In June 1998, the senior management team at Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream faced a number of internal and external difficulties that were some of the most challenging problems the company had ever faced. Problems included profitability issues, record-high butterfat prices, aggressive discounting by competitors, higher margin better-for-you segment collapse, severance of Ben & Jerry's distribution contract, and management health issues. Given a mandatory and necessary financial restructuring of the company, the senior management team faced some tough employee issues and needed to make very significant decisions to overcome their difficult times.
Examines the Application Service Provider (ASP) business model. First, defines the ASP model and describes different ways to categorize ASPs. Next, summarizes the various ways that ASPs create value for their clients. Then, analyzes the economic model for ASPs, focusing on their revenue and cost drivers. Last, examines the payoff to ASPs from pursuing aggressive growth strategies.
Facing dwindling membership and looking to increase its revenue, the American Medical Association (AMA) signed an endorsement deal with Sunbeam Corp., a leader in the small home appliance industry, in August 1997. In the deal, the AMA would receive significant royalties from Sunbeam in exchange for the use of its seal on Sunbeam's home health-care products. Critics protested that this deal posed a conflict of interest before the AMA. Supporters argued, however, that the deal was a good way for the AMA to ease the association's financial troubles. Furthermore, the deal would be beneficial to patients because it encouraged people to monitor their own health.
Pharmacyclics (NASDAQ: PCYC), a pharmaceutical company that manufactures products that will improve existing therapeutic treatments for cancer, arteriosclerosis, and retinal disease, was considering a $60 million private placement in February 2000. The company had more cash than ever before, but projections of R&D and marketing expenses were also unprecedented. PCYC's most promising oncology drug, a radiation enhancer called Xcytrin, was in Phase III clinical trials--the rigorous final phase before FDA approval for commercialization. Analysts gave the drug a slightly better than 50% chance of success. This case focuses on stage financing and a simple decision-tree evaluation. Students have the opportunity to consider the impact of past staged financing decisions on the ownership structure of the firm and to evaluate the current stock market price in light of analyst forecasts of the cash flow and the probability of success for each drug. These two analyses help inform the private placement decision.
British Petroleum and Amoco were the two largest members of the Azerbaijan International Oil Consortium (AIOC), an 11-firm consortium that was spending $10 billion to develop oil fields in the Caspian Sea. As of March 1999, AIOC had completed a $1.9 billion development project known as Early Oil. The two companies, however, had financed their shares of this project in different ways: BP used internal funds (traditional, on-balance sheet corporate finance), whereas Amoco was one of five AIOC partners that raised $400 million of project finance. Following the BP/Amoco merger in December 1998, managers in the combined firm's finance group had to reassess the Early Oil financing strategy and determine the best way to finance its share of the $8 billion Full Field Development Project. Should it use internal funds, project finance, or a mixture of the two?
Project Achieve is a start-up providing information management solutions for schools. Its founders see a need for software both to manage the volumes of information necessary to administer a school and to connect parents, teachers, and students in a more effective way. Originally funded by angel investors, Project Achieve is raising its first formal round of financing and needs to establish a firm valuation. This case outlines the economics of the business and provides the necessary background figures to build the business model and arrive at a valuation. Explores quantitative considerations of venture financing: 1) value neutrality of equity issuance is illustrated; 2) cost of capital is computed from raw return series, and the appropriate discount rate is selected based on comparables; 3) decision trees are used to highlight the importance of probabilistic thinking; and (4) subscriber models are compared with annual free cash flow models both for determining financial value and as decision-making tools for business choices. In addition, provides a setting to discuss the more qualitative issues involved in choosing investors. In particular, the founders are comparing two options: an infusion of additional capital from current and new investors or an investment from a potential strategic partner. Each option has very different implications for the direction of the business going forward.
In a fast-moving, increasingly competitive world, a firm's only enduring source of advantage is its knowledge. Managing that knowledge is therefore crucial, and this article offers suggestions on how leaders can meet that challenge effectively. The author describes a practical six-step process for making knowledge management work. The process he describes will interest CEOs and managers of global corporations as much as it will entrepreneurs of small and medium-sized firms.
Describes online brokers, companies that use the Internet to help clients identify prospective trading partners and sometimes help their clients complete transactions. First, summarizes the various ways that online brokers create value for their clients. Then analyzes the economic model for online brokers, focusing on their revenue and cost drivers. Building on that analysis, the next section examines the payoff to online brokers from pursuing aggressive growth strategies. Delineates the differences between and advantages of being a broker versus a retailer or a market maker, and explores some of the strategic challenges facing offline brokers as they move their businesses online, e.g., the risk of self-cannibalization and the threat of disintermediation by clients. Explores the value proposition offered by these companies and the economic imperatives they face. Finally, seeks to provide a framework to evaluate whether the adoption of aggressive growth strategies is prudent for online brokers.
The merger announcement between DeWaal Pharmaceuticals and BioHealth Labs was front-page news. Two months later, the press had moved on to a new story, and the hard labor of integration loomed. CEO Steve Lindell had worked tirelessly to clear regulatory hurdles, and all signs pointed toward approval in the near future. Now Steve was feeling pressure to attack the real challenge of the merger: bringing together two very different cultures as quickly and efficiently as possible. DeWaal was an established drugmaker based in the Netherlands, and BioHealth, headquartered just north of New York City, had in recent years become competitive at the highest tier of the market. The first step in integrating the two companies was to select the top layers of management for the new company. At the moment, there were some 120 people on two continents for about 65 senior-level jobs. Steve's urgency was not without cause: talented people from both sides were jumping ship, and BioHealth's stock price had dipped 20% after the initial euphoria over the deal had worn off. As the two men attempt to work through the important personnel issues during a lunch meeting, they quickly hit a roadblock. How can they come to agreement about who goes and who stays? In R0101A and R0101Z, commentators David Kidd, Lawrence J. DeMonaco, Grand Freeland, and Patrick O'Sullivan offer advice on this fictional case.
Many companies face the challenge of balancing art with commerce. The conflict between corporate pragmatism and artistic passion and quality is persistent: designers chafe under corporate requirements, budgets, and deadlines, and nondesigners struggle to understand the business value of artistic choices. At German carmaker BMW, the fanaticism about design excellence is matched only by the company's driving desire to remain profitable. Global design director Chris Bangle presides over the intersection of art and commerce at BMW, managing the often-strained relationships among the designers, engineers, and business managers. Bangle goes to great lengths to protect his designers from the unproductive commentary of others in the company, literally posting "Stop: No Entry" signs on the design studio doors. He also protects the design process, making sure that time-to-market pressures do not harm the designs by shifting the focus to engineering too soon. As a mediator, Bangle appeals to the core values of the company and a deeply held sense about BMW-ness--a pride of product shared by everyone in the company that expresses itself in the classic quality of the cars. Every employee, designer and nondesigner alike, understands that if a car doesn't meet this standard of excellence, it's simply not a BMW--and customers won't buy it.
Why is business so admired in the United States and so often denigrated in Europe? How has America created 30 million new jobs in the last 20 years while the European Union, with a bigger population, only managed 5 million? What is feeding America's apparently inexhaustible appetite for growth and its recent dramatic improvements in productivity? In 1831, French philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville came to America to examine its prison system and returned with a vision of democracy so profound it has become part of our cultural heritage. More than a century and a half later, renowned British business philosopher Charles Handy retraces Tocqueville's intellectual journey, this time focusing not on democracy but on capitalism. The result is an eye-opening look at some of the fundamental assumptions underpinning business in America today. It is America's optimism that Handy finds most striking, the unquestioned belief that tomorrow can--and should--be made better than today. The energy engendered by American optimism, coupled with the Puritan belief in work and in the nobility of earned wealth lies, in Handy's view, at the heart of America's success. Will American capitalism, born as it was from a property-owning democracy, now adapt to a dematerialized world, where property is intellectual rather than physical? Handy lays out the challenges that must be overcome for tomorrow to indeed continue to be better than today in this still-young country.
While many management thinkers proclaim an era of radical uncertainty, authors Sawhney and Parikh assert that the seemingly endless upheavals of the digital age are more predictable than that: today's changes have a common root, and that root lies in the nature of intelligence in networks. Understanding the patterns of intelligence migration can help companies decipher and plan for the inevitable disruptions in today's business environment. Two patterns in network intelligence are reshaping industries and organizations. First, intelligence is decoupling--that is, modern high-speed networks are pushing back-end intelligence and front-end intelligence toward opposite ends of the network, making the ends the two major sources of potential profits. Second, intelligence is becoming more fluid and modular. Small units of intelligence now float freely like molecules in the ether, coalescing into temporary bundles whenever and wherever necessary to solve problems. The authors present four strategies that companies can use to profit from these patterns: arbitrage allows companies to move intelligence to new regions or countries; aggregation combines formerly isolated pieces of infrastructure intelligence; rewiring allows companies to connect islands of intelligence; and reassembly allows businesses to reorganize pieces of intelligence into coherent, personalized packages for customers. By being aware of patterns in network intelligence and by acting rather than reacting, companies can turn chaos into opportunity, say the authors.
Increasingly, it seems, there are just two types of companies left in the world: dot-coms, born on the Internet, and "wanna-dots," established organizations that are seeking to incorporate the Internet into their businesses. Some wanna-dots manage the deep mind-shift required to cross the digital divide. These are the pacesetters--the first movers and fast followers that exhibit organizational curiosity and the desire to innovate. But most wanna-dots are laggards; they don't rise to the challenge with the same resolve. In a global research effort involving more than 800 companies, the author uncovered so many wanna-dots making the same kinds of mistakes that it almost seemed they were following a How Not to Change guide. In this article, Kanter creates just such a guide, offering ten pieces of antiadvice that expose the tendency of wanna-dots to make only cosmetic changes when deep transformation is required. Beyond delineating what not to do, Kanter serves up two examples of wanna-dots that got it right: Williams-Sonoma and Honeywell.
The success of Yahoo!, eBay, Enron, and other companies that have become adept at morphing to meet the demands of changing markets can't be explained using traditional thinking about competitive strategy. These companies have succeeded by pursuing constantly evolving strategies in market spaces that were considered unattractive according to traditional measures. In this article--the third in an HBR series by Kathleen Eisenhardt and Donald Sull on strategy in the new economy--the authors ask, what are the sources of competitive advantage in high-velocity markets? The secret, they say, is strategy as simple rules. The companies know that the greatest opportunities for competitive advantage lie in market confusion, but they recognize the need for a few crucial strategic processes and a few simple rules. In traditional strategy, advantage comes from exploiting resources or stable market positions. In strategy as simple rules, advantage comes from successfully seizing fleeting opportunities. Key strategic processes, such as product innovation, partnering, or spinout creation, place the company where the flow of opportunities is greatest. Simple rules then provide the guidelines within which managers can pursue such opportunities. Simple rules, which grow out of experience, fall into five broad categories: how-to rules, boundary conditions, priority rules, timing rules, and exit rules. Companies with simple-rules strategies must follow the rules religiously and avoid the temptation to change them too frequently. A consistent strategy helps managers sort through opportunities and gain short-term advantage by exploiting the attractive ones.
Management theorists have long sought to identify precisely what makes some people flourish under pressure and others fold. But they have come up with only partial anÂswers: rich material rewards, the right culÂture, management by objectives. The probÂlem with most approaches is that they deal with people only from the neck up, conÂnecting high performance primarily with cognitive capacity. Authors Loehr and Schwartz argue that a successful approach to sustained high performance must conÂsider the person as a whole. Executives are, in effect, "corporate athletes." If they are to perform at high levels over the long haul, they must train in the systematic, multilevel way that athletes do. Rooted in two decades of work with world-class athletes, the integrated theory of performance management addresses the body, the emotions, the mind, and the spirit through a model the authors call the perÂformance pyramid. At its foundation is physÂical well-being. Above that rest emotional health, then mental acuity, and, finally, a spiritual purpose. Each level profoundly influences the others, and all must be adÂdressed together to avoid compromising performance. Rigorous exercise, for inÂstance, can produce a sense of emotional well-being, clearing the way for peak mental performance. Rituals that promote oscillaÂtion - the rhythmic expenditure and recovÂery of energy - link the levels of the pyramid and lead to the ideal performance state. The authors offer case studies of execuÂtives who have used the model to increase professional performance and improve the quality of their lives. In a corporate enviÂronment that is changing at warp speed, performing consistently at high levels is more necessary than ever. Companies can't afford to address employees' cognitive caÂpacities while ignoring their physical, emoÂtional, and spiritual well-being.
In this HBR interview, CEO Michael Ruettgers speaks in detail about the managerial practices that have allowed EMC to anticipate and exploit disruptive technologies, market opportunities, and business models ahead of its competitors. He recounts how the company repeatedly ventured into untested markets, ultimately transforming itself from a struggling maker of minicomputer memory boards into a data storage powerhouse and one of the most successful companies of the past decade. The company has achieved sustained and nearly unrivaled revenue, profit, and share-price growth through a number of means. Emphasizing timing and speed, Ruettgers says, is critical. That's meant staggering products rather than developing them sequentially and avoiding the excessive refinements that slow time to market. Indeed, a sense of urgency, Ruettgers explains, has been critical to EMC's success. Processes such as quarterly goal setting and monthly forecasting meetings help maintain a sense of urgency and allow managers to get early glimpses of changes in the market. So does an environment in which personal accountability is stressed and the corporate focus is single-minded. Perhaps most important, the company has procedures to glean insights from customers. Intensive forums involving EMC engineers and leading-edge customers, who typically push for unconventional solutions to their problems, often yield new product features. Similarly, a customer service system that includes real-time monitoring of product use enables EMC to understand customer needs firsthand.