This case introduces risk management in the context of corporate lending, one of the bread-and-butter functions of commercial banks. It evokes the cultural tension between the risk function and the business line, which in this organization reverberated long after the decisive votes were cast at the group credit committee. The case further motivates debate on calculative cultures, and the role of model-based risk assessments in decision-making, and underlines the role of judgment in risk decisions. Modeling and judgment carry different weight in different types of risk decisions. While risk models can be relied upon as the key decision-makers in a retail banking environment (e.g. credit card applications), in the case of large credit decisions, their reliability is, generally, low. This is because the key features of the proposals at hand cannot all be condensed into risk metrics; as in these proposals, several "qualitative" issues arise that the decision-maker needs to judge in tandem with the quantitative metrics. The exercise also highlights that model-based risk metrics are themselves judgmental (they reflect the assumptions of the modeler) and that their use must be as much an art as a science. The story has got a temporal dimension: one proposal was current in mid-2006, the other in late 2008, two very different credit environments.
T.J., an undergraduate at a business school, was upset to find a group mate's contribution to his group project containing plagiarized and poorly paraphrased content (also without any citation as to source in some instances). T.J. and four others had to work with K.C., the errant group member, on three group projects that together made up 30 per cent of the final mark for the course. In particular, T.J. was upset by the shoddy corrections provided by K.C. when his error was highlighted. T.J. was also appalled at K.C.'s nonchalant attitude towards plagiarism and the group projects, especially after discovering that K.C. had done the same on their first group project. T.J. felt strongly that the matter should be brought up to the course professor but two of his group mates disagreed, fearing that the group harmony would be adversely affected, thus jeopardizing their last group project, which carried significantly higher weight at 20 per cent. The remaining two group mates did not seem to consider the matter a serious one. T.J. wondered what the right thing to do would be. This case was written for use in the introductory class to a business ethics course. However, it has potential for use in lessons on negotiation, conflict resolution and team dynamics. The case is based on an actual occurrence but names have been changed to provide anonymity. The subject of plagiarism and a poorly contributing group member to group assignments is one that resonates deeply with students pursuing any course that emphasizes group work as a necessary component of the course assessment. The case has practical relevance to the working world inasmuch as the incident can occur in that context. Apart from being a useful opener to any course on ethics, the case also serves as a good reminder to students about plagiarism. It provides opportunities for clarification and discussion on what exactly constitutes plagiarism and the professors'/universities' stand on the matter.
TOTO, the leading manufacturer of toilets in Japan, is struggling to penetrate the US market with its premier bidet-toilets, which are present in 63% of homes in Japan. The case examines the behavioral, cultural, and institutional barriers that TOTO faces in gaining adoption of an innovation. It also explores the role of product categorization in driving consumer behavior - in contrast to the US, toilets in Japan are considered a high-tech consumer electronic device. Finally, the role of organizational identity and culture is examined. The creation of the bidet-toilet category in Japan was a defining accomplishment for TOTO, and this history has created a strong commitment to promoting it in the US. But given that TOTO has been highly successful selling regular high-end toilets in the US, is this commitment to the bidet-toilet appropriate?
Colfax Corporation was a young, privately held collection of pump-manufacturing companies from the United States and Europe. Intending to go public, it was eager to find a story for investors of how it could grow at rates faster than its subsidiaries had historically grown in their home regions and core-customer industrial markets. This case describes a singular new-growth opportunity: selling Colfax solutions into state-owned petroleum enterprises in the Middle East at a time when these producers were straining to add capacity. Designing the optimal marketing system required Colfax to weigh a complex of issues, including global resource allocation and deployment, a process for customer-relationship building, and estimates for revenue streams versus investment outlays. The design process was, in short, far more than "sticking sales rep pins in the map." Case readers are asked to think along with the Colfax global management team in deciding, "How much can we afford to risk our current income model in order to build new capacity in a new region in a new way?"
This case is a follow-up to SPM-39A, which described three eras of the Anaheim Ducks NHL hockey team. In 2007, the team won the Stanley Cup (the NHL championship). This case describes the opportunities and challenges facing team management as a result of winning the Stanley Cup.
This case traces the Anaheim Ducks of the National Hockey League through three distinct eras, beginning with the teams founding and initial success (1992-1997), through a period of ownership turmoil and financial loss (1998-2004), and then new ownership and rebuilding (2005-2008). It discusses issues both on and off the ice, including ownership business strategy (such as the Disney Company's strategy for using the team to promote tourism to Anaheim, site of Disneyland, and to promote its Mighty Ducks films). The case also discusses branding and other strategic issues addressed during each era by the team's various owners.
February 2008. Lando Simonetti was enjoying the relative cool of his Cucha Cucha office in the suburbs of Buenos Aires, Argentina. It may have been cool, but definitely not quiet. His desire to always be in the middle of the action at the company also meant he had to live through the noise of the factory. This ability to stay in close contact with people and realities on the ground had been instrumental in building La Martina from a modest polo equipment provider to the premier polo brand in the world, with global sales in excess of US$200 million. La Martina was not about polo: it was polo. As an Argentinean of Italian origin, Lando could not have felt prouder to have conquered Europe. At 65, he had reached the pinnacle of the sport he loved so much. A few nagging questions lingered. The brand was being pushed more and more into fashion, a move he had strongly resisted so far. How would this affect its sustainability? La Martina had never been about fashion; it produced and sold functional polo equipment. Polo had become fashionable, and so had its products. Should he fight the trend or capitalize on it? What would that mean for the company? Fashion also meant growth. So far, he had stubbornly pursued only self-financed growth. Perhaps it was time to consider raising more capital. Learning objectives: Building a brand, managing growth, globalizing.
March 2008. Lando Simonetti, founder and CEO of La Martina was pacing around his office in the Buenos Aires suburbs. Not so long ago, the offer that had just landed in his in-box would have been relegated to the trash bin within seconds. He had always been fervently committed to the independence of his firm - independence from investors, boards of directors, banks and politicians. From a local polo equipment producer, La Martina had become one of the most recognized global brand names in polo and fashion alike. He would have preferred to stay true to the brand's DNA, rooted in the estancia lifestyle and the polo game, delivering functional polo equipment. But that no longer seemed possible since the fashion industry had discovered the brand and transformed it into a fashion icon. This time the offer was different. It came from Tribeca Partners, a reputed South American private equity firm in Bogotá that had developed a serious fashion specialty. It had recently concluded its first deal in Argentina, acquiring one of La Martina's local competitors, Etiqueta Negra, with a view to taking it global. The company clearly knew about fashion and Argentina was on its radar screen. The offer was rock solid, valuing the company at close to three times sales and ten times EBIT. Was it time to let go? Learning objectives: Discuss exit planning, harvesting, private equity, growth management, and the fashion industry.
Commercial Director Prado wonders how to leverage the loyalty card information to prepare the Fall 2008 budget. The case discusses the value of subjective and objective information for profit planning purposes. Spanish children's apparel retailer Neck & Neck uses loyalty card information for tactical purposes, such as promotional campaigns. Its management team is thinking about how to incorporate that information to the budgeting (profit planning) process. From an analytical standpoint the case looks at the surprising results of a mailing campaign that reveals the consequences of inadequate updating of the customer database. Also, the budgeting data in the case may be used to teach regression model selection and R-squared.
In 2007, HOYA of Japan must decide whether to change its friendly exchange offer for Pentax into a hostile cash tender offer. A surprising sequence of events had caused a friendly merger agreement to fall apart, resulting in a boardroom coup at Pentax and the intervention of the Sparx Group, an indigenous activist Japanese hedge fund. The case raises issues about corporate valuation, corporate governance, shareholder activism, takeover deal tactics, and the Japanese market for corporate control.
Most companies around the world are controlled by their founding families, including more than half of all public corporations in the U.S. and Europe, and more than two thirds of these in Asia. These companies are the subject of the Financial Management of Family and Closely Held Firms course, an elective MBA course at Harvard Business School. The course introduces students to the unique finance, governance, and management issues faced by family firms, and to the ways in which these issues can be addressed. The course provides students with a framework for analyzing how family ownership, control, and management affect value, and whether and how more value can be created for the various stakeholders in family firms. The course is designed for students who may be involved with these companies in a variety of roles, including those of founders, shareholders, or managers of their own family's firm, as well as those of non-family managers and employees, investors or business partners (e.g., private equity investors), and advisors of various kinds (e.g., Investment bankers, board members, or consultants).
The California Public Employees' Retirement System (CaIPERS)-the largest public pension fund in the U.S.-had adopted a new principles-based approach to investing in emerging market equities in November 2007. Previously, CalPERS internal and external money managers were prohibited from investing in certain developing countries because the countries failed to meet certain standards for political stability, human rights, market regulation, etc. The new principles-based approach would allow CalPERS money managers to invest in companies that were financially attractive and competitively positioned provided their business practices were sound from an environmental, social, & governance (ESG) perspective regardless of where they were located. By allowing investment in these types of companies regardless of where they operated, CalPERS had hoped to improve its investment returns. The case is set in January 2009, a little more than a year from the time the principles-based approach had been adopted. It is a good time to review the implementation process and how the new principles-based approach changed CaIPERS' emerging market equities portfolios and their returns. The case focuses on one of CalPERS' external fund managers, Dimensional Fund Advisors, and a service provider to DFA and CalPERS, KLD Research & Analytics. One question facing CalPERS with this new approach is whether to invest in PetroChina, which had been off-limits previously due to the screening criteria that were used to identify which countries qualified for emerging markets investments. The case also raises the issue of the difference between "value" and "values" investing and the future importance of ESG investing.
Gary Parr, deputy chairman of Lazard Frères & Co. and Kellogg class of 1980, could not believe his ears. "You can't mean that," he said, reacting to the lowered bid given by Doug Braunstein, JP Morgan head of investment banking, for Parr's client, legendary investment bank Bear Stearns. Less than eighteen months after trading at an all-time high of $172.61 a share, Bear now had little choice but to accept Morgan's humiliating $2-per-share, Federal Reserve-sanctioned bailout offer. "I'll have to get back to you." Hanging up the phone, Parr leaned back and gave an exhausted sigh. Rumors had swirled around Bear ever since two of its hedge funds imploded as a result of the subprime housing crisis, but time and again, the scrappy Bear appeared to have weathered the storm. Parr's efforts to find a capital infusion for the bank had resulted in lengthy discussions and marathon due diligence sessions, but one after another, potential investors had backed away, scared off in part by Bear's sizable mortgage holdings at a time when every bank on Wall Street was reducing its positions and taking massive write-downs in the asset class. In the past week, those rumors had reached a fever pitch, with financial analysts openly questioning Bear's ability to continue operations and its clients running for the exits. Now Sunday afternoon, it had already been a long weekend, and it would almost certainly be a long night, as the Fed-backed bailout of Bear would require onerous negotiations before Monday's market open. By morning, the eighty-five-year-old investment bank, which had survived the Great Depression, the savings and loan crisis, and the dot-com implosion, would cease to exist as an independent firm. Pausing briefly before calling CEO Alan Schwartz and the rest of Bear's board, Parr allowed himself a moment of reflection. How had it all happened?
In recent years Lehman Brothers, one of the five largest investment banks in the United States, had grown increasingly reliant on its fixed income trading and underwriting division, which served as the primary engine for its strong profit growth. The bank had also significantly increased its leverage over the same timeframe, going from a debt-to-equity ratio of 23.7x in 2003 to 35.2x in 2007. As leverage increased, the ongoing erosion of the mortgage-backed industry began to impact Lehman significantly and its stock price plummeted. Unfortunately, public outcry over taxpayer assumption of $29 billion in potential Bear losses made repeating such a move politically untenable. The surreal scene of potential buyers traipsing into an investment bank's headquarters over the weekend to consider various merger or spin-out scenarios repeated itself once again. This time, the Fed refused to back the failing bank's liabilities, attempting instead to play last-minute suitors Bank of America, HSBC, Nomura Securities, and Barclay's off each other, jawboning them by arguing that failing to step up to save Lehman would cause devastating counterparty runs on their own capital positions. The Fed's desperate attempts to arrange its second rescue of a major U.S. investment bank in six months failed when it refused to backstop losses from Lehman's toxic mortgage holdings. Complicating matters was Lehman's reliance on short-term repo loans to finance its balance sheet. Unfortunately, such loans required constant renewal by counterparties, who had grown increasingly nervous that Lehman would lose the ability to make good on its trades. With this sentiment swirling around Wall Street, Lehman was forced to announce the largest Chapter 11 filing in U.S. history, listing assets of $639 billion and liabilities of $768 billion. The second domino had fallen. It would not be the last.
This case is designed to teach how to structure information technology (IT) infrastructure outsourcing deals from both the outsourcer and the client perspective. Office Supply Incorporated (OSI) is a company in crisis, with challenges in its cost structure and poor IT performance. Outsourcing to Technology Infrastructure Solutions is an opportunity to both reduce costs and complexity for the firm, but students first must consider whether outsourcing is a good strategic fit for OSI. Detailed spreadsheet templates are given that are based on a real outsourcing client engagement for a major infrastructure outsourcing company. The spreadsheets are complex but have been simplified so that they automatically calculate when populated, allowing the students to quickly move to answering the management challenge: how should TIS price and structure the outsourcing deal? Answering this question provides deep insights into the business case for IT outsourcing and how outsourcers financially engineer a deal structure to ensure a win-win outcome for both the client and outsource service provider.
Rob Griffin, senior vice president and U.S. director of search for Media Contacts, a communications consulting firm, is faced with the task of optimizing search engine marketing (SEM) for Air France. At the time of the case, SEM had become an advertising phenomenon, with North American advertisers spending $9.4 billion in the SEM channel, up 62% from 2005. Moving forward, Griffin wants to ensure that the team keeps its leading edge and delivers the results Air France requires for optimal Internet sales growth. The case centers upon Air France's and Media Contacts' efforts to find the ideal SEM campaign to provide an optimal amount of ticket sales in response to advertising dollars spent. This optimal search marketing campaign is based on choosing effective allocation of ad dollars across the various search engines, as well as selecting appropriate keywords and bid strategies for placement on the search result page for Internet users. In determining the optimal strategy, the case presents background information on the airline industry as well as the Internet search options available at the time, including Google, Microsoft MSN, Yahoo!, and Kayak. Additionally, background information is provided on SEM and its associated costs and means of measuring the successfulness of each marketing effort. The case illustrates how one must first determine the key performance indicators for the project to guide analysis and enable comparison of various SEM campaigns. Cost per click and probability to produce a sale differ among publishers. Therefore, using a portfolio application model's quadrant positions can be used to determine optimal publisher strategies. Additionally, pivot tables help illustrate campaigns and strategies that have historically been most successful in meeting Air France's target Internet sales. Multiple recommendations on how Media Contacts can assist Air France in improving its SEM strategy can be derived from the data provided.
Growing from a passive investment in a Chicago delicatessen in 1978, into a national foodservice company by 2007, Levy Restaurants (Levy) served approximately 63 million customers a year at more than 85 different restaurants and sporting and entertainment venues. Then Levy expanded its fine-dining restaurant business into sports and entertainment venues and such unexpected places as Disney World. Levy grew at greater than 20% compounded growth rates between 1999 and 2007 because of a plethora of newly constructed baseball, football, basketball, and hockey arenas and stadiums. When construction growth leveled off, Levy responded by expanding into entertainment venues. How could Levy maintain its stellar growth rate? Levy's answer to this question depended, in part, on how it defined its core competencies; it needed to decide whether it was a fine-dining company or a foodservice company and how its customer-value proposition differed from its competitors. Levy had to determine which new customer segments to expand and whether to grow, maintain, or shrink its restaurant business.