A major barrier for growth of large multi-business unit firms is the inability to resource the critical initiatives to win-both in terms of dollars and people. The underpinning of the challenge involves the conflict between resourcing current cash-generating legacy businesses vs. new initiatives which may not, in the short term, produce positive financial results. Most companies do not have a formal portfolio process to deal with this fundamental issue. Danaka is a fictional company based on real business experiences. The company has strong growth markets as well as markets that are commoditizing. Unfortunately, the latter represent a sizable portion of the company's business. A framework is given that establishes a matrix to analyze the Danaka businesses using their critical financial criteria-cash generation and top-line growth. Projects are divided into four categories based on how they fit into the matrix, and resource allocations are then analyzed. Students discover that the current allocation does not enable Danaka to meet its aggressive growth goals. The case incorporates an interactive spreadsheet model in which students can dynamically change the various resource allocations and see the impact on future top-line growth. The essence of the case is how to manage the resource allocation for a multi-business unit firm when present allocations will not meet future growth goals.

This exercise asks students to develop criteria that Target Stores should use in evaluating strategic brand alliances to support its positioning as a store where you can "Expect More. Pay Less." Students are then charged with proposing a new strategic partner for Target that meets the criteria they identify. Background information about the Target "guest" and past strategic alliance is provided.

This case explores how and why GM became a major user of private equity and hedge fund capital, as well as the risks and rewards of these new relationships. The Cerberus transaction, audacious in both its size and complexity, is explored in detail. What were the alternatives for GM, and what risks and opportunities lay ahead for both parties? This case investigates the benefits, disadvantages, and potential conflicts of interest that evolved as GM's many suppliers increasingly embraced low-cost, nontraditional financing from hedge funds.

On October 22, 2004, junior trader Mary Lucas was browsing through the recent trading activities of a few convertible bonds the firm held. First Convergence Inc. was a hedge fund specializing in convertible arbitrage founded by three Wall Street traders in 2002. Prior to starting at the firm, she had known little about convertible bonds. Now she stayed late almost every day in order to learn as much about the business as possible. Suddenly, she noticed something unusual about the trading of a convertible bond issued by Countrywide Financial Corporation (NYSE:CFC). Although the average daily trading volume on this bond had been only three thousand during the previous month, it had shot up to fifty thousand in the last three days. Lucas remembered this particular bond. In fact, First Convergence was actually holding a slightly different convertible bond (known as the liquid yield option note or LYON) issued by the same company. On August 20, Countrywide had offered to exchange the new convertible bond for the original LYON. First Convergence had accepted the exchange offer, thus ending up with the new convertible bond. At that time, Lucas was asked to help evaluate the offer, so she was familiar with the features of both bonds. "What's happening?" she asked herself. She quickly checked the recent price movement on Countrywide's stock. The stock had plunged 11.5 percent on Wednesday, October 20, after the company announced earnings below analysts' expectations. On the same day, trading on the convertible shot up. These two events must be related. But how? Is there a potential investment opportunity?

Sun Charities has an endowment of $100 million. Parker, the chief investment officer of Sun Charities, has an opportunity to invest in Extraordinary Value Partners (EVP), a hedge fund. He is considering investing $10 million in EVP. How should he evaluate the investment opportunity?

Citigroup has discovered that Daniel Dantas, hired five years earlier to manage Citigroup's $750 million private equity investment in a Brazilian telecommunications industry joint venture, has allegedly mismanaged more than $300 million in assets and contracts. Dantas's misconduct relates to his management of Citigroup's CVC Fund and II-FIA, a legal entity representing a group of large Brazilian pension funds. Together with Dantas's Grupo Opportunity, CVC and II-FIA own Brasil Telecom, the third largest telecommunications company in the country. The partnership's pyramidal ownership structure makes his actions difficult to track. Citigroup must quickly determine how to disrupt Dantas's intricately woven web of control without allowing him to extract further value from the partnership. This case provides concrete examples of the expropriation risks joint venture partners face when unfamiliar with pyramidal group ownership structures.

Supplement to KEL328

This case examines the leadership challenges associated with budget shortfalls in a young nonprofit organization. The school leader must decide how to close the budget gap and implement the decision. Case A focuses on the decision-making process and the associated communication between the school leaders and the teaching staff. The staff is dissatisfied with the decision and writes a letter of complaint to the Board of Directors. Case B focuses on the Board of Directors' reaction to the letter and the situation's resolution.

Supplement to KEL337

A family media enterprise with very strong family culture and values is in the third and fourth generations of ownership and governance. They face a crisis when a large number of family shareholders want to cash out their shares. What led to this situation? How could it have been avoided? How should it be resolved?

In October 2005 the Bush administration was considering a dramatic change to the U.S. Food Aid program that would take 25 percent of the budget that would otherwise be used to buy food domestically and instead send direct cash transfers that could be used to buy food in or close to the countries in desperate need. The U.S. Food Aid program traditionally enjoyed support in Congress because it provided support to American farmers, agribusiness, and U.S. shipping interests in addition to nongovernmental organizations such as Catholic Relief Services and CARE. The case considers the proposal from the perspective of four different stakeholders: Cargill, USAid, Catholic Relief Services, and Oxfam. Each must come up with a response to the proposal.

The case compares two U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) programs from the 1970s and 1980s: (1) "stealth" combat aircraft, capable of evading detection or engagement by anti-aircraft systems, and (2) precision attack of hardened ground vehicles from "standoff" distances, i.e., far behind the battle lines. Conceived at roughly the same time, motivated by the same strategic challenge, and initially driven by the same DoD organization, stealth combat aircraft progressed from idea to deployment in less than eight years-an astounding pace for a complex military system-while a demonstrated system for standoff precision strike against mobile ground targets was not fully implemented. The case highlights the critical role of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), part of the DoD, regarded as one of the most innovative entities in the U.S. federal government.

The case describes the competitive advantages that U.S. farmers enjoy in the global cotton industry and the subsidies they receive from the U.S. federal government. Arguments for and against the subsidies are presented in the context of global competition. The case includes the data needed to estimate a supply curve for 2004 cotton production and predict the average 2004 cotton price using total cotton consumption for 2004. Students can also estimate the result of eliminating the U.S. cotton subsidies on the average 2004 cotton price.

The spread of bird flu outside of Asia, particularly in Africa and Europe, topped headlines in 2006. The migration of wild birds brought the virus to Europe, where for the first time it spread to productive livestock, bringing it closer to the Western world. Due to today's globalized and highly interconnected world, the consequences of a potential bird flu pandemic are expected to be much more severe than those of the Spanish flu, which killed 50-100 million people between 1918 and 1921. A vaccine for the bird virus is currently not available. As of July 2006, 232 cases of human infection had been documented, mostly through direct contact with poultry. Of those, 134 people died. The best medication available to treat bird flu was Roche's antiviral drug Tamiflu®. However, Tamiflu was not widely available; current orders of government bodies would not be fulfilled until the end of 2008. Well aware that today's avian flu might become a global pandemic comparable to the Spanish flu, Roche CEO Franz Humer had to decide how Roche should respond. While the pharmaceutical industry continued its research efforts on vaccines and medications, Tamiflu could play an important role by protecting healthcare workers and helping to contain the virus-or at least slow down its spread. Due to patent protection and a complicated production process with scarce raw ingredients, Roche had been the only producer of the drug. Partly in response to U.S. political pressure, in November 2005 Roche allowed Gilead to produce Tamiflu as well. Even so, it would take at least until late 2007 for Roche and Gilead to meet the orders of governments worldwide. The issue was a difficult one for Roche: What were the risks; what were the opportunities? If a pandemic occurred before sufficient stockpiles of Tamiflu had been built up, would Roche be held responsible? What steps, if any, should Roche take with respect to patent protection and production licensing in the shadow of a potential pandemic?

In 2003, ITC responded to the high level of obsolete inventory by shifting risk from finished products to manufacturing and raw materials. This required that their supply chain be much more flexible and responsive than it was in the past. By 2006, changes in the supply chain that included moving manufacturing in-house improved flexibility and responsiveness. Obsolete inventory was significantly reduced and the company was much better at matching supply and demand. Cost, however, continued to be higher than that at third parties. The company had to decide on the appropriate tradeoff between cost and responsiveness when structuring its supply chain.

Dove and Axe were two highly successful brands owned by Unilever, a portfolio company. Dove was a female-oriented beauty product brand that exhorted "real beauty" and not the unachievable standards that the media portrayed. In contrast, Axe was a brand that purportedly "gives men the edge in the mating game." Their risqué commercials always portrayed the supermodel-type beauty ideal that Dove was trying to change. Unilever had always been a company of brands where the consumer knew the brands but not the company, but recently there had been the idea to unify the company with an umbrella mission for all of its brands. This would turn Unilever into a company with brands, potentially increasing consumer awareness and encourage cross-purchases between the different brands. However, this raised questions about the conflicting messages between the brands' marketing campaigns, most notably between Unilever's two powerhouse brands, Dove and Axe. The case begins with COO Alan Jope anticipating an upcoming press meeting in New York City to discuss Unilever's current (i.e., 2005) performance and announce Unilever's decision to create an umbrella mission statement for the company. This case focuses on the central question of whether or not consistency between brand messages is necessary or inherently problematic.

The case describes the evolution between 1999 and 2005 of an unusual innovation team within the office of the Chief Information Officer of BP. The team leader, Vice President and Chief Technology Officer (CTO) Phiroz Darukhanavala ("Daru"), eschewed a large group and a venture budget in favor of a small, lean team intimately engaged with BP's business units. The case described several mechanisms created by the CTO office during its early evolution, aimed at expanding executives' appreciation of emerging technology capabilities, building a network of relationships through which emerging technologies are scouted and vetted, and providing structured mechanisms for technology transfer. In late 2005 the CIO's Advisory Group challenged the CTO office to "keep reinventing yourselves." Students are asked to assume Daru's role and suggest new processes and structures to continue the evolution of the CTO office. The teaching note describes what the team actually did, and addresses questions raised at the end of the case.

A married couple who have a successful industrial B2B business evaluate whether or not to sell the business to two of their offspring, who are both entrepreneurial MBA graduates. Complicating factors include the fact that the sale price and structure need to finance the couple's retirement and give fair inheritance treatment to the remaining siblings. In addition, the father has had some health issues and the business is doing well, so there is a lot of forward momentum to sell to the next generation

Because U.S. legislators are often most attentive to the issues raised by people who create jobs in their states, Bob Epstein, a local business owner, has been asked by activists to help lobby for a bill that would mandate the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in California. Before deciding whether he should work to establish the business community's backing for this bill, Epstein must weigh the pros and cons of supporting measures that might put his business (and standing in the community) at risk.

When did you realize you had the right stuff to lead? HBR's editors put that question to a group of business leaders representing different industries, nationalities, executive tenures, and company sizes. The answers were as diverse as the group itself. Nokia CEO Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo recounts a lesson in humility, learned when he was a young CFO and it wasn't clear each month that the company would be able to pay salaries the next. Gary Jackson describes the challenge of preserving his military-training company's high-energy culture, largely through his own example. Arthur Gensler's story highlights the importance of vision in growing his architectural firm and refusing to be constrained by the traditions of a hidebound industry. A world away, Alexander Cummings tells the harrowing tale of withstanding quarter after quarter of declining margins and market share--and intense pressure from his boss, and his boss's boss--because he had conviction that a controversial decision he made at Coca-Cola Africa would prove right in the end. Roche CEO Franz Humer recounts how he learned to trust his intuition, particularly when the rest of his organization was inclined to see only the downside risk in a deal. Other leaders' moments of truth involved tests of still different qualities. Duleep Aluwihare of Ernst & Young in Poland learned from painful encounters with a mentor in his old firm, Arthur Andersen, that he must change his leadership style. Sergey Petrov, the founder of Russia's largest car importer, developed the perspective required of a leader when he was a young dissident held for questioning by the KGB. Finally, Alan Klapmeier of private-aircraft manufacturer Cirrus Design tells of the passion required to bring something truly innovative to market despite recalcitrant board members and the catastrophic loss of a prototype.