Over the past decade, the distribution of household incomes has shifted so much that a much larger proportion of consumers now earns significantly higher-than-average incomes--while still falling short of being truly rich. As a result, what used to be a no man's land for new product introductions has in many categories become an extremely profitable "new middle ground." How can marketers capitalize on this new territory? The key, say the authors, is to rethink the positioning and design of offerings and the ways they can be brought to market. Procter & Gamble, for instance, redefined the positioning map for tooth-whitening solutions by offering its $35 Whitestrips. P&G wisely positioned itself between the $400 bleaching technique that dental centers popularized and $2 to $8 whitening toothpaste. In product categories where the middle ground is already populated, it's important for companies to design or redesign offerings to compete. An example is the Polo shirt. How do you sell a man yet another one after he's bought every color he wants? Add some features, and call it a golf shirt. Here, marketers have introduced designs based on the concept of "occasional use" to stand out. Finally, companies wishing to reach the almost rich can change how they go to market. Consider Target Stores, which has pioneered a focus the company itself characterizes as upscale discount. The strategy has made Target an everyday shopping phenomenon among well-heeled urbanites and prosperous professionals.
Acquisitions and alliances are two pillars of growth strategy. But most businesses don't treat the two as alternative mechanisms for attaining goals. Consequently, companies take over firms they should have collaborated with, and vice versa, and make a mess of both acquisitions and alliances. It's easy to see why companies don't weigh the relative merits and demerits of acquisitions and alliances before choosing horses for courses. The two strategies differ in many ways: Acquisition deals are competitive, based on market prices, and risky; alliances are cooperative, negotiated, and not so risky. Companies habitually deploy acquisitions to increase scale or cut costs and use partnerships to enter new markets, customer segments, and regions. Moreover, a company's initial experiences often turn into blinders. If the firm pulls off an alliance or two, it tends to enter into alliances even when circumstances demand acquisitions. Organizational barriers also stand in the way. In many companies, an M&A group, which reports to the finance head, handles acquisitions, whereas a separate business development unit looks after alliances. The two teams work out of different locations, jealously guard turf and, in effect, prevent companies from comparing the advantages and disadvantages of the strategies. But companies could improve their results, the authors argue, if they compared the two strategies to determine which is best suited to the situation at hand. Firms, such as Cisco, that use acquisitions and alliances appropriately grow faster than rivals do. The authors provide a framework to help organizations systematically decide between acquisition and alliance by analyzing three sets of factors: the resources and synergies they desire, the marketplace they compete in, and their competencies at collaborating.
Companies spend billions of dollars on direct marketing, targeting individual customers with ever more accuracy. Yet despite the power of the myriad data collecting and analytical tools at their disposal, they're still having trouble optimizing their direct marketing investments. Many marketers try to minimize costs by pursuing only those customers who are cheap to find and cheap to keep. Others try to get the most customers they possibly can and keep all of them for as long as they can. But a customer need not be loyal to be highly profitable, and many loyal customers turn out to be highly unprofitable. Companies can get more out of direct marketing if they see it as a single system for generating profits than if they try to maximize performance measures at each stage of the process. This article describes a tool for doing just that. Called ARPRO (Allocating Resources for Profits), the tool is essentially a complex regression analysis that can estimate the impact of a company's direct marketing investments on the profitability of its customer pool. With data that companies already gather, the tool can show managers how much to spend on acquisition vs. retention and even what percentage of their funds they should allocate to the different direct marketing channels. Using the model, companies can easily see that even small deviations from the optimal levels of customer profitability are expensive. The tool can also show that finding the optimal balance between investments in acquisition and retention can be more important than finding the optimum amount to invest overall.
When does it make sense for companies to grow from within? When is it better to gain new capabilities or access to markets by merging with or acquiring other companies? When should you sacrifice the bottom line to nurture the top line? In a thought-provoking series of essays, five executives--Kenneth Freeman of Quest Diagnostics, George Nolen of Siemens USA, John Tyson of Tyson Foods, Kenneth Lewis of Bank of America, and Robert Greifeld of NASDAQ--describe how they have approached top-line growth in various leadership roles throughout their careers. They write candidly about their struggles and successes along the way, relaying growth strategies as diverse as the companies and industries they represent. The leaders' different tactics have almost everything to do with their companies' particular strengths, weaknesses, and needs. Freeman, for instance, emphasizes the importance of knowing when to put on the brakes. When he first became CEO of Quest, he froze acquisitions for a few years so the company could focus on internal processes and "earn the right to grow." But for Greifeld, it's all about innovation, which "shakes up competitive stasis and propels even mature businesses forward." The executives agree, though, that companies can grow (even profitably) by distinguishing their offerings from those of other organizations.
At some point in its development, every industry can be considered a growth industry, based on the apparent superiority of its product. But in case after case, industries have fallen under the shadow of mismanagement. What usually gets emphasized is selling, not marketing. This is a mistake, since selling focuses on the needs of the seller, while marketing concentrates on the needs of the buyer. In this widely quoted and anthologized article, first published in 1980, Theodore Levitt argues that "the history of every dead and dying 'growth' industry shows a self-deceiving cycle of bountiful expansion and undetected decay." But, as he illustrates, memories are short. The railroads serve as an example of an industry whose failure to grow is due to a limited market view. Those behind the railroads are in trouble not because the need for passenger transportation has declined or even because that need has been filled by cars, airplanes, and other modes of transport. Rather, the industry is failing because those behind it assumed they were in the railroad business rather than the transportation business. They were railroad oriented instead of transportation oriented, product oriented instead of customer oriented. For companies to ensure continued evolution, they must define their industries broadly to take advantage of growth opportunities. They must ascertain and act on their customers' needs and desires, not bank on the presumed longevity of their products. In short, the best way for a firm to be lucky is to make its own luck. An organization must learn to think of itself not as producing goods or services but as doing the things that will make people want to do business with it. And in every case, the chief executive is responsible for creating an environment that reflects this mission.
Entrepreneurial middle managers are the key to innovative growth in organizations and are a source of hope for a slowed economy. In fact, strategic directives from senior executives mean nothing without efficient middle managers just below officer level who are able to design the systems and carry out the plans. Rosabeth Moss Kanter's article, first published in 1982, reports on a study of effective middle managers working in large corporations. It distinguishes between managers who fostered basic accomplishments (those that occurred within existing frameworks) and managers who achieved innovative accomplishments (those that increased long-term capacity). Basic accomplishments differ from innovative ones not only in scope and long-run impact but also in what it takes to achieve them. Innovative accomplishments tend to involve highly problematic situations that require creative solutions, power, and influence. Innovative middle managers are not necessarily extraordinary individuals. They do, however, share several characteristics, including comfort with change, clarity of direction, thoroughness, and a participative management style. Such managers also understand that achieving their goals takes time--and tact. Achieving goals also takes the support of a collaborative organization. Entrepreneurial managers require access to abundant information, support, and resources, and they need the power to go beyond the limits of their formal positions.
It's fashionable to talk of being "customer oriented." But regardless of how companies attempt to flatten their organizations or empower frontline workers, the simple truth is that every customer's experience is determined by the order management cycle (OMC): the 10 steps, from planning to postsales service, that define a company's business system. Every time the order is handled, the customer is handled. And every time the order sits unattended, the customer sits unattended. To find the gaps in an OMC--those places where a customer's order is dropped or shunted to the wrong department--managers should try what authors Benson Shapiro, V. Kasturi Rangan, and John Sviokla did in their research. They "stapled" themselves to an order in the 18 companies they studied, literally following it through every stage of the OMC. Based on this practical approach, the authors point out potential gaps throughout the OMC. For example, marketing and production battles can erupt even during order planning, and some of the fiercest fighting can break out during scheduling, when the sales force may want quick turnarounds that are unrealistic for manufacturing. Most companies don't see the OMC as a whole system, especially because each phase may require a bewildering overlap of functional responsibilities. However, when managers take the time to track each step of the OMC, they'll come into contact with customer service representatives, production schedulers, shipping clerks, and other critically important people. In this article, first published in 1992, the authors contend that managers who "staple themselves to an order" will not only move horizontally across their own organizations, charting gaps and building information bridges; they'll also see the company from the customer's perspective.
Why are some companies able to sustain high growth while others are not? To answer that question, Insead professors W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne spent five years studying more than 30 companies around the world. They found that the thinking of less successful organizations is often dominated by the idea of staying ahead of the competition. In stark contrast, high-growth companies pay little attention to matching or beating their rivals. Instead, they seek to make their competitors irrelevant through what the authors call "value innovation." Conventional strategic logic and value innovation differ along the basic dimensions of strategy. Many companies take their industry's conditions as given; value innovators don't. Whereas many organizations let their rivals set the parameters of their strategic thinking, value innovators do not use competitors as benchmarks. Rather than focus on differences between customers, value innovators look for things that customers value in common. Instead of viewing opportunities through a lens of existing assets and capabilities, value innovators ask, "What if we start anew?" In this classic HBR article, first published in 1997, the authors tell the story of the French hotelier Accor, which discarded the notion of what a hotel is supposed to look like in the interest of delivering what customers really want: a good night's sleep at a low price. And Virgin Atlantic challenged airline industry conventions by eliminating first-class service and channeling savings into innovations for business-class passengers. Those companies didn't set out to build advantages over the competition, but in the end, their innovative practices led them to do just that.
Software maker TopTek has acquired a consulting and systems-integration firm, mainly to profit from the software sales that are a natural by-product of consulting engagements. But in many ways the two companies worked better when they were separate. Before the acquisition, the same people who delivered services to clients made the consulting firm's sales. By contrast, TopTek's professional salespeople, all of them highly skilled at selling product, handled sales. Now the consultants and the salespeople are trying to work together, but they're making a hash of it. For instance, the CIO of a TopTek customer--a retailer--is complaining that consultants from the acquired firm are driving him nuts. They've got his boss's ear, and they're selling additional projects left and right, stimulating demand for a pace of change that the CIO says the retailer can't handle. The consultants in the newly constituted TopTek aren't happy either. They get no commissions on products they sell, because commissions for all sales to an account--forever--go to the salesperson who snagged it in the first place. The sales force has its own gripes. The consultants aren't much help in winning new business, according to Ron Murphy, TopTek's sales VP. What will it take for cross selling to succeed at TopTek? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0407B and R0407Z are Ram Charan, an author and adviser to CEOs; Caroline A. Kovac, the general manager of IBM Healthcare and Life Sciences; Jerome A. Colletti, an author and consultant; and Federico Turegano, the managing director of SG Corporate and Investment Banking, an arm of Societe Generale Group.
Software maker TopTek has acquired a consulting and systems-integration firm, mainly to profit from the software sales that are a natural by-product of consulting engagements. But in many ways the two companies worked better when they were separate. Before the acquisition, the same people who delivered services to clients made the consulting firm's sales. By contrast, TopTek's professional salespeople, all of them highly skilled at selling product, handled sales. Now the consultants and the salespeople are trying to work together, but they're making a hash of it. For instance, the CIO of a TopTek customer--a retailer--is complaining that consultants from the acquired firm are driving him nuts. They've got his boss's ear, and they're selling additional projects left and right, stimulating demand for a pace of change that the CIO says the retailer can't handle. The consultants in the newly constituted TopTek aren't happy either. They get no commissions on products they sell, because commissions for all sales to an account--forever--go to the salesperson who snagged it in the first place. The sales force has its own gripes. The consultants aren't much help in winning new business, according to Ron Murphy, TopTek's sales VP. What will it take for cross selling to succeed at TopTek? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0407B and R0407Z are Ram Charan, an author and adviser to CEOs; Caroline A. Kovac, the general manager of IBM Healthcare and Life Sciences; Jerome A. Colletti, an author and consultant; and Federico Turegano, the managing director of SG Corporate and Investment Banking, an arm of Societe Generale Group.
This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Many companies have supply chains that are global. They start with the sourcing of components and raw materials from around the world, then move their basic manufacturing to low-cost locations overseas. But few organizations have innovation processes that are equally global. That is, rarely do businesses have innovation activities that integrate distinctive knowledge from around the world as effectively as global supply chains integrate far-flung sources of raw materials, labor, component, and services. But some companies--Nokia, Airbus, SAP, and Starbucks, among them--have managed to assemble an integrated "innovation chain" that is truly global. They have been able to implement a process for innovating that transcends local clusters and national boundaries, becoming what the authors call "metanational innovators." This process requires three steps: prospecting (finding relevant pockets of knowledge from around the world), assessing (deciding on the optimal "footprint" for a particular innovation), and mobilizing (using cost-effective mechanisms to move distant knowledge without degrading it). When done properly, metanational innovation can provide companies with a powerful new source of competitive advantage: more and higher value innovation at a lower cost.
This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Traditional models for developing and managing corporate portfolios are based on financial frameworks, business synergies, or leveraging core competencies into related businesses. In this article, the author goes beyond those traditional approaches and offers an alternative--the corporate sphere of influence. Like nations, says the author, companies build spheres of influence that protect their cores, project their power outward to weaken rivals, and prepare the way for future moves. By recognizing the strategic purpose of each part of the portfolio, the sphere of influence model focuses attention on the company's overall strategy, including how it wants to structure the division of product and geographic markets in an industry, which threats it will address or ignore, and how the company's portfolio enhances or detracts from its competitive or alliance strategy. Thinking in terms of building a sphere of influence forces managers to draw together corporate- and business-level strategic analyses that are often treated as separate. The corporate-level concern about where to fight and the business-level concern about with whom and how to fight are brought together into a coherent view. In this article, the author defines the components of a sphere of influence and explains how senior executives can use his framework to assess their company's current sphere and map their desired one. He offers examples of how companies have managed their spheres, drawing from a wide range of industries and companies, including Microsoft, Procter & Gamble, Johnson & Johnson, Anheuser-Busch, Nokia, Harley-Davidson, and Mexican cement company CEMEX.
This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. For a firm to succeed over the long term, it needs to master both adaptability and alignment--an attribute sometimes referred to as ambidexterity. The concept is alluring, but the evidence suggests that most companies have struggled to apply it. The standard approach has been to create separate structures for different types of activities. But separation can also lead to isolation, and many R&D and business development groups have failed because of their lack of linkages to the core businesses. In an attempt to shed new light on the discussion, the authors develop and explore their concept of contextual ambidexterity, which calls for individual employees to make choices between alignment-oriented and adaptation-oriented activities in the context of their day-to-day work. The authors introduce this as a complementary concept to traditional structural ambidexterity. By means of their survey- and interview-based research--which took place over a three-year period and involved 4,195 respondents across 41 business units in 10 multinational firms--the authors identify the four behaviors displayed by ambidextrous individuals, each of which involves taking independent, adaptive action in the service of overall company goals. They then present a framework for describing and analyzing which organizational contexts encourage or discourage such behaviors. They link organizational context to ambidexterity and, in turn, ambidexterity to high performance. Finally, the authors describe how companies such as Nokia, Ericsson, Oracle, and Renault have been able to create such high-performance contexts, and they offer managers guidance on how to create them in their own companies.
This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Many companies organize employees into self-managing teams that are basically left to run themselves with some guidance from an external leader. In fact, comprehensive surveys report that 79% of companies in the Fortune 1,000 currently deploy such "empowered," "self-directed," or "autonomous" teams. Because of their widespread use, much research has been devoted to understanding how best to set up self-managing teams to maximize their effectiveness. Interestingly, though, relatively little attention has been paid to the leaders who must oversee such working groups. At first, it seems contradictory: Why should a self-managing team require any leadership at all? But the authors' research has shown that self-managing teams require a particular kind of leadership. Specifically, the external leaders who contribute most to their team's success tend to excel at one skill: managing the boundary between the team and the larger organization. That process requires specific behaviors that can be grouped into four basic functions: (1) moving back and forth between the team and the broader organization to build relationships, (2) scouting necessary information, (3) persuading the team and outside constituents to support one another, and (4) empowering team members.
This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Every industry leader lives in fear of the low-end competitor--a company offering much lower prices for a seemingly similar product. The vast majority of such low-end companies fall into one of four types: strippers, predators, reformers, or transformers. Each of these is defined by the functionality of product and the convenience of purchase. Strippers, for instance, typically enter a market with a bare-bones offering, reduced in function and usually in convenience. Industry leaders have significant advantages for combating low-end competition, but they often hesitate because they're afraid their actions will adversely affect their current profit margins. The answer, then, is to find the response that is most likely to restore market calm in the least disruptive way. An industry leader could choose to ride out the challenge by ignoring, blocking, or acquiring the low-end competitor. Or it could decide to strengthen its own value proposition by adding new price points, increasing its level of benefits, or dropping its prices. Such tactics can be effective in the short term, but the industry leader also needs to consider strategic retreat, particularly when certain conditions make future low-end challenges inevitable.
This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Getting more value from knowledge--especially from a firm's own hard-won knowledge--is one of the central challenges facing companies today. Many organizations have approached this problem in recent years by making big investments in IT systems, but the payoff has often been disappointing. Companies would do better to emulate the innovative giants of the Internet--Google, eBay, and Amazon--whose success has in part derived from their ability to make it easy for customers to find what they are looking for, to browse for products and services, and to evaluate potential purchases. These are exactly the things that are hard to do in most companies. That is, employees find that it is not intuitive to search for information in company repositories; they cannot easily browse within categories of knowledge; and they are not given the context they need to evaluate the quality of the knowledge they do find. The authors assert that if organizations apply the basic, proven approaches of the Internet success stories to capture the attention of their employees, they should be able to improve their ROI on sunk IT costs while increasing knowledge-worker productivity.
This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. As China prepared to enter the World Trade Organization in 2001, many multinationals planned to invest new billions in operations there. But their ambitious growth plans must be viewed with caution. Experienced multinationals have long been aware of the challenges, summed up by the adage that in China "everything is possible, but nothing is easy." But few predicted the most formidable obstacle to success: the emergence of tough competition from local Chinese players. The authors' research over the past five years reveals that although market dominance by local champions is not universal, it's becoming more frequent. Multinationals must face the fact that the competitive edge that is potentially available to them from superior technologies, products, and systems will be blunted unless they build stronger local competencies. Specifically, multinationals must show a new determination to master the complexities of distribution, sales, and service in China's secondary cities and rural heartland and to learn how to adapt products, processes, and marketing messages more sensitively to the peculiarities of the Chinese market.
Concerns the growth of multinational trading companies in the first global economy. Examines two Scottish-owned merchant houses, Jardine Matheson and James Finlay, and shows their changing trade and investment strategies as well as their use of an organizational form later known as business groups. Also demonstrates the role of ethnic networks in globalization during this historical period. A rewritten version of an earlier case.
H&R Block, the U.S. market leader in tax preparation services, must decide whether to offer financial services to its low-income clients. H&R Block is facing increased competition from branded and nonbranded tax preparers, and the number of returns prepared by the company has declined in recent years. The CEO, Mark Ernst, considers a proposal for Block to differentiate itself from these competitors by offering its low-income clients a range of financial services, including check cashing, money transfer, and savings products. Ernst must decide whether this new suite of services would be profitable for the company and determine its impact on Block's brand and how the company and the marketplace would receive it.