Following the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, there was consensus that the FBI needed to make organizational changes. The FBI had long distinguished itself as the world's pre-eminent organization for conducting after-the-fact investigations that laid the groundwork for the prosecution of criminal cases. What remained to be seen was whether the FBI could build on its strengths to extend its capabilities to intelligence gathering and analysis. Describes the FBI organization, career incentives in the agency, and two attempts at organizational restructuring: The 1998 strategic plan (and the creation of the Investigative Services Division) and MAXCAP 05. Also examines the traditional law enforcement approach and how this manifested itself in the agency's organizational structures and systems. Lays the groundwork for discussion of the incentives related to the decentralized management structure, the recruiting and training of new analysts, information sharing and coordination, performance measurement and rewards, and budgeting. Ends with the appointment of Robert Mueller as the new director and his charge to reform the organization.
Examines the organizational strategy of a professional football team that contributed to the team's sustained success. Considers several aspects of the team's "blueprint" with respect to players: recruitment, retention, task structure, training, culture, and compensation. Presents opportunities to explore: the potential complementarities between multiple human resources systems, the role of intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives, whether star players are incompatible with well-functioning teams, and the establishment and maintenance of a culture that reinforces goal alignment.
At a March 2004 annual shareholder meeting, 45% of Walt Disney Co.'s shareholders withheld their support from CEO and Chairman Michael Eisner, producing a large no-confidence vote in the company's leader. The company had struggled financially in recent years and the board was widely believed to be beholden to Eisner. Two directors, Roy Disney and Stan Gold, resigned in protest of Eisner's leadership and the board's unwillingness to change. The two began to wage a PR battle calling for Eisner's removal and asking all shareholders to withhold their support from him at the upcoming shareholder meeting. Traces the history of Eisner's reign at the company and the events leading up to the March 3, 2004, shareholders meeting.
In the context of Japan's struggling economy of the 1990s, ORIX, a leading Japanese financial services company, implemented a new performance evaluation and compensation system. At the time, many higher-paying western firms were entering the Japanese market and threatened to take ORIX's talent. ORIX's system had always included performance-based pay and now sought to make it a bigger part. The CEO sought to create a system combining the best elements of Japanese Western corporate culture. In 2001, ORIX further refined and expanded its evaluation and compensation system. Several managers comment on the system's strengths and weaknesses. Examines these issues in the light of Japan's economy and unique corporate culture.
In the mid-1980s, Arrow, the world's largest electronics distributor, implemented a college recruiting program to hire salespeople. The program was part of an effort to increase the professionalism and skill set of the sales force in an industry where few salespeople had college degrees. After an expensive and thorough training program, many of the new college grads hired were poached by Arrow's competitors for higher salaries. Arrow was ultimately unsuccessful in persuading the college grads to stay, and the recruiting program ended after five years. In 1997, CEO Steve Kaufman decided to start a new college recruiting program, determined not to repeat the mistakes of the past. A rewritten version of an earlier case.
Examines the transition of an orthopedic surgical group at a premier teaching and research hospital from a system in which the surgeons are compensated with flat salaries to a system where they are compensated based on profitability. Allows for an examination of several critical issues in incentive strategy, including pay-to-performance in a not-for-profit environment, whether a compensation system is truly aligned with value creation (issues of quality of care and research time), and the difficulty in designing a compensation system in a competitive labor market when the objectives of the institution extend beyond pure profit maximization. This is a rewritten version of an earlier case.