Josh Domingues had accomplished what countless young entrepreneurs long to achieve: founding a promising company that aspires to make the world a tangibly better place. Shocked to learn that international food waste cumulatively amounted to the world's third largest contributor to greenhouse gas emissions, he founded Flashfood in April of 2016 as part of a mission to drastically reduce food waste. A once-aspiring professional hockey player with no direct industry or technical experience, Domingues was hardly the top pick to solve the crisis. Nevertheless, he set his sights on grocery stores, figuring them as not only substantial contributors to the food waste epidemic, but also practical sites to produce value for consumers, particularly those most in need. His vision driving him relentlessly onward, by November of that year, he had a working app and had secured a pilot with a specialty grocer in Canada. By mid-November, however, the dream quickly seemed to be slipping into a nightmare. Only partway through the pilot, everything was already in chaos. A lack of in-store coordination, a yet-clunky app, and an increasingly irritated district manager spelled growing disaster for Domingues. Did he pull the trigger too early in launching this venture? Maybe he should have built a more solid financial nest egg? Should he really have done this alone, or was entrepreneurship more of a team sport? To make matters more complicated, Domingues was beginning to see interest-and actual financial investment-from other sectors. Maybe he should switch to the restaurant industry, or even partner with a farmer in developing a direct-to-consumer model, and jettison grocery altogether? Despite his inspirational vision, the road that lay ahead of Domingues remained fraught with uncertainty, if only his commitment could see him through.
Sept 2022. Corinne Avelines, SIBIUS's CEO, had received the news that the results of the first large-scale test of the company's first product had just been published. The test, conducted with children between 3 and 4 years old, validated their approach to early detection of autism. The technology was grounded in research showing that it was possible to identify many atypical cognitive behaviors by simply tracking eye movements in test patients. Digitrack dramatically simplified that process by digitizing it, allowing it to be used on any personal tablet device. The method was proposed as a screening, detection support and outcome tracking tool for a variety of clinical conditions, such as Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and Alzheimer (a form of dementia), among many cognitive conditions. But with the early test validation came business questions that kept Corinne extremely busy. Which market should they first target for this tool? Clearly, its versatility was an asset but each target market (healthcare professionals, concerned parents, etc.) required a differentiated approach. Speed was also of the essence to capture the huge potential in mental health, putting pressure on quickly finding the money to fund the rapid scale-up. High on her mind was also the potential conflict between monetizing the technology aggressively and making a massive difference in the lives of so many young patients and their families, i.e. how to balance the harsh realities of business and investors with those of mental health sufferers and society in general. Despite the promising field test results and numerous shows of support, she had little to show in terms of financial commitments at this point. It was time to revisit the assumptions and all features of the business model to ensure a future for this promising technology.
ECOALF, a Spanish fashion brand and sustainability pioneer, aimed to tackle the industry's challenges of excessive consumption and production. The brand's mission was to create timeless apparel exclusively from recycled and eco-responsible materials, matching the quality and design of the best non-recycled alternatives on the market. ECOALF sought to demonstrate that success extended far beyond the reaches of financial profitability, though expanding the business was sometimes at odds with the brand's ambitious goal of achieving net-zero carbon emissions. Could ECOALF reconcile purpose and profit?
Why dealing with turnover requires understanding how the traditional foundation of the workplace has been cracked by a seismic shift in the employer-employee relationship.
In 2019, the three Do sons, Nam, Hoa and Giang were shocked when their parents, Mr Hanh and Mdm Nghi, announced that they would hand over the joint running of their two companies-Dai Viet (DV) and Chien Thang (CT), to them. Since 1999, the Do family had consecutively founded and operated multiple sanitary- and porcelainware factory businesses that included Mdm Nghi's CT in 2002, and the family's DV Group, in 2013. CT and DV were vastly different in their employee base, organisational cultures, and operational processes. Unfortunately, given their proximity at work, cracks soon appeared when family disputes started affecting company operations, and vice versa. This disrupted decision-making at times and escalated to the point of shouting matches in front of employees. Eventually, by early 2019, Mr Hanh and Mdm Nghi were adamant that the brothers had to learn to work with one another to eventually merge and manage the two companies together. Giang however, being the only son who had worked with his father through complex financial and operational challenges, felt the crushing weight of responsibility bearing down on him. He wondered if the two companies ought to be merged despite the cultural, operational, and personal differences. Alternatively, he could hire professional consultants to help iron out the various issues in both companies. The most drastic measure would be to consider selling one of the companies. If so, which of the two companies should the family sell? Their parents had worked hard to grow DV and CT-what would they think if their sons sold off the embodiment of their legacy in the sanitary- and porcelainware industry?
In 2019, the three Do sons, Nam, Hoa and Giang were shocked when their parents, Mr Hanh and Mdm Nghi, announced that they would hand over the joint running of their two companies-Dai Viet (DV) and Chien Thang (CT), to them. Since 1999, the Do family had consecutively founded and operated multiple sanitary- and porcelainware factory businesses that included Mdm Nghi's CT in 2002, and the family's DV Group, in 2013. CT and DV were vastly different in their employee base, organisational cultures, and operational processes. Unfortunately, given their proximity at work, cracks soon appeared when family disputes started affecting company operations, and vice versa. This disrupted decision-making at times and escalated to the point of shouting matches in front of employees. Eventually, by early 2019, Mr Hanh and Mdm Nghi were adamant that the brothers had to learn to work with one another to eventually merge and manage the two companies together. Giang however, being the only son who had worked with his father through complex financial and operational challenges, felt the crushing weight of responsibility bearing down on him. He wondered if the two companies ought to be merged despite the cultural, operational, and personal differences. Alternatively, he could hire professional consultants to help iron out the various issues in both companies. The most drastic measure would be to consider selling one of the companies. If so, which of the two companies should the family sell? Their parents had worked hard to grow DV and CT-what would they think if their sons sold off the embodiment of their legacy in the sanitary- and porcelainware industry?
In 2019, the three Do sons, Nam, Hoa and Giang were shocked when their parents, Mr Hanh and Mdm Nghi, announced that they would hand over the joint running of their two companies-Dai Viet (DV) and Chien Thang (CT), to them. Since 1999, the Do family had consecutively founded and operated multiple sanitary- and porcelainware factory businesses that included Mdm Nghi's CT in 2002, and the family's DV Group, in 2013. CT and DV were vastly different in their employee base, organisational cultures, and operational processes. Unfortunately, given their proximity at work, cracks soon appeared when family disputes started affecting company operations, and vice versa. This disrupted decision-making at times and escalated to the point of shouting matches in front of employees. Eventually, by early 2019, Mr Hanh and Mdm Nghi were adamant that the brothers had to learn to work with one another to eventually merge and manage the two companies together. Giang however, being the only son who had worked with his father through complex financial and operational challenges, felt the crushing weight of responsibility bearing down on him. He wondered if the two companies ought to be merged despite the cultural, operational, and personal differences. Alternatively, he could hire professional consultants to help iron out the various issues in both companies. The most drastic measure would be to consider selling one of the companies. If so, which of the two companies should the family sell? Their parents had worked hard to grow DV and CT-what would they think if their sons sold off the embodiment of their legacy in the sanitary- and porcelainware industry?
In September 2023, John Ridding, CEO of the Financial Times, was considering the possible impact of Generative AI on the industry and his business. Having navigated successfully the seismic shift from print to digital, and reporting record results, the company was debating how to harness the power of generative AI. The case therefore is an example of a successful business confronting a new paradigm in its market which will impact many of the industry's power and profit dynamics, making it appropriate for teaching Porter's Five Forces, S-curves, corporate innovation, sources of value and competitive advantage.
ASML Holding NV (ASML) was a leading technology company headquartered in the Netherlands that specialized in the design and production of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment. It had a global presence, with operations in Asia, Europe, and North America. Its unique chip manufacturing technology was essential for the development of technology products from military equipment and laundry machines to the smartphones in peoples’ pockets. ASML produced complex and consequential products that were the foundations of the modern economy. Because of this, ASML played a significant role in global geopolitics and found itself in the middle of the West’s increasing efforts to control exports of semiconductor technology to China. In December 2022, a couple of months after the US government unilaterally restricted exports of chip technology to China, ASML faced a strategic crossroads: should it maximize company profits and ignore Western policy by engaging China, or should it weigh the pitfalls of ignoring the West’s political decision to block China from essential technology and disengage from its business with the People’s Republic of China?
In July 2021, a major supply-side crisis in Nigeria forced the Dangote Tomato Processing Co. Limited plant of Dangote Farming to operate at just 20 per cent of its production capacity. Since its inception in 2016, the plant was shut down several times due to a shortage of fresh tomatoes of the required quality. Although the Nigerian government supported Dangote Farming by pursuing pro-tomato and pro-tomato-paste policies, it was unable to operate its processing plant at full capacity, reduce per-unit cost, and improve profitability. Due to various constraints, several tomato processing plants had exited the Nigerian market in the past several years. In view of persistent supply-side problems and tough competition from low-priced Chinese tomato paste, Dangote Farming needed to decide about the continuity of its tomato processing plant in the Nigerian market. If it decided to remain in the market, then it needed to devise strategies that could make the plant competitive and profitable.
During VMware's 10-year DEI effort, leaders had to learn about making diversity gains last. VMware successfully increased the percentage of women employees globally and underrepresented employees in the U.S., at rates that stand out in the tech industry. Its journey has lessons on how to prioritize diversity, equity, and inclusion efforts that move the needle in sustainable ways for the long term. Learn from VMware's three best practices for culture change, including an expansive reverse-mentoring program.
This note presents an abridged description of balance of payments (BOP) and international investment position (IIP) data. It refers to data for Mexico, but given that there are worldwide standards for countries that report BOP and IIP, it provides guidance for understanding the data of just about any country.
This technical note provides an overview of accounting for investments in equity securities. It discusses passive investments and fair value accounting, investments resulting in significant influence and the equity method of accounting, and investments resulting in control and consolidation accounting. It provides examples of each of the three possible accounting approaches and walks through the appropriate accounting for each.
This technical note provides an overview of accounting for contingent liabilities. It outlines the decision process management uses to determine the financial statement implications of such liabilities. It provides an example and walks through the appropriate accounting steps.
This case, a follow-up to "WillowTree: Project Driven with a Product Mindset (A)" (UVA-S-0338), examines WillowTree, a digital products company that is navigating the implications of employees returning to the office after the COVID-19 pandemic lockdowns and also coping with increased employee desire to continue working from home. It explores the shift in client contract preferences toward more flexible, team-oriented models and the subsequent adjustments in team formation and collaboration strategies. The case also delves into how WillowTree measured and responded to client and team sentiment, and the effect transitioning back to office work had on WillowTree's employee satisfaction and organizational culture. The case highlights the resilience and adaptability of digital businesses that previously relied on colocated teams to develop and deliver its products. The managerial dilemma posed by this follow-up case is: What is an optimal policy for returning to work in the office? This decision will define the company's future.
How do venture capital and private equity funds actually work? This Technical Note covers the "when, who, and how" details: "When": fund length, extensions, and when investors can no longer initiate new investments. "Who": who is in the General Partner entity, the importance of the firm's Management Company (the owners of the firm), how fees and carried interest flows work, and the Limited Partners' Advisory Committee. "How": key person clauses, invested capital vs, committed capital, what happens when an investor defaults on its commitment, how multiples are calculated (MOIC vs. TVPI), the difference between realized and unrealized gains/losses, how fund distributions work, and the difference between distributed and residual value.
This case is about TPG Rise Climate, a $7.3 billion climate impact fund launched in 2021 by alternative asset manager TPG. Climate investing is a complex, capital-intensive endeavor; entering it has forced TPG to think and act differently. Relative to other funds, Rise Climate's investments take longer to mature, require far more capital, and are more vulnerable to swings in commodity markets and fickle government policies. Set in December 2023, the case finds TPG considering the future for Monolith, a Rise Climate portfolio company with significant impact potential but an uncertain business model.
This case examines the leadership challenges faced by Nathalie Wappler, the new CEO of SRF, a public media company that operates in the German-speaking part of Switzerland and is part of the largest media company in Switzerland, SRG. The study spans the period from 2019 to 2021, capturing the seismic shift in corporate identity, disruptive changes in consumer behavior and the emergence of new players in the media industry. The central challenge revolves around two key questions: First, how to lead a traditional media organization towards the future while also maintaining its core amid industry disruption? And second, what leadership qualities are required to effectively navigate such a dual transformation? Drawing on a combination of internal strategy documents, along with publicly available information, the case highlights the strategic journey undertaken by Nathalie amidst the turbulence of the Covid-19 pandemic, and the broader challenge of leadership in the face of an unpredictable black swan-style event that becomes the new normal. It reveals that strategic decision making should not be paralyzed by incomplete data and emphasizes the importance of a robust and bold strategy combined with the right type of leadership. The findings underscore that Nathalie's leadership style, characterized by collaboration and inclusivity, was complemented by a clear vision and strong conviction. This framework enabled her to effectively navigate the transformational journey and overcome potential short-term derailments. Unique and unfiltered access to Nathalie and the SRF organization provide valuable insights, enabling students to explore the complexities of decision making in dynamic industries. The case prompts students to consider when to persevere, adapt or pivot, and encourages self-reflection on their own leadership adaptability in similar challenging scenarios.