GenCorp, a Connecticut-based paper-goods manufacturer, has long supported employee-organized network groups. Its social support group for African-Americans, in fact, has been a particular success, having provided black employees with opportunities to further enhance their careers and helped the company retain top talent, meet its EEO goals, and gain favorable publicity. So when Alice Lawrence, a top accountant at GenCorp, called general manager Bill Thompson about the Christian network group being organized in one of the company's southern plants, Bill hardly flinched. After all, the Christian group was being organized by Russell Kramer, one of the company's most effective plant managers. What could be the problem there? But a couple of years ago, Alice noted, Russell had sent around a companywide letter that talked about the sinful nature of homosexuality. And that letter has made her and other gay and lesbian employees terribly uneasy. To complicate matters, the issue of "Christian rights" in the workplace was being widely discussed on radio talk shows, and several books on the topic had recently been published. An employee had even called the new region's head of human resources to get clarification on the topic. Up until now, GenCorp hadn't placed a lot of restrictions on network groups. But the emergence of a religious group was raising new questions for GenCorp's managers: Should the company accept religious groups or try to stop them? What policy, if any, should GenCorp adopt toward these network groups? In 99405 and 99405Z, Laura Nash, Maureen A. Scully, Gregory Poole, Jr., Jacquelyn Gates, and Kim I. Millis comment on this fictional case study.
GenCorp, a Connecticut-based paper-goods manufacturer, has long supported employee-organized network groups. Its social support group for African-Americans, in fact, has been a particular success, having provided black employees with opportunities to further enhance their careers and helped the company retain top talent, meet its EEO goals, and gain favorable publicity. So when Alice Lawrence, a top accountant at GenCorp, called general manager Bill Thompson about the Christian network group being organized in one of the company's southern plants, Bill hardly flinched. After all, the Christian group was being organized by Russell Kramer, one of the company's most effective plant managers. What could be the problem there? But a couple of years ago, Alice noted, Russell had sent around a companywide letter that talked about the sinful nature of homosexuality. And that letter has made her and other gay and lesbian employees terribly uneasy. To complicate matters, the issue of "Christian rights" in the workplace was being widely discussed on radio talk shows, and several books on the topic had recently been published. An employee had even called the new region's head of human resources to get clarification on the topic. Up until now, GenCorp hadn't placed a lot of restrictions on network groups. But the emergence of a religious group was raising new questions for GenCorp's managers: Should the company accept religious groups or try to stop them? What policy, if any, should GenCorp adopt toward these network groups? In 99405 and 99405Z, Laura Nash, Maureen A. Scully, Gregory Poole, Jr., Jacquelyn Gates, and Kim I. Millis comment on this fictional case study.
GenCorp, a Connecticut-based paper-goods manufacturer, has long supported employee-organized network groups. Its social support group for African-Americans, in fact, has been a particular success, having provided black employees with opportunities to further enhance their careers and helped the company retain top talent, meet its EEO goals, and gain favorable publicity. So when Alice Lawrence, a top accountant at GenCorp, called general manager Bill Thompson about the Christian network group being organized in one of the company's southern plants, Bill hardly flinched. After all, the Christian group was being organized by Russell Kramer, one of the company's most effective plant managers. What could be the problem there? But a couple of years ago, Alice noted, Russell had sent around a companywide letter that talked about the sinful nature of homosexuality. And that letter has made her and other gay and lesbian employees terribly uneasy. To complicate matters, the issue of "Christian rights" in the workplace was being widely discussed on radio talk shows, and several books on the topic had recently been published. An employee had even called the new region's head of human resources to get clarification on the topic. Up until now, GenCorp hadn't placed a lot of restrictions on network groups. But the emergence of a religious group was raising new questions for GenCorp's managers: Should the company accept religious groups or try to stop them? What policy, if any, should GenCorp adopt toward these network groups? In 99405 and 99405Z, commentators Laura Nash, Maureen A. Scully, Gregory Poole, Jr., Jacquelyn Gates, and Kim I. Mills offer advice on this fictional case.
You've watched them comfort colleagues, defuse tense situations, and take the heat from tough bosses. You've seen them step in to ease the pain during layoffs and change programs. Who are they? The authors call them toxic handlers--managers who voluntarily shoulder the sadness, frustration, bitterness, and anger of others so that high-quality work continues to get done. Toxic handlers are not new. They are probably as old as organizations themselves. But there has never been a systematic study of the role they play in business. In this article, the authors introduce the role of toxic handlers, explaining what they do and why. Managing the pain of others is hard work. Toxic handlers save organizations from self-destructing, but they often pay a high price--emotionally, professionally, and sometimes physically. Some toxic handlers experience burnout; others suffer far worse consequences, such as ulcers and heart attacks. The authors contend that these unsung corporate heroes have strategic importance in today's business environment. Effective pain management can--and does--contribute to the bottom line. No company can afford to let talented employees burn out. Nor can it afford to have a reputation as an unhappy place to work. The authors offer practical advice for managers and organizations about how to support toxic handlers--before a crisis strikes. The role of toxic handler needs to be given the attention it deserves for everyone's benefit, because the health of employees is a key element in the long-term competitiveness of companies and of society.
Financial experts in the West suggest that diversified business groups--or affiliated companies under one parent--in emerging markets should break up. Dismantling these mammoth conglomerates could reduce the debt and inefficiencies that some of them incur; that logic is based on the success that companies in advanced economies had when they unbundled their assets in the 1980s. But the authors argue that breaking up business groups such as the Korean chaebol and India's Tata Group is premature. Emerging economies lack a soft infrastructure--the banks, business schools, corporate governance processes, and so on that are the foundation of economic growth. And building such an infrastructure takes time. Many business groups in emerging markets make up for the absence or weakness of market intermediaries by filling in themselves. For instance, they're venture capitalists when they use funds from one business group affiliate to fund a new one. They're labor market substitutes when business-group headquarters creates management training programs based on the knowledge and experience of managers across several business affiliates. Instead of breaking up the conglomerates now, governments should start the long-term development of market institutions for finance, labor, and goods and services. In the meantime, business groups should strive to improve the way they substitute for those market institutions. The authors suggest several Western business tools and models that business groups can use to boost their role as market intermediaries and to prepare for the eventual development of those institutions.
The debate on business and the environment has typically been framed in simple yes-or-no terms: "Does it pay to be green?" But the environment, like other business issues, requires a more complex approach--one that demands more than such all-or-nothing thinking. Managers need to ask instead, "Under what circumstances do particular kinds of environmental investments deliver returns to shareholders?" This article presents five approaches that managers can take to identify those circumstances and integrate the environment into their business thinking. These approaches will enable companies with the right industry structure, competitive position, and managerial skills to reconcile their responsibility to shareholders with the pressure to be faithful stewards of the earth's resources. Some companies can distance themselves from competitors by differentiating their products and commanding higher prices for them. Others may be able to "manage" their competitors by imposing a set of private regulations or by helping to shape the rules written by government officials. Still others may be able to cut costs and help the environment simultaneously. Almost all can learn to improve their management of risk and thus reduce the outlays associated with accidents, lawsuits, and boycotts. And some companies may even be able to make systemic changes that will redefine competition in their markets. All five approaches can help managers bring the environment down to earth. And that means bringing the environment back into the fold of business problems and determining when it really pays to be green.
At a time when other areas of business are undergoing dramatic improvements in productivity, marketing seems to be getting more expensive and less effective. Marketing has seen no great advances since the advent of brand management and network television after World War II. Reviewer Peter Sealey looks for solutions in three new books. Competing on Value, by Stan Maklan and Simon Knox, advises companies to look beyond specific products and provide value by enlisting the entire organization in satisfying consumer needs. Radical Marketing, by Sam Hill and Glenn Rifkin, tells how niche companies such as Boston Beer won share in competitive markets by carefully studying their customers and bringing their own passions to bear. While these two books offer real improvements to marketing, they don't offer a conceptual breakthrough that enables companies to get beyond the limitations of brand management. Seth Godin's Permission Marketing, by contrast, tells marketers to replace basic brand strategies with full-fledged dialogues with consumers. For Godin, the Internet is tailor-made to host such dialogues; it allows marketers to integrate all their interactions with customers into one medium and permits companies to discover and exploit the individual interests of the target audience. Sealey agrees that the Internet offers the technology for innovation in marketing, but he goes further than Godin, saying that the Internet will lead companies all the way to customer-driven marketing. Customers will actively engage companies and aggressively seek information, allowing marketers to drastically reduce their often wasted efforts to capture consumer attention.
One of the most common business phenomena is also one of the most perplexing: when successful companies face big changes, they often fail to respond effectively. Many assume that the problem is paralysis, but the real problem, according to Donald Sull, is active inertia--an organization's tendency to persist in established patterns of behavior. Most leading businesses owe their prosperity to a fresh competitive formula--a distinctive combination of strategies, relationships, processes, and values that sets them apart from the crowd. But when changes occur in a company's markets, the formula that brought success instead brings failure. Stuck in the modes of thinking and working that have been successful in the past, market leaders simply accelerate all their tried-and-true activities. In attempting to dig themselves out of a hole, they just deepen it. In particular, four things happen: strategic frames become blinders; processes harden into routines; relationships become shackles; and values turn into dogmas. To illustrate his point, the author draws on examples of pairs of industry leaders, like Goodyear and Firestone, whose fates diverged when they were forced to respond to dramatic changes in the tire industry. In addition to diagnosing the problem, Sull offers practical advice for avoiding active inertia. Rather than rushing to ask, "What should we do?" managers should pause to ask, "What hinders us?" That question focuses attention on the proper things: the strategic frames, processes, relationships, and values that can subvert action by channeling it in the wrong direction.
What makes for success in high-tech markets? Many managers believe it's offering products with the best performance at the lowest price. Yet most would also acknowledge that price and performance are just the ante to get into the game, that they don't make the difference between a successful high-tech venture and an unsuccessful one. One factor that can make the difference, the authors argue, is brand management. The problem is, most high-tech managers think of branding only as an advertising campaign or a slogan. Developing and maintaining a strong brand in the fullest sense requires much more--it's conceiving of a promise of value for customers and then ensuring that the promise is kept. The Gateway Computer brand, for example, is a promise of friendly service that's backed by efficient help lines and effective order and service fulfillment. Building a powerful brand requires fives steps. The first two steps involve determining the tangible characteristics of the offerings that carry the brand name and the benefits the customers accrue from those benefits. In the remaining steps, high-tech managers consider the psychological or emotional benefits of the products; what "value" means to a typical loyal customer; and what, ultimately, is the essential nature and character of the brand over time. Like the Apple brand--which has been consistently synonymous with easy-to-use, reliable computers--and the IBM brand--which promises value built on its long tradition of superior service and support--a successful brand commands enduring premium profits that can help a high-tech company get off the price-performance roller coaster.
What does cyberspace mean for physical retail space? Has on-line shopping changed the fundamentals of retailing? And how should managers evaluate new in-store technologies? In this article, the heads of Marks and Spencer, Neiman Marcus, and Karstadt join two distinguished academics to look at what's in store for the bricks-and-mortar store. There's no doubt that new technologies have made retailing more complicated and more competitive. Using the Web, for example, consumers can conceivably sidestep their corner store and patronize shops across the country or around the world. Eventually, they might forsake retailers altogether, shopping directly from manufacturers. By the same token, though, managers can use technology to magnify the benefits of their location--using Web sites to show, for example, the retail topography of a local town and to highlight when stores that sell particular products will be open. And new in-store technologies promise managers--and customers--increased efficiency and more knowledgeable service. It's too early to predict how these new technologies will play out. But the contributors suggest that the fundamentals of retailing really haven't changed. Whether they know it or not, consumers still weigh the same factors when determining where to shop: scope of product assortment, price, convenience, service, and ambiance. The Internet has just added another layer of urgency to an already established agenda--forcing managers to examine their priorities in newly creative ways.
The dramatic reduction in crime in New York City during the 1990s grabbed the attention of the U.S. and the world, seeming to provide evidence that new policy and management approaches could make an enormous difference for the better. This case tells the story of key management decisions that the New York Police Department itself credits with the successful attack on the city's crime rate. Specifically, it describes the approach of Police Chief William Bratton in assembling a core, reform-oriented management team and the development of a computerized crime tracking system used as the foundation for the targeting of police manpower. The epilogue raises the dramatic question of whether the goal of minimizing the misuse of force by police officers is also amenable to the measurement techniques successfully employed to the activity of criminals. This case, in addition to the questions it raises, provides a powerful telling of one of the most successful public sector management initiatives of recent times. HKS case number 1530.0.
The dramatic reduction in crime in New York City during the 1990s grabbed the attention of the U.S. and the world, seeming to provide evidence that new policy and management approaches could make an enormous difference for the better. The main case tells the story of key management decisions that the New York Police Department itself credits with the successful attack on the city's crime rate. This epilogue raises the dramatic question of whether the goal of minimizing the misuse of force by police officers is also amenable to the measurement techniques successfully employed to the activity of criminals. HKS case number 1530.1.
Local firms can compete with transnational firms if their actions are firmly based in the local culture, and if they move from local strengths while being equipped with an in-depth understanding of global production and consumption dynamics. Three domains where local firms can offer alternatives to standard global products are products grounded in local culture, information goods, and products for similar local conditions and the poor worldwide. Local firms must develop an innovative perspective, a global and local vision, self-crafted rather than transferred and imitated marketing skills and practices, partnerships and alliances, and a supportive political environment. Such firms can successfully travel on their alternative road within the global arena.
Buzz Hargrove, national president of the Canadian Auto Workers, needs to find a way to secure an agreement from a negotiated contract with de Havilland, Inc. Local union leaders feel the deal is not good enough, but Hargrove is convinced management will close the plant down otherwise.
The Euro-Arab Management School is an academic institution established by the European Union and the Arab League. The school is a "virtual organization": it does not operate bricks and mortar classrooms. Instead, programs are offered in an innovative manner that combines web-based learning with local tutoring. The case deals with the concept of management of a virtual organization, and introduces some of the benefits and challenges of virtual organizations. Also deals with issues of the future of education in the age of the Internet.
A small manufacturer of car wash facilities has been unable to develop management systems because of rapid growth. Now size dictates the need for such systems because the current personal management style is proving inadequate.
Six years after dropping out of college to focus on his own business reselling PCs and preformatting PC hard disks, Michael Dell had grown his company's annual sales to more than $500 million. Dell Computer earned a reputation for selling quality products. Describes Dell's unique "direct" approach to producing, selling, and distributing computer equipment. It contains a side-by-side comparison with Compaq before its acquisition by Hewlett-Packard (HP).