A new concern is beginning to gain notoriety in society: human trafficking. This issue, which can result in slavery, should concern businesses. Almost 30 million slaves exist globally today. The fact that human trafficking is a $32 billion business indicates either indifference for human rights or an ignorance of the injustice occurring. Even though companies may be against the idea of human trafficking, they may not recognize that they could be contributing to this problem through their business operations and relationships. However, companies can exercise social responsibility by using their influence over suppliers and business partners to prohibit human trafficking. This article examines the extent to which companies are involved in combating human trafficking, and helps companies identify where they are at risk for involvement with human trafficking. Moreover, steps are suggested to prevent human trafficking from occurring within company operations and supply chains.

Situated in Beijing, Tenglong Ltd. is a typical non-state-owned listed firm in China. After its initial public offering, the founder has retained majority ownership and operation control by serving as both chairman and chief executive officer. An independent director of the company is worried about its corporate governance practice. What puzzles him most is the fact that, despite the apparent weaknesses of the board, the company itself is doing very well in the market. As he reflects on his experience, he cannot help wondering whether there is anything wrong with the board and what an effective board should and should not do.

Bonitas, a South African medical scheme (i.e., health insurer), must navigate highly restrictive regulations that make it difficult for Bonitas to innovate, grow, and compete with market leader Discovery as well as providers of alternative insurance products. Bonitas (HBS No. 315-020) must also plan ahead for the rollout of national health insurance-a deeply politicized issue in a country with great disparities in health care quality and access. How can Bonitas compete today while positioning itself to thrive-and not lose relevance-under a universal public health insurance system?

Industry self-regulation has, in general, a lousy track record. Many studies have shown that it is often ineffective unless backed by the power of the state, and that in some cases it serves rather to forestall government intervention or to reduce competition than as genuine self-regulation. Many observers doubt that accelerated private sector regulation could really make a difference against the major public goods issues of our time. Yet we live in a time when many public goods issues are global and global governance mechanisms are at the very earliest stage of development, and in industry after industry leading firms are banding together in an attempt to regulate conduct-designing metrics, relying on independent auditors, and attempting to enforce compliance. Is this a plausible path forward? This note summarizes work in history, political science, and economics-drawing particularly on the work of Eleanor Ostrom-to explore this issue in depth.

The case describes Shanghai's decision to abandon growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as its primary metric of measuring success. Within this context, the case presents the historical roots of GDP and how the measure is calculated. Moreover, the case discusses the prominence of GDP as a measure of economic success. After a discussion of China's and Shanghai's use of GDP growth targets, the case discusses Shanghai's past successes and failures. Specifically, the case describes the enormous economic growth that Shanghai has experienced alongside significant economic, social, and environmental failures such as the inefficient use of resources, pollution, and growing inequality. The case concludes with the decision to abandon GDP growth as a measure of success and opens questions about what this means for Shanghai and China. Moreover, the case raises the question of what alternative metrics measuring success might look like.

Wrigley launched Eclipse gum in August 1999. In early 2000, Paul Chibe became senior marketing manager for Wrigley's breath freshening portfolio, which included Eclipse. With the disappointing first-year performance of the brand, Chibe needed to take action to turn Eclipse around. His task was to use the opinions from other Wrigley executives and from marketing research data to decide if Eclipse could be turned around or if it should be abandoned.

Hewlett-Packard (HP) had a long history of engaging in corporate citizenship, dating back to its founding. By 2009, however, under the leadership of its latest CEO, Mark Hurd, the company had lost its focus on corporate social responsibility (CSR). Hurd instead focused on undertaking a financial turnaround and overcoming other reputational challenges; he viewed CSR and philanthropic efforts as costs rather than as strategic levers. He instituted widespread cost-cutting measures to get HP back on track, including reducing CSR expenditure. The HP board, however, did not want to let CSR go by the wayside; in fact, it wanted HP to reorganize and restrategize its approach to corporate citizenship. The case focuses on this strategic transformation from traditional, cost-center CSR to business-aligned social innovation. It outlines the details of the board's approval of the new strategy, and then discusses how HP employees worked to reorganize their CSR activity. The new team, the Office of Global Social Innovation (OGSI), had to devise a pilot project to demonstrate the new approach. The project under consideration was an engagement that would improve the early infant diagnosis process for testing infants for HIV in Kenya-an area virtually unknown to HP. The case asks students to assess the work of the OGSI team thus far, and to put themselves in the shoes of one team member who had to justify the project to HP's leadership. The case is especially important for demonstrating the most recent shifts across some leading companies regarding how they position CSR, as well as how for-profit leaders can structure partnerships for impact.

In 2010, the assistant general manager and head of strategic development at Lebanon’s BLC Bank attended the annual summit of the Global Banking Alliance for Women, a leading organization of financial institutions that drove the creation of women’s wealth worldwide. On her return to Beirut, she encouraged her bank to capitalize on the inclusion of women as a relevant differentiator from both a business and societal perspective. The result of research into the economic, demographic and social needs of the country was the launch in 2012 of the "We Initiative", a unique and comprehensive program dedicated to the economic empowerment of women in the Middle East and North Africa region. By 2015, the program’s success not only served the bank’s economic bottom line but also benefited the Lebanese economy and community as a whole and exemplified the bank’s sense of responsibility to its society.

Several experts had drawn attention to a peculiar problem existing in public-sector banks in India. There seemed to be two distinct generations: experienced employees who would be superannuated in the next four to five years; and newer employees who had come on board in the last four to five years. Though these young employees were academically sound, they lacked competence acquired through experience and thus were hesitant in taking on responsibilities. The older generation was slowly withdrawing. Management at Indian Overseas Bank (IOB) knew that in order to improve motivation and encourage higher productivity, the company had to trigger change and transform the mindsets of its employees.Harnessing the energies of young members of the marketing team, IOB ran a unique campaign involving all employees called Rang De Basanti. Initial results were encouraging. However, two problems continued to arise: the underperformance of one particular region and the problem of keeping up the momentum and sustaining the change.

In December 2014, Russia cancelled the South Stream pipeline that was envisaged to deliver natural gas through the Black Sea basin on to Europe and replaced it with a new pipeline through Turkey. The Turkish Stream was a great opportunity for Turkey to turn itself into an energy hub of its region. It had already secured TANAP, a natural gas pipeline to carry Azerbaijani gas to Europe through Turkey. The country's geographical position was one of its crucial assets: to its east lay 70% of the world's natural gas reserves, including Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Iraq, and the eastern Mediterranean basin. To its west was Europe, one of the biggest energy consumers of the world. If the Turkish Stream and TANAP pipeline projects were to go through and connect to other possible energy reserves within the wider region, would it be likely that Turkey would eventually become one of Europe's main energy corridors-perhaps even a hub? Was it less risky to remain as a transit country and secure its own energy needs at potentially lower prices? What would be the consequences of being even more dependent on Russian gas through the Turkish Stream? Would Turkey be able to prioritize economic gains and take advantage of the available resources in its south?

Duke Rohlen (HBS MBA '01) hoped to win over a prominent venture capital investor for Series B financing of his firm CVI that was creating a drug-eluting balloon (DES) to treat peripheral arterial disease. As a second-mover, Duke felt he was more likely to acquire funding because his primary competitors had already received FDA approval to conduct a trial and he had learned a great deal about how to improve the DES from the problems the first mover encountered. But Duke's strategy ran counter to many business guru injunctions. Would these bar the investment? His second mover strategy was unconventional because many medical technology marketers believed that being the first technology to be adopted by clinicians was critical to future success. But Duke had spent no money on marketing. Instead, he spent his limited funds on R and D that would correct the problems experienced with other DESs. Then too, he had allowed a likely exit, Covidien, to invest early in CVI and used their balloon. Would Covidien's relationships bar other bidders and lower the price CVI would receive? And instead of using a CRO, Duke performed his own clinical trial of the DES. Did he have sufficient expertise to pass through the FDA's stringent regulatory hurdles?

A medical device startup seeks to complete its clinical trials with very little startup funding and a small staff when compared to its competitors.

This case is designed to be used with HBS Note: Industry Self-Regulation: Sustaining the Commons in the 21st Century, HBS No. 315-074.

Over the course of a tumultuous weekend in April 2010, André Wyss was put in charge of Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation (NPC), the U.S. sales and marketing subsidiary of Novartis Pharma AG. He was brought in at a critical point in the organization's evolution with a mandate to grow the specialty medications business; the skills and capabilities needed to market and sell specialty medications were considerably different than those required for marketing and selling primary care medications, which NPC had been quite successful doing. In 2011, the 5-year revenue projections were revised significantly downward and Wyss needed to cut costs while also building the organization's capabilities quickly in early 2012.

In late 2014, Dr. John Moore (CEO), Frank Moss (chairman), and Scott Gilroy (CTO) of Twine Health (Twine) had to resolve several challenges that threatened to restrict the widespread dissemination of its sole product, Twine. Twine was a cloud-based platform that enabled patients to create and manage chronic disease treatment plans in conjunction with their primary care providers and specialized coaches. Twine had already enjoyed impressive successes in early clinical trials and among early adopters. The issues Twine's leadership team had to address included identifying clinical care providers willing to pay for Twine, ensuring adoption and effective use by both patients and health care providers, adding capabilities to support the management of additional chronic diseases, and seamlessly integrating Twine with a client organization's electronic medical record (EMR) system and information technology (IT) infrastructure. The need to solve these problems had become more pressing since Twine was named a finalist in the Health Acceleration Challenge (HAC) sponsored by Harvard Business School and Harvard Medical School.

"Discover Capital" provides an in-depth look at a first time search fund run by the tenacious Kelly Quann Bianucci. It provides background information about search funds and follows Kelly as she successfully raises her over-subscribed fund and begins the search process. The following useful information is included for students who are considering starting a search fund: offering memoranda, fundraising techniques, staffing, screening techniques, marketing materials and processes, letters of intent, and deal evaluation criteria. The case also looks at the potential fund returns from the perspective of an investor.

In 2015, Chris Godfrey, founder and CEO of Bloodbuy has to consider the best path to growth for his young company that is attempting to disrupt the blood donation industry.