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It was supposed to be an amicable "merger of equals," an example of European togetherness, a synergistic deal that would create the world's second-largest consumer foods company out of two former competitors. But the marriage of entrepreneurial powerhouse Royal Biscuit and the conservative, family-owned Edeling GmbH is beginning to look overly ambitious. Integration planning is way behind schedule. Investors seem wary. But for Royal Biscuit HR head Michael Brighton, the most immediate problem is that he can't get his German counterpart, Dieter Wallach, to collaborate on a workable leadership development plan for the merged company's executives. And stockholders have been promised details of the new organizational structure, including a precise timetable, in less than a month. The CEO of the British company--and of the postmerger Royal Edeling--is furious. It's partly a culture clash, but the problems may run deeper than that. Commenting on the fictional case study in R0405A and R0405Z are Robert F. Bruner, the executive director of the Batten Institute at the University of Virginia's Darden Graduate School of Business Administration in Charlottesville; Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, the codirectors of the Center for Evolutionary Psychology at UC Santa Barbara; Michael Pragnell, the CEO and director of the board for the agribusiness firm Syngenta, based in Basel, Switzerland; and David Schweiger, the president of the Columbia, South Carolina-based management consulting firm Schweiger and Associates.

It was supposed to be an amicable "merger of equals," an example of European togetherness, a synergistic deal that would create the world's second-largest consumer foods company out of two former competitors. But the marriage of entrepreneurial powerhouse Royal Biscuit and the conservative, family-owned Edeling GmbH is beginning to look overly ambitious. Integration planning is way behind schedule. Investors seem wary. But for Royal Biscuit HR head Michael Brighton, the most immediate problem is that he can't get his German counterpart, Dieter Wallach, to collaborate on a workable leadership development plan for the merged company's executives. And stockholders have been promised details of the new organizational structure, including a precise timetable, in less than a month. The CEO of the British company--and of the postmerger Royal Edeling--is furious. It's partly a culture clash, but the problems may run deeper than that. Commenting on the fictional case study in R0405A and R0405Z are Robert F. Bruner, the executive director of the Batten Institute at the University of Virginia's Darden Graduate School of Business Administration in Charlottesville; Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, the codirectors of the Center for Evolutionary Psychology at UC Santa Barbara; Michael Pragnell, the CEO and director of the board for the agribusiness firm Syngenta, based in Basel, Switzerland; and David Schweiger, the president of the Columbia, South Carolina-based management consulting firm Schweiger and Associates.

It was supposed to be an amicable "merger of equals," an example of European togetherness, a synergistic deal that would create the world's second-largest consumer foods company out of two former competitors. But the marriage of entrepreneurial powerhouse Royal Biscuit and the conservative, family-owned Edeling GmbH is beginning to look overly ambitious. Integration planning is way behind schedule. Investors seem wary. But for Royal Biscuit HR head Michael Brighton, the most immediate problem is that he can't get his German counterpart, Dieter Wallach, to collaborate on a workable leadership development plan for the merged company's executives. And stockholders have been promised details of the new organizational structure, including a precise timetable, in less than a month. The CEO of the British company--and of the postmerger Royal Edeling--is furious. It's partly a culture clash, but the problems may run deeper than that. Commenting on the fictional case study are Robert F. Bruner, the executive director of the Batten Institute at the University of Virginia's Darden Graduate School of Business Administration in Charlottesville; Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, the codirectors of the Center for Evolutionary Psychology at the University of California, Santa Barbara; Michael Pragnell, the CEO and director of the board for the agribusiness firm Syngenta, based in Basel, Switzerland; and David Schweiger, the president of the Columbia, South Carolina-based management consulting firm Schweiger and Associates.

Diana Sullivan, CEO of Lenox Insurance, thought she had done her job when, after three years of hard work, she had delivered Lifexpress on time and on budget. A sophisticated computer-aided system, it enabled Lenox's 10,000-plus agents to do everything from establish a prospect's financial profile, to select the most appropriate products from the company's myriad policies, to generate all the paperwork needed to close a sale. But now Sullivan's boss, CFO Clay Fontana, seemed to be holding her accountable not only for the creation and implementation of the system but for realizing its business goals as well. And Lenox's CEO, James Bennett, appeared to concur. In this hypothetical case study, Sullivan and the other top executives at Lenox must decide who should be responsible for realizing the business goals of information technology projects. Should Sullivan have gone about the project in another way? Should Fontana and Bennett be playing more active roles? In 97308 and 97308Z, commentators James K. Sims, Thornton May, Richard Nolan, Robert A. Distefano, and John King offer advice on this fictional case study.

Diana Sullivan, CEO of Lenox Insurance, thought she had done her job when, after three years of hard work, she had delivered Lifexpress on time and on budget. A sophisticated computer-aided system, it enabled Lenox's 10,000-plus agents to do everything from establish a prospect's financial profile, to select the most appropriate products from the company's myriad policies, to generate all the paperwork needed to close a sale. But now Sullivan's boss, CFO Clay Fontana, seemed to be holding her accountable not only for the creation and implementation of the system but for realizing its business goals as well. And Lenox's CEO, James Bennett, appeared to concur. In this hypothetical case study, Sullivan and the other top executives at Lenox must decide who should be responsible for realizing the business goals of information technology projects. Should Sullivan have gone about the project in another way? Should Fontana and Bennett be playing more active roles? In 97308 and 97308Z, commentators James K. Sims, Thornton May, Richard Nolan, Robert A. Distefano, and John King offer advice on this fictional case study.

Diana Sullivan, CEO of Lenox Insurance, thought she had done her job when, after three years of hard work, she had delivered Lifexpress on time and on budget. A sophisticated computer-aided system, it enabled Lenox's 10,000-plus agents to do everything from establish a prospect's financial profile, to select the most appropriate products from the company's myriad policies, to generate all the paperwork needed to close a sale. But now Sullivan's boss, CFO Clay Fontana, seemed to be holding her accountable not only for the creation and implementation of the system but for realizing its business goals as well. And Lenox's CEO, James Bennett, appeared to concur. In this hypothetical case study, Sullivan and the other top executives at Lenox must decide who should be responsible for realizing the business goals of information technology projects. Should Sullivan have gone about the project in another way? Should Fontana and Bennett be playing more active roles? In 97308 and 97308Z, commentators James K. Sims, Thornton May, Richard Nolan, Robert A. Distefano, and John King offer advice on this fictional case study.