Netflix, a subscription-based movie and television show rental service, offered content to subscribers either via DVDs delivered by mail, or through Internet-based streaming. After splitting the two services, the company lost subscribers, and its stock price plummeted. Most observers were skeptical that Netflix could maintain its profit margins, given the increased cost of acquiring streamable content. However, Netflix not only reduced its cost per user but also increased its subscriber growth both in the United States and internationally. Were these moves sufficient to deliver the growth needed to support its rising stock price? Netflix also faced increased streaming costs because it used disproportionately more bandwidth than other streaming companies. Would these costs mean that the Netflix business model was no longer viable?<br><br>This is a follow-up case to Netflix, 9B09M093, which describes the company’s innovative business model of delivering DVDs by mail, and Netflix Inc.: The Second Act—Moving into Streaming, 9B16M080, which describes the after-effects of the dual-subscription model.
In April 2014, a research analyst for UR Investing, an investment group from the University of Regina, in Saskatchewan, Canada, was contemplating the decision of investing in a real estate investment trust (REIT). The decision had strategic implications because it would affect the risk profile of the student-managed fund. The analyst was given the task of evaluating the H&R REIT in particular and estimating a target price for H&R's units. He had to carefully weigh the benefits in terms of returns generated against the risk of taking a position in the REIT. He had to analyze the strategic value of investing in REITs and decide whether to recommend that UR Investing should buy H&R units.
In late 2011, Netflix was migrating from its highly successful business model of delivering DVDs by mail to streaming movies and other media content directly to subscribers' televisions. To be profitable, Netflix decided to charge more for receiving DVDs by mail-a service that its existing customers had come to expect as a minor add-on to their original subscription arrangement. This charge led to a huge backlash: subscribers defected and Netflix's stock price dropped. Netflix faced the dilemma of remaining profitable in the video streaming business while paying much more for content and dealing with competition that had been absent in its DVD-by-mail business model. The company was at a crossroads; the path it chose would affect its future. Should it return to combining the two services or continue with two separate services and live with the consequences?
Netflix, a subscription-based movie and television show rental service, offered content to subscribers either via DVDs delivered by mail, or through Internet-based streaming. After splitting the two services, the company lost subscribers, and its stock price plummeted. Most observers were skeptical that Netflix could maintain its profit margins, given the increased cost of acquiring streamable content. However, Netflix not only reduced its cost per user but also increased its subscriber growth both in the United States and internationally. Were these moves sufficient to deliver the growth needed to support its rising stock price? Netflix also faced increased streaming costs because it used disproportionately more bandwidth than other streaming companies. Would these costs mean that the Netflix business model was no longer viable? This is a follow-up case to "Netflix," which describes the company's innovative business model of delivering DVDs by mail, and "Netflix Inc.: The Second Act-Moving into Streaming," which describes the after-effects of the dual-subscription model.
Infinity Life Insurance Company was a joint venture between two Indian public sector banks and a U.K.-based insurance firm. The company began its operations in November 2009, as the youngest entrant in the life insurance market in India. Within three years of launching operations, it ranked among the top 10 private firms for new business premiums. When the joint venture project started, the senior leadership group identified numerous challenges and various strategies to address those challenges (detailed in this case). The company connected its basic business strategies to a set of human resource strategies, which were then applied through various human resource processes. With the Indian government focusing on further liberalization in the insurance sector, the joint venture needed to be ready for the next leap. Which processes should it continue, and which needed to be changed?
In May 2015, the chief executive officer (CEO) of the Valspar Corporation (Valspar) contacted the CEO of an industry competitor to discuss a potential strategic combination of the two companies. As discussions continued, Valspar's board and senior management realized that an alternative strategic collaboration might be more beneficial, so Valspar then contacted the CEO of the second-largest comparable firm in the industry, Sherwin-Williams, which had previously expressed an interest in a business combination with Valspar. Valspar was awaiting a "compelling and pre-emptive" offer from Sherwin-Williams on an "accelerated timetable." However, several questions remained. What maximum price could be justified in a bidding contest? What was the probability that antitrust regulators would eventually block the deal, resulting in a waste of time and resources to structure a deal that would later collapse? Could the negotiating teams for Valspar and Sherwin-Williams structure the merger agreement to allow for a potential consent decree?
In October 2014, the chief executive officer (CEO) of a high-end, invite-only digital branding firm was contemplating which (if any) web analytics service the company should offer to its clients. The CEO knew that in order to justify the high price his firm charged its executive and celebrity clientele, all ancillary services like web analytics reporting would have to be just as extravagant and just as functional as the core product-branded website design. With three web analytics options on the table, all with relatively similar characteristics yet vastly different price points, the firm had to identify the differentiated advantages of each option.
The Haifei Bus Company (Haifei), the leader in bus manufacturing in China, specialized in research and development, production, and sales of passenger buses. In 2010, Haifei's general manager was concerned with the business process re-engineering project the company had launched in 2009. The goal of this project was to transform Haifei's standardized production mode to one of mass customization. The new mode would deliver a competitive advantage for Haifei. However, the vice-general manager in charge of the project failed to create any improvement in the company's performance. Instead, he had managed to intensify the existing internal conflicts within the company. The resulting decrease in production output, production inefficiencies, shrinking market share, and deteriorating financial position meant the general manager had to find a solution to deal with his vice-general manager's performance. He was also responsible for assisting the various departments such as sales, procurement, logistics, and technology during the re-engineering process. How would the general manager direct Haifei, the former bus-industry leader, back to a position of prominence?
In 2016, Deutsche Telekom's CEO Tim Hottges was steering the 69 billion euro telecom incumbent in new directions and seeking to disrupt the industry from within. The company's tagline was "Life is For Sharing." Its goal was to be Europe's leading digital communication services company that was most trusted by consumers and business customers for safely sharing content. Hottges wanted to achieve this by having the best network, the best service, the best products, and the best customer experience. The company also aimed to be the preferred provider for business customers. A major part of Deutsche Telekom's strategy involved building up the company's core business-its network-by increasing infrastructure investment 20 percent. Hottges described this as his "big bet," saying the network was the basis for everything the company did. Even as it built out the network, an ongoing challenge was finding the right software talent to support the growing software IT components of the network infrastructure. With that in mind, Deutsche Telekom was also developing capabilities on top of network connectivity, such as security, device management, privacy, and global reach capability. While focusing its innovation on advanced network capabilities, Deutsche Telekom was shifting resources away from efforts to internally innovate in competition with Internet-based players. Instead, it was now intent on winning by partnering with companies like Microsoft, Spotify, and BMW to bring new capabilities, innovations, and services to customers. European and German regulations created significant constraints, and external competition remained fierce from both telecommunications companies and so-called "Over the Top" companies such as Google, Facebook, and WhatsApp. These companies had diverted billions of dollars away from traditional telecommunications companies, enabled by telco companies' infrastructures. To counter that, Deutsche Telekom needed to strongly align strategy and execution.
Sondologics, a manufacturer of video, audio, and gaming accessories products, was experiencing pricing and distribution problems in its channels. Numerous retailers were complaining about unfair price competition from unauthorized retailers, i.e., gray marketers, on standalone websites or Amazon's Marketplace, offering discounts of up to 30% off list price. The company estimated that about 10% of its retail volume in the United States was being generated by unauthorized retailers. Compounding the problem, gray marketers and authorized retailers alike were selling at below-list prices, which violated the Sondologics MAP (minimum advertised pricing) policy. Sondologics was considering numerous initiatives to address the MAP and gray-market problems, including retaining a third-party service to monitor pricing and distribution in the channel. Students are asked to develop recommendations that would promote sales while protecting the name-brand image and price points of Sondologics' products.
Infinity Life Insurance Company was a joint venture between two Indian public sector banks and a U.K.-based insurance firm. The company began its operations in November 2009, as the youngest entrant in the life insurance market in India. Within three years of launching operations, it ranked among the top 10 private firms for new business premiums. When the joint venture project started, the senior leadership group identified numerous challenges and various strategies to address those challenges (detailed in this case). The company connected its basic business strategies to a set of human resource strategies, which were then applied through various human resource processes (detailed in case B). With the Indian government focusing on further liberalization in the insurance sector, the joint venture needed to be ready for the next leap. Which processes should it continue, and which needed to be changed?
In October 2014, the chief executive officer (CEO) of a high-end, invite-only digital branding firm was contemplating which (if any) web analytics service the company should offer to its clients. The CEO knew that in order to justify the high price his firm charged its executive and celebrity clientele, all ancillary services like web analytics reporting would have to be just as extravagant and just as functional as the core product—branded website design. With three web analytics options on the table, all with relatively similar characteristics yet vastly different price points, the firm had to identify the differentiated advantages of each option.
In May 2015, the chief executive officer (CEO) of the Valspar Corporation (Valspar) contacted the CEO of an industry competitor to discuss a potential strategic combination of the two companies. As discussions continued, Valspar’s board and senior management realized that an alternative strategic collaboration might be more beneficial, so Valspar then contacted the CEO of the second-largest comparable firm in the industry, Sherwin-Williams, which had previously expressed an interest in a business combination with Valspar. Valspar was awaiting a “compelling and pre-emptive” offer from Sherwin-Williams on an “accelerated timetable.” However, several questions remained. What maximum price could be justified in a bidding contest? What was the probability that antitrust regulators would eventually block the deal, resulting in a waste of time and resources to structure a deal that would later collapse? Could the negotiating teams for Valspar and Sherwin-Williams structure the merger agreement to allow for a potential consent decree?
After a year at AW Ltd., a family-owned Indian pharmaceutical company, a change management agent was disillusioned about her ability to add value to the organization or gain buy-in for her change initiative. Although she was adept at information collection, data analysis, and using tools for organizational intervention, she had failed to account for softer issues of change management in terms of people management, handling inertia, breaking power centres, and building influence. Management of group inclusion processes were crucial to build buy-in and a sense of urgency to enact change. Why exactly had her change management process gone so badly? Should she continue at the firm and, if so, what should she do differently?
The case explores the attempt of Shervin Pishevar, a prominent Silicon Valley investor, to shepherd hyperloop, a futuristic pod-in-tube transportation technology, from concept to transformative reality via Hyperloop One and Sherpa Capital, both companies he co-founded. The case outlines the technology-first brought to widespread attention by Tesla and SpaceX executive Elon Musk-then follows Pishevar as he builds a team, develops prototypes, recruits investors and partners, and navigates the many obstacles in pursuit of this "moonshot." Students are presented wih historical parallels and precedents that may illuminate certain aspects of the challenge.
While extant research has studied the motivations of individualistic security compliance, this study explains what motivates employees to share security advice and troubleshoot with others. We argue that such findings are crucial for the development of people-centric security workplaces, where desirable security behaviors are disseminated amongst the employees. In this research, we applied network analysis techniques to perform two tasks. First, we explored the structural patterns of employees' sharing of security advice and troubleshooting. Second, we evaluated the effects of security climate perceptions, perceived accountability, and personal attributes on those sharing activities. While the sharing network was found to be thin and sparse, perceptions of direct a supervisor's security practices and accountability for security tasks can increase sharing. Age, seniority, and tenure-as well as having the same gender and department membership-can also motivate sharing. In contrast, security climate perceptions of coworkers and top management's security practices were found to discourage sharing. Our practical recommendations focus on the strategies to maximize security engagement in the workplace. Potential ideas for future research are also discussed in detail. Most importantly, we hope to offer this research as the foundation for future network studies in the behavioral security field.