In some languages, the word for "business" is the same as the word for "negotiation." That's not really surprising: Every interaction--with customers, suppliers, and even partners and investors--entails negotiation. And some involve very high stakes: The breakdown in negotiations between Hewlett-Packard's management and its founding families, for instance, put the company's future in doubt. Dominick Misino is a man who knows about negotiating when the stakes are at their very highest. As a hostage negotiator for the New York Police Department, Misino successfully persuaded the hijacker of Lufthansa Flight 592 to lay down his gun and turn himself in. Misino spent the last 6 years of his career as a primary negotiator, handling more than 200 incidents and never losing a life. Since his retirement in 1995, he has taught negotiating skills to law enforcement officials, military personnel, and business executives. Negotiation, he says, is really a series of small agreements, and he is adept at orchestrating those agreements from the start so that his adversary learns to trust him and come around to his point of view. In vivid and sometimes hair-raising detail, Misino demonstrates how he gets criminals to trust police officers enough to refrain from harming innocent parties and give themselves up. Many of the techniques he describes are surprisingly applicable to business negotiations, where the parties may seem equally intractable and failure is not an option.

On the day of the terrorist attacks on New York's World Trade Center, 1,779 employees of Marsh & McLennan Co. (MMC) had office space in the twin towers and another 129 were visiting that day. From his office at MMC headquarters in midtown, CEO Jeffrey Greenberg watched in horror as the second plane hit. By the time the towers fell, he had gathered a team of his colleagues to begin to outline how the company would respond. In this first-person account, Greenberg relates what it was like to manage through the unimaginable. The needs of MMC's people and the families of employees who perished took top priority. In the midst of chaos and unforeseeable problems, Greenberg and his colleagues improvised ways of communicating and assembled a broad-based program of support. Help appeared from all sides from people of various rank, title, and functional expertise within MMC as well as past chairmen, outside directors, and retired executives. An emergency communications center was immediately set up at MMC headquarters and became a centralized location for messages and information and a memorial to colleagues lost in the attacks. The company arranged for grief counselors and established a family assistance center and a Family Relationship Management Program for those who had lost MMC employees. It has also provided families with access to long-term psychological and financial counseling. At the same time, Greenberg offers lessons about leadership, company culture, and adaptability. He and his colleagues held responsibility for a business devastated by operational destruction and financial losses and facing dramatically changed market conditions. Their resolve was not simply to keep it on course but to come back stronger than ever.

The traditional growth strategies of organic expansion and acquisition require up-front investments in additional assets, with an uncertain payoff. So the pursuit of growth almost always narrows margins, for a time or, in the worst case, forever. But another kind of strategy--leveraged growth--doesn't require companies to trade profitability for growth. That's because instead of owning assets, a company leverages the assets of other businesses operating at many levels of the value chain, capturing value for itself as a knowledge broker. The Hong Kong-based trading company Li & Fung, for instance, owns none of the facilities involved in processing raw material into the finished goods it supplies to European garment retailers and designers. It does, however, have privileged access to some 7,500 companies around the world that possess specialized production and distribution capabilities. Li & Fung uses its knowledge of the apparel market to leverage those companies' assets, using whichever companies are most suited to making whatever goods its customers demand. Orchestrating such a process network is one way to leverage other companies' assets. Another involves aggregating their resources, as Charles Schwab does when it makes the services of many related companies available through its web site or IBM does when it sponsors user groups. And Microsoft and Intel engage in possibly the subtlest of the leveraged growth strategies--shaping an economic web--by placing themselves at the center of a vast, ever-shifting group of companies that build on the Wintel computing platform. In a world of leveraged growth, the key question becomes: Which of your assets would give you the greatest power over other organizations? The company with the most powerful assets will have the greatest growth potential.

Companies in many industries are feeling immense pressure to improve their ability to innovate. But executives know that the best ideas aren't always coming out of their own R&D labs. That's why a growing number of companies are exploring the idea of open-market innovation--an approach that uses tools such as licensing, joint ventures, and strategic alliances to bring the benefits of free trade to the flow of new ideas. For instance, when faced with the unanticipated anthrax scare last fall, Pitney Bowes had nothing in its R&D pipeline to help its customers combat the deadly spores. So it sought help from outside innovators to come up with scanning and imaging technologies that could alert its customers to tainted letters and packages. In this article, Bain consultants Darrell Rigby and Chris Zook describe the advantages and disadvantages of open-market innovation and the ways some companies are using it to gain competitive advantage. Creative types within a company will stick around longer if they know their ideas will eventually find a home--as internal R&D projects or as concepts licensed to outside buyers. However, the authors warn against entering into open-market innovation without properly structuring deals: Xerox and TRW virtually gave away their innovations and had to stand by while other companies capitalized on them. The company with the most powerful assets will have the greatest growth potential.

Beyond the recent accounting scandals, something is wrong with the way most companies are managed today. That's the message of this fictional letter from a board member to a CEO, written by Joseph Fuller, CEO of the strategy consulting firm Monitor Group. The letter highlights the challenges and complexities of running a business in today's uncertain environment. The letter addresses a single CEO and company, yet it is intended to speak to executives and boards everywhere: "It wasn't the recession that caused us to make 3 acquisitions in 2 years at very, very high prices; the need to fuel [unreasonable] growth did. Nor was it the recession that caused us to expand our capacity in anticipation of gaining market share; rather, it was our own overly optimistic sales forecasts that led us to that decision. Where did those forecasts originate? From line managers trying to fulfill profit goals that we created after meeting with the analysts. The root cause of many of the problems that became apparent in the last 24 months lies not with the economy, not with September 11, and not with the dot-com bubble. Rather, it lies with that willingness to be led by outside forces--indeed, our own lack of conviction about setting a course." Restoring sound, strategic decision making--thinking that looks beyond tomorrow's analyst reports--will go a long way toward keeping those outside forces at bay, according to Fuller.

In the quest to reduce waste on production lines, managers often find that the harder they work at improving their manufacturing processes, the more elusive the benefits become. The authors' study of data provided by Belgian manufacturer N.V. Bekaert S.A., the world's largest independent producer of steel wire, showed that only a quarter of process improvement projects delivered factorywide benefits; half had no bottom-line impact, and the remaining 25% had a negative impact on the plant's overall productivity. But it's possible to design projects that are more likely to improve the plant's bottom line. The key is making sure they deliver both conceptual and operational learning. Conceptual learning yields know-why: acquiring a better understanding of cause-and-effect relationships through statistics and other scientific methods. Operational learning yields know-how: implementing a theory and observing results. Projects that delivered high levels of both learning approaches were the only ones that enhanced the global rate of quality improvement. In such projects, teams drew on scientific insights to implement changes and produce replicable results.

In valuing any investment project or corporate acquisition, executives must decide what discount rate to use in their estimates of future cash flows. The traditional approach is to apply the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), which has remained fundamentally unchanged for 40 years. But the formula--in particular, its beta element--has long been a source of frustration. In fact, corporate executives and investment bankers routinely fudge their CAPM estimates, say the authors, because experience and intuition tell them the model produces inappropriate discount rates. CAPM has three main problems: First, beta is a measure of both a stock's correlation and its volatility; second, beta is based on historical data; and third, CAPM rates don't take into account the term of the investment. These factors together result in discount rates that defy common sense. As an alternative to CAPM and its beta element, the authors developed a forward-looking approach to calculating a company's cost of capital--the market-derived capital pricing model (MCPM). It does not incorporate any measure of historical stock-to-market correlation, relying instead on estimates of future volatility derived from the options market. This is helpful given that investor expectations from the options market are built into a company's current stock price. Using GE as an example, the authors give step-by-step instructions for how to calculate discount rates with MCPM. They also offer evidence from a range of industries to show that MCPM's discount rates are more realistic--especially from the corporate investor's perspective--than are CAPM's.

Cheryl Hailstrom, the CEO of Lakeland Wonders, a manufacturer of high-quality wooden toys, is the first person outside the Swensen family to hold the top job. But she's not a stranger to this 94-year-old company: She'd been the COO of one of its largest customers and had worked with Lakeland to develop many best-selling products. Wally Swensen IV, the previous CEO, chose Cheryl because she knew how to generate profits and because he believed her energy and enthusiasm could take the company to the next level. Yet here she is, nearing her six-month anniversary, wondering why her expansive vision for the company isn't taking hold. She's tried to lead by example: traveling a pounding schedule to visit customers, setting aggressive project deadlines, and proposing a bonus schedule. She has a plan to reach the board's growth goals. The problem is that while Cheryl's senior managers are giving her the nod on the surface, they're all really dragging their feet. Is Cheryl pushing too much change too quickly? Should she bring in outsiders to speedily adopt the changes she envisions and overhaul Lakeland's corporate culture? Or should she keep trying to work with the current team? In R0210A and R0210Z, commentators Kathleen Calcidise of Apple Retail Stores; executive coach Debra Benton; Dan Cohen, co-author of The Heart of Change; and consultant Nina Aversano offer advice on this fictional case study.

Cheryl Hailstrom, the CEO of Lakeland Wonders, a manufacturer of high-quality wooden toys, is the first person outside the Swensen family to hold the top job. But she's not a stranger to this 94-year-old company: She'd been the COO of one of its largest customers and had worked with Lakeland to develop many best-selling products. Wally Swensen IV, the previous CEO, chose Cheryl because she knew how to generate profits and because he believed her energy and enthusiasm could take the company to the next level. Yet here she is, nearing her six-month anniversary, wondering why her expansive vision for the company isn't taking hold. She's tried to lead by example: traveling a pounding schedule to visit customers, setting aggressive project deadlines, and proposing a bonus schedule. She has a plan to reach the board's growth goals. The problem is that while Cheryl's senior managers are giving her the nod on the surface, they're all really dragging their feet. Is Cheryl pushing too much change too quickly? Should she bring in outsiders to speedily adopt the changes she envisions and overhaul Lakeland's corporate culture? Or should she keep trying to work with the current team? In R0210A and R0210Z, commentators Kathleen Calcidise of Apple Retail Stores; executive coach Debra Benton; Dan Cohen, co-author of The Heart of Change; and consultant Nina Aversano offer advice on this fictional case study.

Intermountain Health Care (IHC), an integrated delivery system based in Utah, has adopted a new strategy for managing health care delivery. The approach focuses management attention not only on the facilities where care takes place but also on physician decision making and the care process itself, with the aim of boosting physician productivity and improving care quality, while saving money. This case explores the challenges facing Brent James, executive director of the Institute for Health Care Delivery Research at IHC, as he implements new structures and systems (including a data warehouse for care outcomes, electronic patient records, computer workstations, clinical data support systems, and protocols for care) designed to support clinical process management across a geographically diverse group of physicians with varying levels of interest and dedication to IHC. Also highlights an innovative strategy for creating and disseminating knowledge at the individual and organizational levels to maintain high standards in care delivery.

Dimensional Fund Advisors (DFA) is an investment management firm that prides itself on basing its investment strategies on sound academic research. Many of the best-known finance research papers of the past two decades (especially those by Eugene Fama and Kenneth French, who work closely with DFA) have led to DFA investment strategies. DFA began as a small-stock fund, attempting to take advantage of the "size affect" (excess performance of small stocks) that had been discovered by a number of academic researchers. Later, DFA added "value" strategies to its mix of offerings. After academic research documented superior performance by value stocks in a multitude of countries, DFA began to create a variety of international value-stock and small-stock investment funds. The company was highly successful, despite missing out on the great 1990s growth-stock boom. DFA's assets under management grew from $8 billion to $40 billion between 1991 and 2002. With value stocks having performed well in the first two years of the new decade, DFA is experiencing continued growth of its investor base and is now seeking new areas in which it can add value for investors while continuing to claim to have no special "stock-picking" ability.

Surfing on the crest of various consumption trends (health, organic foods, life-styled eating, convenience...), Fresh and Wild launches in the UK a chain of rather focused stores. Should they remain a niche player or try to reach out for the "mass market"? How should they reinforce their management skills and tweak their corporate culture to fulfil their strategic ambitions.

In January 2000, two British middle-tier high technology companies, Stream and Line, announce their merger agreement. On 6 May 2000, in a record period of four months one of the biggest high technology companies with a capitalized market value of more than US$84 billion is formally launched on the world stock markets. On August 1st, the company celebrates its launch with world-wide satellite links in the presence of the newly designated CEO, Roger Farrell. This series of three sequential cases recounts the story of the merger from the perspective of one of the business unit, the Sales Organization, in the UK. The first case, "The Story of a Merger" covers the period between January 2000 and August 2000. It introduces the key character of the three cases, Anne Wright, the newly appointed Sales Organization President. After describing the business and cultures of the two merging companies, it proceeds by giving an account of the two most emotionally engaging events faced by the protagonist early in her position: her introduction to the acquired company, Stream, and the process of site selection and announcement. The second case, "Building the New Organization" covers the second half of 2000. It describes the painful experience of those remaining with the unsuccessful and closing site and the journey of those moving, temporary, to the winning location. After reviewing the appointment process, it gives an account of how the company brings to life the new values of the merged company. The third case, "Bumpy Road of Transformation" gives an account of the major activities during 2001 and 2002. It opens up by going over the residual frustrations as experienced by middle managers. It then proceeds by giving an overview of the systems and initiatives launched by the global and the UK company to equip the organization to meet the challenges of the future.

In January 2000, two British middle-tier high technology companies, Stream and Line, announce their merger agreement. On 6 May 2000, in a record period of four months one of the biggest high technology companies with a capitalized market value of more than US$84 billion is formally launched on the world stock markets. On August 1st, the company celebrates its launch with world-wide satellite links in the presence of the newly designated CEO, Roger Farrell. This series of three sequential cases recounts the story of the merger from the perspective of one of the business unit, the Sales Organization, in the UK. The first case, "The Story of a Merger" covers the period between January 2000 and August 2000. It introduces the key character of the three cases, Anne Wright, the newly appointed Sales Organization President. After describing the business and cultures of the two merging companies, it proceeds by giving an account of the two most emotionally engaging events faced by the protagonist early in her position: her introduction to the acquired company, Stream, and the process of site selection and announcement. The second case, "Building the New Organization" covers the second half of 2000. It describes the painful experience of those remaining with the unsuccessful and closing site and the journey of those moving, temporary, to the winning location. After reviewing the appointment process, it gives an account of how the company brings to life the new values of the merged company. The third case, "Bumpy Road of Transformation" gives an account of the major activities during 2001 and 2002. It opens up by going over the residual frustrations as experienced by middle managers. It then proceeds by giving an overview of the systems and initiatives launched by the global and the UK company to equip the organization to meet the challenges of the future.

In January 2000, two British middle-tier high technology companies, Stream and Line, announce their merger agreement. On 6 May 2000, in a record period of four months one of the biggest high technology companies with a capitalized market value of more than US$84 billion is formally launched on the world stock markets. On August 1st, the company celebrates its launch with world-wide satellite links in the presence of the newly designated CEO, Roger Farrell. This series of three sequential cases recounts the story of the merger from the perspective of one of the business unit, the Sales Organization, in the UK. The first case, "The Story of a Merger" covers the period between January 2000 and August 2000. It introduces the key character of the three cases, Anne Wright, the newly appointed Sales Organization President. After describing the business and cultures of the two merging companies, it proceeds by giving an account of the two most emotionally engaging events faced by the protagonist early in her position: her introduction to the acquired company, Stream, and the process of site selection and announcement. The second case, "Building the New Organization" covers the second half of 2000. It describes the painful experience of those remaining with the unsuccessful and closing site and the journey of those moving, temporary, to the winning location. After reviewing the appointment process, it gives an account of how the company brings to life the new values of the merged company. The third case, "Bumpy Road of Transformation" gives an account of the major activities during 2001 and 2002. It opens up by going over the residual frustrations as experienced by middle managers. It then proceeds by giving an overview of the systems and initiatives launched by the global and the UK company to equip the organization to meet the challenges of the future.

Hawaii Best, Inc. is a company with lackluster performance and a variety of issues requiring management attention.

The case lays out the controversies surrounding the human genome project. The ability to generate any individual's genetic profile raises important legal, social, and ethical questions. How should these issues be addressed and how can the rights of the individual be protected? This case can be used to portray problems in the biotechnology industry, confidentiality in the health care industry, as well as the progress of technology and the ability of the present legal and medical system to deal with it.

Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) faces a serious loss of knowledge--both because of the "faster, better, cheaper" mandate for Mars missions and from the retirement of key personnel. An extensive knowledge management system for NASA/JPL includes formal knowledge-capture mechanisms such as Web pages and digitized manuals and such informal ones as storytelling. The former are much easier to get funded and to implement than the latter, but chief knowledge architect Jeanne Holm is concerned that technology cannot solve some of the most difficult issues she faces. This case focuses more on managing the tacit knowledge held in the heads of scientists and experienced project managers than on the information technology that Holm has put in place. The switch from expensive but infrequent Mars missions to 2 missions every 26 months propelled a number of junior managers into positions of responsibility and decision making for which they had inadequate experience. In the face of increasingly tight budgets, Holm must decide what kinds of knowledge management initiatives to back--and how to encourage the cultural change that is needed in the organization.

Presents a conceptual framework of the circumstances when multinationals attempt to create, or face difficulty creating, value in cross-border commerce. Particular attention is paid to the role of multinationals as intermediaries in international transactions where the existence of traditional market intermediaries is absent.

Involves a start-up, X-IT Products LLC, whose founders had designed an innovative, lightweight, and easy-to-use--yet strong--escape ladder. After X-IT had filed a patent application for the ladder in the United States, X-IT was approached by Kidde PLC, one of the largest vendors of fire protection products in the world. Negotiations to license X-IT's invention or to buy X-IT ensued. The parties entered into a confidentiality agreement, which gave Kidde's patent counsel access to X-IT's confidential patent application for the narrow purpose of reporting to Kidde whether the patent claims were weak or strong. After the X-IT founders saw Kidde representatives displaying a ladder at a major trade show that was almost identical to X-IT's ladder, X-IT's CEO had to decide what to do next. Although suing Kidde for violating the confidentiality agreement was an option, X-IT barely had sufficient cash to fill orders, not to mention pay attorney fees.