In May 2008, the board of directors of BCE. Inc. (BCE), one of Canada's leading integrated communications companies, was dealing with the fallout of a previous day's Quebec Court of Appeal decision. The court had ruled to disallow a $50 billion privatization deal as, according to the court, the process was flawed and did not take into consideration the debenture (bond) holders of Bell Canada (a wholly-owned subsidiary of BCE). The court had ruled that the board allowed a deal in which benefits had accrued only to the shareholders (a 40 per cent increase in value since the firm was in play) at the expense of the bondholders, who were dealt an 18 per cent decrease in value over the same time period. In deciding whether or not to launch a last-ditch appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, management and the board needed to determine who were the key stakeholders involved in the decision to take the firm private, what their interests were, and how those interests should guide the board.
Unlike conventional supply chains, green supply chains are designed to ensure that value creation, rather than risk and waste, accumulates at each step, from design to disposal and recovery. As a primer, this note is suitable for undergraduate, MBA, or executive students exploring corporate response to environmental degradation, rising energy and materials prices, and the growing challenges of international global supply chains. Managing complex relationships and flows of materials across companies and cultures poses a key challenge for green supply chains. But "greening" a supply chain nets many benefits.
This technical note expands on the previous note, "Forwards and Futures" (UV1045), which introduced the basics of forward and futures contracts. It begins with examples where the hedging was one-for-one and the maturity of the futures contract exactly matched the timing of the transaction. Often times the hedging approach is not as clear as it is in those examples. This note covers hedging and more complex examples.
This case discusses the issue of leading change at the business banking division of Nedbank, a prominent South African bank, between 2005 and 2009. (This timeframe, beginning just 11 years after Apartheid's end, covers Ingrid Johnson's leadership of this division during a period of significant change within Nedbank and South Africa). One of the oldest banks in South Africa, Nedbank merged with another South African bank in 2002. Troubles financing the acquisition and several ill-advised bets in the market caused Nedbank's market value to plummet and led to the ouster of the bank's senior leadership. The business banking division was one of Nedbank's largest business units with 2000+ staff. For many years, it had been a consistently profitable but underperforming division, and had yet to fully implement a strategic restructuring when Johnson takes over in 2005. Johnson's mandate is to instill a high performance culture, which she determines requires overhauling the division's culture, formal organization, critical tasks, and people. The class discussion focuses on what Johnson did to lead the change effort, what worked, what did not, and what more she needs to do. The case and associated video nicely describe Ingrid's leadership style shifting from a chartered accountant to a more seasoned leader. The video shows Ingrid interacting with AMP participants. Ingrid describes what she did in Business Banking, how she executed those changes, what she learned about leading large system change, and what she learned about herself as a leader.
On July 17, 2009, Zappos.com, a privately-held online retailer of shoes, clothing, and other soft-line retail categories, learned that Amazon.com, a $19 billion multinational online retailer, had won its Board of Directors' approval to offer to merge the two companies. Amazon had been courting Zappos since 2005, hoping a merger would enable Amazon to expand and strengthen its market share in soft-line retail categories. While Amazon's interest intrigued Zappos' senior executives, they had not felt the time was right--until now. Amazon's offer-10 million shares of stock (valued at $807 million), $40 million in cash, restricted stock units for Zappos' employees, and a promise that Zappos could operate as an independent subsidiary-was on the table. Zappos' financial advisor, Morgan Stanley, estimated the future equity value of an IPO to be between $650 million and $905 million; this estimate skewed the Amazon offer-at least in financial terms--toward the high end of Zappos' estimated market value. Hsieh and Lin, Zappos' CEO and COO, respectively, knew that much of Zappos' growth, and hence its value, had been due to the company's strong culture and obsessive emphasis on customer service. In 2009, they were focusing on the three C's-clothing, customer service, and company culture--the keys to the company's continued growth. Hsieh and Lin had only a few days to consider whether to recommend the merger to Zappos' board at their July 21 meeting.
Just months after declaring their intent to become a solar cell equipment supplier, van Mierlo and Sachs were again revisiting the issue of what the company should be. Becoming a successful solar cell manufacturer would potentially be much more lucrative than becoming a successful equipment supplier. But, the latter was much less capital intensive and perhaps a less operationally risky approach. For van Mierlo and Sachs, the question - "What kind of company should 1366 become?" - was back on the table.
Web 2.0 technologies are now a staple of social collaboration on the internet. In 2006 Andrew McAfee, of the MIT Center for Digital Business, coined the term Enterprise 2.0 to describe how organizations use emergent social software platforms, or ESSPs, to pursue their goals. However, some organizations don't achieve the many collaboration-related benefits that internal ESSPs can offer. After studying both successful and unsuccessful E2.0 initiatives, McAfee attributes most of the failures to five misconceptions. The first two myths crop up before an E2.0 initiative is launched. One is that the risks of ESSPs, most notably from inappropriate use, will greatly outweigh the rewards. McAfee makes the case that those dangers rarely manifest in practice. The other pre-launch myth is that the ROI of an E2.0 initiative should be calculated in monetary terms. McAfee shows how Enterprise 2.0 can deliver valuable benefits in terms of developing human, organizational, and information capital - without a numerical ROI yield. The final three myths arise after an E2.0 project is deployed. One holds that people will flock to a collaboration platform once it is built. Success actually requires various types of top-down support, including active participation by senior leaders. Another is that E2.0's primary worth is in helping close colleagues work together better. In reality, the value extends to networks of expertise well beyond a user's inner circle. The importance of those far-reaching interpersonal connections also debunks the last myth: that E2.0 should be judged by the information it generates. Information is indeed useful, but E2.0's greatest advantage lies in transforming potential ties between people into actual ones.
On June 23, 2006, Anadarko Petroleum Corporation announced that it was simultaneously acquiring two public companies, Kerr-McGee and Western Gas Resources, in all-cash deals. The total price was about $24 billion, a figure close to Anadarko's market cap at the time. The parallel deal flows and negotiations had been completed in a matter of months. The specific dynamics of this "deal" were extraordinary. Anadarko, Kerr-McGee and Western were all companies with rich and dynamic histories. The combination of resources, processes and people involved in these deals was complex and powerful. The announcement presented a real investor relations challenge for Anadarko. How would Anadarko explain the deals? How would the companies combine to build the most value? What would be divested to pay back the cash? What was the strategy behind these transformative deals? How was this pulled off so quickly and effectively?
The M-Budget Card case study is about mastering the challenges of an exploratory strategic initiative in a context marked by time pressure and frequent change. M-Budget was the first of a series of highly successful projects that established GE Money Bank as a leader in the Swiss credit card market. The business concept was to cooperate with the country's leading retailer MIGROS to develop an innovative credit card offering, the M-Budget card. The M-Budget card was launched a mere six months later and was an immediate success. The demand for the card exceeded expectations by far and the bank was inundated by more than 100,000 applications in the first weeks. The road to the successful market launch, however, was a rocky one and the team around Pierre had to master numerous challenges. Pierre, who took the lead in the initiative, had to select the right people to compose a team that had all the expertise and knowledge required to develop an entirely new market offering. A competitive move by the second largest retailer COOP forced the team to change its initial value proposition while working under intensive time pressure. Finally, the team had to overcome a series of operational problems after the initial market launch. The case study retraces the initiative's development over time and describes the leadership and organizational challenges faced by the team on its way to the successful creation of an entirely new business segment.
For months, Jon Baumhauer, the Chairman of the Family Board and influential member of the Executive Board of E. Merck OHG, had sustained the commitment of the family owners to a transformational merger that would define the future of Merck. Maintaining such secrecy among the 120-plus family partners representing the 10th to the 12th generations of Merck family owners was no small feat, but the absence of a deal was starting to create tensions on all levels. The offer from Ernesto Bertarelli, the largest shareholder of Serono, a Swiss-listed, family-controlled biotechnology firm, was hardly a surprise. Ernesto, through the company's investment bankers, had peddled the firm for months to all major pharma companies in the world, but had found few takers. The surprise was the newfound willingness of Serono to consider a negotiated deal. Merck's Executive Board, the family and Merck's advisers had kept an eye on Serono throughout the year. The company was attractive for its family culture, strong R&D capabilities, significant US presence, a rich product pipeline and of course world-class biotechnology manufac-turing competencies. Its size would give Merck much needed critical mass, but the deal was not cheap. It required extensive leverage and new equity injections from the family, its risk profile was higher than Merck's and cultural differences ran deep. Now the deal was within reach. Was this the transformational opportunity the Merck family sought? It was time to put the "courage and pioneering spirit" of the family firm to the ultimate test. Learning objectives: Managing a family business for sustainability; sophisticated family and business governance structures; managing growth; technology innovation; maintaining the entrepreneurial spirit; multi-generation family business; critical size and growth issues in the pharma business; managing incentive systems for executives.
This case presents market research data concerning the launch of a new drawstring trash bag in Brazil. Ad-lider, one of the leaders in the Brazilian plastic bag industry, has purchased the production machinery for producing the trash bag, and now must decide how the new product should be launched. Data for focus groups and field interviews are included for analysis. The case touches on many areas of marketing, including new product development, marketing research, and creating customer value.
Airwide manufactures a broad line of heating, ventilation, air conditioning (HVAC) products. The Italian director of Sales and Marketing for Residential and Light Commercial is reviewing the company's channel management policies. The Italian market is currently served by three master-distributors who have geographic responsibility for the North, Central, and South regions of Italy, and accounts for 85 percent of Airwide sales in Italy. The balance is sold by small dealers, remnants of an early channel management arrangement. Nuova Climatizzazione, the dealer based in Genova, has approached Airwide with a proposal to have their reseller discount be equaled to a master distributor's. Airwide's management must examine the decision and consider the implications for their channel strategy and partnership arrangements
Trip Hawkins founded Digital Chocolate in Silicon Valley in 2003 to develop outstanding games for mobile devices. By 2008, the company had expanded its operations into four countries and Digital Chocolate was one of the top developers of soloplayer games for standard mobile phones and iPhones. In 2009, Hawkins was eager for Digital Chocolate to start developing new types of mobile games that could be played by multiple players over a period of time. Hawkins wondered how to guide his company into this new area of social gaming without losing any of the tremendous creative momentum the team had built over the previous years.
The Endowment Model of Investing, which was based on creating high risk-adjusted performance through diversification, a long time-horizon, top-notch outside managers, and illiquid investments, had served Notre Dame and other large universities well over the past several decades. Scott Malpass, Notre Dame's Chief Investment Officer, was confident that this was a successful way to invest if implemented effectively, but he also saw the top university endowments experience 25% to 35% declines in portfolio value during the second half of 2008 that eviscerated the investment gains from the past several years. Notre Dame had weathered the crisis relatively well, but there were several key questions Malpass had to address. Should Notre Dame continue to make illiquid investments in the context of rising unfunded commitments relative to liquid funds? Was compensation adequate for the illiquidity of these types of investments? In relation to manager selection, how could the Notre Dame investment team continue to find the best managers to create alpha? To what extent would the performance of managers during the crisis be predictive of future performance in other portions of the economic cycle? How would the long-established industry terms of contract between clients and managers change going forward? Was there an opportunity for clients to negotiate better terms? These issues all needed to be addressed in the context of protecting the University's operating budget and supporting the mission of the institution.
Emotiv is getting ready to launch its innovative brain-computer interfacing (BCI) technology. The company has developed a special headset, called EPOC, and highly sophisticated software that can translate a person's emotions, cognitive thoughts and facial expressions into digital outcomes. Emotiv wants the technology to be adopted by mainstream consumers and is leaning towards the video game market as its primary initial target. However, it needs to decide whether to continue efforts to convince one of the big three console makers (PS3, Xbox 360, Wii) to enable the EPOC on their platform or to settle for the PC gaming market. Alternatively, the company could have chosen a number of different markets to focus on (such as medical, military, market research). A host of additional marketing decisions (pricing, channels, bundling a demo game) need to be made. The case allows students to grapple with the issues of: selecting a target application for the launch of an innovation; determining the importance of having a big name partner for the launch by an unknown start-up; considering the wisdom of taking a B2C rather than B2B approach with a novel technology; using analogous products to forecast demand and sales for a new technology.
The Cosan case introduces students and executive education participants to political economy and business strategy in the biofuels industry. Cosan, based in Brazil, is the largest grower and processor of sugarcane in the world, and the largest sugar and ethanol producer in Brazil; it is also the world's largest exporter of ethanol for vehicle fuels. Rubens Ometto, Cosan's CEO, has staked out a leading position in the Brazilian ethanol and sugar industries by virtue of his efficiencies in agricultural production and in downstream logistics. He now needs to consider whether, and how aggressively, to expand abroad, either with production facilities or by exporting Brazilian output. He also needs to decide the appropriate vertical structure for the firm: whether he should be involved more extensively in agriculture, processing, distribution, or retail. The answers to these questions depend on his views of the future of the industry, and on the governmental institutions that will affect the distribution of value along the value chain.
In September 2009, the president and chief executive officer (CEO) of Rona Inc. was reviewing the company's progress in relation to the ongoing economic recession. Rona was the largest retailer of hardlines in Canada. Rona had noticed definitive signs of slowdown in the third quarter of 2007 and had launched Strategic Plan 2008 - 2011 as a response. The two-phase program was nearing the completion of its first phase of Productivity, Efficiency and Profitability (PEP) and was gearing up for the 24 month-long Recovery Program. The Strategic Plan had been tweaked since its launch, all with a view towards strengthening the core platform. The objective of the Recovery Plan was to restore focus on growth vectors from which the company had become distracted. On the eve of commencement of the Recovery Plan, the CEO began to wonder if Rona was ready to act on increasing sales, recruiting independents, constructing new stores and pursuing acquisitions. Or was it necessary to redesign and relaunch the PEP program, thus deferring the Recovery Plan?
The case follows Laurie Thomas, a Silicon Valley software executive, as she transitions to a career in the restaurant industry as Executive Vice President of a small restaurant management company in San Francisco. Specifically, the case covers Thomas's background and introduction to the company and her decision to come on board full time. When she takes over the company, she discovers a series of problems that had been going on under the founder and she has to make several critical decisions early on. The case then highlights several employee related issues that are going on at one of the restaurants and the different potential options Thomas has for dealing with them. Next the case covers the events of a company offsite where Thomas was confronted with some negative feedback from her direct reports. The case concludes with Thomas considering the different options she has in confronting the various problems at the company.