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Instructor Spreadsheet for product 8B17N023.

Student Spreadsheet for product 9B17N023.

In June 2012, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) sought to further financial inclusion in India by permitting non-bank corporate bodies to roll out “white-label” automated teller machine (WLA) networks. Unfortunately, most licensed operators soon found that the number of customers using the white-label machines was lower than anticipated, while the costs of installation, operation, and maintenance were higher than projected, and the revenues received from card-issuing agencies (i.e., banks) were inadequate to ensure viability of the business proposition. However, one operator, Tata Communications Payment Solutions Limited (TCPSL), rolled out its “Indicash” network very quickly, installing over 7,000 units in about 33 months, accounting for close to 60 per cent of all WLA installations by March 2016. Yet by June 2016, in what seemed like a reversal, TCPSL was put up for sale at an estimated valuation of between INR10–13.5 billion. In attracting potential buyers of the Indicash network, how could TCPSL leverage its accomplishments with the WLAs to make a sale? What would attract a strategic buyer to the WLAs?

Potatoes are grown across 130 countries and form the largest non-cereal food crop consumed in large per-capita measures in some of the Eastern European and South American countries. India is the world’s third-largest producer of the crop and is estimated to consume about 25 million tonnes each year. Calcutta-based Sumangal Industries Limited launched a high yield investment program under the banner of the Flexi-Potato Purchase Scheme. Market regulator, Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), took exception to the company’s collecting uncollateralized deposits from the members of the public without due registration, and issued prohibitive orders.<br><br>This case puts the facts underlying the offering in perspective and conducts a micro-economic analysis to assess the strengths of the business proposition. The statistical analyses reveal that the volatility and predictability of seasonal pricing patterns that the company seeks to exploit may not continue beyond the short-term. Further, the early success of the scheme is likely to attract entry into the segment, thereby squeezing arbitrage margins and enhancing business process costs. This case also lays out facts relating to exogenous influences on the local potato market and encourages policy makers to adequately inform potential investors as a means to empower them to make sound resource allocation decisions. The conclusions of the case could be applied beyond West Bengal, and beyond India, to other agricultural produce and pyramidal investment schemes, qualified by local conditions.

In August 2010, SKS Microfinance became India’s (and South Asia’s) first publicly traded microfinance institution with a stock exchange listing. A share in the company was offered at INR 985 and it commenced trading at INR 1,036, reaching INR 1,404 within a month. However, that was the extent of the good news as far as the company and its shareholders were concerned. Things began to unravel rapidly. The initial public offering of shares was seen as the initiation of a conflict between the interests of the company’s shareholders and the poor rural borrowers it was expected to serve. Further, the company fired an arguably successful chief executive officer due to “inter-personal issues” within days from the end of the post-listing 40-day silent period. Matters were aggravated when 30 women who happened to be microfinance borrowers committed suicide within a span of 45 days, 13 of whom were reported to have been SKS members. The provincial government in the state of Andhra Pradesh, the hub of microfinance activity in the country, brought out an ordinance that effectively curbed microfinance lending and recovery operations. By May 2011, the Reserve Bank of India, the country’s banking regulator, had issued a notification placing caps on interest rates and margins and specifying minimum tenures for relatively larger loan sizes. Was this the end of the microfinance movement in India?

Termination of WorldSpace India’s satellite radio operations in 2009 was part of the restructuring efforts of the Maryland, U.S.-based parent company that had filed for bankruptcy in October 2008. As of June 30, 2008, WorldSpace Inc. (later 1 WorldSpace) had listed debt of US$2.1 billion and assets of US$307.4 million and had sought bankruptcy protection to help repay its debts. The parent’s two regional satellites, AfriStar and AsiaStar, and related ground assets had been acquired by U.S.-based Liberty Media, which also owned 40 per cent of satellite radio service provider Sirius XM Radio. The termination of WorldSpace raised a series of questions regarding early-mover disadvantages, business ideas, and pricing strategy. Analysts further extended the arguments to draw parallels with the satellite telephone service provider Iridium to question strategic decisions relating to the service-hardware mix, service provision and pricing, power of complementary products, power of substitutes, and consumers’ willingness to pay for incremental choice.