Since emerging from decades of conflict in 2002, Angola has been growing at a scorching double-digit rate, led by its oil industry. But the nation remains beset with seemingly intractable problems: immense inequality, low life expectancy, a non-diversified economy, and constant grumblings of corruption. The global financial crisis and subsequent fall in state oil revenue drives a loan-seeking Angola towards either the IMF, who demand extensive reforms, or the Chinese, who seek to take a direct stake in the nation's recovery. The case explores the dynamics of post-conflict recovery as well as the challenges associated with a reliance on oil wealth, including the resource curse and Dutch disease.
This case illustrates how Dow Chemical acquired and integrated Wolff Walsrode, a German specialty chemicals firm that was part of the Bayer Group. This acquisition, combined with Dow's existing cellulosics unit, helped it create a new specialty business with a forecasted $1.1 billion in annual sales and strengthen its footprint in Central and Eastern Europe. The main challenge in this case concerns the complexities of acquisition integration, which are demanding in spite of Dow's extensive experience and track record. Dow is confronted with various integration challenges and faces several decisions concerning the degree and speed of integration of Wolff Walsrode and one of its units, Probis. The decisions pit considerations of rapid cost synergy capture via leveraging global systems platforms against process technology transfer and accommodating different customers and their requirements. Along with providing a review of the importance of a multitude of codified implementation templates and tacit integration mechanisms, this case illustrates how Dow's M&A integration personnel prove their worth by ensuring Wolff's successful integration. The case confronts students with the complexities and uncertainties of cross-border acquisition integration (e.g. speed, level of integration) and the way in which a renowned serial acquirer like Dow manages a medium-sized integration. Moreover, it presents the inherent complexities involved in decision-making in the context of acquisition programs. Lastly, it underlines the pros and cons of mergers and acquisition (M&A) experience, how to appropriately use M&A experience, and the role deliberate learning mechanisms contained in Dow's M&A methodology (the M&A Technology Center) play in improving the success rate of integrating acquisitions.
Trade between China and Africa was estimated to have quadrupled between 2000 and 2008, with China becoming Africa's third-largest trading partner and second-largest export destination. Trade relationships between China and Africa were mainly concentrated in three areas: primary resources from Africa to China; cheap manufactured goods and FDI from China to Africa, including new investment opportunities such as land acquisition; and outsourcing of farm production, particularly of staples and biofuels. It was estimated that by 2009, 1 million Chinese farmers were working in Africa. Africa had large extensions of fertile land available, although the lack of infrastructure (not only for farming activities themselves but also for transport) and political factors such as land ownership, corruption and governance were serious issues. This case discusses China's growing businesses with Africa and the risks that these can entail, particularly for Chinese state-owned enterprises.
The regulations in the home care industry are changing. The industry is moving toward consolidation and favouring large companies. Closing the Gap, a small home care provider in Ontario, reaches a crossroad. The company has three strategic options to choose from: (1) sell the company, (2) buy another company, or (3) grow organically. Given these conditions, students will be asked to conduct an industry analysis and help the chief executive officer (CEO) of Closing the Gap make the appropriate decision. In the (B) case, students will be asked to evaluate an acquisition possibility and advise the CEO whether the acquisition will be a successful one or not.
This is a supplement to Closing the Gap - The Changing Home Care Environment (A) case, product #9B10M051. The regulations in the home care industry are changing. The industry is moving toward consolidation and favouring large companies. Closing the Gap reaches a crossroad. In this (B) case, students will be asked to evaluate an acquisition possibility and advise the chief executive officer whether the acquisition will be a successful one or not.
Gone Rural employs 750 women in rural communities across Swaziland to produce handwoven baskets and other hand-crafted items. The women are mostly grandmothers caring for children orphaned as a result of the country's high AIDS-related death rate. The company has a strong social mission to improve the economic situation of these women and wants to grow rapidly. It has been very successful designing, making, and selling its products in the high-end global marketplace. It now needs to raise significant external capital to build new facilities. This may be the first time in its 18-year history that the company brings in external profit-minded stakeholders.
In 2004, Miami-Dade County Public Schools began the planning process for creating the Parent Academy, a new district-wide initiative to increase family engagement in schools. This case discusses the planning and implementation for this major initiative, and describes how the initiative changed when a new superintendent entered the system in 2008. It delves into the theory behind the initiative, the challenges and benefits of this approach to addressing family engagement, and presents the dilemma of whether and how to sustain the program into the future.
In 2006, Hermann Gudmundsson (the chief executive officer [CEO] of Bilanaust, an Icelandic automotive spare parts retailer) was part of a group of partners that had purchased Esso Iceland. He had subsequently been appointed to the CEO position at Esso Iceland. The two companies were quite different: Bilanaust dealt with real-time customer needs, carried a wide range of products, and enjoyed a rising market share and profits. Esso Iceland was 12 times the size of Bilanaust, skilled at developing and executing medium- to long-term strategies, and was operating in a stagnated market. Gudmundsson evaluated the opportunities in front of him: could a successful merger be wrought from the two companies or would it be better to maintain two separate entities? He determined that a lot of work would need to be done to gain consensus around the right strategic direction for the future. Careful thought identified three areas of initial focus: 1) improving staff morale; 2) creating a sense of optimism; 3) placing effective leaders at key points in the organization.
Hermann Gudmundsson, the CEO of Esso Iceland (provider of fuel and lubricants) was expected to begin merging Esso Iceland with Bilanaust, an Icelandic automotive spare parts retailer with the end result of a unified entity that would be dominant in its respective industries. The Icelandic economy was growing at favourable rates and Esso had enjoyed its position as the leading fuel provider in Iceland for the past 60 years with 40 per cent of the market. Gudmundsson and his partners bought Esso Iceland in 2006 from a private equity firm that had been focused on stripping Esso Iceland down to its core fuel business, using staff reductions as part of a cost-reduction program. Gudmundsson believed that Esso Iceland had untapped wealth that could only be enhanced by the cross-selling synergies formed as a result of a successful integration of over 500 accounts in the two companies. His overriding concern was to lead the combined organization to achieve these goals in the next two years without destroying shareholder value.
Hermann Gudmundsson, the new chief executive officer (CEO) of both Esso Iceland (provider of fuel and lubricants) and Bilanaust (an automotive spare parts retailer) was starting to develop an organizational strategy to carry the two firms forward for the next few years. His overriding concern was to create value for themselves and the customers they served, and Gudmundsson considered several methods to achieve that goal: should each company be led and managed on a stand-alone basis, or would a formal merger bring the hoped-for synergies? He determined that the best approach would be to capture an accurate picture of the talent existing in both organizations but was unsure of the best method to sort, rank and evaluate the talent existing in each of Esso Iceland and Bilanaust. Ultimately, he wanted to create a list of objectives for the evaluation program and methods to implement the findings.
By December 2006, Hermann Gudmundsson (the chief executive officer of both Esso Iceland and Bilanaust) had spent the past 10 months evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of both organizations, and determined that the best approach going forward would be to, "consider creating a new organization with a new structure and a new brand name." He weighed the advantages, disadvantages and costs of either retaining two separate companies and their associated brand-image, or merging into one new organization. Gudmundsson was facing resistance from both the board of directors and three different advertising agencies to forgo the Esso brand; but with an ultimate mandate to increase shareholder value he needed to figure out the best method, from a branding perspective, to achieve that objective.
In December 2006, Hermann Gudmundsson (the chief executive officer of both Esso Iceland and Bilanaust) announced to employees of both companies that a merger was to occur. Various workshops were held to involve employees in the developing structure of the new organization, resulting in a tenable logistics strategy and increased trust between members of the different organizations. By April 2007, Gudmundsson and his team had merged the two organizations, created a new company name and designed a new logo. On the official launch day, over 800 employees were expected to be in attendance as Gudmundsson unveiled the new brand. Gudmundsson wanted to deliver a memorable speech that captured all the excitement and conveyed the right message of the brand going forward - but was unsure of what issues to address in the speech and concepts he should emphasize to create the right first impression.
By the end of 2007, Hermann Gudmundsson (the chief executive officer of N1 - created from the merger between Esso Iceland and Bilanaust) was focused on building trust within his organization. By involving employees in decision-making, N1 had received valuable suggestions on effective business operations. But Gudmundsson had noted a lack of chemistry between employees of the two former firms, and thought that a stumbling block to better relations was the separate clubs or societies for Esso Iceland and Bilanaust employees. After human resources was unable to find a satisfactory resolution, Gudmundsson reluctantly stepped in to render his opinion on how to resolve the issue.
By October 2008, the merger of Esso Iceland and Bilanaust into the new company N1 was considered a success. Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) was on its way to doubling in three years, and cross-selling was gaining traction. But N1's plans were under threat of derailing due to a looming currency crisis. In October 2008, the Icelandic banking sector collapsed. Gudmundsson called upon his team to determine what internal and external changes needed to be made to remain viable and productive now that they were without access to commercial credit.
The vice-president of manufacturing for W.C. Wood Company was reviewing a proposal to change the company's packaging for their line of refrigerators and freezers. The proposal recommended a move from cardboard packaging to a combination of polystyrene foam and clear plastic film. Switching to this method of packaging would save on material and labour costs, and result in a significant reduction in damage claims due to the increased package stability; however, a substantial capital investment would be required to launch the change. The equipment required to convert to the new design would require a six-month lead time and one week to install, preferably over the company's summer shut-down. The vice-president needed to evaluate his options of converting all lines at once or transitioning to the new packaging system in stages in order to make his decision.
The vice-president of manufacturing for W.C. Wood Company (Wood) was pleased with the implementation of the new packaging system for the refrigerators and freezers (known as "clear pack"). Despite some initial start-up issues, problems were resolved and customers had even begun complimenting Wood on the change. Therefore, it came as a surprise when Maytag refused to take delivery of the clear pack product and instead notified Wood of an impending warranty claim under their supply agreement for product damages. Wood had filed all the product testing forms and approvals with Maytag prior to implementing the clear pack product; however, the Maytag distribution warehouse had not been made aware of the proper handling requirements. Additionally, Maytag's largest customer had not been made aware of the handling changes and was similarly unprepared. As a result, damage claims had increased more than 300 per cent and were expected to rise if something was not done quickly.
Deborah McDonald of Upper Canada Insurance (Upper Canada) was reviewing several pieces of data she and her team had spent the last month collecting. McDonald and her team had been asked to address the inefficiencies in the life insurance application process, largely due to the high numbers of applicants withdrawing from the system (known as "wastage") in the midst of the process. Upper Canada had determined that the most common reason for clients abandoning the application process was the long time required to get a response, followed by lack of communication and poor customer service. It was thought that by solving these problems, Upper Canada could meet or exceed industry wastage levels and improve the efficiency of the sales team. McDonald was assigned the task of analyzing the data and making recommendations to resolve the issues of the application process, but was not certain where to begin.
In the 1990s, considerable debate arose concerning the strength and stability of China's banks. Of particular concern were the debts owed to the banks by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Many SOEs were experiencing financial difficulties and so they might not have been able to repay these loans. Some analysts emphasized that, since the banks and the SOEs were both owned by the government, the only relevant concern was the financial strength of the government and its preparedness to take responsibility for any of the banks' non-performing loans. In the early years of the 21st century, the government undertook a widespread program aimed at improving the balance sheets at the banks by purchasing non-performing loans from the banks and then reselling these at a discount, often to foreign private sector financial institutions. Prior to 2010, this process provided a generally accepted faith in the stability and security of China's banks. Total non-performing loans as a per cent of total bank loans decreased from 20 per cent in 2003 to three per cent in 2008. The year 2010 brought a new realization that the non-performing loan problem had reappeared. However, China's banks now had private as well as government shareholders, and so the solution had become more complex. The government's response was to insist that China's banks increase their capital base by issuing new equity.