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For 30 years, Mazda Motor Corporation (Mazda) partnered with Ford Motor Company (Ford), helping Ford in small-car engineering and lean manufacturing in exchange for finance and marketing know-how; however, this alliance was terminated due to the global financial crisis in 2008. In 2015, Mazda entered into another long-term partnership to share technologies and cope with cost pressures—this time with Toyota Motor Corporation (Toyota). According to its 2016 Structural Reform Plan, Mazda aimed to achieve a global sales volume of 1.65 million units, an operating income ratio of at least 7 per cent, an equity ratio of at least 45 per cent, and a dividend payout ratio of at least 20 per cent by 2019. Given the highly competitive domestic and global automotive markets, to what extent could the partnership with Toyota and the Structural Reform Plan allow Mazda to achieve these goals? Would Mazda need to make any changes to its competitive strategies to keep the company driving forward?

On April 1, 2016, fashion house Yves Saint Laurent (YSL) announced the departure of its creative director who had been responsible for successfully reviving the struggling YSL brand since 2012. Three days after this surprising departure, the company announced that its next creative director would be a relatively inexperienced, 36-year-old designer. After decades of leadership turmoil and financial instability at YSL, the incoming creative director was facing increasing pressure from stakeholders to build off the success that his predecessor had achieved. The global luxury fashion industry had become increasingly competitive, with multiple brands competing for the industry’s estimated value of €265 billion in 2017. Had YSL made the right decision in selecting this young director? To help YSL remain one of the top brands in the fashion industry, should the new director implement a strategy that builds upon the successful foundation created by his predecessor, or should he develop new strategies?

On April 1, 2016, fashion house Yves Saint Laurent (YSL) announced the departure of its creative director who had been responsible for successfully reviving the struggling YSL brand since 2012. Three days after this surprising departure, the company announced that its next creative director would be a relatively inexperienced, 36-year-old designer. After decades of leadership turmoil and financial instability at YSL, the incoming creative director was facing increasing pressure from stakeholders to build off the success that his predecessor had achieved. The global luxury fashion industry had become increasingly competitive, with multiple brands competing for the industry's estimated value of €265 billion in 2017. Had YSL made the right decision in selecting this young director? To help YSL remain one of the top brands in the fashion industry, should the new director implement a strategy that builds upon the successful foundation created by his predecessor, or should he develop new strategies?

For 30 years, Mazda Motor Corporation (Mazda) partnered with Ford Motor Company (Ford), helping Ford in small-car engineering and lean manufacturing in exchange for finance and marketing know-how; however, this alliance was terminated due to the global financial crisis in 2008. In 2015, Mazda entered into another long-term partnership to share technologies and cope with cost pressures-this time with Toyota Motor Corporation (Toyota). According to its 2016 Structural Reform Plan, Mazda aimed to achieve a global sales volume of 1.65 million units, an operating income ratio of at least 7 per cent, an equity ratio of at least 45 per cent, and a dividend payout ratio of at least 20 per cent by 2019. Given the highly competitive domestic and global automotive markets, to what extent could the partnership with Toyota and the Structural Reform Plan allow Mazda to achieve these goals? Would Mazda need to make any changes to its competitive strategies to keep the company driving forward?

Brooks Sports, Inc. (Brooks) strove to inspire and promote an active lifestyle through its innovative gear, enabling its customers to run longer, farther, and faster. The shoe company had endured a number of growths and declines in its 100 years of operations. Nearly bankrupt by 2000 because of its attempt to compete with diversified athletic brands, Brooks had finally found a strategy to compete in the sports market. Operating as an independent subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Brooks focused entirely on the niche running market, transforming into a brand that generated over $500 million in 2014. Now Brooks had set its sights on becoming a $1 billion brand by 2020. In the past, few companies had focused on the small but growing running industry; however, with the running market becoming increasingly competitive, would Brooks’s runner-focused strategy carry the company to its $1 billion goal by 2020, or would it be forced to shift back to a diversified approach as the running market became more crowded?

Brooks Sports, Inc. (Brooks) strove to inspire and promote an active lifestyle through its innovative gear, enabling its customers to run longer, farther, and faster. The shoe company had endured a number of growths and declines in its 100 years of operations. Nearly bankrupt by 2000 because of its attempt to compete with diversified athletic brands, Brooks had finally found a strategy to compete in the sports market. Operating as an independent subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Brooks focused entirely on the niche running market, transforming into a brand that generated over $500 million in 2014. Now Brooks had set its sights on becoming a $1 billion brand by 2020. In the past, few companies had focused on the small but growing running industry; however, with the running market becoming increasingly competitive, would Brooks's runner-focused strategy carry the company to its $1 billion goal by 2020, or would it be forced to shift back to a diversified approach as the running market became more crowded?

Facing a decline in the company’s core camera business as a result of the aggressive entry of smartphones, Canon identified the network security industry as a potential growth market, with expected revenues of US$23 billion by 2020. Canon opted to pursue this kind of growth potential outside its core competency by acquiring Milestone Systems in 2014 and Axis Communications in 2015. Canon paid a 50-per-cent premium to acquire Axis in a cash-only offer, while choosing to allow its two acquired companies to continue operating as independent entities. Should Canon have instead created a strategic alliance with these two companies? Would these acquisitions allow Canon to achieve synergies and secure its goal of $1 billion in sales from the network securities market by 2020?

Facing a decline in the company's core camera business as a result of the aggressive entry of smartphones, Canon identified the network security industry as a potential growth market, with expected revenues of US$23 billion by 2020. Canon opted to pursue this kind of growth potential outside its core competency by acquiring Milestone Systems in 2014 and Axis Communications in 2015. Canon paid a 50-per-cent premium to acquire Axis in a cash-only offer, while choosing to allow its two acquired companies to continue operating as independent entities. Should Canon have instead created a strategic alliance with these two companies? Would these acquisitions allow Canon to achieve synergies and secure its goal of $1 billion in sales from the network securities market by 2020?