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Spreadsheet to accompany product 9B20N018.

In late 2016, it had been three years since Blackstone Group Inc. (Blackstone) had completed its last public-to-private leveraged buyout (LBO), and it had US$45 billion of capital available for investment, called “dry powder.” Blackstone’s head of private equity (PE) blamed this public LBO drought on “historically high multiples of cash flow.” Blackstone submitted a preliminary offer to acquire a firm they had previously acquired 11 years earlier and exited in 2009. The banks committed to provide a senior credit facility, consisting of a seven-year Term Loan B, a revolver, and junk bonds; management provided forecasts of revenue and earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization. The four-week exclusivity period was set to expire, and previous bidders in a recent takeover battle could re-emerge. Blackstone had to determine a final offer based on their LBO model.

In late 2016, it had been three years since Blackstone Group Inc. (Blackstone) had completed its last public-to-private leveraged buyout (LBO), and it had US$45 billion of capital available for investment, called "dry powder." Blackstone's head of private equity (PE) blamed this public LBO drought on "historically high multiples of cash flow." Blackstone submitted a preliminary offer to acquire a firm they had previously acquired 11 years earlier and exited in 2009. The banks committed to provide a senior credit facility, consisting of a seven-year Term Loan B, a revolver, and junk bonds; management provided forecasts of revenue and earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization. The four-week exclusivity period was set to expire, and previous bidders in a recent takeover battle could re-emerge. Blackstone had to determine a final offer based on their LBO model.

Supplement for product 9B20N018.

B case to W20532

Student spreadsheet to case W20532

In August 2019, WeWork filed for an initial public offering; investors in its 14 venture capital rounds were anxious for an exit. Softbank had invested US$6 billion in WeWork, including US$2 billion in the Series H round that valued the firm at US$47 billion; consequently, it hoped for a positive reception from Wall Street. While WeWork had 100 per cent recent sales growth, its net income was US$1.9 billion, and it was on pace to spend over US$5 billion in 2019; it needed capital. WeWork's chief executive officer met with SoftBank in Tokyo to discuss a "dramatic reduction in its valuation." Should they proceed with the IPO, even if it required a reduction in its valuation, or should they cancel the IPO and pursue an additional round of private capital?

Student spreadsheet to case W20367

Spreadsheet to accompany product 9B20N015.

In August 2019, WeWork filed for an initial public offering; investors in its 14 venture capital rounds were anxious for an exit. Softbank had invested US$6 billion in WeWork, including US$2 billion in the Series H round that valued the firm at US$47 billion; consequently, it hoped for a positive reception from Wall Street. While WeWork had 100 per cent recent sales growth, its net income was US$1.9 billion, and it was on pace to spend over US$5 billion in 2019; it needed capital. WeWork’s chief executive officer met with SoftBank in Tokyo to discuss a “dramatic reduction in its valuation.” Should they proceed with the IPO, even if it required a reduction in its valuation, or should they cancel the IPO and pursue an additional round of private capital?

In 2014, mobile payment company Square, Inc., based in San Francisco, California, was one of an increasing number of venture capital financed firms with valuations above US$1 billion, which had become known as unicorns. By September 2014, the company had raised $371 million over five rounds of venture capital financing. Since the first funding round had been almost five years previous, it was possible that venture funding investors would be pushing for an exit. The firm considered an acquisition offer and an initial public offering, but it was apparent that neither option would yield its desired $6 billion exit value. With $139 million in cash on hand, Square, Inc., was on track to use $138 million of cash in 2014. It approached venture capital investors for a sixth round of financing. It was then up to the investors to determine if they could agree to suitable terms.

In 2014, mobile payment company Square, Inc., based in San Francisco, California, was one of an increasing number of venture capital financed firms with valuations above US$1 billion, which had become known as "unicorns." By September 2014, the company had raised $371 million over five rounds of venture capital financing. Since the first funding round had been almost five years previous, it was possible that venture funding investors would be pushing for an exit. The firm considered an acquisition offer and an initial public offering, but it was apparent that neither option would yield its desired $6 billion exit value. With $139 million in cash on hand, Square, Inc., was on track to use $138 million of cash in 2014. It approached venture capital investors for a sixth round of financing. It was then up to the investors to determine if they could agree to suitable terms.

In May 2015, the chief executive officer (CEO) of the Valspar Corporation (Valspar) contacted the CEO of an industry competitor to discuss a potential strategic combination of the two companies. As discussions continued, Valspar's board and senior management realized that an alternative strategic collaboration might be more beneficial, so Valspar then contacted the CEO of the second-largest comparable firm in the industry, Sherwin-Williams, which had previously expressed an interest in a business combination with Valspar. Valspar was awaiting a "compelling and pre-emptive" offer from Sherwin-Williams on an "accelerated timetable." However, several questions remained. What maximum price could be justified in a bidding contest? What was the probability that antitrust regulators would eventually block the deal, resulting in a waste of time and resources to structure a deal that would later collapse? Could the negotiating teams for Valspar and Sherwin-Williams structure the merger agreement to allow for a potential consent decree?

Student spreadsheet for product 9B16N063.

Student spreadsheet for case W16751.

In May 2015, the chief executive officer (CEO) of the Valspar Corporation (Valspar) contacted the CEO of an industry competitor to discuss a potential strategic combination of the two companies. As discussions continued, Valspar’s board and senior management realized that an alternative strategic collaboration might be more beneficial, so Valspar then contacted the CEO of the second-largest comparable firm in the industry, Sherwin-Williams, which had previously expressed an interest in a business combination with Valspar. Valspar was awaiting a “compelling and pre-emptive” offer from Sherwin-Williams on an “accelerated timetable.” However, several questions remained. What maximum price could be justified in a bidding contest? What was the probability that antitrust regulators would eventually block the deal, resulting in a waste of time and resources to structure a deal that would later collapse? Could the negotiating teams for Valspar and Sherwin-Williams structure the merger agreement to allow for a potential consent decree?