This sequel accompanies the case Tackling Poor Performance (1571.0). When Paulo Renato de Souza accepts an appointment to become Brazil's minister of education, he faces extreme challenges. Public education in Latin America's most populous nation is widely viewed as a failure. Brazil's vast population of poor children often attends schools that are both physically inadequate and have inadequate textbooks. His own department has seen a parade of ineffective leaders and has only indirect authority of state governments responsible for primary education. HKS Case Number 1571.1

Artists for Humanity (AFH) is a nonprofit that hires 30 to 40 teenagers each year for after-school work and training in the arts and entrepreneurship. The young artists, working in six different studios, make and sell the art they produce. AFH was started in 1990 by local artist Susan Rodgerson and six middle school students in a Boston garage studio; in 1993, they were able to expand and move to two floors of a wharf-area warehouse. At the time of the case, Rodgerson, the executive director, is weighing issues of expansion, staff turnover, and a capital campaign to raise money to secure a building (the warehouse lease ran out in 2001). The case showcases the challenges that face many small nonprofit organizations, and outlines some of the particular characteristics that describe nonprofit organizations that also have an entrepreneurial arm.

Conventional wisdom says that companies from the periphery of the global market can't compete against established global giants from Europe, Japan, and the United States. Companies from developing countries have entered the game too late; they don't have the resources. But Christopher Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal disagree. The problem for most aspiring multinationals from peripheral countries, say the authors, is that they enter the global marketplace in low-margin businesses at the bottom of the value curve, and they stay there. But it doesn't have to be that way. They studied 12 emerging multinationals based in such countries--from emerging markets like Brazil to relatively more prosperous yet still peripheral nations like Australia to developing countries like the Philippines. These companies now enjoy global success because they treated global competition as an opportunity to build capabilities and move into more profitable segments of their industry. The path to globalization isn't easy, but the authors show that it is possible. Each company in the study overcame the same core challenges. They broke out of the mind-set that they were unable to compete successfully on the global stage. They adopted strategies that made being a late mover a source of competitive advantage. They developed a culture of continual cross-border learning. And they all had leaders who drove them relentlessly up the value curve. The companies discussed in this article are models for the thousands of marginal companies in peripheral economies that have the potential to become legitimate global players.

Why didn't a single minicomputer company succeed in the personal computer business? Why did only one department store--Dayton Hudson--become a leader in discount retailing? Why can't large companies capitalize on the opportunities brought about by major, disruptive changes in their markets? It's because organizations, independent of the people in them, have capabilities. And those capabilities also define disabilities. As a company grows, what it can and cannot do becomes more sharply defined in certain predictable ways. The authors have analyzed those patterns to create a framework managers can use to assess the abilities and disabilities of their organization as a whole. When a company is young, its resources--its people, equipment, technologies, cash, brands, suppliers, and the like--define what it can and cannot do. As it becomes more mature, its abilities stem more from its processes--product development, manufacturing, budgeting, for example. In the largest companies, values--particularly those that determine what are its acceptable gross margins and how big an opportunity has to be before it becomes interesting--define what the company can and cannot do. Because resources are more adaptable to change than processes or values, smaller companies tend to respond to major market shifts better than larger ones. The authors suggest ways large companies can capitalize on opportunities that normally would not fit in with their processes or values; it all starts with understanding what the organizations are capable of.

If you think the Internet has changed the shape of business, just imagine what genetic engineering is going to do. In this groundbreaking article, Juan Enriquez and Ray Goldberg explain how advances in genetics will not only have dramatic implications for people and society, they will reshape vast sectors of the world economy. The boundaries between many once-distinct businesses, from agribusiness and chemicals to pharmaceuticals and health care to energy and computing, will blur, and out of that convergence will emerge what promises to be the largest industry in the world: life science. And as scientific advances continue to accelerate, more and more businesses will be drawn, by choice or by necessity, into the life-science industry. Companies have realized that unlocking life's code opens up virtually unlimited commercial possibilities, but operating within this new industry presents a raft of wrenchingly difficult challenges as well. Companies must rethink their business, financial, and M&A strategies. They must make vast R&D investments with distant and uncertain payoffs. They must enter into complex partnerships and affiliations, sometimes with direct competitors. And perhaps most difficult, they must contend with a public that is uncomfortable with even the thought of genetic engineering. The optimal structure of the life-science industry--and of the companies that compose it--is as yet unknown. But the actions that executives take now will go a long way toward determining the ultimate role their companies play in the world's largest and most important industry.

A leader's singular job is to get results. But even with all the leadership training programs and "expert" advice available, effective leadership still eludes many people and organizations. One reason, says Daniel Goleman, is that such experts offer advice based on inference, experience, and instinct, not on quantitative data. Now, drawing on research of more than 3,000 executives, Goleman explores which precise leadership behaviors yield positive results. He outlines six distinct leadership styles, each one springing from different components of emotional intelligence. Each style has a distinct effect on the working atmosphere of a company, division, or team, and, in turn, on its financial performance. The styles, by name and brief description alone, will resonate with anyone who leads, is led, or, as is the case with most of us, does both. Coercive leaders demand immediate compliance. Authoritative leaders mobilize people toward a vision. Affiliative leaders create emotional bonds and harmony. Democratic leaders build consensus through participation. Pacesetting leaders expect excellence and self-direction. And coaching leaders develop people for the future. The research indicates that leaders who get the best results don't rely on just one leadership style; they use most of the styles in any given week. Goleman details the types of business situations each style is best suited for, and he explains how leaders who lack one or more of these styles can expand their repertories. He maintains that with practice leaders can switch among leadership styles to produce powerful results, thus turning the art of leadership into a science.

Stock option grants have come to dominate the pay of top executives. But while they've made many people wealthy, their impact on business in general remains controversial. Critics say options motivate corporate leaders to boost stock values in the short run rather than build companies that will thrive over the long run. Drawing on an extensive analysis of the real-world impact of options, Brian Hall argues that the critics are wrong. Option grants are the best compensation mechanism we have for getting managers to act in ways that ensure the long-term success of their companies and the well-being of workers and stockholders. But because options tend to be poorly understood, companies often end up with counterproductive plans. The author explains the three types of option plans that can be used. Fixed value plans, for which executives receive options of a predetermined value every year, are ideal for companies that set pay according to compensation surveys, but they weaken the link between pay and performance. Fixed number plans, which stipulate the number of options executives will receive over the plan period, provide a much stronger link. The lump-sum megagrant is the most highly leveraged type of grant because it not only fixes the number of options in advance, it fixes the exercise price as well. The type of plan must be carefully matched to the company's strategy. The article is accompanied by several exhibits, including a chart entitled "Which Plan?" that succinctly sets out the weaknesses and strengths of each type of option program.

For years, partners at professional service firms considered the leap from professional to partner a function of "natural selection"--a test of survival of the fittest. But that model is on the verge of extinction: in today's firms, securing and retaining talent is becoming paramount as young MBAs, once willing to log years of hard labor in hopes of being made partner, are leaving in hordes for hot new Internet companies. So how can companies keep the talent they've worked so hard to cultivate? One way, Ibarra says, is to have partners take a more active mentoring role in helping junior professionals create a partner persona. She explains the three steps that senior colleagues can take to guide junior professionals on this journey. The first has to do with observing role models. By taking a collage approach, young professionals can survey a broad range of personalities and so accumulate a larger repertoire of possible styles to choose from. For their part, partners can assist in this observation process by communicating explicitly what styles work for them and why. The second step partners can take is to encourage professionals to develop a repertoire of role models; by working with many senior professionals, junior colleagues are more apt to find just the right mix of mentors. And third, senior people can take extra care to support young professionals at the most difficult moments in the process. Indeed, the leap from professional to partner is difficult--even trying at times. But for those willing and daring enough to take the leap--and for those who've already made it--understanding the associated psychological and emotional obstacles is critical to success.

Like every other ambitious, Ivy League-educated baby boomer, Randy Komisar wanted to climb the corporate ladder--any corporate ladder. But he just couldn't bring himself to play the traditional career game. Instead, Komisar made up his own rules, taking a series of jobs that sparked his passions and made him happy--and successful. Today, the charismatic 45-year-old is a "virtual CEO"--an off-site but supercharged consultant to flesh-and-blood CEOs at a number of start-up companies in Silicon Valley and beyond. But that was only after he'd worked his way through 11 companies in 25 years--a crazy quilt of jobs as a music promoter, corporate lawyer, CFO at a software start-up, and chief executive at a video game company, just to name a few. Komisar's success came by not having a career--at least, not in the traditional old-economy sense of the word. He realized there were alternatives to marching your way straight up the corporate ladder and that success in the new economy can involve a series of twists and turns. In this first-person account, Komisar describes why a nontraditional career path such as the one he unintentionally took may appeal to more businesspeople than might suspect it themselves. He tracks his professional journey along a sometimes tense, often enlightening, and ultimately prosperous course. He shares lessons learned along the way. Komisar also makes a strong business case for pursuing the passion-driven career; such a career, he says, makes supreme sense in the new economy because it's flexible and challenging--both for an individual and for the companies he chooses to work for.

Price wars are a fact of life, whether we're talking about the fast-paced world of knowledge products, the marketing of Internet appliances, or the staid, traditional sales of aluminum castings. If you're a manager and you're not in battle currently, you probably will be soon, so it's never too early to prepare. The authors describe the causes and characteristics of price wars and explain how companies can fight them, flee them--or even start them. The authors say the best defense in a pricing battle isn't to simply match price cut for price cut; they emphasize other options for protecting market share. For instance, companies can compete on quality instead of price; they can alert customers to the risks and negative consequences of choosing a low-priced option. Companies can reveal their strategic intentions and capabilities; just the threat of a major price action might hold rivals' pricing moves in check. And, finally, companies can seek support from interested third parties--governments, customers, and vendors, for instance--to help avert a price war. If a company chooses to compete on price, the authors suggest using complex pricing actions, cutting prices in certain channels, or introducing new products or flanking brands--each of which lets companies selectively target only those segments of the market that are under competitive threat. A simple tit-for-tat price move should be the last resort--and managers should act swiftly and decisively so competitors will know that any revenue gains will be short-lived.

Most of the advice on organizational learning, change, and employee commitment does not work and, worse, often leads to counterproductive results. That's the argument of Chris Argyris's Flawed Advice and the Management Trap, and Eileen Shapiro finds it convincing. A consultant to venture capitalists, Shapiro lauds Argyris's dissection of some leading popular works on leadership. Examples from their own books suggest that Stephen Covey, Jon Katzenbach, and John Kotter may preach the virtues of openness and respect, but in practice they aren't averse to using deception and unilateral control. Similarly, Argyris shows the dishonesty behind most empowerment programs. Too many companies, he finds, ask workers to act like owners without truly giving them the authority or the incentives to do so. The underlying trouble is a deep-seated mind-set of winning at all costs that keeps managers from fully engaging with their subordinates. While agreeing with Argyris's diagnosis, Shapiro is skeptical of his remedy, a program of coaching aimed at getting executives to see the contradictions between their intentions and their behavior. Some companies do fully empower their people, she finds, but only because they compete in high-growth industries where employees need to make quick decisions to capture big opportunities. Like the milk in a cup of cappuccino, she says, these enterprises are swirling around in the economy, far above the slow-moving traditional companies that Argyris has studied. Managers and employees in these fast-moving companies share power not because they were trained to do so, but because that's the only way they can reap the great rewards they seek.

There is much euphoria about the possibilities offered by e-commerce. Consumers envision lower prices and easy shopping; investors imagine cashing in on Internet IPOs; and start-ups want their business model to be the one that transforms an industry. But beneath all the excitement lies a sobering reality: the Internet represents the biggest threat thus far to a company's ability to brand its products, extract price premiums from buyers, and generate high profit margins. Indrajit Sinha explains that this threat comes from what economists call cost transparency, a situation made possible by the abundance of free, easily obtained information on the Internet. Pricing information is the most prevalent, but consumers can also find a wealth of material about product quality, supplier reliability, service offerings, and much more. All that information makes sellers' costs more transparent to buyers. It lets them see through manufacturing costs and determine whether those costs are in line with the prices being charged. That will make it much harder for companies, whether they are on-line or not, to impose large price premiums. What can companies do to fight back? Sinha suggests several options. One is to implement creative pricing strategies that go beyond traditional price cutting. Another is bundling--packaging a product with other goods and services in order to obscure the product's costs. But the best way of countering cost transparency is through innovation, Sinha says. Consumers will always reward makers of new and distinctive products that improve their lives.

Norman Spencer, who grew up poor, worked for two decades to make his investment firm successful and his family wealthy. The company he founded, Arrowhead, is now known on Wall Street as a top-notch boutique firm with $25 billion in assets under management. His family has a mansion in San Francisco and a "cottage" in Nantucket. His 17-year-old daughter drives a BMW, his 13-year-old son takes flying lessons in his own plane, and his wife has a personal feng shui adviser. But at the pinnacle of his career, Norman feels as though he's drowning. Norman's success only makes him feel numb, and his home life is a disaster; his wife is so resentful of his lack of family involvement that she no longer speaks to him. His daughter refused to wish him happy Father's Day. "You're not a father," she said. Alternately harsh and remote at work, this fictional entrepreneur has been asked by one senior executive at Arrowhead to stay away from the analysts. So he spends a lot of time surfing the Internet, looking at real estate in far-flung places, and haunting web sites about missing persons, wondering what became of his younger sister, who ran away from home at age 14. What is wrong with Norman, and how can he fix it? In R00211 and R00213, commentators Edward M. Hallowell, Scott Neely, Jean Hollands and F.R. Manfred Kets de Vries offer advice on this fictional case study.

Back in the prehistoric days of information technology--say, about 15 years ago--many companies opted to deal with the frighteningly complicated matter of "machines and men" by creating a new position: chief information officer. This newfangled executive, companies hoped, would protect and prepare them for the coming technology revolution. But now that the revolution is upon us, and as more and more companies integrate e-commerce into their corporate strategies, the role of the chief information officer is undergoing intense scrutiny. Should the CIO participate fully in strategy formulation? Is the position evolving from a technical manager to a general manager? If, in fact, the CIO role is becoming largely strategic, how much will the job overlap with that of the CEO? And what of the operational responsibilities that traditionally go along with the CIO title? Commenting on these issues are: Dawn Lepore, CIO and vice chairman at Charles Schwab; Jack Rockart, director of the Center for Information Systems Research at MIT; Michael J. Earl, professor of information management at London Business School; Tom Thomas, chairman and CEO at Vantive Corporation; and Peter McAteer and Jeffrey Elton, consultants at Giga Information Group and Integral, respectively.

Norman Spencer, who grew up poor, worked for two decades to make his investment firm successful and his family wealthy. The company he founded, Arrowhead, is now known on Wall Street as a top-notch boutique firm with $25 billion in assets under management. His family has a mansion in San Francisco and a "cottage" in Nantucket. His 17-year-old daughter drives a BMW, his 13-year-old son takes flying lessons in his own plane, and his wife has a personal feng shui adviser. But at the pinnacle of his career, Norman feels as though he's drowning. Norman's success only makes him feel numb, and his home life is a disaster; his wife is so resentful of his lack of family involvement that she no longer speaks to him. His daughter refused to wish him happy Father's Day. "You're not a father," she said. Alternately harsh and remote at work, this fictional entrepreneur has been asked by one senior executive at Arrowhead to stay away from the analysts. So he spends a lot of time surfing the Internet, looking at real estate in far-flung places, and haunting web sites about missing persons, wondering what became of his younger sister, who ran away from home at age 14. What is wrong with Norman, and how can he fix it? In R00211 and R00214, commentators Edward M. Hallowell, Scott Neely, Jean Hollands, and Manfred F.R. Kets de Vries offer advice on this fictional case study.

Norman Spencer, who grew up poor, worked for two decades to make his investment firm successful and his family wealthy. The company he founded, Arrowhead, is now known on Wall Street as a top-notch boutique firm with $25 billion in assets under management. His family has a mansion in San Francisco and a "cottage" in Nantucket. His 17-year-old daughter drives a BMW, his 13-year-old son takes flying lessons in his own plane, and his wife has a personal feng shui adviser. But at the pinnacle of his career, Norman feels as though he's drowning. Norman's success only makes him feel numb, and his home life is a disaster; his wife is so resentful of his lack of family involvement that she no longer speaks to him. His daughter refused to wish him happy Father's Day. "You're not a father," she said. Alternately harsh and remote at work, this fictional entrepreneur has been asked by one senior executive at Arrowhead to stay away from the analysts. So he spends a lot of time surfing the Internet, looking at real estate in far-flung places, and haunting web sites about missing persons, wondering what became of his younger sister, who ran away from home at age 14. What is wrong with Norman, and how can he fix it? In R00211 and R00213, commentators Edward M. Hallowell, Scott Neely, Jean Hollands and Manfred F.R. Kets de Vries offer advice on this fictional case study.

Direct foreign investment in Russia was only 1% of GDP in 1999, and Russian industry was only half as productive in that year as in 1992. Not surprisingly, the prevailing opinion is that privatization has only aggravated Russia's economic problems, and that foreign firms should avoid investing in Russia for the time being. This case study argues that, on the contrary, Russian companies can be successfully integrated within a multinational organization. It shows that an Anglo-Saxon-style revolutionary change process is not always the best way to proceed in Eastern European organizations; that the commonly accepted goals of rapid change, employee empowerment and a flatter hierarchy are not necessarily appropriate in these organizations in the short-term, moreover that even the definitions of trust, strategy and leadership can differ according to cultural context. The challenge lies in understanding the complexities the lingering influence of the Soviet planned central economy - as well as the Russian culture and management systems.

Supplement to case IN1056. Direct foreign investment in Russia was only 1% of GDP in 1999, and Russian industry was only half as productive in that year as in 1992. Not surprisingly, the prevailing opinion is that privatization has only aggravated Russia's economic problems, and that foreign firms should avoid investing in Russia for the time being. This case study argues that, on the contrary, Russian companies can be successfully integrated within a multinational organization. It shows that an Anglo-Saxon-style revolutionary change process is not always the best way to proceed in Eastern European organizations; that the commonly accepted goals of rapid change, employee empowerment and a flatter hierarchy are not necessarily appropriate in these organizations in the short-term, moreover that even the definitions of trust, strategy and leadership can differ according to cultural context. The challenge lies in understanding the complexities the lingering influence of the Soviet planned central economy - as well as the Russian culture and management systems.

Supplements the (A) case.

Merrill Lynch, a full-service brokerage firm with $1.5 trillion in client assets, is under attack from both discount and electronic brokerage firms. It responds with Integrated Choice, a suite of products designed to capture clients from the do-it-yourself investor who doesn't want to use a broker to clients who want to rely completely on a broker. The strategy is high risk and requires a sea change from the company.