfrog competition and create large molecule biologics in India. The company understood that its transition from an API to an innovation-led company focused on new biologics would require patience and a risk-taking mindset. Although there was some commonality in the bioprocessing aspects of both approaches, the regulatory approvals, product development paths, and market-access timelines were dramatically different--almost diametrically opposed. Analyzes Biocon's strategic decisions, as well as the risks and challenges associated with migrating from a manufacturing to an innovation-led enterprise. How would they balance short-term pragmatism versus long-term vision? Do they have the appropriate human resources to scale and innovate? Is their India-centric strategy appropriate, since 86% of their end-market demand is in the U.S., Europe, and Japan? Fortunately, early indications with their innovation-led strategy were showing positive signs and demonstrable results--such as their biogenetic insulin and monoclonal antibody launch in India. Their lead oral insulin project, with a planned $100 million budget, was meeting its milestones and deliverables. Many critical business challenges are detailed in this case. Nevertheless, given their fully integrated business model and significant manufacturing base, the odds are in Biocon's favor to overcome these challenges and lead India's biotechnology revolution.
Two partners of Warburg Pincus, a global private equity firm, are trying to decide whether to take a portfolio company public, and on what exchange. The company, Norway-based ElectroMagnetic GeoServices (emgs), has developed a market-leading technology that determines whether an undersea rock formation contains oil -- prior to the oil company drilling a hole. With its high-growth characteristics, emgs is very different from the typical oilfield services company, and would be more suitable for floating on the NYSE or LSE, where liquidity and valuations would also be greater than on the Oslo Bors, the other possibility. Yet floating in the U.S. would involve greater compliance expense and might also require the management team to move to New York or Houston, something the team is reluctant to do. The partners need to decide what to do before the IPO window for energy-related companies closes.
Chris Prangel, a recent MBA graduate, has returned home to West Virginia to manage the marketing operations of the Mountain Man Beer Company, a family-owned business he stands to inherit in five years. Mountain Man brews just one beer, Mountain Man Lager, also known as "West Virginia's beer" and popular among blue-collar workers. Due to changes in beer drinkers' taste preferences, the company is now experiencing declining sales for the first time in its history. In response, Chris wants to launch Mountain Man Light, a "light beer" formulation of Mountain Man Lager, in the hope of attracting younger drinkers to the brand. However, he encounters resistance from senior managers. Mountain Man Lager's brand equity is a key asset for Mountain Man Brewing Company. The question is whether Mountain Man Light will enhance it, detract from it, or irreversibly damage it.
Atlantic Computer, a leading player in the high-end server market, has detected a marketplace opportunity in the basic server segment. They have developed a new server, the Tronn, to meet the needs of this segment. In addition, they have created a software tool, called the "Performance Enhancing Server Accelerator," or PESA, that allows the Tronn to perform up to four times faster than its standard speed. The central question revolves around how to price the Tronn and PESA. Although cost-plus, competition-based, and status-quo pricing are the most common means by which firms establish prices for their offerings, these approaches may prevent firms from fully realizing the benefits that are due to them. Provides an opportunity to optimize value capture for the firm by utilizing value-in-use pricing (i.e., examining the value that a firm's offering creates for the customer, and using the savings generated as the basis for developing prices). Also allows for the exploration of the challenges surrounding the implementation of a value-in-use pricing strategy. These include the reactions of competitors, customers, and stakeholders within the firm.