In this interview, best-selling author and social media expert Charlene Li talks about the new openness and the implications for leaders everywhere. According to Li, these include embracing four objectives of openness: learn, dialog, support and innovate. She describes each in detail and shows that just as there is a continuum of openness for organizations, there is also a continuum of openness for leaders. She describes four 'openness archetypes' and the particular challenges faced by each, as well as the need for every organization to clearly define its 'sandbox'. In the end, she shows that leaders never really had total control over their customers and employees; what they have to give up now is the need for control.

The authors argue that in our highly-connected environment, it's all-too-easy to forget how important 'inner work life' is to an organization's progress: when one goes downhill, so does the other. They define inner work life as consisting of each employee's emotions, perceptions and motivations -- and show that leaders can't help but influence their subordinates' inner work lives on a daily basis. The only question, they say, is what direction that influence will take. They describe three key 'influencers' of inner work life and show how managers can use them to foster productivity and well-being. The article is an adapted excerpt from the authors' book, The Progress Principle: Creativity, Productivity, and the Psychology of Everyday Work Life (Harvard Business Review Press, 2011).

The emergence of 'Web 2.0' tools such as blogs, Facebook and Twitter has significantly lessened the amount of control that organizations have over their messaging. Web 2.0 presents marketers with a dilemma: on the one hand, being talked about, shared and parodied on the Internet brings attention to a brand; on the other, it may not be the kind of attention the brand wants. The author provides three recommendations for organizations: lose the illusion of control; constantly monitor Web 2.0; and actively engage with your customers. He shows that in the end, while it might seem like a brand new playing field has emerged, in many ways, Web 2.0 returns us to two of the very foundations of Marketing: understand your customers deeply and develop active, engaged relationships with them.

Enabled by new digital technologies, openness has become a mega-trend for innovation and the topic du jour for organizations of all kinds. However, little has been said about what this 'new openness' means for the realm of design. In this article, the author reframes open from a design perspective, arguing that we must learn how to design for the loss of control that is inherent in being an increasingly-open organization. Indeed, he argues that a deliberately-designed loss of control may grant companies the most critical competitive advantage available today: access. He describes ten tools of openness and predicts that embracing them and designing for the loss of control will quickly rise to the top of the list of management challenges.

As the ways in which consumers make purchasing decisions continue to multiply, retailers are at a crossroads. One of the key reasons for operating a bricks-and-mortar store-building a strong, distinctive brand experience-no longer seems as relevant. Thanks to the rapid rise of social media and corporate transparency, consumers wield tremendous influence in shaping retail brands and are growing increasingly skeptical of overly-slick store designs, clerks and marketing messages. The once-dependable competitive edges enjoyed by bricks-and-mortar retailers are eroding, which means they can no longer afford to assume any inherent advantages over their online competitors. The authors describe three key paradigm shifts that smart retailers are embracing to solidify customer loyalty and provide shoppers with that increasingly-important window into an organization's soul.

The author argues that as a society, we have become fixated on setting and solving single-answer problems. There is nothing inherently wrong with single-answer problems, she says; without being able to frame and answer them, we would never get anything done. The difficulty lies in our preoccupation with the small fragment of the world that they represent. Regardless of a problem's complexity, our fixation with finding an answer causes us to narrow our attention, and in doing so, we often overlook what matters most. She describes two more complex types of problems -- enigmatic problems and open-ended problems -- and shows how adopting three particular mindsets can enable one to develop a more open mind and become a 'possibilian'.

Prosperous and growth-oriented small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) - generally defined as firms with fewer than 500 employees -- are vital to an economy's health. In our increasingly borderless digital society, the most promising growth opportunities for SMEs tend to lie in foreign markets. But doing business in foreign markets can be both difficult and costly, and as a result, most choose to operate domestically. But the authors argue that the opportunities far outweigh the risks. They encourage SMEs to take the plunge, describing the three challenges that digital markets present and how to build a reputation online beyond a firm's borders.

In this interview, the founder of the Linux operating system, which runs everything from Google to the New York Stock Exchange to Japan's high-speed rail system, describes his evolution from student hacker to the founder of open-source pioneer Linux. He touches on the unique merits of open collaboration, the perils of centralized vs. distributed environments, and why Linux is even more interesting from a social standpoint than from a technical standpoint. In the end, says Torvalds, the most important thing about open source is not any one ideology: it's that everybody can adapt it for their own personal needs and objectives.

The cost of capital is one of the most important concepts in finance. It is the minimum acceptable rate of return that new investments must yield and it represents the long-term opportunity cost of the funds used by a company. If management decides to invest in projects with expected returns above the cost of capital, the company value goes up. Conversely, if a company invests in projects (that despite having positive profitability) with expected returns below the cost of capital, it destroys value and company value goes down. Similarly, the cost of capital is the discount rate that should be used in a discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis, in capital budgeting applications, when valuing a company or a division, or an acquisition target.

The value of a firm depends not only on the cash flows it provides to its investors, but also on the timing, as well as the risk of those cash flows. This note focuses on the main methods used to value companies, whether it is in a merger and acquisition setting or not. It covers concepts such as: 1) The discounted cash flow (DCF) method; 2) Discount rates and cost of capital; 3) Valuation using multiples; 4) Value creation through mergers and acquisitions (M&As).

The case is set in February 2006, right after Sonaecom's announcement of its takeover bid for Portugal Telecom (PT) of €9.50 per share. The reader does not yet know how PT will react and whether its management will accept the offer or not. The case recounts this fascinating and intense M&A transaction, taking us through one of the largest takeover bids ever in the European Telecom sector, with a deal value above €15 billion. How will PTs board regard this bid? On the one hand, it represents a 20% premium over the prior stock price. On the other hand, it is a terrible blow to the international aspirations of the PT group. Moreover, the sometimes conflicting views of the general public, the competition regulator, employees and the government have the potential to complicate matters further. Lastly, this deal also has important international implications. One thing is sure. Given all the external pressure, for example from regulators, nothing will be the same for PT or the Sonae Group after this offer. The case serves as a rigorous application of valuation methodology with a focus on understanding the difficulties in forecasting future cash flows and the sensitivity of the valuation analysis to underlying assumptions.

Most management teams are caught off guard when their company becomes the target of a takeover. However, P's management team had seen it all from the other side before and knew just what to do. They viewed this challenge professionally. After declining the €9.50 bid, Portugal Telecoms board formed a special committee to lead the defense strategy. However, the board also confirmed it was not saying no to a deal: We wo't defend at any price. We will do what is right for shareholders, stated Zeinal Bava, P's CFO.

In February 2007, Sonaecom revised their bid to €10.50 per share. Less than one week later, the PT Board wrote to its shareholders maintaining the rejection of this new offer. So far, most shareholders had not manifested their views publicly. PT had been fighting hard for its independence. But would economic conditions be right for Sonaecom's takeover bid to succeed? What would it take to convince shareholders to accept? PT's international roadshow was reaching an end. How would investors react to all this information? Was it time for PT to sit down with Sonaecom?

In March 2007, more than a year after Sonaecom had announced its original takeover bid for Portugal Telecom (PT), things had progressed: new investors had come along, the authorities had approved the deal, both parties were holding roadshows, and finally Sonaecom increased its offer price to€10.50. The day before the final shareholders' meeting (2 March 2007), when the votes would be counted, everyone was doing their own numbers. According to the company's bylaws, votes cast by a single shareholder whose shares exceeded 10% of the share capital would not be counted. Sonaecom's offer was conditional on the removal of this restriction. The removal of this restriction had to be approved by two-thirds of the shareholders present at the AGM. After that, for the offer to be successful, Sonaecom would have to have the support of at least 50.01% of PT's shareholders to its €10.50 per share offer. This was one of the largest deals ever in the Telecoms sector, and investors from around the world were placing their bets on who was going to win the battle.

Case A of this series sets the scene for the largest merger and acquisition (M&A) deal in the telecom industry in Brazil and Latin America. Cases B to F follow on by relating the events up to the deal's conclusion. The sequencing of this story creates a sense of urgency for readers and forces them to take position on different questions at different times. Events began in 2003 when a 50:50 joint venture (JV) between Portugal Telecom (PT) and Spain's Telefónica acquired 60% of Vivo, the leading Brazilian mobile operator. In the subsequent years, Vivo experienced double-digit annual growth, as it reaped the benefits of its own heavy investments and booming consumer demand. In May 2010, Telefónica made a€5.7 billion cash bid for PT's share of the JV. According to Telefónica, this was a full, fair and final offer. How would PT's board regard the bid? On the one hand, it represented a 100% premium on Vivo's pre-announcement stock price. On the other hand, it was a terrible blow to the PT Group's international aspirations. Moreover, the occasionally conflicting views of the general public and the government had the potential to complicate matters further. Lastly, this deal also had important international implications. The case shows how: a) corporate governance practices vary across countries, including environments where there are dual-class shares; and b) the role of corporate governance in ensuring that managers undertake activities that maximize shareholder value as well as serving the needs and strategy of the company. The case also allows for an in-depth analysis of a variety of strategic, organizational, financial and economic issues related to growth strategies through JVs and M&As. The key focus of the case is on the links between finance and strategy.

Case A of this series sets the scene for the largest merger and acquisition (M&A) deal in the telecom industry in Brazil and Latin America. Cases B to F follow on by relating the events up to the deal's conclusion. The sequencing of this story creates a sense of urgency for readers and forces them to take position on different questions at different times. Events began in 2003 when a 50:50 joint venture (JV) between Portugal Telecom (PT) and Spain's Telefónica acquired 60% of Vivo, the leading Brazilian mobile operator. In the subsequent years, Vivo experienced double-digit annual growth, as it reaped the benefits of its own heavy investments and booming consumer demand. In May 2010, Telefónica made a €5.7 billion cash bid for PT's share of the JV. According to Telefónica, this was a full, fair and final offer. How would PT's board regard the bid? On the one hand, it represented a 100% premium on Vivo's pre-announcement stock price. On the other hand, it was a terrible blow to the PT Group's international aspirations. Moreover, the occasionally conflicting views of the general public and the government had the potential to complicate matters further. Lastly, this deal also had important international implications. The case shows how: a) corporate governance practices vary across countries, including environments where there are dual-class shares; and b) the role of corporate governance in ensuring that managers undertake activities that maximize shareholder value as well as serving the needs and strategy of the company. The case also allows for an in-depth analysis of a variety of strategic, organizational, financial and economic issues related to growth strategies through JVs and M&As. The key focus of the case is on the links between finance and strategy.

Case A of this series sets the scene for the largest merger and acquisition (M&A) deal in the telecom industry in Brazil and Latin America. Cases B to F follow on by relating the events up to the deal's conclusion. The sequencing of this story creates a sense of urgency for readers and forces them to take position on different questions at different times. Events began in 2003 when a 50:50 joint venture (JV) between Portugal Telecom (PT) and Spain's Telefónica acquired 60% of Vivo, the leading Brazilian mobile operator. In the subsequent years, Vivo experienced double-digit annual growth, as it reaped the benefits of its own heavy investments and booming consumer demand. In May 2010, Telefónica made a €5.7 billion cash bid for PT's share of the JV. According to Telefónica, this was a full, fair and final offer. How would PT's board regard the bid? On the one hand, it represented a 100% premium on Vivo's pre-announcement stock price. On the other hand, it was a terrible blow to the PT Group's international aspirations. Moreover, the occasionally conflicting views of the general public and the government had the potential to complicate matters further. Lastly, this deal also had important international implications. The case shows how: a) corporate governance practices vary across countries, including environments where there are dual-class shares; and b) the role of corporate governance in ensuring that managers undertake activities that maximize shareholder value as well as serving the needs and strategy of the company. The case also allows for an in-depth analysis of a variety of strategic, organizational, financial and economic issues related to growth strategies through JVs and M&As. The key focus of the case is on the links between finance and strategy.

Case A of this series sets the scene for the largest merger and acquisition (M&A) deal in the telecom industry in Brazil and Latin America. Cases B to F follow on by relating the events up to the deal's conclusion. The sequencing of this story creates a sense of urgency for readers and forces them to take position on different questions at different times. Events began in 2003 when a 50:50 joint venture (JV) between Portugal Telecom (PT) and Spain's Telefónica acquired 60% of Vivo, the leading Brazilian mobile operator. In the subsequent years, Vivo experienced double-digit annual growth, as it reaped the benefits of its own heavy investments and booming consumer demand. In May 2010, Telefónica made a €5.7 billion cash bid for PT's share of the JV. According to Telefónica, this was a full, fair and final offer. How would PT's board regard the bid? On the one hand, it represented a 100% premium on Vivo's pre-announcement stock price. On the other hand, it was a terrible blow to the PT Group's international aspirations. Moreover, the occasionally conflicting views of the general public and the government had the potential to complicate matters further. Lastly, this deal also had important international implications. The case shows how: a) corporate governance practices vary across countries, including environments where there are dual-class shares; and b) the role of corporate governance in ensuring that managers undertake activities that maximize shareholder value as well as serving the needs and strategy of the company. The case also allows for an in-depth analysis of a variety of strategic, organizational, financial and economic issues related to growth strategies through JVs and M&As. The key focus of the case is on the links between finance and strategy.

Case A of this series sets the scene for the largest merger and acquisition (M&A) deal in the telecom industry in Brazil and Latin America. Cases B to F follow on by relating the events up to the deal's conclusion. The sequencing of this story creates a sense of urgency for readers and forces them to take position on different questions at different times. Events began in 2003 when a 50:50 joint venture (JV) between Portugal Telecom (PT) and Spain's Telefónica acquired 60% of Vivo, the leading Brazilian mobile operator. In the subsequent years, Vivo experienced double-digit annual growth, as it reaped the benefits of its own heavy investments and booming consumer demand. In May 2010, Telefónica made a €5.7 billion cash bid for PT's share of the JV. According to Telefónica, this was a full, fair and final offer. How would PT's board regard the bid? On the one hand, it represented a 100% premium on Vivo's pre-announcement stock price. On the other hand, it was a terrible blow to the PT Group's international aspirations. Moreover, the occasionally conflicting views of the general public and the government had the potential to complicate matters further. Lastly, this deal also had important international implications. The case shows how: a) corporate governance practices vary across countries, including environments where there are dual-class shares; and b) the role of corporate governance in ensuring that managers undertake activities that maximize shareholder value as well as serving the needs and strategy of the company. The case also allows for an in-depth analysis of a variety of strategic, organizational, financial and economic issues related to growth strategies through JVs and M&As. The key focus of the case is on the links between finance and strategy.

Case A of this series sets the scene for the largest merger and acquisition (M&A) deal in the telecom industry in Brazil and Latin America. Cases B to F follow on by relating the events up to the deal's conclusion. The sequencing of this story creates a sense of urgency for readers and forces them to take position on different questions at different times. Events began in 2003 when a 50:50 joint venture (JV) between Portugal Telecom (PT) and Spain's Telefónica acquired 60% of Vivo, the leading Brazilian mobile operator. In the subsequent years, Vivo experienced double-digit annual growth, as it reaped the benefits of its own heavy investments and booming consumer demand. In May 2010, Telefónica made a €5.7 billion cash bid for PT's share of the JV. According to Telefónica, this was a full, fair and final offer. How would PT's board regard the bid? On the one hand, it represented a 100% premium on Vivo's pre-announcement stock price. On the other hand, it was a terrible blow to the PT Group's international aspirations. Moreover, the occasionally conflicting views of the general public and the government had the potential to complicate matters further. Lastly, this deal also had important international implications. The case shows how: a) corporate governance practices vary across countries, including environments where there are dual-class shares; and b) the role of corporate governance in ensuring that managers undertake activities that maximize shareholder value as well as serving the needs and strategy of the company. The case also allows for an in-depth analysis of a variety of strategic, organizational, financial and economic issues related to growth strategies through JVs and M&As. The key focus of the case is on the links between finance and strategy.