Bed Bath & Beyond Inc. (BBBY) was founded in 1971 and focused on retailing items for customers’ “home and heart” life events, such as weddings, births, and moves. By the end of 2017, the company had over 1,530 stores distributed in the United States, Puerto Rico, and Canada, but its third-quarter earnings results revealed a 50 per cent year-over-year decline in net profits and a 45 per cent decline in stock price compared to the beginning of the year. BBBY was facing a steady decrease in physical store sales even as digital sales showed growth. BBBY was trying to catch up to competitors with digital initiatives, gain and retain customers through discount and membership programs, and keep a close control on costs, but the question remained: How could BBBY stay relevant and competitive in the long term?

In 2015, Dietmar Hopp, owner of Germany's Bundesliga football team TSG Hoffenheim and co-founder of the global enterprise software company SAP, was considering how to ensure long-term sustainability and competitiveness for TSG Hoffenheim. While historically a small team from bottom rungs of the league, TSG Hoffenheim, with revenues of €60 million to €70 million, reached the top division of the Bundesliga in the 2008-2009 season thanks to a deliberate strategy focused on enhanced scouting, strong youth programs, and innovative technology and analytics that improved player development. In 2014 Hopp, who had personally invested €300 million in the club, built a "footbonaut," an automated training environment that collected data on players' skills and strengths. The tool, one of three in the world, helped scouts and coaches better assess and develop each player. Yet some managers felt the technology was a distraction, an investment too expensive for a team that was not yet cash-flow positive. The team finished the 2014-2015 season in eighth place, below the top division, and Hopp wondered whether the focus on technology and analytics was the right strategy to grow the club. He wondered if the "moneyball" approach-when a smaller team competed with wealthier teams by using statistical analysis to buy undervalued assets and sell overvalued assets-could work in football and if investments in technology could lead the team to financial independence.

Bed Bath & Beyond Inc. (BBBY) was founded in 1971 and focused on retailing items for customers' "home and heart" life events, such as weddings, births, and moves. By the end of 2017, the company had over 1,530 stores distributed in the United States, Puerto Rico, and Canada, but its third-quarter earnings results revealed a 50 per cent year-over-year decline in net profits and a 45 per cent decline in stock price compared to the beginning of the year. BBBY was facing a steady decrease in physical store sales even as digital sales showed growth. BBBY was trying to catch up to competitors with digital initiatives, gain and retain customers through discount and membership programs, and keep a close control on costs, but the question remained: How could BBBY stay relevant and competitive in the long term?

This case illustrates how Vontobel, a mid-size Swiss private bank successfully built out its multi-issuer platform for Structured Products (SPs). The case starts by describing the industry of SPs, the market for SPs in Switzerland, and on Vontobel building its know-how in SPs. As a result, deritrade® Single-Issuer Platform (SIP) was launched in 2010. The platform helped gain operational efficiency, relieve employees from doing manual operations and thus allow scarce resources to focus on the core businesses. The bank then gained experience in the market with its SIP. Once the SIP delivered its full power and the SP market stagnated, Vontobel considered opening its platform to its competitors to become a Multi-Issuer Platform (MIP). Yet, there were numerous challenges faced by the company with this decision: cannibalization, convincing competitors to join, pricing, and governance.

The case discusses the strategy of Pantheon, a UK-based fund of funds investing in private equity. Client demands and preferences had changed in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis and Pantheon had to adapt its business model to accommodate requests for new asset classes and customized portfolios. The challenge was to keep an eye on the fee structure, as clients also put pressure on the costs. Pantheon had extended its offer into infrastructure, real assets, and private debt, and had found a way to offer customized portfolio solutions at an acceptable cost level, but the very long-term nature of private asset classes was making it difficult to assess the success of this strategic turnaround.

This note provides essential information on funding sources and valuation topics facing deep technology startups-ventures that are capital-intensive, with high technical and market uncertainty, and require long gestation periods. Both dilutive and non-dilutive sources of investment are described, along with empirical examples and figures.

The chief executive officer of RenY Corporation (RenY) based in Hong Kong, had just established the Ghana Investment Fund Limited (GIF) as a subsidiary of RenY in Ghana. GIF aimed to invest in the entrepreneurial ideas of university graduates in Ghana under a model that brought together the intellectual capital of the graduates, e-commerce, and investment capital under an umbrella of mentoring and collaboration. Access to Ghanaian government contracts to provide products and services was an important aspect of the CEO's sustainable development plans for low income communities, but he was faced with ethical issues on the way government business was done in Ghana-to be successful in gaining some of these contracts, extra payments were required. He had to decide if his investment was going to result in nothing or if there was a way to move forward.

The chief executive officer of RenY Corporation (RenY) based in Hong Kong, had just established the Ghana Investment Fund Limited (GIF) as a subsidiary of RenY in Ghana. GIF aimed to invest in the entrepreneurial ideas of university graduates in Ghana under a model that brought together the intellectual capital of the graduates, e-commerce, and investment capital under an umbrella of mentoring and collaboration. Access to Ghanaian government contracts to provide products and services was an important aspect of the CEO’s sustainable development plans for low income communities, but he was faced with ethical issues on the way government business was done in Ghana—to be successful in gaining some of these contracts, extra payments were required. He had to decide if his investment was going to result in nothing or if there was a way to move forward.

The chief financial officer (CFO) of the Richard Ivey School of Business (Ivey) is reflecting on the state of the school. Ivey's MBA program was just beginning its inaugural year in the new 12-month format at the Spencer Leadership Centre (Spencer), and all signs pointed to a successful start. However, it was becoming obvious to the CFO that the Executive Education programs at Ivey would face some serious capacity constraints, given the resulting reduction in available space in the building. The CFO was considering the need for a $7 million expansion to Spencer to ensure that Ivey would be able to continue its number one position in the executive education market in Canada.

Student spreadsheet to case UV6041

Set in 2019, the case describes the challenge Starbucks faces from Luckin coffee, a local start up in China. Having entered China in 1999, Starbucks was the undisputed leader with more than 70% market share and 3600 cafes by 2018. The brand's success was rooted in its core proposition of providing consumers a 'third place', an escape from both home and the work place, to relax and indulge themselves. While China/Asia Pacific was Starbucks' fastest growing market, the company faced a setback in the region in 2018. There was a decline in its third quarter sales, total number of transactions for the year, and the annual operating income. Starbucks' sudden downturn in the region could be attributed to the threat to its third place positioning by Luckin. Launched in November 2017, Luckin grew to more than 2,300 stores in just 17 months. Unlike Starbucks, it offered lower prices and the convenience of having coffee anywhere - at home, the work place or a café. Its mobile app-linked order and cashless payment platform, and a store pick-up and delivery model appealed to the country's digitally savvy millennials. Over 2018-2019, the company successfully raised US$550 million, and in May 2019, came out with its IPO. By the end of 2019, Luckin aimed to open a total of 4,850 stores to surpass Starbucks' planned network of 4,200 stores. The sudden rise of Luckin raises serious questions to engage students. What should Starbucks do in order to maintain its dominance in China? Should it emulate Luckin and work towards building a stronger and wider delivery channel, or should it continue to pursue its premium priced experiential retail strategy? And, would Luckin's cash burn business model that includes heavy discounting, aggressive advertising and a rapid store expansion fail or succeed eventually?

Spreadsheet supplement for case 520031.

In 2007, California-based Pannacotta Development had built iPort 12 near two active New Jersey shipping ports for $122 million. Now in 2011, with only one tenant, the property was losing $2.7 million at the operating level, and the project's $76.5 million construction loan was in default. The lender, Bank of America (BofA), had taken control of the property and decided to sell the buildings. The transaction market was at a standstill and BofA knew iPort 12 would certainly sell for less than the loan balance. KTR, one of only a few buyer prospects, was under contract to purchase the project for $53 million-less than half of Pannacotta $122 million cost. It was a heady time for KTR. The fully integrated real estate private equity fund manager specializing in industrial property was sitting on $375 million of uninvested capital from KTR's $700 million second fund, a 2008-vintage vehicle whose investment period was due to expire at the end of 2011. On the heels of the financial crisis, KTR's 2009 and 2010 investments were priced to deliver relatively safe 13 percent IRRs, with potential upside if the market recovered. But the investment market had begun to shift in late 2010. Prices for well-located, leased properties had firmed as the capital markets recovered. In sharp contrast, the market for properties with substantial vacancy was an entirely different story as leasing activity remained depressed. As debt service shortfalls mounted, lenders became impatient, seized control and began selling the distressed collateral for defaulted loans. Buying these properties meant considerably greater risk than KTR's 2009 and 2010 acquisitions. But, with more risk came the prospect of 20 percent or higher IRRs.

This note examines the corporate venture capital (CVC) industry, which has played an increasingly large role in the global innovation ecosystem, especially in Silicon Valley, over the last decade. The contents of the note include: a history of CVC beginning in the early 1960s; a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the industry in the late 2010s; a summary of the primary reasons why large corporations establish CVC arms; a framework for balancing strategic and financial value; profiles of three prominent CVC arms; a discussion of the challenges to realizing strategic value; and a process model to improve strategic collaboration.

Why do large, successful public companies and their CEOs suddenly weaken? To find out, we studied 45 large European and U.S. stumbles. Our case studies point to some common mistakes, such as undertaking unnecessarily risky growth strategies, treating compliance issues lightly, or poor cost control. These simple mistakes often had complex origins, such as attempts to meet conflicting objectives, weak board governance, or even executives being misled by positive experiences with ambitioius growth investments. We develop a checklist of "Emperor's Clothes" failings to help executives and boards lessen the risk of the worst stumbles.

This article explores solutions-driven innovation within an emerging market context, specifically in Africa, and how it can be utilized as a strategy by multinational enterprises to address institutional voids in these markets. Through a qualitative case study of Uber and their expansion into Africa, it demonstrates how solutions-driven innovation can create markets and mitigate distance and institutional voids in emerging market contexts. Uber created markets in Africa by developing a solution to consumers' unmet needs. Such solutions-driven innovation can create opportunities not only at the bottom but also in the middle of the economic pyramid. But to be successful in African markets requires being mindful of how institutional voids necessitate innovative solutions and potentially different value propositions.

This article provides guidance to social entrepreneurs and their funders as they seek to advance the enterprise from startup to scale. It focuses on the evolution of four social entrepreneurs and their decision-making paths as they attempt to scale their respective organizations. It then develops a framework to understand how social entrepreneurs alternate between pursuing activities to increase the scale of their work and delivering social impact in a "zig-zagging" process.

The paradox of openness is inherent to all platform ecosystems-the tension in enabling maximum openness to create joint innovation while guaranteeing value capturing for all actors. Governance mechanisms to solve this paradox are embedded into the technical architecture of the platform, addressing the dimensions of access, control, and incentives. Blockchain technology offers unique ways to design novel governance mechanisms through the standardization of interactions. However, the design of such an architecture requires careful consideration of the cost associated with it.