Pokemon, the colloquial name given to a collection of 150 fantastic, animal-inspired creatures with organic powers and the capacity to evolve, are the stars of video games, trading card games, and TV cartoons. Conceived in Japan in 1996, Pokemon quickly became that nation's favorite toy phenomenon, and attracted the attention of Nintendo of America, who, in February 1998, purchased all intellectual rights to everything bearing the Pokemon name outside of Asia. Launched in September 1998, Pokemon quickly took the United States by storm, single-handedly resuscitating Nintendo's lagging video game sales, and earning stature as one of the top three licensing success stories of all time by year-end 1999 (on worldwide sales of $7 billion and U.S. sales of $1.2 billion). This case begs the question of how management at Nintendo and licensing partner 4Kids Entertainment did it and, perhaps more importantly, whether they can sustain (and perhaps grow) Pokemon's success over time. Is Pokemon just a passing fad to be "milked," or can it be managed as a sustainable brand franchise? Was Pokemon's success simply a fluke, an unpredictable function of mere good fortune, or is sound brand strategy and planning the cause?
i-mode is a wireless Internet service offered in Japan by NTT DoCoMo. In just three years, the service has won over 30 million subscribers and achieved a 60% share of Japan's mobile Internet market, making it the most successful mobile data service in the world. It is now early 2002 and Keiichi Enoki, managing director of NTT DoCoMo's i-mode service, faces two challenges. On the domestic front, i-mode must fend off two strong competitors while managing the migration of i-mode's existing customer base to DoCoMo's new 3G (third-generation) wireless service. On the international front, the company must figure out a way to bring the i-mode model to U.S. and European markets, where consumers appear reluctant to adopt the mobile Internet.
Hang Seng Bank is the second-largest locally incorporated bank and the fifth-largest public company in Hong Kong. Due to growing consumer demand, peer pressure, and pressure to improve profits, Hang Seng launched e-banking in August 2000. This case provides a study of why Hang Seng accelerated its online banking strategies, critical issues in its implementation of strategies, and how Hang Seng is differentiating its online banking from that of other banks. Hang Seng has been serving customers throughout Hong Kong since 1933; it has been regarded as a reliable and traditional community bank. Discusses how e-banking is helping Hang Seng to strengthen its new image as a contemporary and progressive bank. The case also presents the issue of how to measure the profitability of online banking and/or technology investment.
In 2001, Citibank's Cash and Trade Group division transformed itself into an e-business, with the strategic intent of converting traditional money management business into an e-business framework. This case discusses how Citibank is using its traditional assets and integrating Internet initiatives into its e-business strategy to create sustainable competitive advantages. Competition in the cash and trade business is becoming intense and a new breed of competent and aggressive competitors is vying for the market, including technology companies interested in B2B e-payment. Citibank is responding to the competition by continually evolving its e-business strategy--connect, transform, extend. Also looks into the challenges that Citibank e-Business Group is facing in developing a single global web platform for the corporate market. The focus is on how Citibank is developing an e-business product that would serve the highly segmented market and how to encourage these markets to use a global single platform online. At one end of the spectrum are multinationals and top-level domestic corporates that operate sophisticated treasuries, and at the other end are companies and small- and medium-size businesses that are not yet ready to upgrade and transform their systems.
Uses a numerical example to demonstrate that when you discount the cash flows to capital from a project at the weighted average cost of capital, you get same net present value result as you obtain when discounting the cash flows to equity at the cost of equity. Also demonstrates why it is far easier to do a net present value calculation using the weighted average cost of capital (assuming a fixed debt ratio and market value weights) than it is to do the same calculation using the cost of equity.
This is the fourth in a series of lecture notes which, if tied together into a textbook, might be entitled "Practical Regression." The purpose of the notes is to supplement the theoretical content of most statistics texts with practical advice based on nearly three decades of experience of the author, combined with over one hundred years of experience of colleagues who have offered guidance. As the title "Practical Regression" suggests, these notes are a guide to performing regression in practice. This technical note introduces the concept of endogeneity bias with specific coverage of omitted variable bias. Students who read this note will understand why omitting key predictors can sometimes bias the coefficients of included variables. The note illustrates omitted variable bias by means of an extended example and offers practical advice for model building that balances the desire for parsimony developed in a previous note with the need to limit omitted variable bias.
In early 2002, the co-chief investment officer of Allianz Dresdner Capital Management (ADCM), the fourth-largest asset management firm in the world, reflects on the structure of the firm's "global research platform" and any changes that might be desirable. The tasks for the student are to map the structure of the global platform, evaluate it, and recommend modifications.
In early 2002, Pamela Pollace, vice president and director of Intel's worldwide marketing operations, is debating whether the company should extend its "Intel Inside" branding campaign to non-PC product categories, such as cell phones and PDAs. The "Intel Inside" campaign has been one of the most successful branding campaigns in history. However, the campaign is more than ten years old, and growth in the PC market appears to be stagnating. In contrast, sales of portable digital devices--such as PDAs and cell phones--appear to be growing at a healthy rate. Pollace is debating whether the "Intel Inside" campaign will work in these other product categories, even though Intel doesn't dominate these other markets like it does the PC market, and it isn't clear that consumers will associate Intel with these other markets.
China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the end of 2001 brought promises that foreign financial institutions would be permitted to operate throughout China. In 1998, Citicorp and Travelers Group Inc. had merged to create the new Citigroup Inc. Travelers brought a vast array of financial services that added to Citibank's existing portfolio of consumer and commercial lending. Travelers had developed extensive businesses in investment banking, asset management, life insurance, and property/casualty insurance, as well as consumer lending. Citigroup now had to determine the business prospects for each of its activities in the growing China market. Fears of social and economic dislocation might lead China to impose regulatory restrictions limiting the pace of foreign expansion. Economic growth might be impeded by the existing political structure, and reforms might not occur in the near term. A myriad of other challenges included human resources difficulties, e-commerce limitations, and regional disparities. The pace of privatization of state-owned enterprises and the societal preferences in regard to alternative insurance and investment products added to the uncertainties. Citibank had a record of success in less developed countries, and had developed certain competitive advantages that might be the basis for success in China, but whether and how these could be extended to other Citigroup financial activities remained an important question.
Most businesses shower attention and rewards on potential recruits and current employees, but they ignore another key human asset: their ex-employees. That's a costly oversight, because a company's alumni can play many roles on its behalf.
Marketers have masterfully targeted the middle class and the very rich, but a breed of consumer is flying under their radar--those who aren't truly wealthy but still rank in the top 20% of earners. Three tactics can help companies reach the "almost rich."
What do your customers really think? Harvard Business School professor Gerald Zaltman discusses his novel market-research method for revealing consumers' unconscious thoughts about everything from fabric sprays to the Internet.
Anyone who argues that "green" business makes economic sense is bending the truth, says the director of environmental affairs at Aspen Skiing Co. Sustainable business can't occur without a company mandate springing from ethics, not economics.
Preparations for GPC's 75th anniversary are in full swing when the company archivist, David Fisher, uncovers a stash of letters from the founder to a wartime sweetheart. Amid Hud Parker's declarations of devotion is a page featuring formulas for GPC's first product, Parkelite. But it seems clear from the document that Hud Parker was not the miracle plastic's true inventor. David recalls that a lawsuit was brought against the company in 1938 by the father of Karl Gintz, claiming that his son, by then deceased, had been the sole inventor of Parkelite. Hud and Karl had been fellow chemistry students at Princeton, close friends, and army buddies. The lawsuit was decided in favor of GPC, but, David believes, this newly unearthed document would have allowed the Gintz family to prevail. Now Hap Parker, grandson of the founder and GPC's current CEO, must decide what to do. His grandfather's name doesn't deserve to be impugned: Even if Hud hadn't invented Parkelite, he built the company that brought it, and many innovations since, to market. Newland Lowell, GPC's lawyer, counsels Hap that it may not be necessary to divulge the discovery. He lays out a convincing argument that this evidence might not have changed the trial's outcome and he states that no heirs to Karl Gintz have been located. He speculates, plausibly, that the two fellow chemists might have been collaborating on the innovation all along. Still, concealment makes Hap uncomfortable: GPC's corporate culture has always embraced integrity. He's just decided to make the finding public when a chance encounter with three managers gives him pause again. Is it fair to GPC's 8,000 employees to destroy a myth--even if it is a myth--that informs a vibrant and fair-dealing culture? In R0206A and R0206Z, four commentators weigh in on this fictional case.
You can learn a lot from closely observing a business committed to excellent customer service; you can learn even more from actually trying to provide that service. Paul Hemp, an HBR senior editor, spent a week being trained and then working as a room-service waiter at Ritz-Carlton's Boston Common hotel. His tale, though sometimes humbling, offers lessons that managers in any service business might use to improve employee-customer interactions. The author first participated in a two-day orientation program at the Ritz-Carlton, which gave him a chance to learn how the company inculcates its service philosophy in new employees. Upon completion of the program, he went to work, first with a veteran room-service waiter at his side, then on his own. His aim was to put into practice the Ritz-Carlton service precepts, including its motto: "We are Ladies and Gentlemen serving Ladies and Gentlemen." The author draws a number of conclusions from his experiences. Great service, he finds, should be based on dynamic principles rather than rigid formulas. Also, managers can build employees' emotional commitment to their jobs by emphasizing company traditions. Such commitment serves as a driver of excellent customer service only when employees are empowered to take initiative. And that empowerment has no potency unless employees are motivated to seize it. This depends in part on the kind of people you hire. For one thing, job candidates should exhibit not only concern for others but also genuine empathy--the ability to get inside customers' heads and anticipate their needs and desires.
Let's face it, to lead is to live dangerously. Although leadership is often viewed as an exciting and glamorous endeavor, one in which you inspire others to follow you through good times and bad, such a portrayal ignores leadership's dark side: the inevitable attempts to take you out of the game. This is particularly true when a leader must steer an organization through difficult change. When the status quo is upset, people feel a sense of profound loss and dashed expectations. They may need to undergo a period of feeling incompetent or disloyal. It's no wonder they resist the change and often try to eliminate its visible agent. This "survival guide" offers a number of techniques--relatively straightforward in concept but difficult to execute--for protecting yourself as you lead such a change initiative. Adapted from the book Leadership on the Line: Staying Alive Through the Dangers of Leading (Harvard Business School Press, 2002), the article has two main parts. The first looks outward, offering tactical advice about relating to your organization and the people in it. It is designed to protect you from those who would push you aside before you complete your initiatives. The second looks inward, focusing on your own needs and vulnerabilities. It is designed to keep you from bringing yourself down. The hard truth is that it is not possible to experience the rewards and joys of leadership without experiencing the pain as well. But staying in the game and bearing that pain is worth it, not only for the positive changes you can make in the lives of others but also for the meaning it gives your own.
Few companies have a clear strategic vision. The problem, say the authors, stems from the strategic-planning process itself, which usually involves preparing a large document, culled from a mishmash of data provided by people with conflicting agendas. That kind of process almost guarantees an unfocused strategy. Instead, companies should design the strategic-planning process by drawing a picture: a strategy canvas. A strategy canvas shows the strategic profile of your industry by depicting the various factors that affect competition. And it shows the strategic profiles of your current and potential competitors as well as your own company's strategic profile--how it invests in the factors of competition and how it might in the future. The basic component of a strategy canvas--the value curve--is a tool the authors created in their consulting work and have written about in previous HBR articles. This article introduces a four-step process for actually drawing and discussing a strategy canvas. Readers will learn how one European financial services company used this process to create a distinct and easily communicable strategy. The process begins with a visual awakening. Managers compare their business's value curve with competitors' to discover where their strategy needs to change. In the next step--visual exploration--managers do field research on customers and alternative products. At the visual strategy fair, the third step, managers draw new strategic profiles based on field observations and get feedback from customers and peers about these new proposals. Once the best strategy is created from that feedback, it's time for the last step--visual communication. Executives distribute "before" and "after" strategic profiles to the whole company, and only projects that will help move the company closer to the "after" profile are supported.
A personal coach to help your most promising executives reach their potential--sounds good, doesn't it? According to Steven Berglas, executive coaches can make a bad situation worse. Because of their backgrounds and biases, they ignore psychological problems they don't understand. Companies need to consider psychotherapeutic intervention when the symptoms plaguing an executive are stubborn or severe. Executives with issues that require more than coaching come in many shapes and sizes. Consider Rob Bernstein, an executive vice president of sales at an automotive parts distributor. According to the CEO, Bernstein had just the right touch with clients but caused personnel problems inside the company. The last straw came when Bernstein publicly humiliated a mail clerk who had interrupted a meeting to ask someone to sign for a package. At that point, the CEO assigned Tom Davis to coach Bernstein. Davis, a former corporate lawyer, worked with Bernstein for four years. But Davis only exacerbated the problem by teaching Bernstein techniques for "handling" employees--methods that were condescending at best. Although Bernstein appeared to be improving, he was in fact getting worse. Bernstein's real problems went undetected, and when his boss left the company, he was picked as the successor. Soon enough, Bernstein was again in trouble, suspected of embezzlement. This time, the CEO didn't call Davis; instead, he turned to the author, a trained psychotherapist, for help. Berglas soon realized that Bernstein had a serious narcissistic personality disorder and executive coaching could not help him. As that tale and others in the article teach us, executives to be coached should at the very least first receive a psychological evaluation. And company leaders should beware that executive coaches given free rein can end up wreaking personnel havoc.