Even at the prototype stage, experts were saying the technology was obsolete. Yet, in the face of tepid consumer response, the company stubbornly kept increasing production capacity and developing new models. By the time it was finally killed, the initiative had cost the company an astounding $580 million and had tied up resources for 14 years. The product was RCA's SelectaVision videodisc recorder, and its story is hardly unique. Companies make similar mistakes--if on a somewhat smaller scale--all the time. But why? No one comes to work saying, "I'm going to pursue a project that will waste my company millions of dollars." Quite the opposite. They come to work full of excitement about a project they believe in. And that, surprisingly, can be the root of the trouble--a fervent belief in the inevitability of a project's ultimate success. Starting, naturally enough, with a project's champion, this faith can spread throughout the organization, leading everyone to believe collectively in the product's viability and to view any signs of impending doom merely as temporary setbacks. This phenomenon is documented here in two chillingly detailed case studies, one involving Essilor, the world's largest maker of corrective lenses for eyeglasses, and the other involving Lafarge, the largest producer of building materials. By counterexample, they point the way toward avoiding such morasses: assembling project teams not entirely composed of like-minded people and putting in place--and sticking to--well-defined review processes.
There's an unsung hero in your organization. It's the person who's bringing in new ideas from the outside about how to manage better. This is the manager who, for instance, first uttered the phrase "Balanced Scorecard" in your hallways, or "real options," or "intellectual capital." Managerial innovation is an increasingly important source of competitive advantage--especially given the speed with which product innovations are copied--but it doesn't happen automatically. It takes a certain kind of person to welcome new management ideas and usher them into an organization. The authors recently studied 100 such people to find out how they translate new ideas into action in their organizations. "Idea practitioners," as the authors call them, begin by scouting for ideas. All of them are avid readers of management literature and enthusiastic participants in business conferences; many are friendly with business gurus. Once they've identified an idea that seems to hold promise, they tailor it to fit their organizations' specific needs. Next, they actively sell the idea--to senior executives, to the rank and file, to middle managers. And finally, they get the ball rolling by participating in small-scale experiments. But when those take off, they get out of the way and let others execute. In this article, the authors identify the characteristics of idea practitioners and offer strategies for managing them wisely.
Most experienced negotiators are comfortable working out the terms of an economic contract--they bargain for the best price, haggle over equity splits, and finesse detailed exit clauses. Yet these same seasoned professionals spend so much time ironing out the letter of the deal that they often pay little attention to the spirit of the deal--the social contract. And that can lead to major problems, say the authors, because even though the parties agree to the same terms on paper, they may have very different expectations about how to meet them. Because the parties have failed to have a true meeting of the minds, they sign a deal that is likely to fall apart. To avoid such a disastrous outcome, negotiators should explicitly discuss the details of their social contract before inking the deal. For instance, what is the real nature, extent, and duration of the agreement? And in practice, how will we make decisions, handle unforeseen events, communicate with one another, and resolve disputes? The authors also highlight risk factors that can lead to misunderstandings and expose common misperceptions about the social contract.
If your company operates in a developing country, AIDS is your business. Although Africa has received the most attention, AIDS is also spreading swiftly in other parts of the world. Why should executives be concerned about AIDS? Because it is destroying the twin rationales of globalization strategy--cheap labor and fast-growing markets--in countries where people are heavily affected by the epidemic. Fortunately, investments in programs that prevent infection and provide treatment for employees who have HIV/AIDS are profitable for many businesses--that is, they lead to savings that outweigh the programs' costs. Due to the long latency period between HIV infection and the onset of AIDS symptoms, a company is not likely to see any of the costs of HIV/AIDS until five to ten years after an employee is infected. But executives can calculate the present value of epidemic-related costs by using the discount rate to weigh each cost according to its expected timing. That allows companies to think about expenses on HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programs as investments rather than merely as costs. Fighting AIDS not only helps those infected; it also makes good business sense.
Researchers have established that trust is critical to organizational effectiveness. Being trustworthy yourself, however, does not guarantee that you are capable of building trust in an organization. That takes old-fashioned managerial virtues like consistency, clear communication, and a willingness to tackle awkward questions. It also requires a good defense: You must protect trust from its enemies. Any act of bad management erodes trust. Among the most common enemies of trust are inconsistent messages from top management, inconsistent standards, a willingness to tolerate incompetence or bad behavior, dishonest feedback, a failure to trust others to do good work, a tendency to ignore painful or politically charged situations, consistent corporate underperformance, and rumors. Fending off these enemies must be at the top of every chief executive's agenda. But even with constant vigilance, an organization and its leaders will sometimes lose people's trust. During a crisis, managers should enlist the help of an objective third party.
When customers lack the expertise to judge a company's offerings, they naturally turn detective, scrutinizing people, facilities, and processes for evidence of quality. The Mayo Clinic understands this and carefully manages that evidence to convey a simple, consistent message: The needs of the patient come first. From the way it hires and trains employees to the way it designs its facilities and approaches its care, the Mayo Clinic provides patients and their families concrete evidence of its strengths and values--an approach that has allowed it to build what is arguably the most powerful brand in health care. Marketing professors Leonard Berry and Neeli Bendapudi conducted a five-month study of evidence management at the Mayo Clinic. Their experiences led them to identify best practices applicable to just about any company, in particular those that sell intangible or technically complex products. Essentially, the authors say, companies need to determine what story they want to tell, then ensure that their employees and facilities consistently show customers evidence of that story. At Mayo, the evidence falls into three categories: people, collaboration, and tangibles. The way in which Mayo manages evidence to communicate its message is an example to be followed.
Budgeting, as most corporations practice it, should be abolished. Most other building blocks are in place, but companies continue to restrict themselves by relying on inflexible budget processes and the command-and-control culture that budgeting entails. A number of companies have rejected the foregone conclusions embedded in budgets, and they've given up the self-interested wrangling over what the data indicate. In the absence of budgets, alternative goals and measures--some financial, such as cost-to-income ratios, and some nonfinancial, such as time to market--move to the foreground. Companies that have rejected budgets require employees to measure themselves against the performance of competitors and against internal peer groups. Because employees don't know whether they've succeeded until they can look back on the results of a given period, they must use every ounce of energy to ensure that they beat the competition. A key feature of many companies that have rejected budgets is the use of rolling forecasts, which are created every few months and typically cover five to eight quarters. Because the forecasts are regularly revised, they allow companies to adapt continuously to market conditions. The forecasting practices of two such companies, both based in Sweden, are examined in detail: the bank Svenska Handelsbanken and the wholesaler Ahlsell.
For ten years, Jeff Patterson's firm, Flynn Fuller Consulting, has worked on projects for financial services giant GloBank. Now Jeff's contact, Bill Holland, says another project is imminent--good news for the recession-battered consultancy--but there's just one problem: GloBank has an enigmatic new CEO, H. Frank Maloney III. Brought in to restore profitability, Maloney has been examining GloBank's bottom line, looking for places to cut. The new CEO wants to slash GloBank's extensive use of consultants, which means that division presidents like Bill must justify major consulting projects. Worse, firms like Flynn Fuller must sell themselves again to GloBank. Jeff will have just one hour to try to sway Maloney, or his client will disappear. How can Jeff persuade Maloney that outside consultants are worth the cost? Jeff's presentation isn't a progress report or a pitch to a new client; rather, it's a defense of Flynn Fuller's continuing added value. Jeff pulls together a team to make the case, but he hears as many approaches as there are people in the room. In R0302A and R0302X, commentators P. William Bane, a recently retired vice-president and director at Mercer Management Consulting; Tom Van Berkel, the president and CEO of insurance firm Main Street America Group; Peter Klein, the senior vice-president of strategy and business development for Gillette; and Tricia Stone, a founding partner of Stone Communications, offer advice on this fictional case study.
For ten years, Jeff Patterson's firm, Flynn Fuller Consulting, has worked on projects for financial services giant GloBank. Now Jeff's contact, Bill Holland, says another project is imminent--good news for the recession-battered consultancy--but there's just one problem: GloBank has an enigmatic new CEO, H. Frank Maloney III. Brought in to restore profitability, Maloney has been examining GloBank's bottom line, looking for places to cut. The new CEO wants to slash GloBank's extensive use of consultants, which means that division presidents like Bill must justify major consulting projects. Worse, firms like Flynn Fuller must sell themselves again to GloBank. Jeff will have just one hour to try to sway Maloney, or his client will disappear. How can Jeff persuade Maloney that outside consultants are worth the cost? Jeff's presentation isn't a progress report or a pitch to a new client; rather, it's a defense of Flynn Fuller's continuing added value. Jeff pulls together a team to make the case, but he hears as many approaches as there are people in the room. In R0303A and R0303Z, commentators P. William Bane, a recently retired vice-president and director at Mercer Management Consulting; Tom Van Berkel, the president and CEO of insurance firm Main Street America Group; Peter Klein, the senior vice-president of strategy and business development for Gillette; and Tricia Stone, a founding partner of Stone Communications, offer advice on this fictional case study.
The case describes Microsoft's first significant acquisition in Europe and its first in the telecom equipment (software) market. SendIt is a publicly listed Swedish start-up, which offers the only Windows based solutions to the IP-based mobile phone services market. The acquisition starts in high tone, loses momentum and is finally integrated with some degree of success.
The case describes Microsoft's first significant acquisition in Europe and its first in the telecom equipment (software) market. SendIt is a publicly listed Swedish start-up, which offers the only Windows based solutions to the IP-based mobile phone services market. The acquisition starts in high tone, loses momentum and is finally integrated with some degree of success.
The case describes Microsoft's first significant acquisition in Europe and its first in the telecom equipment (software) market. SendIt is a publicly listed Swedish start-up, which offers the only Windows based solutions to the IP-based mobile phone services market. The acquisition starts in high tone, loses momentum and is finally integrated with some degree of success.
The case describes Microsoft's first significant acquisition in Europe and its first in the telecom equipment (software) market. SendIt is a publicly listed Swedish start-up, which offers the only Windows based solutions to the IP-based mobile phone services market. The acquisition starts in high tone, loses momentum and is finally integrated with some degree of success.
This case describes Banyan Tree Resorts & Hotel's rapid growth starting from a single resort converted from a disused tin mine in Phuket, Thailand, to become an international resort operator and one of Asia's top 20 brands. It explores the realisation of an innovative lifestyle concept, the subsequent challenges involved in replicating its original success in different parts of the world, the company's marketing strategy, and the development of service operations capabilities to back the brand, as well as the challenges faced in extending the brand into new businesses including branded goods and a travel portal.
No one's surprised when executives of a newly acquired company leave in droves. But, new research shows, executive turnover rates are twice as high after a merger as before one--even nine years after the acquisition. Those initial departures have a lot to do with it.
How does the structure of social networks affect the way fads catch on and companies solve problems? Columbia University network scientist Duncan Watts says that this young field is on the path to answers.
If you spring for optional pollution-control devices at your overseas plant, have you violated your duty to maximize shareholder value? Here's a framework that can help clarify this and other ethical dilemmas.
The coach of the varsity Army crew team at West Point assembled his top eight rowers into the first crew team and the second tier of rowers into the second team using objective data on individual performance. As the second boat continually beat the first boat in races, the coach attempted to discern the team dynamics causing these aberrant results. By using very clean, objective performance data, the case makes clear that a team can be more (or less) than the sum of its individual parts, but allows students to analyze the factors that make this true.
Examines DoubleClick's capital structure from IPO. Discusses additional offering of common stock, stock splits, dividends, sale of convertible debt, repurchase of convertible debt, and repurchase of common stock.