The European Recycling Platform was the only pan-European recycling organization created in response to the European Union's groundbreaking directive to promote recycling of electronic waste. Braun, Electrolux, Hewlett-Packard and Sony established ERP in 2002 as an alternative to the monopolistic e-waste takeback systems then existing in several European countries. ERP was based on the principle of producer responsibility, in which manufacturers are financially responsible for managing the end-of-life phase of their goods. By late 2007, ERP operated in eight countries. It had achieved significant market share and stimulated competition in European e-waste recycling. In November 2007, ERP's board was meeting to evaluate whether the company should greatly expand its scope. Should ERP start handling new product categories such as discarded batteries and packaging? Should it expand to more countries? If so, which countries? If it expanded, could ERP handle the additional business complexity while preserving its low-cost, outsourced model? The case looks at an organization at the forefront of efforts to address the world's growing e-waste crisis. It highlights the importance of managing the end-of-life phase of products. Students will evaluate recycling as a business and market opportunity. They will assess the industry and market changes sparked by Europe's e-waste directive.
Plantar S.A. is a pig iron producer based in Brazil working toward an integrated supply chain producing 100% green pig iron. The company is gradually converting the coke fed into the blast furnaces from fossil to green (i.e., coal produced from renewable biomass). The company owns large eucalyptus plantations in Brazil, and was the first in Brazil to obtain the approval to trade Kyoto Protocol carbon credits. At the time of the case, both internationally and locally, the process and the technical methodologies were yet insufficiently defined. The World Bank saw Plantar as an opportunity to consolidate the process and showcase the Kyoto Protocol. The Plantar project was a success from a strictly financial viewpoint. In addition, it put the organization on the path of significant transformation, and new growth opportunities.
In May 2008, the executive team of MLC Corporation (MLC) became deeply involved in the examination of whether it should expand its production and distribution operations into Russia. The Russian economy had grown dramatically, mainly thanks to rising natural gas exports to Europe. A sharp rise in energy prices had further accelerated the growth of the energy sector, as well as supported the expansion of the economy. Thus, in early January 2009, Mark Olexi, the CEO of MLC, was faced with three potential alternatives. The first one was to expand plant capacity at home and continue to export, as the company had done so successfully for years. The second alternative was to risk building a manufacturing plant and distribution center in Russia, and strengthen the company's competitive position abroad. The third alternative was to await and delay both decisions because of the uncertainties caused by the global financial and economic crises. Whether Russia could manage its economy to avoid the worldwide recession and an internal financial and economic crisis was an open debate. In addition, Russia had just experienced a leadership change, energy prices had collapsed, and the Russian-U.S. relationship had deteriorated.
This is a negotiation exercise. The case involves the negotiated licensing agreement between an American manufacturer in Arizona, and a Mexican licensor in the State of Sonora. Sam Paint owns and operates the largest wholesale paint business in southern Arizona. Although he sells a variety of house-paint products, he is best known for his quick-drying paint, a process he developed and patented in the United States twelve years ago. Sam also holds a Mexican patent for quick-drying paint. Both patents are scheduled to expire in five years. This negotiation takes place in the aftermath of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the passage in Mexico of a strengthened intellectual property system
The case focuses on the turnaround situation facing the newly elected chief executive officer (CEO) of the Vancouver YMCA. The YMCA has suffered a long series of operating deficits ($9 million per year), has mounting debts to third parties, declining membership, and a maxed out $1 million operation line of credit. There are issues with its assets (old facilities with little renovations done over the past three decades), political infighting and union issues. The CEO has to work to turn the situation around before the organization goes bankrupt.
The developers of a simple, inexpensive, locally produced rain water harvesting system tackle the social marketing issues in the undeveloped market of rural Kenya. The benefits of the product are obvious but the poverty levels and entrenched traditions create significant and unique marketing challenges.
Two inexperienced, but strongly committed, entrepreneurs face the hassles of a new venture: exporting dough from Puerto Rico to cities in the United States with large numbers of Puerto Rican immigrants who are longing nostalgically for their beloved pan sobao (bread made with vegetable shortening). With thousands of Puerto Ricans living in and/or moving to the United States and after several incidents of fraud by partners of the entrepreneurs, they are thinking about how to take advantage of what seems to be an opportunity for doing business outside their Caribbean home. These entrepreneurs are confronting several challenges: 1) Preparing to detect opportunities and to get personally involved in a demanding export business 2) Differentiating and positioning the brand in a crowded market. Is a nostalgic feeling enough of a motivator to engage customers with the brand? 3) Deciding whether institution is a substitute for market data and feasibility determination.
This case presents the decisions facing the managing director/executive director of PacificLink iMedia (PacificLink), more than 10 years after he founded the company. The company had experienced periods of growth and decline since its founding and was facing a period of uncertain growth given the turmoil in world markets in 2009, following several years of strong growth and expansion. The director anticipated that the company could continue to grow into new geographic or product markets, or perhaps become fundamentally altered in its governance structure and financial resource base, through an initial public offering. The case involves analysis of these alternatives for growth. It can be used to teach about sources of competitive advantage and evaluations of growth alternatives. See also the first and third cases in the three-part series, 9B00M024 and 9B16M202.
MAN B&W Diesel (MBD), a subsidiary of MAN AG, had become very successful by having its large two-stroke diesel engines produced under licence in Asia. The success had led it to the position of world leader in ship engines, with world market shares between 70 and 80 per cent. The relationship between MBD and the licensees was characterized by both parties leveraging each other’s competencies. It was critical for MBD to access new knowledge in order to optimize products from the producing licensees. Similarly, the licensees leveraged access to the design specifications of the engines as well as expert knowledge and service offerings from MBD. Despite MBD’s success with the licence business model during recent years, new developments had triggered some concerns over the model’s long-term sustainability and feasibility, particularly with regard to competitors and intellectual property rights in China. Hence, the main challenge facing MBD was how to future-proof and perhaps adjust its business model to secure more control of critical knowledge and the licensees without jeopardizing the productive and lucrative licensee relationships.
The international affairs manager was responsible for developing and implementing an alliance strategy for System@tic Paris Region, a pôle de compétitivé (industry cluster) based in the Paris Region, France. The critical point was that, although inter-clusteral alliances had become essential to the success of a cluster - and the firms within them, many of the world's most prestigious clusters were highly sought after and, as a result, increasingly unavailable as alliance partners. Given limited time and resources, the result appeared to be an emerging race for partners in which clusters competed with each other to establish a productive and viable inter-clusteral alliance network. Within the next two weeks, the manager's goal was to establish the outline of a plan to develop an inter-clusteral alliance network that was both achievable and productive for his cluster member firms.
Otoyol Motor Company, a large commercial vehicle manufacturer, is on the verge of being liquidated by its shareholders. Despite all efforts to maintain its competitive position, the company has been caught in a downward spiral. Erosion of its first mover advantages, shifts in industry core competencies and changes in consumer preferences have depreciated the company's value proposition and deteriorated its market share. Utilizing empirical data, this case illustrates the evolution of the commercial vehicle industry in Turkey, changes in industry conditions, and competitive strategies employed by the incumbent and its Japanese rivals in various life cycle stages. Puppy dog ploy, market penetration, product strategy, long term market share acquisition stratagems employed by challengers, and the incumbent's counter moves are chronicled.
When L.C. Tu receives an emergency order, he is confronted with a range of production scheduling choices, each of which has unique costs and trade-offs. The case was designed to help students understand job-shop style production and the impact of disruptions and reactive scheduling. Students use two of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company's mainstream processes as a vehicle for analysis. The case describes a real situation in which upper management accepts an emergency order. By working through the impact on the production system, students should develop a feel for how shifting demand in a large factory that is structured as a job shop alters the demands on, and utilization rates of expensive capital equipment in a complex way. As bottlenecks shift, students can explore several alternatives, each with different costs and trade-offs. Students may also reflect on the true cost of providing the extraordinary service, and whether management properly takes the impact on operations into account when it makes customer commitments.
On 27 November 2006, Bharti Enterprises Ltd ("Bharti"), one of India's principal business groups, and American retail giant Wal-Mart Stores Inc ("Wal-Mart"), entered into a joint venture with equal partnership for both companies. The partnership would give Wal-Mart access to the highly regulated Indian retail market, which was valued at US$320 billion. Bharti would own retail shops under the Wal-Mart franchise and the companies would jointly operate in areas of the Indian retail industry which were accessible for foreign investment, such as logistics and cash-and-carry. This partnership between the US retail giant and one of India's most successful corporate houses was expected to bring a dose of modernity to the Indian retail landscape. It could be questioned, however, how Wal-Mart would cope with the opposition it faced from local shop owners and civil rights groups given its poor reputation with regard to social responsibility. In addition, the state of the country's transportation network was very poor and the question remained how Wal-Mart planned to implement its supply chain management model in India.
Globalization has prompted a new trend of cross-border acquisitions from the East to the West. Fueled by non-traditional motivations, Asian companies are acquiring respected and well-established Western brands, technology, assets and knowledge, and through these acquisitions gaining access to developed markets and talent pools. One such company, Gold Peak Electronics ("GPE"), is a multinational corporation that is among an elite group of Hong Kong electronics companies that design, manufacture and sell premium professional and home electronics products. Acquiring two high-end British premium loudspeaker companies in 1992-KEF Audio and Celestion International-has allowed GPE to take advantage of these companies' well established intellectual assets and R&D capabilities. However, cross-border acquisitions such as these are complicated, requiring companies to take into consideration differing regulations, national cultures, political factors, employee mindsets and work cultures. The acquiring company has also had to deal with human resource issues in its acquisitions, including handling work distribution and promoting employees' sense of job security. Although several years have passed since the acquisition, collaboration between GPEs various R&D sites in the UK, Hong Kong, and China is still not optimal. How can GPE successfully overcome the distances between these locations and promote innovative collaboration between its dispersed R&D sites? Was growth by acquisition of Western companies the best strategy for GPE's growth? This case illustrates opportunities and challenges for global R&D and virtual collaboration across geographic and cultural distances. This case also familiarizes students with the unique challenges in acquisitions of Western companies by Eastern companies, including human resources management and how the process of innovation and innovative thinking differs across countries.
Gilead Sciences launched Truvada, a combination pill incorporating Gilead's individual antiviral drugs, Viread and Emtriva, in the U.S. in 2004. This involved gaining FDA approval, setting a national price, and negotiating reimbursement levels with private and public insurers. While these activities had been resource intensive, their completion meant that Gilead was able to sell Truvada, a combination HIV/AIDS therapy, across the entire United States, approximately 50 percent of the worldwide market. The remaining 50% of Truvada's potential commercial success, however, would be pursued in Europe. Europe presented a more complex environment for reimbursement than the U.S. for three reasons. First, the reimbursement process differed in each European country as to required submissions and approaches to pricing. Second, the average time between the beginning and end of reimbursement negotiations was highly variable across European countries. Third, the local office for Gilead in each European country had its own estimate as to the likely length of negotiations and level of reimbursed price for Truvada, making it challenging to devise and communicate a consolidated strategy across the organization. Gilead needed to determine the order by which it would pursue reimbursement approval for Truvada in Germany, France and Spain. Germany's regulatory authority used a "free pricing" approach. In France and Spain, the government health ministers often (though not always) referenced neighboring markets' prices for a given product in order to determine the product's domestic reimbursable amount. . The approach Gilead decided upon would not only determine the future for Truvada in Europe but also would have a significant impact on the company's future financial health.
How does a pioneer in a new product category deal with the runaway success of a follower? Can search engine marketing and social media help? In 2008 Slanket CEO, Gary Clegg, found that his product, a blanket with sleeves, had been eclipsed by The Snuggie, another sleeved blanket. Snuggie made a brazen entry into the market with a $10 million spend on television infomercials. The Snuggie quickly became a pop culture phenomenon, talked about on popular television programs such as Oprah and The Tonight Show with Jay Leno, and paid mock tribute to on web sites such as YouTube, where hundreds of video parodies could be found. Clegg had been counting on building his Slanket brand. Will the coming of Snuggie mean the end of Slanket?     
Explores Canadian regulators' decision to adopt International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The Canadian decision in 2005 to adopt IFRS is particularly interesting because Canada had well-developed domestic accounting standards and because a significant fraction of Canadian industry was lobbying for the adoption of U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and not IFRS. The case positions the student as an advisor to an important local politician. Based on cultural, economic, and political information available in 2005, the case requires the student to choose between: (i) retaining Canadian GAAP; (ii) adopting U.S. GAAP; or (iii) adopting IFRS.
This case examines the importance of forecasting expected returns in asset allocation decisions. While the case is targeted to MBA students in an investments or portfolio management course, it is also appropriate for an advanced undergraduate course. It is written from the perspective of a new employee at a small investment management firm that was surprised by the market crash of 2008 and subsequent market rebound in 2009. The CIO of the firm is meeting with an important client to explain his asset allocation recommendations for 2008 and 2009 and to suggest a new allocation going forward. He enlists the help of this new employee in preparing the materials for this presentation. The case requires students to analyze the ability of simple valuation ratios to forecast returns. Students will use a smoothed price-to-earnings ratio to forecast future returns and given step-by-step instructions for the analysis. In addition, students must use their regression results to form a simple (two-asset) tactical asset allocation strategy to better understand the importance of forecasting expected returns for asset allocation decisions and how such forecasts could be used to form a simple tactical asset allocation model. Students also will examine the issues associated with performance measurement for a tactical asset allocation or market-timing investment strategy.
In 2006, Samsung Electronics semiconductor business was the world's largest supplier of flash memory components. The company, however, did not originally invent flash technology and entered the market in the early 1990s behind technology leader Toshiba Corporation of Japan. This case explains how Samsung became a leader in the global market for flash memory over the following fifteen years. Readers are asked how they would make investment decisions to maintain this leadership position going forward.