We interpret the past--what we've experienced and what we've been told--to chart a course for the future. It seems like a reasonable approach, but it could be a mistake. The problem is that we view the past through filters that distort reality. One filter is the business environment, which focuses on outcomes rather than the processes that lead to them and celebrates successes while ignoring failures, thus making it hard for us to learn from mistakes. Another is our circle of advisers, who may censor the information they share with us. A third filter is our own limited reasoning abilities. We tend to focus on evidence that confirms our beliefs and gloss over information that contradicts them, and we read too much into our personal experience, which inevitably involves a small sample of incidents. We can base our decisions on a clearer view of the world if we study failures and near misses--especially the processes behind them; encourage all employees to pursue preventive measures instead of just solving problems; surround ourselves with people who will speak frankly; search for evidence that our hunches are wrong, and encourage employees, data scientists, and consultants to do the same; and broaden our perspective in order to give new meaning to our varied experiences.
When we make decisions, we make mistakes. We all know this from personal experience, of course. But in case we didn't, a stream of experimental evidence in recent years has documented the human penchant for error. This line of research is probably best known for its offshoot, behavioral economics. Its practitioners have played a major role in business, government, and financial markets. But that isn't the only useful way to think about making decisions. The academic arena alone contains two other distinct schools of thought, one of which has a formal name--decision analysis--and the other of which can be characterized as demonstrating that we humans aren't as dumb as we look. Each school of thought brings vital insights to bear. Managers need to understand when to make decisions formally, when to make them by the seat of their pants, and when to blend those approaches. This article briefly tells the story of where the three schools arose and how they have interacted, beginning with the explosion of interest in the field during and after World War II and continuing to the present day, when companies such as Chevron have hundreds of decision analysts on staff. Its aim is to make readers more-informed consumers of decision advice--which in turn should make them better decision makers.
Social entrepreneurship has emerged over the past several decades as a way to identify and bring about potentially transformative societal improvements. Ventures in this realm are usually intended to benefit economically marginalized segments of society that can't transform their prospects without help. But the endeavors should be financially sustainable, because there's no guarantee that subsidies from taxpayers or charitable givers will continue indefinitely. Grameen Bank is a famous example of a social venture that met both goals. In studying the winners of the Skoll Award for Social Entrepreneurship, the authors found that they all focus on changing two features of an existing system: the economic actors involved and the enabling technology applied. For example, the children's rights activist Kailash Satyarthi realized that reaching ethically concerned consumers through Rugmark (now GoodWeave International) could help foil exploitative labor brokers in India's carpet weaving industry. And through the Kiva platform, Matt Flannery and Jessica Jackley enabled small-scale lenders in wealthy countries to lend to small-scale borrowers in poor countries. Today GoodWeave operates globally, and Kiva is on track to facilitate more than $1 billion in microloans within the next couple of years.
With the help of technology, companies today sweep up huge amounts of customer data. But they tend to be opaque about the information they collect and often resell, which leaves their customers feeling uneasy. Though that practice may give firms an edge in the short term, in the long run it undermines consumers' trust, which in turn hurts competitiveness, say authors Morey, Forbath, and Schoop. In this article, the three share the results of a survey of 900 people across five countries, which looked at attitudes about data privacy and security. It examined what people knew about the information trails they leave online, which organizations they did--and did not--trust with their data, and which data they valued the most. The results show that the value consumers place on different data depends a lot on what it is and how it is used. In general, the perceived value rises as the data's breadth and sensitivity increases from basic, voluntarily shared information to detailed, predictive profiles that firms create through analytics, and as its uses shift from benefiting the consumer to benefiting the company. If data is used to improve a product, consumers generally feel the enhancement itself is a fair trade, but they expect more in return for data used to target marketing, and the most in return for data sold to third parties. To build trust, companies must be transparent about the data they gather and offer consumers appropriate value in exchange for it. Simple legal disclosures aren't enough, however; companies must actively educate their customers and incorporate fairness into their products and models from the start. Companies that get this will win consumers' goodwill and business and continued access to their data. Companies that don't will find themselves at a serious disadvantage, and maybe even shut out.
The author was Apple's second software "evangelist" and is now the chief evangelist for Canva, an online design firm. He believes that all managers can adopt the practice, with great benefit to their organizations and their careers. No matter what your company, it probably offers something valuable and differentiated and therefore worth evangelizing about: if not goods or services, then corporate values, cutting-edge accounting practices, or flexible work-at-home policies. Kawasaki outlines three ways to effectively evangelize: (1) Schmoozing. This requires you to get out of your office, ask questions, unveil your passions, follow up with people, e-mail effectively, make it easy to get in touch with you, and do favors. (2) Public speaking. You need to deliver quality content, omit the sales pitch, customize the speech for your audience, focus on entertaining your listeners, tell stories, circulate in the audience beforehand, control scheduling and venue when you can, and practice and speak all the time. (3) Social media. When posting you should offer value, be interesting, take chances, keep it brief, be a mensch, add drama, tempt with headlines, use hashtags, and stay active.
On November 15, 1996, Stanford's Board of Trustees and the University of California (UC) Board of Regents voted to merge their two academic medical centers; on November 1, 1997, the merger became official. However, less than two years later, in October 1999, the merger came to an abrupt end. Was the merger an ill-conceived "snakebit venture" or a reasonable response to the environmental and economic pressures of the time that fell apart in its execution? Would the same ills have befallen Stanford and UCSF regardless of the merger?
Mr. J, the Manager of the Health Department in District X, South Africa, was hopeful that he could bring increased resources and better health to the area. District X, one of about 50 districts in 9 provinces in South Africa, was a largely rural area saddled with high levels of poverty, poor infrastructure, and high mortality rates; medical needs were high but almost half of the positions in the health department were unfilled, and turnover among staff was high. In South Africa, there was a push to improve primary care and to decentralize management to local levels in order to respond to local needs more effectively, but the processes for planning, reporting and budgeting were extremely complex and did not seem to support that goal. Mr. J wondered what additional skills he needed in order to work the system, and was also thinking about how the system itself could be improved.
Dr. Laurie Gianturco ("Dr. G."), Chief of Radiology at Baystate Health and President of the private imaging practice Radiology & Imaging, Inc. ("R&I"), and her partner for this project, Suzanne Hendery, VP of Marketing & Communications at Baystate Health, considered their new assignment. With Baystate leadership's full executive sponsorship and support, but no additional budget, they were tasked with consolidating two competing practices-one operated by R&I, the other by Baystate Medical Center-to form a new breast services center under the Baystate umbrella. The consolidation would simplify redundant Baystate-affiliated breast services offerings, making the system less confusing for patients and providers while giving Baystate the opportunity to offer more patient-centered services as well as reducing its operating costs and boosting revenues. They knew it would be a complicated project, involving two competing physician practice cultures, three clinical specialty orientations, the potential disruption of existing referral networks, and the merger of imaging services for healthy women along with treatment for women with breast cancer. Despite these challenges, they banded together to define a patient-driven culture, create an integrated program, and build a strong brand anchored by the new facility. Their goal was to gain a competitive advantage by developing a relationship-based approach that would exceed customer (patients and referring physicians) expectations for service. "The financial argument was the easy part," Dr. G reflected. "How to actually design a model of care is where we came to an impasse."
After extensive negotiation, Baystate Health (BH) and the private Radiology and Imaging (R&I) hammered out a clear business plan to consolidate their two practices in a new breast center in a new location. Despite a clear business plan, however, tensions among the two staffs remained high. Project leaders Dr. Gianturco and Suzanne Hendery carefully crafted an internal communication and implementation plan, detailed to the hour, and enlisted a consultant to help to unify the "warring factions." The consultant worked with Dr. G and Ms. Hendery to plan and hold a retreat with all of the stakeholders-clinicians, management, and staff-from all locations and from both legacy organizations, with the goals of constructing a new cultural blueprint and designing a new patient experience.
As CEO Rick Siegrist signed the paperwork to dissolve his three-year-old startup Cambria Health, he pondered what had gone wrong. He had started the company to provide a turnkey software and technical solution to health care organizations that wanted to introduce shared medical appointments to improve patient care. But after several successful beta sites, the company was not able to achieve sufficient traction to continue. After over a year of inactivity, he decided to officially "pull the plug." Rick had previously co-founded three successful healthcare software companies before starting Cambria Health. He wondered what was different with Cambria. Was it a failure related to the idea or vision? Was it the strategy or business model of the company? Execution? Other reasons? Rick knew that he and fellow entrepreneurs liked to talk a lot about their successes, but not much about their failures. Perhaps there was more to learn from those failures regarding future opportunities.
Starting with a small pilot centre in Hyderabad in 2010, a chain of quality dialysis centres had grown to 25 centres by mid-2014, with plans to expand to 100 by 2017. As they planned for this growth, the three co-founders had several questions with respect to NephroPlus's business model, partners, staff, systems, processes and culture playing on their minds. With the threat of competition looming large, they knew that they had to work hard to achieve both high quality and affordability as they continued with their fast-paced growth.
The management of the Youreka Hotel in Amritsar, India, was concerned about the hotel's overall returns relative to its annual operating cost and large initial investment. The new five-star hotel was now up and running and customers had started checking in, but occupancy levels were low. The hotel industry in India was making double-digit margins, but the hotel had not even achieved operational breakeven yet. Of key importance for the operations head was choosing the best seafood supplier - based on selling price, transportation cost and other factors - for supplying the hotel's restaurants. A poor decision could have a negative impact on room occupancy and profitability. Among management, there were also concerns that the location of the hotel might be unfavourable. When could the operations head expect the hotel to match the profitability of the industry? What could he do to improve the hotel's profitability?
This is a case organized around the theme of preserving an entrepreneurial culture in the face of rapid growth, including over 800 employees and several offices. Founded by four friends, all still under age 30, the company has reached over $124 million in annual sales. As of January 23, 2015, when the company went public, its market valuation was over $1.5 billion. The company is particularly conscious of wanting to preserve the open, action-centered, fun culture that has been created. In some ways it is a highly representative Silicon Valley technology company, and the case tries to capture the flavor of such an organization. There is an excellent video available that was made for Inc. magazine when it named Box CEO Aaron Levie as entrepreneur of the year in 2013,[1] as well as several video interview clips done for the case with Dan Levin, COO.
The Akshaya Patra Foundation (TAPF), a Bangalore-based non-governmental organization (NGO), has been hailed globally for running the world's largest school meal program. It operated through 16 centralized and 3 decentralized kitchens across 9 states of India; it states its Mission 2020 as being able to reach out to 5 million children by 2020. The challenge that the foundation faces in achieving its stated mission is not only of scaling up by 2020, but also of maintaining the economic sustainability of its operations in view of increased government spending on alternative social sector schemes such as Right to Food, which may reduce or limit allocations to the Mid-Day Meal (MDM) scheme. The case aims to study the critical challenges that Akshaya Patra faces in sustaining its operations and the several sustainability initiatives undertaken by the NGO to meet the various challenges it faces and the opportunities that it could further take to innovatively fulfil its mission of feeding 5 million children daily by 2020. It looks at the interrelations between the different dimensions of sustainability and uses frameworks to assess these sustainability initiatives at Akshaya Patra.
The Akshaya Patra Foundation (TAPF), a Bangalore based non-governmental organization (NGO), has been hailed globally for running the world's largest school meal program. It operated through 16 centralized and 3 decentralized kitchens across 9 states of India; it states its Mission 2020 as being able to reach out to 5 million children by 2020. The challenge that the foundation faces in achieving its stated mission is not only of scaling up by 2020, but also of maintaining the economic sustainability of its operations in view of increased government spending on alternative social sector schemes such as Right to Food, which may reduce or limit allocations to the Mid-Day Meal (MDM) scheme. The case aims to look at the critical challenges that Akshaya Patra faces in sustaining its operations and the several sustainability initiatives undertaken by the NGO to meet the various challenges and the opportunities that it could further take to innovatively fulfil its mission of feeding 5 million children daily by 2020. It looks at the interrelations between the different dimensions of sustainability and uses frameworks to assess these sustainability initiatives at Akshaya Patra. The (B) case supplements the (A) case.
The ''Taxi For Sure: Technological Innovation in the Radio Cab Industry'' and ''The Radio Cab Industry (August 2014)'' cases present an example of the services industry arguably experiencing disruption owing to technological innovations. This case is set in the radio cabs industry in a developing nation (India). The case takes the perspective of the management of TaxiForSure, a Bangalore-based startup operating in the radio cab industry in India, whose management team has to chart its growth strategy as well as review the operating model in order to ensure that they maintain a competitive edge. Introduced in India in 2000, the concept of radio cabs took off only around 2006-2007 when Meru Cabs entered the industry. Since then, the industry has evolved rapidly with several startups entering the market owing to its huge potential for growth. The strategic and operational decisions made by these companies play a major role in deciding their future as they vie for the same set of customers and drivers in somewhat similar cities across India (with some companies planning overseas expansion). There are two key operating models followed by companies in the radio cab industry - the ''owner operator model'' and the ''aggregator model''. The cases explore the benefits and consequences of choosing either of the two models as well as trigger a debate on adoption of a "hybrid model".
The ''Taxi For Sure: Technological Innovation in the Radio Cab Industry'' and ''The Radio Cab Industry (August 2014)'' cases present an example of the services industry arguably experiencing disruption owing to technological innovations. This case is set in the radio cabs industry in a developing nation (India). The case takes the perspective of the management of TaxiForSure, a Bangalore-based startup operating in the radio cab industry in India, whose management team has to chart its growth strategy as well as review the operating model in order to ensure that they maintain a competitive edge. Introduced in India in 2000, the concept of radio cabs took off only around 2006-2007 when Meru Cabs entered the industry. Since then, the industry has evolved rapidly with several startups entering the market owing to its huge potential for growth. The strategic and operational decisions made by these companies play a major role in deciding their future as they vie for the same set of customers and drivers in somewhat similar cities across India (with some companies planning overseas expansion). There are two key operating models followed by companies in the radio cab industry - the ''owner operator model'' and the ''aggregator model''. The cases explore the benefits and consequences of choosing either of the two models as well as trigger a debate on adoption of a "hybrid model".
The case on IndiaMART enumerates important decisions that are made in platform business models with regards to the pricing of the different sides of the platform. Discussions on the case would encompass the role of pricing in creating and leveraging network effects analyze the ''penguin problem'' and how firms could overcome manage and resolve the same. The case is set in 2013-2015 and describes the evolution of IndiaMART, the challenges they faced while addressing four major concerns at the turning point at which the organization was: namely, the speed of customer acquisition, arresting customer churn, responding to the opportunity of the increasing penetration of mobile phones for a platform such as IndiaMART and the decision to venture into new markets such as the B2B business.
VW understood the customer funnel and worked backwards on planning ad inventories. ''Cost per lead'' was the key metric to measure any campaign performance. After brand awareness was built through display ads, VW invested in search engine marketing for organic and paid searches which led to ''Planet Volkswagen,''(PV). PV represented VW activities on a revolving circular globe with each section designed around a specific theme. PV received good response; however, owing to recession in industry in 2012, marketing had to lead to test drives - hence efforts towards PV were reduced. Two campaigns were launched one after other towards increasing leads. VW launched New Jetta in 2011 with a social media campaign called ''#AnythingforJetta''. It revolved around the concept that Jetta gave so much driving pleasure that people would do anything to own Jetta. Twitter was chosen for the campaign to get instant responses and to tap into specific customer segment. VW prepared video content showing people doing quirky stuff for Jetta. Full front page ads were published in leading newspapers, which gave the campaign a big push. #AnythingforJetta became the No. 1 trending topic on Twitter and it also led to 15% increase in Twitter users in India. "Jetta TSI YouTube Test Drive" campaign was launched in 2012, which took test drives drives from roads to viewers' desktops, tablets, and mobiles. The idea behind the YouTube test drive was to engage users and let them ask any questions about the car just as they would in a real world test-drive. The campaign, reached 21 million unique users against planned reach of 10 million. The challenge facing VW was how to break the clutter and engage fans to generate positive word-of-mouth.