Nissan Motors Ltd. went through a spectacular turnaround led by Carlos Ghosn. Nevertheless, in spite of strong growth in new car sales, "After Sales" of automobile parts in Japan did not keep up, hurting dealer profitability. Since dealer profitability is a key success factor in the auto industry, Nissan decided to lead its Japanese dealers to (1) improve their cost structure, (2) improve their management methods, and (3) stimulate "customer traffic" via better marketing strategies. The After Sales department identified a Toyota dealership that actually managed to increase its profitability by working on these three factors, and its president agreed to let Nissan benchmark with his operation. The department decided to replicate this Toyota dealer's management methods, costs and strategy. The latter includes significant price reductions on fees for road worthiness tests, which dealers are authorized to perform on behalf of the Japanese government. Many Nissan dealers raised objections to this pricing approach and, in order to convince them, the company executes the strategy on a "pilot" basis, in Hakone, testing the approach and, hopefully, creating a showcase. While initial results were encouraging, the growth in market share seems to flatten, possibly vindicating the doubting dealers' arguments. The case, generates considerable controversy in both MBA and executive classes, includes discussion on market segmentation, pricing strategy, channel design and dealer network management issues. The case includes a detailed discussion of the dealers' "business model", allowing the class to inspect the financial impact of various strategic scenarios for both Nissan and its dealers.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Most large-scale change efforts fail to meet their expectations. A major problem is that even the most advanced change models will stumble when they face organizational designs and management practices that are inherently anti-change. The truth is that the effectiveness of change efforts is largely determined by organizational design, or how a company's structure, processes, reward systems, and other features are orchestrated over time to support one another as well as the company's strategic intent, identity, and capabilities. In a world that is perpetually changing, an organization's design must support the idea that the implementation and reimplementation of a strategy is a continuous process. However, a number of traditional organizational design features tend to discourage change. Thus, to transform themselves into organizations that are "built to change," companies need to rethink a number of these basic design assumptions with respect to managing talent (forget about job descriptions and redefine the relationship between company and worker), reward systems (implement a "person-based" pay system), structure (redesign the organization to maximize its "surface area"), information and decision processes (scrap the annual-budget process and move decision making closer to the front lines), and leaders (replace hierarchical command-and-control with shared leadership).

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. According to conventional wisdom, companies resemble organisms destined to pass through the stages of start-up, scaling, maturity, and decline. In reality, business opportunities--and not firms--pass through these stages, and most organizations consist of multiple opportunities arrayed across the different stages of the life cycle. Executives who understand this crucial distinction can view their organization as a portfolio of opportunities that requires constant re-jiggering to balance the demands of the present with the promise of the future. The authors suggest that, when assessing any opportunity portfolio, executives should remain on the lookout for the following common pathologies: waiting too long to exit a declining business, failing to salvage usable pieces of a business that is shut down, shunning promising new markets because of an overly conservative fiscal approach, trying to scale too many business opportunities so that none of them receives the necessary resources, applying the same management style to business opportunities at different life cycle stages, and erring on the side of loss aversion.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Early research in e-commerce projected that online retailing would spiral into a never-ending price war. But recent research has shown that customers are more likely to pay higher prices to online retailers of high quality that they trust. But how do customers evaluate quality in online retailing? What are the specific aspects of an online transaction that customers value and use to distinguish one site from another? The authors explored these issues by surveying customers who had recently engaged in an online retail transaction to determine how they evaluate the quality of their experiences with online retailers. The results demonstrated that customers' perceptions of quality and satisfaction with online purchases depend on three things: interaction with the Web site, delivery of the product, and how prepared retailers are to address problems when they occur. Of the three, product delivery has the strongest influence on customer satisfaction and future purchase intentions. The authors further break down each of the three aspects of quality to create a complete picture of what it takes to build a trusting relationship with customers in an e-commerce environment.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Responding to competitive pressures, a growing number of corporate managers are dismantling organizations and cultures that were built on selling particular products and replacing them with new structures designed to be more responsive to customer needs. The push to restructure around customers is more than a new management fad. It is supported by success stories at companies including IBM, Cummins India, Fidelity Investments, and Imation. Companies transitioning from product-oriented to customer-centered organizations progress along a continuum. They begin with informal coordination to overcome the deficiencies of product or functional silos, adding integrating functions (such as key account managers and customer segment task forces) as needed. The market logic for becoming customer focused is often compelling. In surveying 347 companies, the author found that companies that embraced this approach saw accountability for customer relationships improve, and information about customers was more readily shared. These companies were also easier to do business with, according to customers. However, the author found that transforming product-centered cultures can be difficult and that the potential benefits do not necessarily translate into superior performance.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Launching new ventures outside a corporation's core business is risky and failure prone, yet, it is often perceived as vital to innovation and organic growth. Can investing in new ventures add value to a company despite the risks? To explore that question, the authors conducted an in-depth study of corporate venturing at Nokia Corp. between 1998 and 2002. The research yielded a number of lessons about corporate venturing. For example, Nokia discovered that looking at the success or failure of an individual project as a business was the wrong way to evaluate the effectiveness of the venturing program. Whether they succeeded as businesses, Nokia's corporate ventures often added important capabilities to the core business, such as familiarity with a new customer segment for the company. In fact, seemingly unrelated investments sometimes led to technologies that later benefited the company's core business. The authors conclude that, to extract value from corporate ventures, companies must use different management practices than in their established businesses, structure new ventures so that they don't face pressure to deliver immediate results, and emphasize learning. Although 70% of Nokia's corporate venturing investments during the period studied were either discontinued or completely divested, the capabilities and technologies developed nonetheless played an important role in helping the company's core businesses respond to change.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. As businesses add more and more products to their portfolios, they face diminishing returns on variety and greater costs in bringing their products to market. As a result, managers must balance the costs and benefits of variety in determining their product lineups. The authors worked with a wide range of businesses and discovered that a widespread approach, whereby low-volume products are cut first, is often ineffective. As an alternative, the authors discuss five critical lessons for maximizing the value and effectiveness of variety management, and present a process for making value-driven variety management successful. First, all products are not created equal. Both complexity costs and benefits may vary considerably for different types of product variants. Second, be exhaustive. The impact on any one cost area may be insignificant. It is the compound effect of the impact that creates the complexity monster. Third, take a return on investment view. A business case for adding variety should consider impact of both one-time and recurring costs over the whole product life cycle and balance this against the incremental benefits over the product life cycle. Fourth, tailor the variety-management strategy to the type of complexity cost. Fifth, reduce product complexity costs without reducing product complexity.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. There are now at least 10 separate schools of thought regarding strategy and more than a dozen common definitions of the term. To clarify and deepen our understanding of corporate strategy, the author suggests general guidelines that set the boundaries of the discipline to facilitate future executive decisions. The author argues that strategy comprises three objectives: creating value, handling imitation, and shaping a perimeter. The ability to sustain value creation, whether from the customer's or the shareholder's perspective, is the ultimate goal of any strategy. Concepts such as benchmarking, differentiation, core competencies, unique resources, institutionalism, and competitive rivalry are all connected with the ability to prevent, implement, or leverage imitation. Decisions about diversification, outsourcing, vertical integration, internationalization, and positioning are all linked with the search for a profitable perimeter.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Conflict is inevitable in any large organization, and these conflicts, particularly in the board of directors, can often be costly to a firm both in terms of real dollars and in lost organizational focus. However, drawing on best practices in conflict management, the author suggests that organizations can take a comprehensive approach to settle conflict quickly inside the board, making use of four resources available to any organization. The first is the board itself. Directors and boards should take the lead in addressing their own problems and disagreements using the most constructive approaches possible. Boards also need to establish a set of internal and external resources. Internally, they can rely on resources such as general counsel, the chief ethics officer, and the organizational ombudsman. Externally, organizations can rely on mediation and arbitration as well as investigative counsel. In cases of last resort, the board can rely on public resources such as the courts and government agencies. However, this approach may not be enough. The authors suggest a new role: the board ombudsman, for a highly competent, independent, and confidential resource who can help directors and boards to solve problems through effective, informal methods, such as assisted negotiation or shuttle diplomacy.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. The success of the IKEA Group, the world's largest furniture retailer, is generally attributed to its highly innovative strategy. Through global sourcing of products and customer self-service in the areas of furniture delivery and assembly, IKEA achieves a low-cost position that enables it to charge low prices. Meanwhile, IKEA's use of Scandinavian design and an innovative retail environment increase customers' perception of receiving good value. By examining the history of IKEA, the author concludes that, while founder Ingvar Kamprad initially had a general vision, many important details of IKEA's strategy were developed through experimentation and adaptation to market circumstances rather than through preplanned strategy formulation. In academic literature, this approach to strategy is known as logical incrementalism. The author suggests that IKEA's experiences in strategy development demonstrate the importance of starting with a clear vision but refining it over time; experimenting constantly and being willing to make mistakes; seeking to turn problems into opportunities; and learning from other people's ideas.

In the 1960s thalidomide, a popular new drug considered to be safe and effective, was revealed to cause severe nerve damage and birth defects in newborn infants, prompting health officials to ban the use of the drug and tighten overall restrictions on new drugs and drug use. Twenty years later, after recognizing the positive effects of thalidomide when treating patients with leprosy and its potential role in the treatment of certain types of cancer and cases of HIV/AIDS, the Celgene corporation would be forced to contend with stringent FDA regulations, liability concerns, public skepticism, and poor mass media portrayal in order to secure the drug's approval.

An abstract is not available for this product.

As president of Scotch whisky maker Glenmeadie, Bob Littlefield is pleased to see the results of his CMO's recent marketing initiatives. There are new interactive capabilities on the company's Web site, a product information call center, and numerous other customer interfaces designed to deepen consumers' connection to the brand. Thanks to these front-end innovations, sales are up--and largely because of more loyal purchasing behavior, research shows. But not all the news is good. Glenmeadie's CFO says the marketing programs account for half the company's costs. Meanwhile, Glenmeadie's master distiller, Ellis Cameron, resents the fact that, with so much money going toward enhancing customer relations, there isn't enough left for his R&D efforts. In a meeting with Bob, he launches into a tirade about priorities. "There's an old expression," Ellis says, "Build a better mousetrap, and the world will beat a path to your door." Glenmeadie, he says, is neglecting the customer's basic need, "We've given up on redesigning his mousetrap and are trying to trap him instead!" Commenting on this fictional case study in R0610A and R0610Z are David Herman, president of luggage maker Hartmann; Marketspace's president, Jeffrey Rayport; Stephen Dull, vice president of strategy at VF; and Joe Scafido, who leads innovation at Dunkin' Brands.

Companies today glorify the executive who logs 100-hour workweeks, the road warrior who lives out of a suitcase in multiple time zones, and the negotiator who takes a red-eye to make an 8 a.m. meeting. But to Dr. Charles A. Czeisler, the Baldino Professor of Sleep Medicine at Harvard Medical School, this kind of corporate behavior is the antithesis of high performance. In fact, he says, it endangers employees and puts their companies at risk. In this interview, Czeisler describes four neurobiological functions that affect sleep duration and quality as well as individual performance. When these functions fall out of alignment because of sleep deprivation, people operate at a far lower level of performance than they would if they were well rested. Czeisler goes on to observe that corporations have all kinds of policies designed to protect employees--rules against smoking, sexual harassment, and so on--but they push people to the brink of self-destruction by expecting them to work too hard, too long, and with too little sleep. The negative effects on cognitive performance, Czeisler says, can be similar to those that occur after drinking too much alcohol: "We now know that 24 hours without sleep or a week of sleeping four or five hours a night induces an impairment equivalent to a blood alcohol level of .1%. We would never say, 'This person is a great worker! He's drunk all the time!' yet we continue to celebrate people who sacrifice sleep for work." Czeisler recommends that companies institute corporate sleep policies that discourage scheduled work beyond 16 consecutive hours as well as working or driving immediately after late-night or overnight flights. A sidebar to this article summarizes the latest developments in sleep research.

Over the past 20 years, waves of liberalization have all but washed away protectionist barriers in developing countries. As multinational corporations from North America, Western Europe, Japan, and South Korea stormed into the emerging markets, many local companies lost market share or sold off businesses--but some fought back. India's Mahindra & Mahindra, China's Haier Group, and many other corporations in developing countries have held their own against the onslaught, restructured their businesses, exploited new opportunities, and built world-class companies that are today giving their global rivals a run for their money. In this article, the authors, citing the results of their six-year study of "emerging giants," describe the three strategies these businesses used to become effective global competitors--despite facing financial and bureaucratic disadvantages in their home markets. Some capitalized on their knowledge of local product markets. The Philippines' Jollibee Foods, for instance, has profitably battled McDonald's because it realizes that Filipinos like their burgers to have a particular soy and garlic taste. Some have exploited their knowledge of local talent and capital markets, thereby serving customers both at home and abroad in a cost-effective manner. India's software companies, for instance, recognized the possibility of providing services to overseas customers at least a decade before Western companies even considered hiring Indian software professionals. And some emerging giants have exploited institutional voids to create profitable businesses. China's Emerge Logistics, for instance, helps foreign companies navigate the country's disjointed transportation system and baffling bureaucracy, guiding them all the way from ports to retail outlets. The authors' research indicates there's more than one way to skin the proverbial cat: Some emerging-market companies compete in several countries, but others sell only at home.

Employers can choose from lots of tools when they want to encourage employees to work together toward a new corporate goal. One of the rarest managerial skills is the ability to understand which tools will work in a given situation and which will misfire. Cooperation tools fall into four major categories: power, management, leadership, and culture. Choosing the right tool, say the authors, requires assessing the organization along two critical dimensions: the extent to which people agree on what they want and the extent to which they agree on cause and effect, or how to get what they want. The authors plot on a matrix where various organizations fall along these two dimensions. Employees represented in the lower-left quadrant of the model, for example, disagree strongly both about what they want and on what actions will produce which results. Those in the upper-right quadrant agree on both dimensions. Different quadrants call for different tools. When employees share little consensus on either dimension, for instance, the only methods that will elicit cooperation are "power tools" such as fiat, force, and threats. Yugoslavia's Josip Broz Tito wielded such devices effectively. So did Jamie Dimon, current CEO of JPMorgan Chase, during the bank's integration with Bank One. For employees who agree on what they want but not on how to get it--think of Microsoft in 1995--leadership tools, such as vision statements, are more appropriate. Some leaders are blessed with an instinct for choosing the right tools--Continental Airlines' Gordon Bethune, General Electric's Jack Welch, and IBM's Lou Gerstner are all examples. Others can use this framework to help select the most appropriate tools for their circumstances.

Three years ago, consultants Laurence Prusak and Thomas H. Davenport asked prominent management thinkers to name their gurus and reported the results in HBR. James G. March appeared on more lists than any other person except Peter Drucker. A professor emeritus in management, sociology, political science, and education at Stanford University, March has taught courses in subjects as diverse as organizational psychology, behavioral economics, leadership, rules for killing people, friendship, computer simulation, and statistics. He is perhaps best known for his pioneering contributions to organization and management theory. March's accomplishments in that field, and in many others, have conferred on him an almost unprecedented reputation as a rigorous scholar and a deep source of wisdom. As University of Chicago professor John Padgett wrote in the journal Contemporary Sociology, "March's influence, unlike that of any of his peers, is not limited to any possible subset of the social science disciplines; it is pervasive." March approaches thought aesthetically; he cares that ideas have "some form of elegance or grace or surprise." His poetic sensibility can be felt in the metaphors he has created over the years--the "garbage can theory" of organizational choice, for instance, and the "hot-stove effect" in learning. In this edited interview with HBR senior editor Diane Coutu, March shares his thinking on aesthetics, leadership, the role of folly, and the irrelevance of relevance when it comes to the pursuit of ideas. He also comments on the fundamental differences between academic and experiential knowledge, underscoring the need for both.

Two-sided networks, or platforms, often enjoy significantly greater returns at scale than traditional value chains. Despite these advantages, many companies struggle to develop these platforms in a sustainable way. This largely stems from an assumption that products with network effects will operate in the same way as traditional products, leading managers to make highly flawed decisions. In this article, the authors draw on recent theoretical work to guide executives negotiating the challenges of two-sided networks, touching on how to develop a pricing scheme, how to manage "winner take all" dynamics, and how to address the threat of envelopment by an adjacent platform. There are no easy answers, but thinking through the challenges presented in this piece will give you the tools you need to move forward with confidence.

To be competitive, companies must grow innovative new businesses. Corporate entrepreneurship, however, isn't easy. New ventures face innumerable barriers and seldom mesh smoothly with well-established systems, processes, and cultures. Nonetheless, success requires a balance of old and new organizational traits--and unless companies keep those opposing forces in equilibrium, their new businesses will flounder. The authors describe the challenges companies face when they pursue new businesses, as well as the usual problematic responses to those challenges. Such companies, they say, must perform three balancing acts: 1) Develop strategy by trial and error, which includes narrowing potential choices, learning from small samples, using prototypes to test business models, tracking progress through nonfinancial measures, and knowing how and when to pull the plug on a new venture; 2) Find the best combination of old and new operational processes by staffing new ventures with "mature turks," changing veterans' thinking, knowing which capabilities to develop and which to acquire, and having old and new businesses share responsibility for operating decisions; 3. Strike the right balance of integration and autonomy by assigning both corporate and operating sponsors to new ventures, establishing criteria for handoffs to existing divisions, and using creative organizational structures. The authors provide a detailed look at IBM's Emerging Business Opportunity system, which manages all these balancing acts simultaneously.

In 1976, Genentech, the first biotechnology company, was founded by a young venture capitalist and a university professor to exploit recombinant DNA technology. Thirty years and more than $300 billion in investments later, only a handful of biotech firms have matched Genentech's success or even shown a profit. No avalanche of new drugs has hit the market, and the long-awaited breakthrough in R&D productivity has yet to materialize. This disappointing performance raises a question: Can organizations motivated by the need to make profits and please shareholders successfully conduct basic scientific research as a core activity? The question has largely been ignored, despite intense debate over whether business's invasion of basic science--long the domain of universities and nonprofit research institutions--is limiting access to discoveries, thereby slowing advances in science. Biotech has not lived up to its promise, says the author, because its anatomy, which has worked well in other high-tech sectors, can't handle the fundamental challenges facing drug R&D: profound, persistent uncertainty and high risks rooted in the limited knowledge of human biology; the need for the diverse disciplines involved in drug discovery to work together in an integrated fashion; and barriers to learning, including tacit knowledge and murky intellectual property rights, which can slow the pace of scientific advance. A more suitable anatomy would include increased vertical integration; a smaller number of closer, longer collaborations; an emphasis by universities on sharing rather than patenting scientific discoveries; more cross-disciplinary academic research; and more federal and private funding for translational research, which bridges basic and applied science. With such modifications, science can be a business.