This case describes the growth of ReNew Power during its first decade of operation. Sumant Sinha, a first-generation entrepreneur and former banker, founded the company, which grew from a modest generator-cum-developer of wind energy-based electricity to one of India's largest companies in the renewable energy sector. With the entry of large, well-funded players such as Tata Power and Adani Green into the Indian renewable sector by the end of 2020, Sinha had to make a strategic decision: should ReNew continue to organically scale up its presence in an increasingly competitive yet expanding Indian renewable energy sector, should it diversify geographically, or should it pursue emerging opportunities for vertical or horizontal integration within the sector? The case provides an opportunity to discuss how alternative business models and competitive scenarios may facilitate or inhibit the growth of a player in the renewable energy sector.

Essar Steel India Limited was one of the first 12 firms admitted for insolvency resolution under a newly created law in India-the lnsolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The case describes the challenges faced by the professional turnaround firm Alvarez and Marsal India (A&M) that was appointed by the committee of creditors to preserve and enhance value before Essar Steel could be sold to a new investor at a price that would minimise the "hair cut" for the creditors. Mr Nikhil Shah, a managing director at A&M, reflected on his team's experience with simultaneously turning around Essar Steel and managing the processes laid out by the code as per the law. The case provides insights into how insolvencies were dealt with in India under the new code and how a professional firm managed a financially distressed firm and turned it around.

This case is the first of a three-part series that follows the managerial, strategic, and communication decisions of the Swachh Bharat Mission (SBM) or Clean India Mission, the flagship program of the Government of India to eliminate the practice of open defecation (i.e., not using a toilet) from 2014 to 2019. As of 2014, 550 million people in India practiced open defecation. This problem posed a massive public health hazard and economic drag for the country. Written from an insider's perspective, the cases center on the decisions made by a new Secretary of India's Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation, who was hired to implement the SBM - focused on changing the behaviour of over 500 million people from open defecation to the usage of toilets. Case A sets the stage for addressing open defecation in rural India and discusses the human resources and strategic challenges to implementing SBM from the vantage point of the new Secretary. It ends with strategic dilemmas related to what the new SBM team should do once they had sized up the challenges to eliminating open defecation by 2019. The case provides an opportunity to deliberate the managerial and strategic decisions of a globally relevant public behaviour change and rural infrastructure development program as well as different forms of public sector implementation in the Indian context.

This case is the first of a three-part series that follows the managerial, strategic, and communication decisions of the Swachh Bharat Mission (SBM) or Clean India Mission, the flagship program of the Government of India to eliminate the practice of open defecation (i.e., not using a toilet) from 2014 to 2019. As of 2014, 550 million people in India practiced open defecation. This problem posed a massive public health hazard and economic drag for the country. Written from an insider's perspective, the cases center on the decisions made by a new Secretary of India's Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation, who was hired to implement the SBM - focused on changing the behaviour of over 500 million people from open defecation to the usage of toilets. Case B discusses the start-up challenges for SBM, including implementation in India's complex federal system, workplace culture, and the deep-rooted behaviour of open defecation in rural India and the managerial and communication strategies formulated to address them. The case concludes by framing the difficulties and challenges faced by the mission as it got scaled up.

This case is the first of a three-part series that follows the managerial, strategic, and communication decisions of the Swachh Bharat Mission (SBM) or Clean India Mission, the flagship program of the Government of India to eliminate the practice of open defecation (i.e., not using a toilet) from 2014 to 2019. As of 2014, 550 million people in India practiced open defecation. This problem posed a massive public health hazard and economic drag for the country. Written from an insider's perspective, the cases center on the decisions made by a new Secretary of India's Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation, who was hired to implement the SBM - focused on changing the behaviour of over 500 million people from open defecation to the usage of toilets. Case C discusses the team's strategy to promote sanitation behaviour change, accelerate progress in states with particularly recalcitrant rates of open defecation, and monitor progress at a national scale. A key theme is how the team employed methods unconventional for a historically low-profile government ministry, including personalized attention to certain states, harnessing the power of stardom to communicate key messages, and continuing to leverage political commitment from the Central (Federal) government. The case ends with a sense of achievement but outlines the issues that could threaten the sustainability of the gains made in toilet. Readers are challenged to analyse how lessons from SBM could inform public policies for eliminating open defecation in other countries.

Case B contains a description of the deal between the Trust's original Sponsor (Sterlite Power) and a new set of financial investors led by KKR. The new investors first entered as an additional Sponsor and eventually replaced the original Sponsor to become the IndiGrid Trust's sole Sponsor. Through the deal, the incoming investors and the eventual Sponsor committed to buying five of the original Sponsor's transmission projects as and when they became operational, with two such operational projects to be acquired immediately. The case concludes with a summary of the consequence of this change on the outlook of the Investment Manager, now owned by the incoming Sponsor. The Investment Manager, freed from the limiting interest of the original Sponsor, had to search for investment opportunities from the perspective of incoming financial investors, which included the new Sponsor.

The case describes the structure of one of the earliest infrastructure investment trusts (InvITs) created and launched in Indian markets in 2017. IndiGrid was an InvIT created by Sterlite Power Grid Ventures Limited (SPGVL), the Sponsor. As a developer, SPGVL had been in the business of constructing and making available transmission links and assets to the grid operator on the basis of competitively bid annuity-like payments over 25 to 35 years. IndiGrid, an InvIT, acquired the transmission assets of the Sponsor to enable wider participation of investors. As the case illustrates, InvITs were allowed to act as pass-through vehicles for tax purposes in order to facilitate investors' direct participation in financing private-sector infrastructure investments. Historically, most investments made by private players in the infrastructure sectors in India relied on bank debt and risk capital brought by the developers or mobilised via equity markets.

The Indian electricity sector was opened to the private sector under the IPP policy. The NTPC, India's largest and perhaps most efficient generator had to respond to the changing scenario. It set out to set up the Simhadri project in Andhra Pradesh, going beyond to original mandate. The IPP policy, its perversities, the background of the power sector, the problems there in and the response of NTPC are discussed. Case (B) discusses the issues related to Project Planning and Implementation.