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Due to health, environmental, and animal welfare concerns, increasing numbers of consumers have been switching to vegetarian, vegan, and flexitarian diets. This value migration in customer demand has driven consisten growth in the plant-based food market over the last 20 years, although at a slowing rate in 2022. Demand growth for plant-based products has provided an opportunity for startups and new ventures, as well as for legacy food producers in the United States. These companies entered the new plant-based food market using a variety of mechanisms including acquisition, organic growth, and partnerships. Powerful retailers such as Kroger, Walmart, and Whole Foods also entered the plant-based food market with private label brands. * In 2022, Kraft Heinz and NotCo announced a new joint venture (JV), The Kraft Heinz Not Company. Kraft Heinz in 2022 was the fifth largest food and beverage company in the world with a broadly diversified porduct portfolio. NotCo was a Chilean, plant-based, food-tech company that used artificial intelligence algorithms to produce plant-based food. The goal for the JV was to capitalize on the may strengths of Kraft Heinz including scale, product portfolio, commercialization know-ho and access to distribution channels, and on the unique leadership NotCo brought to the venture as a technology company in the food business. * The JV posed interesting challenges for Lucho Lopez-May, newCEO of The Kraft Heinz Not Company, LLC, as well as for the two separate companies Kraft Heinz and NotCo. How could the new JV best position to face the challenges of working with parent companies? Were there specific conflicts of interest that would need to be addressed early to manage different relationships and decisions across these organizations? Were the goals of the JV and the individual companies similar or different?

In mid-2020, Uber Technologies, Inc. (Uber) acquired Latin American-based mobile application Cornershop, which delivered online grocery purchases to the consumer’s home. The operation involved technology firms based on multisided platforms. Uber, which focused on the intermediation of passenger transport, had expanded to businesses such Uber Eats for the delivery of restaurant meals, while Cornershop’s focus was the purchase and delivery of supermarket products. Recently, Walmart had attempted to acquire Cornershop, but Mexico’s antitrust authorities would not authorize the acquisition. Uber’s acquisition of Cornershop involved important managerial challenges. What were the main sources of value? Should the two companies be managed separately or as joint units? Would Walmart have been a better fit for Cornershop? What was the best strategy to grow in this multisided business space?

In mid-2020, Uber Technologies, Inc. (Uber) acquired Latin American-based mobile application Cornershop, which delivered online grocery purchases to the consumer's home. The operation involved technology firms based on multisided platforms. Uber, which focused on the intermediation of passenger transport, had expanded to businesses such Uber Eats for the delivery of restaurant meals, while Cornershop's focus was the purchase and delivery of supermarket products. Recently, Walmart had attempted to acquire Cornershop, but Mexico's antitrust authorities would not authorize the acquisition. Uber's acquisition of Cornershop involved important managerial challenges. What were the main sources of value? Should the two companies be managed separately or as joint units? Would Walmart have been a better fit for Cornershop? What was the best strategy to grow in this multisided business space?

In 2020, Falabella, one of the largest Latin American multi-format and multi-country retailers, faced increasing competition from the online world. The growth of online giants posed significant challenges for Falabella's senior executives, who needed to decide how to allocate investments in this highly competitive environment. There were also growth opportunities in the brick-and-mortar business in many Latin American countries. Falabella needed to assess how to compete in the dual online and off-line world. The COVID-19 pandemic had created additional challenges for Falabella's management team, as most shopping malls and stores were obliged to close for a long period of time, and the lower off-line sales were not expected to be fully compensated by increasing online sales. Should Falabella's executives continue to focus on the historical strength of Falabella, fuelled by horizontal, vertical, and international expansion? Should they focus their efforts on the online business and divest some of their current business units.

In 2020, Falabella, one of the largest Latin American multi-format and multi-country retailers, faced increasing competition from the online world. The growth of online giants posed significant challenges for Falabella’s senior executives, who needed to decide how to allocate investments in this highly competitive environment. There were also growth opportunities in the brick-and-mortar business in many Latin American countries. Falabella needed to assess how to compete in the dual online and off-line world. The COVID-19 pandemic had created additional challenges for Falabella’s management team, as most shopping malls and stores were obliged to close for a long period of time, and the lower off-line sales were not expected to be fully compensated by increasing online sales. Should Falabella’s executives continue to focus on the historical strength of Falabella, fuelled by horizontal, vertical, and international expansion? Should they focus their efforts on the online business and divest some of their current business units.

In 2011, Chile's Undersecretary of Telecommunications, Jorge Atton, was considering adopting a different policy toward regulating competition in Internet services than previously applied to voice telephony. Atton headed Chile's telecommunications regulatory agency, SUBTEL. For the past two decades, SUBTEL had encouraged the emergence of competition in telephone services in part by forcing the incumbent telephone company to give new entrants to the industry access to its customers. SUBTEL had circulated for public comment consultation document that raised the possibility of imposing "open access" requirements on the providers of broadband Internet services. This case discusses the debate over open access in Chile. This case can be used with the accompanying teaching note (HKS 878). HKS Case Number 1955.0.

Trying to operate two business models at once often causes strategic failure. Yet LAN Airlines, a Chilean carrier, runs three models successfully. Casadesus-Masanell, of Harvard Business School, and Tarzijan, of the Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile, explore how LAN has integrated a full-service international passenger model with a premium air-cargo business model while separately operating a no-frills passenger model for domestic flights. LAN's multimodel success comes from recognizing the complementarity of its two high-end services and the distinct, or substitute, nature of its no-frills offering. LAN came to that insight by analyzing the major assets that the models share and the compatibility of the models' operational resources and capabilities. It recognized that the more the models have in common, the more likely they are to generate greater value together than apart; the less they share, the more likely they are to be best executed separately. Nevertheless, managing multiple models is a tall order. LAN has had to face greater complexity, broaden its organizational skills, increase the flexibility of its workforce, and make other investments. But by mastering three models, the company has built formidable advantages that are difficult for competitors to overcome. Its example has shown how, properly applied, the implementation of multiple business models is not a risk but rather a new tool for strategists.

Lan Airlines operates three distinct models: low-cost for domestic short-haul flights, full-service for international routes; and an international cargo business, the latter of which makes up 33 percent of Lan's overall revenues (markedly different from many U.S. legacy carriers which derive 3 to 4 percent of revenues from cargo). Since a change of ownership in 1994, Lan has grown steadily and quickly at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 19 percent from $318 million in revenues to $3.5 billion at the end of 2007. Lan is at an interesting point in history as the low-cost model was recently implemented. While early results have been strong, observers wonder if the airline can successfully manage three disparate business models.

This is Part B to the "Arauco: Forward Integration or Horizontal Expansion?" case. This short case looks at the company in late 2007 after it has decided to invest in a Brazilian joint venture involving forests, saw mills and a paper mill. The case acts as an epilogue and allows students to revisit the concept of forward integration into paper in the Brazilian context.

Looks at the different business models of two highly successful and profitable airlines: Chilean-based Lan Airlines and U.S.-based Southwest Airlines. Lan Airlines pursues a hub-to-spoke international full-service model where passenger and cargo operations are highly integrated. Southwest, on the other hand, is set up for a point-to-point, low-fare, "no frill's" service with a homogenous fleet. Designed for a course on the design of business models.

Celulosa Arauco is a major Chilean producer of market pulp and wood products. Owning over 1.2 million hectares of forest in Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, the company's key advantage is the ideal growing conditions in which the company's forests are located. As of early 2004, Arauco is the third largest producer of market pulp (pulp sold on the open market) and is considering increasing its capacity, tying it with Brazilian competitor Aracruz as the world's largest producer. The first phase of the project has been approved by the board of directors and includes a sawmill, plywood mill, and energy complex valued at $120 million. Now, Alejandro Perez, Arauco's president and CEO, is seeking approval for the second phase of the project, which would include the company's sixth market pulp plant at a cost of $1.2 billion. Perez's concerns about the volatility of market prices for the past three years led the company to diversify into wood products like panels, medium-density fiberboard, and other remanufactured wood products. These divisions are highly successful and currently account for approximately 50% of Arauco's revenues. Perez is debating whether the company and its shareholders would be better served by a forward integration into the paper business instead of increasing the company's capacity in market pulp.