In September 2019, the project manager of Washington, DC, technology company Zinthro found a serious calculation error in her company’s bid for a major government project. When she discovered the mistake, the bid had already been accepted and the project was well under way. The issue threatened her working relationship with several key individuals related to the project, including the executive overseeing the project, the client representative, the team that put together the original bid for the project, fellow project managers, and team leaders. Although she was not the one who made the mistake, she was the one who had discovered it and had to decide what to do next. Who should she talk to about the error? Who should be told first? How should she deliver the bad news?
Teld was one of China's largest EV charging pile network operators. It was a young company founded by a serial entrepreneur, Yu Dexiang. His first company, TGood, designed and manufactured box-type substations, which represented a relatively small and saturated market. Yu started Teld based on rational analysis of China's EV industry. His strong vision made him an early starter. He adopted high financial leverage to invest in building a nation-wide infrastructure and new technology development. Teld's business did not take off quickly enough, which almost put TGood on the verge of bankruptcy. Deeply influenced by Yu's passion and charisma, no one in the management team, including key scientists, chose to leave even though they had not seen the pay check for three months. Fortunately, after two years of turmoil, favorable government policies came one after another. Teld spared no effort in building joint ventures with China's local governments. Yu needed to find roughly a thousand qualified city managers to oversee local businesses and handle government relations discreetly and wisely.
In January 2021, the chief data and analytics officer (CDAO) at Allianz Benelux SA (Allianz) spotted a possible opportunity to optimize cash flow with direct debit. Direct debit was a pre-authorized financial transaction between two parties where the amount due was directly and automatically collected from the payer's bank account. Direct debit would allow Allianz to shorten payment processes, reduce risks by anticipating payments, and improve customer loyalty. Despite the clear advantages of direct debit for both clients and insurers, only a few of Allianz's clients were currently making use of direct debit. It was not clear what drove Allianz's customers or brokers to implement direct debit. This was where the CDAO and his data office team came in. The data office possessed a large amount of data on Allianz's property and casualty insurance contracts and customers. Now the team needed to investigate how this data could be leveraged to determine the value drivers and develop a strategy to convert more clients to direct debit payments.
One of India's leading stainless steel conglomerates, Jindal Stainless Limited (JSL) specialized in manufacturing flat sheets and coils, specific sections, pipes, and tubes. Abhyudaya Jindal, the managing director of JSL, was recently informed about the growing number of counterfeit products on the market that were adversely impacting JSL's brand reputation and sales, as well as goodwill towards the company. This case explores the challenges faced by Abhyudaya Jindal as he tried to address the issue of counterfeiting in the stainless steel pipes and tubes market. The case discusses various ways a company can battle counterfeit goods and how co-branding can be used as a market strategy. The case also examines how strengthening relationships with channel members can help a brand fight counterfeiting.
By January 2022, approximately 100 employees from Microsoft Corporation's (Microsoft) HoloLens division, which had pioneered augmented reality (AR), quit. Most joined Meta Platforms Inc. (formerly Facebook), despite the company's recent controversies. Meta was seeking talent for metaverse technology that required AR and virtual reality (VR) expertise. Metaverse talent was scant industry wide. Meta offered double salaries to poach talent from Microsoft, its partner for different projects. The executives leaving Microsoft were key employees of the HoloLens division. Microsoft's choice to not hire more engineers after the US Army contract led employees to question Microsoft's commitment toward HoloLens, a part of metaverse technology. However, Satya Nadella, chief executive officer of Microsoft, confirmed Microsoft's commitment toward metaverse technology, though some employees disagreed. What could Nadella do to retain HoloLens employees? With an increasing demand for metaverse-related skills, how could Nadella attract more talent? Was Meta's employee poaching likely to bring any good news for Microsoft?
When vaccines became widely available in 2021, Dr. Bonnie Henry-the provincial health officer of British Columbia (BC)-was tasked with the monumental mission of immunizing all BC residents against the COVID-19 pandemic. By November 19, 2021, almost 91 per cent of eligible residents had received their first dose of the vaccine, and 87 per cent had received their second dose. At the same time, the pediatric vaccine for children aged five to eleven was approved by Health Canada; however, polling suggested that BC parents were hesitant to vaccinate their young children. Henry faced the new challenge of creating a plan to convince parents and caregivers that vaccinating their children was both necessary and safe.
In September 2019, the project manager of Washington, DC, technology company Zinthro found a serious calculation error in her company's bid for a major government project. When she discovered the mistake, the bid had already been accepted and the project was well under way. The issue threatened her working relationship with several key individuals related to the project, including the executive overseeing the project, the client representative, the team that put together the original bid for the project, fellow project managers, and team leaders. Although she was not the one who made the mistake, she was the one who had discovered it and had to decide what to do next. Who should she talk to about the error? Who should be told first? How should she deliver the bad news?
Chinese Online (COL) was one of China's largest Chinese-language digital content distributor. Its offerings ranged from literature, audio, TV, film, and micro-drama. From 2018 to 2020, the company was in serious financial trouble as a result of an unwise acquisition. The founder of COL returned from overseas to turnaround the company by executing a strategic refocus to its core business field, which was literature and other forms of content. In addition to business contraction and cost reduction, he creatively designed a collective decision-making system called Class Committee, where he encouraged divisional heads to break the ice and make decisions together. This mechanism aligned divisional goals and allowed for executives to understand COL's business lines from a more integral perspective. In early 2021, COL recovered from the crisis thanks to the executives' joint effort. Tong was thinking how to leverage this mechanism to cultivate the next generation of CEO.
Business ethics has become too complex and is undermining the ability of companies to meet the ethical expectations of stakeholders. Simpler is better. Leaders need to stop outsourcing ethics and explain their company's value propositions in a clear, concise, nontechnical sentence or two that their least sophisticated stakeholder can understand. And they need to resist making big bets on visions for future social change instead of being transparent around current sources of profitability.
In 2016, Swedish entrepreneurs Carl-Erik Lagercrantz and Peter Carlsson founded an electric battery company called Northvolt with the dual goals of creating a company to address climate change and bringing battery manufacture to Europe. Northvolt, which succeeded in building a "gigafactory" near the arctic circle in Sweden, was soon on track to become one of the largest and most sustainable battery manufacturers in the world. But, building "the world's greenest battery" to fight climate change was a difficult-and perhaps unrealistic-goal. How much could Northvolt really contribute to the European effort against society's greatest challenge?
In early 2018, Eugenia Kuyda, co-founder and CEO of San Francisco-based chatbot Replika AI, was deciding how to monetize the app she had built. Launched in 2017, Replika was a consumer AI "companion app" developed by a team of AI software engineers originally based in Moscow. Replika allowed users to create their own customized AI avatar and then have free-flowing text conversations back and forth with it, like one would with a friend. Replika had a successful initial launch, signing up 2.5 million users in its first year, however, it was struggling to keep users on its app. Replika's research showed that its heavy users tended to be struggling with a bouquet of physical or mental health issues. Two monetization options were being considered: develop a subscription model for the AI companion app or pivot into a mental health app. The subscription model would offer a host of added benefits for subscribers and could be marketed at a broad TAM of lonely people. The mental health app would combine talk therapy (with the chatbot) with clinically proven therapeutic exercises, and would be targeted at people struggling with mental health issues. On the subscription side, investors were concerned that the app's users did not fit the typical profile of paid app subscribers. Yet pursuing the mental health app would mean venturing into a more regulated market and engaging in more carefully scripted responses rather than the freeform texting of the current app. The firm had been through a series of pivots and was hoping to find a clear path before venture funding ran out.
Urban Company (UC) was a digital labour platform that connected consumers with service providers (referred to as “partners” by UC) for home services such as plumbing, painting, and beauty and salon services. UC was ranked as the top digital platform company in India in the Fairwork India Ratings in 2020, but on October 10, 2021, the company met with a protest by its women partners from the beauty and salon segment. Two months later, on December 20, it faced another protest from its partners for unfair work practices. UC had shown a stellar performance in 2020, registering a 146 per cent increase in its revenue. However, the company was unprofitable, and its losses inflated further in 2021. Accommodating the partners’ demands might deteriorate the company’s bottom line further and might adversely impact the success of its initial public offering, planned for 2023. Additionally, continued unrest by the women partners might tarnish the company’s image, adversely affecting its rating in Fairwork’s annual survey. There was also a possibility that the government might impose stricter norms for the functioning of digital platforms. What should the company do to appease the protesters while also protecting its bottom line?
Products and services that claim to provide business insights based on brain research are proliferating, but some of these applications may be of limited value. This article educates managers on some underlying issues with translating neuroscience findings into information that's useful for business.
This case is a 2-party deal-making negotiation regarding the sale and purchase of IT solutions involving hardware, software and maintenance services. The focus is on the practical application of interest-based negotiation theory and concepts. The facts of the case provide multiple opportunities for generating creative solutions and employing strategic communication techniques. The case is also designed to illustrate the use of alternatives and BATNA as objective and realistic measures of negotiation success.
This case is a 2-party deal-making negotiation regarding the sale and purchase of IT solutions involving hardware, software and maintenance services. The focus is on the practical application of interest-based negotiation theory and concepts. The facts of the case provide multiple opportunities for generating creative solutions and employing strategic communication techniques. The case is also designed to illustrate the use of alternatives and BATNA as objective and realistic measures of negotiation success.
Urban Company (UC) was a digital labour platform that connected consumers with service providers (referred to as "partners" by UC) for home services such as plumbing, painting, and beauty and salon services. UC was ranked as the top digital platform company in India in the Fairwork India Ratings in 2020, but on October 10, 2021, the company met with a protest by its women partners from the beauty and salon segment. Two months later, on December 20, it faced another protest from its partners for unfair work practices. UC had shown a stellar performance in 2020, registering a 146 per cent increase in its revenue. However, the company was unprofitable, and its losses inflated further in 2021. Accommodating the partners' demands might deteriorate the company's bottom line further and might adversely impact the success of its initial public offering, planned for 2023. Additionally, continued unrest by the women partners might tarnish the company's image, adversely affecting its rating in Fairwork's annual survey. There was also a possibility that the government might impose stricter norms for the functioning of digital platforms. What should the company do to appease the protesters while also protecting its bottom line?
In December 2021, Forest Essentials opened its one hundredth store in India and a store in the United Kingdom; the Indian home-grown luxury Ayurveda brand had rapid expansion plans despite the obstacles it faced. Twenty-one years earlier, the company’s founder, liberal arts graduate Mira Kulkarni, converted the six-thousand-year-old science of Ayurveda into bottles and jars of luxurious skin-care and hair-care products, making Forest Essentials an aspirational luxury brand. Forest Essentials had grown to establish a robust presence in five categories—skin care, hair care, wellness, health, and makeup—while acquiring a large and loyal customer base in India. The company was meticulous about the quality of its ingredients and put great effort into sourcing high-quality ingredients from all over India; however, easy access to cheaper Ayurveda-based brands and the entry and availability of international wellness brands into the Indian market threatened Forest Essentials’ customer retention.<br><br>Kulkarni and her son, Samrath Bedi, needed to sustain the growth of Forest Essentials across digital and physical channels in India’s cluttered beauty and wellness market, with a price-sensitive customer base, while also growing the brand’s presence in cross-cultural markets overseas. Could they pursue growth in both marketspaces consistently? Should Kulkarni and Bedi focus on engaging with their existing and potential customers in India, or should they aim to establish their luxury brand in international markets?