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  • Silicon Valley Bank: The Role of Risk (Mis)Management

    On March 24, 2015, the chief executive officer of SVB Financial Group Inc., the parent company of Silicon Valley Bank, was testifying to a US Senate committee. His goal was to provide evidence in support of raising the threshold of US$50 billion in assets, for Silicon Valley Bank’s application for enhanced prudential standards under the Dodd-Frank Act. Silicon Valley Bank was above the threshold of $10 billion for some enhanced prudential standards, and close to the $50 billion cut-off for the full array of enhanced prudential standards. By the end of 2021, Silicon Valley Bank still fell below strict scrutiny from the enhanced prudential standards, despite having experienced rapid growth since the US Senate testimony. With the rapid growth of its deposits, the bank was facing a dilemma. Given the nearly zero rates on short-term bonds as of the end of 2021, should Silicon Valley Bank chase the higher yields provided by longer-term bonds and accept higher interest rate risk? What risk management practices should the bank follow? With its deposit base largely uninsured, would the bank’s risk exposure become an issue?
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  • Silicon Valley Bank: The Role of Risk (Mis)Management - Student Spreadsheet

    Spreadsheet to accompany product W34036.
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  • Silicon Valley Bank: The Role of Risk (Mis)Management

    On March 24, 2015, the chief executive officer of SVB Financial Group Inc., the parent company of Silicon Valley Bank, was testifying to a US Senate committee. His goal was to provide evidence in support of raising the threshold of US$50 billion in assets, for Silicon Valley Bank's application for enhanced prudential standards under the Dodd-Frank Act. Silicon Valley Bank was above the threshold of $10 billion for some enhanced prudential standards, and close to the $50 billion cut-off for the full array of enhanced prudential standards. By the end of 2021, Silicon Valley Bank still fell below strict scrutiny from the enhanced prudential standards, despite having experienced rapid growth since the US Senate testimony. With the rapid growth of its deposits, the bank was facing a dilemma. Given the nearly zero rates on short-term bonds as of the end of 2021, should Silicon Valley Bank chase the higher yields provided by longer-term bonds and accept higher interest rate risk? What risk management practices should the bank follow? With its deposit base largely uninsured, would the bank's risk exposure become an issue?
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  • Silicon Valley Bank: The Role of Risk (Mis)Management, Student Spreadsheet

    Spreadsheet Supplement for Case W34036.
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  • Emerging Markets Development Group: Bankruptcy and Restructuring in Partnerships

    <p align=”justify”>US-registered Emerging Markets Development Group (EMDG), a small but successful international consulting firm that provided development assistance in emerging and post-conflict regions, bet big on a project in Southeast Asia in 2008 that was financed by a Small Business Administration (SBA)-guaranteed loan issued by a local bank. The project failed, with catastrophic results. After seven years of attempting to dig themselves out of the hole, the principals were out of cash and needed to either significantly restructure the balance of EMDG’s outstanding loan or shut the firm down. Complicating the situation was the possibility that a former partner, who had left the firm over nine years before, might be held liable for the current debt.</p>
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  • Emerging Markets Development Group: Bankruptcy and Restructuring in Partnerships

    US-registered Emerging Markets Development Group (EMDG), a small but successful international consulting firm that provided development assistance in emerging and post-conflict regions, bet big on a project in Southeast Asia in 2008 that was financed by a Small Business Administration (SBA)-guaranteed loan issued by a local bank. The project failed, with catastrophic results. After seven years of attempting to dig themselves out of the hole, the principals were out of cash and needed to either significantly restructure the balance of EMDG's outstanding loan or shut the firm down. Complicating the situation was the possibility that a former partner, who had left the firm over nine years before, might be held liable for the current debt.
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  • Sarajevo Graduate School of Business - Spreadsheet A

    Spreadsheet A for teaching note product 8B10N17.
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  • Sarajevo Graduate School of Business - Spreadsheet B

    Spreadsheet B for teaching note product 8B10N17.
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  • Sarajevo Graduate School of Business

    In January 2008, the manager of Sarajevo Graduate School of Business (SGSB) was looking ahead to a set of meetings that would mean a new beginning or the end for the fledgling business school he had managed over the past couple years. SGSB provided U.S.-style MBA education in English in Sarajevo, Bosnia and served an ethnically diverse student population of young managers from across Bosnia and six other countries. These meetings would, he hoped, bring two new partner organizations into the school's leadership. He was contemplating the analyses he would need to prepare for the meetings.
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