In 2015, Automaten Technik Baumann (ATB) was dismayed to learn that Volkswagen Financial Services had acquired a 92 per cent stake in Sunhill Technologies, one of Europe's largest providers of mobile parking and ticketing solutions. ATB had focused on the production of parking meters for several decades, but was now seeing a threat to its existing business due to the rise of mobile parking providers. Consumers could now use their smartphone to pay for parking-making parking meters obsolete. Should ATB take the rise of new entrants seriously? Would ATB need to adjust its business model?
In early 2016, the chief executive officer (CEO) of Pennycook Power Boats was approached by the CEO of a competitor, who was interested in purchasing Pennycook Power Boats and asked to see the company's audited financial statements. The CEO of Pennycook Power Boats faced a dilemma: he wanted to engage in a meaningful discussion about a possible sale but also needed to protect his firm's business interests.
Setting a strategic direction for a business school, initiating a culture change, and overcoming a massive financial deficit were challenges faced by the incoming dean of the Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan, Alison Davis-Blake. Of the four strategic pillars adopted-analytical rigor, action learning, boundarylessness, and a focus on the positive-the positive pillar was both the most controversial and the most differentiating. After experiencing dramatic success over a five-year period, Davis-Blake stepped down and a new dean was appointed, Scott DeRue. He had to determine whether to keep the positive pillar or abandon it.
DataXu served marketers by buying digital advertising for brands using its demand-side platform. It sought a way to build a more predictable revenue stream in the very transactional media marketplace, and hoped that two new marketing analytics products would give it a more predictable revenue stream. But sales were behind forecast. DataXu's large brand and advertising agency clients found the new products interesting, but evidence suggested that their buying processes might be incompatible with the recurring sales model DataXu wanted to implement. Will DataXu need to change its sales organization, pricing approach, or hiring criteria to sell the new products?
The Los Angeles Philharmonic Orchestra (LA Phil), under the leadership of Deborah Borda, had enjoyed great successes in the 2000s and 2010s, even as other U.S. orchestras faltered. The architecturally acclaimed Walt Disney Concert Hall had opened its doors. The institution's finances looked healthy after years of operating losses. A celebrity music director, Gustavo Dudamel, had joined the team. The LA Phil had launched its Youth Orchestra of Los Angeles (YOLA), a classical-music outreach program. Yet the LA Phil still faced real challenges, as all U.S. orchestras did--an aging subscriber base, concern around appeal to younger audiences, and development of a pipeline of donors for the future. How could Borda continue to position the orchestra for success?
Hong Kong Telecommunications Limited (HKT) is a member firm of the PCCW conglomerate and Hong Kong's largest telecommunications company. With its core telecom business maturing, HKT has been exploring new business opportunities to sustain its growth momentum. In November 2011, HKT rolled out eSmartHealth; the first cloud-based health data management service in the territory. eSmartHealth aimed at providing integrated data on personal wellness and healthcare management. The business kicked off with a wellness management service targeting figure-conscious females, marathon lovers, and health-conscious urban dwellers. Over the next five years, eSmartHealth evolved its positioning from wellness to healthcare and explored new segments. HKT would typically give a new business venture a year's grace period to break even. But eSmartHealth was going into its sixth year and still looked like it was in the startup stage. Teresa Ng, the Head of marketing for HKT's consumer group, sensed the pressure to turn eSmartHealth around and make it a success was intensifying. She and her team realized that the generosity of top management would not persist if the business failed to make a decent profit.
In April 2015, Shell offered to pay 0.4454 of its B shares and 383 pence in cash for each BG share in a deal valued at $70 billion. The offer entailed a sizable 50%-plus premium for the BG Group by assuming a $90/bbl forward oil price. Shell had to seek approval from at least 50% of its shareholders, and BG Group would require the backing of 75% of its shareholders for the deal to go through. On January 8, 2016, Standard Life, a major shareholder in both Royal Dutch Shell plc and BG Group, announced that it would vote No to a merger between Shell and BG at a Shell shareholder meeting to be held on January 27, stating that "the proposed terms of the acquisition of BG are value-destructive for Shell shareholders." However, the same investor would vote Yes at a BG shareholder meeting on January 28. A volatile oil market further complicated the M&A decision. With oil prices in the low $30s/bbl, the market was worried that Shell's view of the future was overoptimistic. Shell top executives needed to make a business case to win shareholder support, which might turn into a case of overpromising and underdelivering to investors. Learning objective: The case offers an opportunity to study the pros and cons of a deal on both sides, as well as to evaluate the strategic benefits and the price tag. Students gain an understanding of three valuation techniques - discounted cash flows (DCF), net asset value (NAV) and market multiples - and of the sensitivity of the deal value to changes in forward oil prices. The incomplete and uncertain nature of firm valuation is revealed and the reality that financial analysis often depends on many assumptions.
Orb, a tiny Silicon Valley start-up, came up with a breakthrough technology. Before anyone else was doing it, Orb developed software that enabled every type of media on a PC (including music, photos, and videos) to be streamed remotely to any mobile device for free. Orb also enabled users to stream live TV onto their PCs and mobile devices. This was a significant technological feat in the days before the iPhone and other smartphones. When it launched the product in 2005, Orb won the "Next Big Thing" award from an influential technology publication. Orb had developed a sophisticated technology that generated positive press, yet the product did not immediately go viral, as the company had hoped. So Orb carried out several marketing, technological, and strategic pivots-and faced a lot of disappointment until it hit on what seemed to be a winning combination. The case, set in 2007, details these pivots and addresses the following topics: new product and feature development; customer acquisition; customer usage and retention; and marketing opportunities and challenges. The case ends with a decision about what the company should do next.
In 2003, the tiny start-up Orb came up with a breakthrough technology. Through its software, every type of media on a PC (including music, photos, and videos) could be streamed remotely to any mobile device for free. Orb also enabled users to stream live TV onto their PCs and mobile devices. This was a technological feat in the days before the iPhone and other smartphones. When Orb launched in 2005, it won the "Next Big Thing" award from the influential tech publication CNET. It had been a challenging technology to develop, and with such positive press, Orb watched and waited for the technology to go viral. This case is divided into three parts. Part (A) covers the early challenges Orb had with user adoption, unexpected technology challenges, and its realization that it was not going to go viral - at least not as the company and product existed at that time. At the end of 2005, Orb had about 300,000 users, and it needed to decide its next move. It could keep pushing the product to consumers - either on its own or through partners; try to find partners in the B2B space and supply streaming architecture; or maybe call it a day and try to sell the company for the technology. Parts (B) and (C) cover Orb in 2006 and 2007. Topics include: 1) New product and feature development, 2) Strategy and product pivots, 3) Customer acquisition versus product usage, 4) Marketing opportunities and challenges, and 5) decisions about selling a company. Part (B) and (C) of the case are for instructor use only.
Indigo Agriculture had successfully developed and launched its first commercial product, microbe-enhanced cotton seeds, on an accelerated product development timeline. In late 2016, as the company was about to launch their second product, winter wheat, the management team proposed to again accelerate their development timeline and introduce six new products in four countries within the next 12 months. The CEO and Director of Business Development met to discuss the feasibility of accelerating their timeline, potential bottlenecks in the product development process, resource management, and the potential need for a more formalized development process.
This note introduces key managerial issues in new product development. It describes the product development funnel and alternative approaches to structuring product development teams including functional, lightweight, heavyweight, and autonomous/dedicated teams, which vary in their capacity to manage integration. More formal product development approaches including the stage-gate process and critical-path method are described, as are agile methods and principles-and related tools such as scrum, extreme programming, feature-driven development. Product development metrics including lead time, capacity, and productivity are defined and discussed.
In 2016, LA Fitness was the largest chain of non-franchised fitness clubs in North America, operating 676 clubs, serving 4.9 million members, and generating revenues of over $1.9 billion. Founded by Chinyol Yi, Louis Welch, and Paul Norris in 1984, the privately held company revealed little about its future plans or its operations, leading one journalist to write of "the quiet ascension of LA Fitness." However, it continued to expand aggressively, focusing on a full-service model, often including swimming pools and racquetball courts at moderate prices. Rumors of an IPO had circulated for over a decade, triggered by the fact that several private-equity houses had invested in the business and might be looking for an exit. In 2014, the company had arranged up to $1.6 billion in debt to fund expansion and buy out some investors. Whether this would be sufficient to appease its owners and support future growth was not clear. Nor was it clear how much more expansion LA Fitness could expect with its full-service model in the highly competitive fitness-club industry.
The case examines the rationale for why shadow banking exists, what role it plays in the financial system, and the risks that it may pose. In the case, an analyst in an investment fund is tasked to examine in greater detail the decision by GE to divest GE Capital. Understanding the rationale for this transaction, the role of GE Capital in the financial system, and the potential risks for the financial system would be important for the analyst's decision. This case would fit well in a second-year MBA elective course on Financial Institutions or Capital Markets.
APLO was a reputable supplier of LED lighting systems for diverse countries from Taiwan to the United Kingdom. In 2015, APLO signed a contract to supply and install 30,000 pieces of 60-watt ecological street lights in several towns within one of Indonesia’s provinces. With over 250 million inhabitants, Indonesia was in dire need of modernizing its infrastructure as it expanded economically. Having already been contracted for street lighting in several parts of Jakarta, Indonesia’s capital city, APLO was eager for more projects across Indonesia. Would APLO be able to make this its showcase project and win many more contracts throughout Indonesia’s 34 provinces?