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CEOs face constant scrutiny over their compensation packages. This scrutiny has only intensified amid discussions of CEO-to-employee pay ratios and income inequality nationwide. CEO retirement packages are criticized as camouflage compensation used to award excessive compensation to CEOs and were, prior to 2006, less transparent than they are now. Thanks to the transparent disclosures now required by the SEC, we have a better understanding of the types and amounts of compensation owed to CEOs after they depart or retire, termed inside debt. I investigate whether all CEO inside debt components share similar incentive effects and offers some thoughts on how companies might structure these packages to be most effective. I discuss the structure and incentive effects of the two primary components of inside debt: deferred compensation and supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs). I explain why inside debt, particularly CEO SERPs, may actually help companies manage firm risk. Finally, I outline the best ways to structure inside debt so that it functions as a resource to manage firm risk and foster a long-term perspective rather than mirroring the incentive effect of equity, increasing risk, and encouraging a myopic focus.

From the WorldCom and Enron accounting debacles that triggered the demise of Arthur Andersen to Ernst & Young's 2013 and 2015 settlements claiming that its audits facilitated massive accounting fraud by financial services firm Lehman Brothers, large-scale financial scandals have led to increasing scrutiny of public auditors. Investors are justifiably eager to ascertain the quality of audits of public companies when making investment decisions. In the U.K., the reputation of the audit partner is recognized as a signal of audit quality, and as such, the names of the lead partner have been disclosed to the public since 2009. The U.S. standard of providing the auditing firm name without identifying the lead partner recently changed to match the U.K. and EU standard after much debate. As of May 2016, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board has adopted-and the Securities and Exchange Commission has approved-new regulations that will require the public disclosure of the individual audit partner responsible for each public company audit, as well as the identification of any additional accounting firms that contribute to the audit. This article examines the new rules in light of disclosure requirements imposed on other professionals, as well as international auditor disclosure requirements. The accounting profession has generally opposed the new disclosures, but this article suggests opportunities and benefits for the profession as a result of the changes, including the opportunity for audit partners to develop individual reputations for quality and specialization. In addition, this article makes recommendations for business managers, owners, and investors for making the best use of the information the new disclosures will provide.