Despite all of the time, money, and energy that executives pour into corporate change programs, the stark reality is that few companies ever succeed in genuinely reinventing themselves. That's because the people at those companies rarely master the art of transformational learning--that is, eagerly challenging deeply held assumptions about a company's processes and, in response, altering their thoughts and actions. Instead, most people just end up doing the same old things in superficially tweaked ways. Why is transformational learning so hard to achieve? HBR senior editor Diane Coutu explores this question with psychologist and MIT professor Edgar Schein, a world-renowned expert on organizational development. In sharp contrast to the optimistic rhetoric that permeates the debate on corporate learning and change, Schein is cautious about what companies can and cannot accomplish. Corporate culture can change, he says, but this kind of learning takes time, and it isn't fun. In this article, he describes two basic types of anxiety--learning anxiety and survival anxiety--that drive radical relearning in organizations. Schein's theories spring from his early research on how American prisoners of war in Korea were brainwashed by their captors. Heavy socialization is back in style in U.S. corporations today, Schein says, even if no one is calling it that.
The collective behavior of people in crowds, markets, and organizations has long been a mystery. Why, for instance, do employee bonuses sometimes lead to decreases in productivity? Why do some products generate a tremendous buzz, seemingly out of nowhere, whereas others languish despite multimillion-dollar marketing campaigns? How could a simple clerical error snowball into a catastrophic loss that bankrupts a financial institution? Traditional approaches like spreadsheet and regression analyses have failed to explain such "emergent phenomena," says Eric Bonabeau, because they work from the top down, trying to apply global equations and frameworks to a particular situation. But the behavior of emergent phenomena, contends Bonabeau, is formed from the bottom up--starting with the local interactions of individuals who alter their actions in response to other participants. Together, the myriad interactions result in a group behavior that can easily elude any top-down analysis. But now, thanks to "agent-based modeling," some companies are finding ways to analyze--and even predict--emergent phenomena. This article discusses emergent phenomena in detail and explains why they have become more prevalent in recent years. In addition to providing real-world examples of companies that have improved their business practices through agent-based modeling, Bonabeau also examines the future of this technology and points to several fields that may be revolutionized by its use.
For most companies, organization design is neither a science nor an art; it's an oxymoron. Organizational structures evolve in fits and starts, shaped more by politics than by policies. Although most executives can sense when their organization designs are not working well, few take meaningful action, partly because they lack a practical framework to guide them. The authors of this article provide just such a framework; they present nine tests that can be used either to evaluate an existing organization design or create a new one. Four "fit" tests offer an initial screen: The market advantage test asks whether a design directs sufficient management attention to the company's sources of competitive advantage; the parenting advantage test determines whether the design gives enough attention to the corporate-level activities that provide real value to the company; the people test shows whether the design reflects the employees' strengths; and the feasibility test looks at constraints that may impede implementation. Five "good design" tests can help a company refine its prospective design. The specialist cultures test ensures that there's sufficient insulation for units that need to be different from the prevailing culture; the difficult-links test determines whether a design offers solutions for potentially problematic unit-to-unit links; the redundant-hierarchy test asks whether the design has too many parent levels; the accountability test looks at whether every unit has suitable controls; and the flexibility test ensures that the design lets the company adapt to change. Once a design is altered, the tests should be repeated. Organizational decisions are inevitably complex, and tweaking one part of the design may produce unanticipated consequences elsewhere.
Jared Gordan, the president of the Industrial Products Division for Compunext, is a first-rate manager. In just three years, he's turned around a flagging division and increased sales and profits by 50%--a dramatic shift from five years earlier, when analysts were suggesting that the company sell the division. But that's not all. In addition to being a turnaround expert, Jared has shown a special aptitude for recruiting and developing talent. Many executives have noticed this faculty, and--unfortunately for Jared--those running Compunext's biggest, most glamorous divisions are poaching his best managers. In fact, Industrial Products has just been raided for the tenth time in two years, and Jared is spitting mad. This time, the Telecommunications Division has wooed--and won--Stan Simpson, Industrial Products' VP of sales. Jared, right or wrong, confronts Hank Dodge, president of Telecommunications, for not coming to him before offering Stan the job. Still furious, Jared then meets with Sue Patel, Compunext's VP of human resources, to discuss what can be done to avoid future raids. Does Jared have good reason to be angry? What lies at the root of the problem, and how can Jared solve it? In R0203A and R0203Z, Peter Browning, Frank Morgan, Hubert Saint-Onge, and Charles H. King weigh in on this fictional case study.
Jared Gordan, the president of the Industrial Products Division for Compunext, is a first-rate manager. In just three years, he's turned around a flagging division and increased sales and profits by 50%--a dramatic shift from five years earlier, when analysts were suggesting that the company sell the division. But that's not all. In addition to being a turnaround expert, Jared has shown a special aptitude for recruiting and developing talent. Many executives have noticed this faculty, and--unfortunately for Jared--those running Compunext's biggest, most glamorous divisions are poaching his best managers. In fact, Industrial Products has just been raided for the tenth time in two years, and Jared is spitting mad. This time, the Telecommunications Division has wooed--and won--Stan Simpson, Industrial Products' VP of sales. Jared, right or wrong, confronts Hank Dodge, president of Telecommunications, for not coming to him before offering Stan the job. Still furious, Jared then meets with Sue Patel, Compunext's VP of human resources, to discuss what can be done to avoid future raids. Does Jared have good reason to be angry? What lies at the root of the problem, and how can Jared solve it? In R0203A and R0203X, Peter Browning, Frank Morgan, Hubert Saint-Onge, and Charles H. King weigh in on this fictional case study.
The Museum of Fine Arts in Boston and Fleet Financial Group's sponsored the Monet in the 20th Century exhibition, the world's largest, in 1998. The case chronicles the solicitation of a large corporate sponsor, as well as the growth and development of their partnership. Includes color exhibits.
Deals with MAC Development's efforts to develop a 41-acre site near Chicago. Reviews two years of efforts and highlights the remaining issues of: 1) gaining town approval for development and tax reductions, 2) meeting the bank's debt covenants, including finding a buyer for the first lot, and 3) agreeing on a final purchase price with the seller. Includes color exhibits.
In early 2002, XM and Sirius were fighting for control of the emerging U.S. market for satellite radio. Each company targeted consumers in automobiles, providing 100 channels of CD-quality audio for a monthly subscription fee of $10-$13. Wall Street analysts predicted that these companies would be profitable by 2005-2006, but investors were increasingly skeptical of ventures that required huge, irrevocable bets on customer acquisition and infrastructure. This case describes the business models of the satellite radio companies, the technology they employed, and their target markets. Poses questions about their pricing strategies, strategic partnerships with auto manufacturers, and whether they should develop interoperable radios that receive either company's signals.
Quack.com was in dire straits. An early entrant in the voice portal market, Quack was quickly running out of money. The company's management team had just returned from a road show for a second round of venture financing, but they had been unsuccessful. To exacerbate this issue, Quack's two major competitors had each received substantial funding. At the current burn rate, Quack could survive on its bridge financing for only three more months. Moreover, after the first few months of running the voice portal, Quack's business-to-consumer model for voice portals was already showing signs of weakness. Quack's management believed the failure of its road show could be related to its B2C focus. The company was facing many major decisions that would reshape and dictate the future of the firm. This case deals with the possible options for new strategic direction.
Describes some of the difficulties of working with one's relatives in the family firm, especially with one's brother(s). Examines some of the reasons for the difficulties and proposes ways of dealing with them.
In April 1994, the world witnessed a political milestone in South Africa. After decades of repression and racial segregation, South Africa's black majority came to power at last, as the African National Congress (ANC), led by the celebrated Nelson Mandela, rode into power with 63% of the vote in the country's first racially inclusive election. Eight years after this electoral victory, however, many South Africans are starting to question the shifting priorities of the ANC. Although the political situation of the country has vastly improved, the economy remains fragile, and some of the ANC's most loyal allies are decrying what they see as a change of faith. Thabo Mbeki, a former political exile who became president in 1999, must now decide what democracy means for South Africa and how best to preserve it.
In early 2001, makers of AIDS drugs were suing to prevent developing countries from violating their patents. The issue was driven by price. The developing countries could not afford the market price for these drugs. At the same time, the drug companies were reluctant to sell drugs at or below cost in one country and at 10 to 20 times cost in another country. Using a series of published articles, this case outlines the pressures facing the drug companies and asks the question, "How should they respond?"
Todd Dagres, general partner of Battery Ventures, reflects on his firm's organization and it's effectiveness in one particular deal. One of the perennial challenges of venture capital is the scaling of the firm. Usually regarded as a craft industry, venture firms tend to have fewer than ten deal-makers. Battery has undertaken a particular approach to this problem, instituting a career path that begins at a very low level, progressing to general partner. Examining Battery making a deal demonstrates the advantages and disadvantages of this structure.
Emphasizes the gradual, two-dimensional gradients between commodities and specialties. Provides a new way to improve the profit margins of commodities.
Focuses on the coordination of marketing and sales--two functions that seem alike but are, in practice, difficult to integrate. Briefly explains the challenges to coordination and provides some solutions.
Explains the opportunities and limitations of using performance-based pricing in which the price paid is a function of the quality provided. Includes application guidelines.