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Linc Pen and Plastics Limited (LPPL) was a 40 year old Indian writing instruments company with a presence in over 50 countries through its sole brand Linc, a value brand that had a brand image of providing good quality products at a low price. Over the past year and half , LPPL had faced margin pressure due to a steep increase in the price of raw materials. In late 2019, Deepak Jalan, the managing director , decided not to disturb the brand equity of Linc but instead to move upmarket by developing a new ballpoint pen, Pentonic, for the premium segment. LPPL priced Pentonic ball pens at ₹10 -higher than Linc's original ball pens, which mostly sold at ₹5. The Pentonic ball pen was highly successful right from its launch, and within a year, Pentonic had become the company's second largest product in terms of volume and its largest product in terms of value. Pentonic had an independent identity in the market. In the last board meeting, Jalan had proposed building Pentonic as a separate brand for the premium market. The board had asked him to develop a detailed plan for developing the new product to target the premium market and balancing the marketing mix and positioning strategy for the specific target customers of the two brands, Linc and Pentonic.

Linc Pen and Plastics Limited (LPPL) was a 40 year old Indian writing instruments company with a presence in over 50 countries through its sole brand Linc, a value brand that had a brand image of providing good quality products at a low price. Over the past year and half , LPPL had faced margin pressure due to a steep increase in the price of raw materials. In late 2019, Deepak Jalan, the managing director , decided not to disturb the brand equity of Linc but instead to move upmarket by developing a new ballpoint pen, Pentonic, for the premium segment. LPPL priced Pentonic ball pens at ₹10 —higher than Linc’s original ball pens, which mostly sold at ₹5. The Pentonic ball pen was highly successful right from its launch, and within a year, Pentonic had become the company’s second largest product in terms of volume and its largest product in terms of value. Pentonic had an independent identity in the market. In the last board meeting, Jalan had proposed building Pentonic as a separate brand for the premium market. The board had asked him to develop a detailed plan for developing the new product to target the premium market and balancing the marketing mix and positioning strategy for the specific target customers of the two brands, Linc and Pentonic.

Spencer's Retail, a fast-moving consumer goods retail chain in India, had been perceived as an expensive retailer exclusively for high-end consumers. A new sector head took over in 2013 and shifted the store from a positioning statement of "Taste the World" to "Make Fine Living Affordable." Within five years, Spencer's was making a profit. However, traditional grocery stores continued to dominate the Indian retail scene and were more heavily frequented by Indian shoppers. To maintain a sustainable profit, Spencer's had to expand the business by opening more retail outlets and increasing same-store sales growth by increasing footfalls and basket size. What store format and combination of private label and national label products would help Spencer's reach this goal?

Wow! Momo Foods Private Limited (Wow! Momo), a quick-service restaurant (QSR) chain, was a Kolkata-based start-up that sold a variety of momos, a Tibetan food. The restaurant's specialty was a pan-fried variety of momos prepared to suit the Indian palate. In late 2018, the founders were reviewing the company's financials and considering how they could improve the company's growth. Their goal of becoming a widely recognized brand, both nationally and internationally, seemed elusive. How could Wow! Momo make momos a front-line fast food like pizza and burgers? Should they create a niche market, or should they seek to make Wow! Momo a mainstream fast food? And, ultimately, how could they first make Wow! Momo a national brand alongside other leading multinationals in India before expanding the business internationally?

Wow! Momo Foods Private Limited (Wow! Momo), a quick-service restaurant (QSR) chain, was a Kolkata-based start-up that sold a variety of momos, a Tibetan food. The restaurant’s specialty was a pan-fried variety of momos prepared to suit the Indian palate. In late 2018, the founders were reviewing the company’s financials and considering how they could improve the company’s growth. Their goal of becoming a widely recognized brand, both nationally and internationally, seemed elusive. How could Wow! Momo make momos a front-line fast food like pizza and burgers? Should they create a niche market, or should they seek to make Wow! Momo a mainstream fast food? And, ultimately, how could they first make Wow! Momo a national brand alongside other leading multinationals in India before expanding the business internationally?

Spencer’s Retail, a fast-moving consumer goods retail chain in India, had been perceived as an expensive retailer exclusively for high-end consumers. A new sector head took over in 2013 and shifted the store from a positioning statement of “Taste the World” to “Make Fine Living Affordable.” Within five years, Spencer’s was making a profit. However, traditional grocery stores continued to dominate the Indian retail scene and were more heavily frequented by Indian shoppers. To maintain a sustainable profit, Spencer’s had to expand the business by opening more retail outlets and increasing same-store sales growth by increasing footfalls and basket size. What store format and combination of private label and national label products would help Spencer’s reach this goal?

In mid-2019, the managing director of Switz Foods Pvt. Ltd. (SFPL), which owned the Mio Amore bakery brand, faced the dilemma of how to tackle its competition. Under a franchise agreement from 1989–2014, the company had manufactured and sold cakes and other food products in Eastern India under the Monginis brand name. Due to the managing director’s innovative and emotion-centric market positioning, Monginis quickly became the number one bakery brand in Eastern India. In 2015, however, the franchise licence was discontinued with a condition that, for a period of three years, Monginis would not enter the territories where SFPL had held the Monginis franchise. In 2015, SFPL created the new bakery brand, Mio Amore. In 2019, the Monginis brand re-entered the East Indian market. The managing director’s dilemma was how to sustain Mio Amore’s leadership position, while countering the competition from a former brand.

In mid-2019, the managing director of Switz Foods Pvt. Ltd. (SFPL), which owned the Mio Amore bakery brand, faced the dilemma of how to tackle its competition. Under a franchise agreement from 1989-2014, the company had manufactured and sold cakes and other food products in Eastern India under the Monginis brand name. Due to the managing director's innovative and emotion-centric market positioning, Monginis quickly became the number one bakery brand in Eastern India. In 2015, however, the franchise licence was discontinued with a condition that, for a period of three years, Monginis would not enter the territories where SFPL had held the Monginis franchise. In 2015, SFPL created the new bakery brand, Mio Amore. In 2019, the Monginis brand re-entered the East Indian market. The managing director's dilemma was how to sustain Mio Amore's leadership position, while countering the competition from a former brand.

The director of Edible Agro Products Limited (EAPL) was reviewing the production figures for Gujarat Til-2, a variety of white sesame that EAPL had introduced to West Bengal in 2008. He had hoped to bring about a revolution in sesame production with this superior new variety and to create higher value for West Bengal farmers and for EAPL. However, his plan had yet to achieve the outcomes he had anticipated. The year 2010 was the third consecutive year in which EAPL had received less than 20 per cent of the expected quantity of harvested produce. Should he quit sesame production and focus only on the oil trading business? Should EAPL change its communications policy/strategy for promoting the value of white sesame to farmers who are not formally educated? How should he address the growing concerns of the farmers? How can he prevent malpractice among vendors and farmers, such as selling the harvested produce to other traders at a higher price? Should he change the pricing policy?

The director of Edible Agro Products Limited (EAPL) was reviewing the production figures for Gujarat Til-2, a variety of white sesame that EAPL had introduced to West Bengal in 2008. He had hoped to bring about a revolution in sesame production with this superior new variety and to create higher value for West Bengal farmers and for EAPL. However, his plan had yet to achieve the outcomes he had anticipated. The year 2010 was the third consecutive year in which EAPL had received less than 20 per cent of the expected quantity of harvested produce. Should he quit sesame production and focus only on the oil trading business? Should EAPL change its communications policy/strategy for promoting the value of white sesame to farmers who are not formally educated? How should he address the growing concerns of the farmers? How can he prevent malpractice among vendors and farmers, such as selling the harvested produce to other traders at a higher price? Should he change the pricing policy?

This case examines the business strategies available to an Indian company, Indraprastha Cold Storage Ltd. (IPCSL). It has made substantial investments in upgrading its existing cold storage to differentiate itself from the competition based on the premise that by providing superior product quality, it could charge a premium for its value added cold storage service. However, competitors lowered their rates in an attempt to capture even more customers, and IPCSL was concerned about the long-term viability of the business. It must decide on a course of action, taking into consideration the constraints of growing, transporting, storing and selling fruit in India; the asymmetry in price information available to growers and commission agents in the market, coupled with the old-fashioned way of doing business through open and closed auctions; and the costs and benefits of vertical integration between grower and IPCSL.

This case examines the business strategies available to an Indian company, Indraprastha Cold Storage Ltd. (IPCSL). It has made substantial investments in upgrading its existing cold storage to differentiate itself from the competition based on the premise that by providing superior product quality, it could charge a premium for its value added cold storage service. However, competitors lowered their rates in an attempt to capture even more customers, and IPCSL was concerned about the long-term viability of the business. It must decide on a course of action, taking into consideration the constraints of growing, transporting, storing and selling fruit in India; the asymmetry in price information available to growers and commission agents in the market, coupled with the old-fashioned way of doing business through open and closed auctions; and the costs and benefits of vertical integration between grower and IPCSL.<br><br>This case also includes a two-part video which instructors may share with the class. The first part shows the buzz of daily activities in New Subzi Mandi, Azadpur - including market exchanges by open and closed auctions. The second is an interview with Sanjay Aggarwal about the challenges IPCSL faced and his immediate reaction to the crisis. Please refer to the teaching note for details.

In an era of ever-changing technology, the challenge for a social entrepreneur is to cope with the fast pace of change. With a concern for the environment and energy conservation, the entrepreneur in this case became an entrepreneur with the development of a new product – a mechanical charger. His company, ideaForge, manufactured and sold two types of products: mechanical chargers and other conventional chargers such as bike chargers. The mechanical charger, an innovation of ideaForge, was a product that could produce electricity through mechanical operation. The sales of other conventional chargers were increasing, while the sales of mechanical chargers were decreasing.<br><br><br><br>The company faced two major challenges while running the business: how to market this innovative product to customers used to traditional mobile phone chargers, and whether the company should increase the product range or concentrate on existing products. The decision that had to be made was whether to sell only through distribution channels or through a sales force, or both. The young entrepreneur, along with his two cofounders, also had to make decisions on how to position and price their products in the market. With a changing market scenario, several initiatives and calculated risks would have to be taken if they wanted to develop new product offerings, such as laptop chargers and bicycle chargers, both of which would mean diversifying the business.

In an era of ever-changing technology, the challenge for a social entrepreneur is to cope with the fast pace of change. With a concern for the environment and energy conservation, the entrepreneur in this case became an entrepreneur with the development of a new product - a mechanical charger. His company, ideaForge, manufactured and sold two types of products: mechanical chargers and other conventional chargers such as bike chargers. The mechanical charger, an innovation of ideaForge, was a product that could produce electricity through mechanical operation. The sales of other conventional chargers were increasing, while the sales of mechanical chargers were decreasing. The company faced two major challenges while running the business: how to market this innovative product to customers used to traditional mobile phone chargers, and whether the company should increase the product range or concentrate on existing products. The decision that had to be made was whether to sell only through distribution channels or through a sales force, or both. The young entrepreneur, along with his two cofounders, also had to make decisions on how to position and price their products in the market. With a changing market scenario, several initiatives and calculated risks would have to be taken if they wanted to develop new product offerings, such as laptop chargers and bicycle chargers, both of which would mean diversifying the business.

Bihar State Milk Cooperative Federation (COMPFED) had been marketing its milk and milk-related products under the Sudha brand name in the Bihar and Jharkhand regions of India for three decades. It operated through six unions and two dairies to process the milk collected from nearly 4,000 village-level cooperatives. COMPFED appeared to have a competitive advantage for its supply of milk, since it maintained the largest network for milk procurement, which spanned a large area and was unmatched by its competitors. However, due to various environmental forces, the ability to procure an adequate supply had declined in the last two years, which negatively affected the profitability of the organization.<br><br><br><br>The marketing manager of COMPFED had been facing difficulty in serving the growing demand and maintaining profitability. Since he operated in an industry with high fixed costs, the declining supply of milk procurement meant lower sales. As a result, there was no opportunity to significantly lower operating costs to match the limited supply.<br><br><br><br>The marketing manager thought of two reasons in the external environment that contributed to this situation. First, a series of floods had caused damage to grazing land and livestock operations. Additionally, private players were disrupting the supply chain by offering short-term higher payments to some suppliers/farmers. These players did not face the same regulatory and hygiene guidelines that COMPFED did. The marketing manager’s options included two very different alternatives: trying to work with these agents or securing a process to minimize or eradicate their activities.

Bihar State Milk Cooperative Federation (COMPFED) had been marketing its milk and milk related products under the brand name of Sudha in the Bihar and Jharkhand regions of India for three decades. They operated through six unions and two dairies to process the milk collected from nearly 4,000 village level cooperatives. On the surface, COMPFED appeared to have a competitive advantage for its supply of milk since it maintained the largest network for milk procurement, which spanned a wide geography over these two regions and was unmatched by its competitors. However, due to various environmental forces, the ability to procure an adequate supply had diminished in the last two years, which negatively affected the overall profitability of the organization.The marketing manager of COMPFED had been facing a difficult challenge in serving the growing demand and maintaining profitability. Since he operated in an industry with high fixed costs, the declining supply of milk procurement meant lower sales. As a result, there was no opportunity to significantly lower operating costs to match the limited supply.The marketing manager thought of two reasons present in the external environment that contributed to this situation. First, a series of incessant floods had caused damages to grazing land and livestock operations in many of the villages that were the source for milk. Additionally, private players were disrupting the supply chain by offering short term higher payments to some suppliers/farmers on a case by case basis. These players did not face the same regulatory and hygienic guidelines that COMPFED did and operated outside the normal infrastructure. His options included two very different alternatives; trying to work with these agents or securing a process to minimize or eradicate their activities.

Vithal Kamat (CMD, Kamat Hotels India Ltd.) is a second generation entrepreneur who has taken the Kamat Hotels brand to new heights. A small restaurant chain was transformed into a full-fledged hospitality services group under his leadership. Kamat Hotels (India) Ltd. included five major verticals from five-star luxury hotels (The Orchid Ecotel) to economy restaurants (namely Kamat Restaurants) that catered to the different customer segments. Kamat had ambitious plans for the expansion of every vertical using alternative growth strategies. However, the recent economic slump had caused a sudden setback due to the fall in average room occupancy and competing room-tariff rates offered by other hotels. In such a tumultuous situation, Kamat planned to use the core competency of the hotel as an 'ecotel,' that is, an environment friendly hotel, to go in for corporate branding and lever its position in the market. The case illustrates the challenges faced by Kamat in extending the core competency of 'The Orchid' to its other verticals. The Orchid had performed better than the industry average until 2008. However, in 2009, the performance dipped, partly because of the economic recession. This prompted the board members of the company to decide on extending the core competency of the ecologically sustainable hotel into other verticals. However, this decision had to be considered carefully in the light of its impact on 'The Orchid' as well as on the other verticals. What are the challenges that will be faced while extending the core competency of 'ecoteling' to the other verticals? There were numerous related issues that needed to be addressed strategically as well as tactically, in order to maintain a balance between extending the core competencies across the verticals while extending the brand per se.

Vithal Kamat, chairman and managing director of Kamat Hotels India Ltd., was a second-generation entrepreneur who has taken the Kamat Hotels brand to new heights. Kamat Hotels included five major verticals, from five-star luxury hotels (The Orchid Ecotels) to economy restaurants (Kamat Restaurants) catering to different customer segments. Kamat had ambitious plans for the expansion of every vertical using alternative growth strategies. However, the recent economic slump had caused a sudden setback due to the fall in average room occupancy and competing room-tariff rates offered by other hotels. In such a tumultuous situation, Kamat planned to use the core competency of The Orchid as an “ecotel,” that is, an environmentally friendly hotel, to go in for corporate branding and leverage its position in the market.<br><br>The case illustrates the challenges faced by Kamat in extending the core competency of The Orchid to its other verticals. The Orchid had performed better than the industry average until 2008, but in 2009 its performance dipped, partly because of the economic recession. This prompted the company board members to decide on extending the core competency of the ecologically sustainable hotel into other verticals. However, this decision had to be considered carefully in light of its impact on The Orchid as well as on the other verticals. What were the challenges that would be faced while extending the core competency of “ecoteling” to the other verticals?

The case describes the dilemma faced by the senior vice-president of business development and strategy when deciding in 2006 whether UTV Software Communications Ltd. (UTV) should go ahead with a joint venture with Walt Disney Company (Disney) even if it meant selling Hungama TV, the leading children's channel in India, to Disney. UTV was one of the large media companies in India and had diversified interests, including TV content, movies, animation and new media content. Although UTV had opened operations in the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries two years before, its international presence was limited. The CEO of UTV wanted UTV's business to increase from Rs2 billion to Rs5 billion by 2008 and to Rs10 billion by 2010. This seemed possible if UTV went ahead with a strategic alliance with Disney. UTV anticipated that an alliance with Disney in India would help it increase its business in all other verticals globally. On the other hand, Disney, a large multinational, had several records of acquisition. The vice-president of UTV was concerned that Disney's interest in a strategic alliance could be part of a long-term plan to acquire the company and benefit from its profitable business. Since UTV had established itself in the Indian media industry over the last 15 years, it could collaborate with different companies through its various verticals, thereby reducing the threat of losing its identity.<br><br>The case achieves the following learning objectives: 1) to explore various possibilities of strategic alliances with multinationals in order to expand business when it means selling off one part of the business toa multinational; 2) to assess the costs and benefits associated with cross-border mergers involving acquisitions of one part of the business and alliances in another part; 3) to identify business opportunities while integrating with a foreign entity; 4) to come up with "win-win" strategies that encompass multiple stakeholders of a business.

In 2006, the senior vice-president of business development and strategy has to decide whether UTV Software Communications Ltd. (UTV) should go ahead with a joint venture with Walt Disney Company (Disney) even if it means selling Hungama TV, the leading children's channel in India, to Disney. UTV was a large media company in India and had diversified interests, including TV content, movies, animation and new media content. Although UTV had opened operations in the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries two years before, its international presence was limited. The CEO of UTV wanted UTV's business to increase from Rs2 billion to Rs5 billion by 2008 and to Rs10 billion by 2010. This seemed possible if UTV went ahead with a strategic alliance with Disney. UTV anticipated that an alliance with Disney in India would help it increase its business in all other verticals globally. On the other hand, Disney had a track record of acquisitions. The vice-president of UTV was concerned that Disney's interest in a strategic alliance could be part of a long-term plan to acquire the company. Since UTV had established itself in the Indian media industry over the last 15 years, it could collaborate with different companies through its various verticals, thereby reducing the threat of losing its identity.<br><br>