Venture capital is a cyclical, ever-changing industry, as seen in recent years. The late 2010s and early 2020s witnessed record amounts of capital flowing into the sector, high valuations, and new types of investors entering the market. Innovations in the seed stage, such as rolling funds and SPVs, enabled more individuals to enter the industry. At the later stages, firms were becoming multi-stage investors, and aggressive hedge funds had entered the space. Then, in 2022, the macroeconomic environment created challenges, fundraising declined, and few venture-backed IPOs occurred. As of 2023, it was unclear where the VC industry was heading next. This note covers these recent events and the industry's increased focus on diversity and ESG.

With the rapid growth of venture capital ("VC") in recent decades, we might wonder: who succeeds at VC and why? This is a complicated question, as many factors come into play. VC partnerships are comprised of individual investors with varying backgrounds, experiences, and skillsets. VC firms also feature a wide range of investment philosophies, goals, history, and resource sets. Finally, external factors such as geography and culture seem to be correlated with VC activity. This note summarizes some VC research at the individual, firm-wide, and national levels.

Why do some entrepreneurs succeed and others do not? Are there personality traits that lead someone to become an entrepreneur? Although many questions still remain, there has been significant research on the "entrepreneurial personality." This note provides an overview of the most frequently studied entrepreneurial traits, including a set of "Big 5" traits, a need for achievement, locus of control, innovativeness, and risk tolerance. Where data exist, we chronicle what is correlated with a desire to be an entrepreneur and what is associated with actual success as an entrepreneur.

Yup Kim, the Head of Investments, Private Equity at the California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS), reflected on the pension fund's private equity strategy. In July of 2022, the fund was in the midst of a multi-year turnaround strategy with the goal to "consistently deploy capital at scale in order to build a diversified, cost-efficient portfolio of high-conviction investments that outperform [its] PE policy benchmark." CalPERS had also recently increased the overall allocation to private equity from 8% to 13%, making it even more critical that Kim and the private equity team achieve their goals. Moreover, CalPERS faced a global economy seemingly headed into a recession and changes within the private equity industry as a whole. Kim needed to decide if they had the right strategy in place to achieve their long-term vision. This case also explores the U.S. public pension system and private equity co-investments.

In December 2021, Han Kim, Anthony Lee, and Ho Nam reflected on how far they had come since 2012. This B case provides an update on Altos Ventures' decision-making and performance since the events presented in the A case.

In December 2012, Altos Ventures General Partners Han Kim, Anthony Lee, and Ho Nam met to discuss the future of the firm. Altos had already adjusted its strategy multiple times. It began as a U.S.-focused venture capital investor whose first two funds were backed by a sole limited partner, a South Korean financial conglomerate. In late 2001, the partners made their first transformative decision, raising a fund from traditional institutional LPs to focus on bootstrapped technology companies. In 2008, Altos again refined its strategy, this time to fund similar capital-efficient companies but with more "explosive growth" potential. Now, in 2012, the firm was running out of capital and did not have the realized track record to raise another traditional institutional fund. They considered two options: raise a South Korea-focused VC fund or offer more co-investment opportunities to LPs through a "mini" fund. What should Altos do to stay afloat?

In late June of 2022, Sonja Perkins, co-founder of Broadway Angels, contemplated the group's future. She and her co-founders, Jennifer Fonstad, and Magdalena Yesil, started the group to gather together the most successful and powerful women in venture capital and technology with the mission to build a powerful network, showcase top female talent, inspire more women to enter VC and entrepreneurship, and make great investments. Overall, she was pleased with their progress toward their mission but still felt that gender equity in VC was slow to happen. She considered several different ways the group could expand its impact.

In June 2020, Jeremy Blank prepared for a meeting with his fellow partners at York Capital to discuss an investment he had championed in Enovix, a company developing a state-of-the-art, silicon-based battery. Early-stage technology companies, like Enovix, were not typical investments for York, but Blank had convinced his partners to invest. However, the partnership wanted to be "one and done" without reinvesting in future rounds. By 2020, Enovix had made great progress but not as quickly as forecasted. The company had set out to raise more money and received a term sheet from a well-known publicly-traded company. Blank saw this as an exciting opportunity for Enovix, but he was disappointed to see that it would require York to invest more capital and forego a key protective feature. How should Blank approach this meeting with his partners, and what should he recommend?

In June 2022, 3G Capital Co-Managing Partners Alex Behring and Daniel Schwartz were in a partners' meeting. On the agenda were three potential investments. Code named "Alpha," "Bravo," and "Charlie" (real target companies that have been disguised), they were the finalists amongst hundreds that the team had screened. Unlike other private equity firms, 3G did not build a portfolio: each of its funds had only one investment. This model had worked extremely well for some investments, with successes like Restaurant Brands International, but it had also faced some challenges. Each investment decision was crucial to the future of the firm. What should their next investment be?

When and how much risk to take? In October 2020, Ken Sweder, CEO of Individual FoodService ("IFS"), contemplated this question as he evaluated a proposal to acquire Brady Industries, a distributor of janitorial and sanitation products. Sweder and his private equity partners at Kelso & Company had been working hard to grow IFS, and now they had a unique opportunity to make a transformative acquisition. The deal had great potential and risks; it was unclear if this was the right time to make such a large, complex acquisition amid disruptions from the COVID-19 pandemic. Sweder needed to decide if he should recommend the transaction and, if so, how to set the right value creation plan for the combined company.

The case explores whether alternative investments play a unique role in achieving low carbon dioxide emissions at the portfolio level. This case is set in April of 2020 and follows Kasper Ahrndt Lorenzen, Chief Investment Officer, and Peter Tind Larsen, Head of Alternative Investments, at PFA, the largest commercial pension fund in Denmark. PFA had recently seen increased demand from its corporate clients to offer a product with lower carbon dioxide emissions. The case explores PFA's decision to offer a "Climate Plus" product that would aim to produce strong returns and meet ambitious climate-related goals. In the case, the protagonists meet to discuss the role of alternative assets in the product. Importantly, PFA already has a significant presence in the alternative space and, in particular, in private equity and renewable energy. A large fraction of their alternative portfolio is managed in-house. Among other things, PFA is thinking about adding timberland investments as a new asset class to achieve net zero emissions. Lorenzen and Larsen need to determine if they could leverage their existing team and processes to invest in timberland and whether it is the right time to launch a climate-focused product. This case provides a good platform for discussion on direct investing in the alternative space and the role of alternatives for large institutional investors.

How should a venture capital firm divide compensation and decision rights between its founders and its next-generation partners? Platinum Capital faced this decision in July 2020. Platinum's younger partners had just requested a piece of the firm's highly lucrative Management Company from Platinum's founders. The founders felt they were owed compensation for the risk and "lean" years they had faced when founding the firm. Yet, the high-performing new partners had other career opportunities and wanted to be "real" partners in the business. Should the founders grant the next generation access to the management company? If so, how should the firm's decision rights work in this new scenario?

Founder Collective ("FC") launched in 2009 with a clear mission: to be the most aligned fund for founders at the seed stage. In keeping with its mission, FC maintained smaller fund sizes and was not a lifecycle investor. By November of 2021, the seed market had become more competitive, and FC had successfully picked several Unicorn and even Decacorn investments, causing some LPs to wonder about the opportunity costs of FC's "no pro rata" view. Managing Partners David Frankel, Eric Paley, and Micah Rosenbloom wondered if the seed investing sector had changed too much and if they should evolve their strategy. They contemplated three potential paths forward: start investing their pro rata in later rounds, raise an opportunity fund, or continue their current strategy.

Keith Bender, Principal at Pear Venture Capital, is working over the weekend to prepare for a Monday morning investment meeting. He has three startup pitch decks in front of him, and he must choose one to recommend at the meeting. He finds that each company has its strengths and weaknesses, but each has a notable advantage. The first company has a particularly compelling product, the second company is in a strong market, and the final company has a highly experienced team. Which pitch deck should Bender recommend?

By July 2016, the Aldrich Capital Partners team had spent over two years trying to raise their inaugural growth-equity fund. They had pitched to over 140 investors, but none had committed. Managing Partners Mirza Baig and Raz Zia each had extensive experience in the growth-equity space, but they did not have an investment track record together. Investors seemed hesitant to commit to a "blind pool" of capital with a new team. Now, the partners were contemplating an investment in a company code-named "Hollywood." The deal had several risks and was not a perfect fit with their investment thesis, but the partners wondered if this deal could prove their abilities and strategy to investors. Should Aldrich invest in Hollywood?

In June of 2021, KKR's executive team convened to prepare for an upcoming board meeting. From a small, three-person partnership that started in 1976 and invested only in U.S. LBOs, the firm 45 years later was a public company that employed over 1,600 people and managed $252 billion across 21 offices around the world. As a public company, KKR needed to maintain growth to be competitive, and the executives wanted to envision what KKR would look like in 2025. A target earnings number for that year would give a tangible goal to its employees and Wall Street. What should it be? The executives also wanted to provide the Board of Directors a sense of what drove each of KKR's profit streams. Which profit streams were most attractive and why? As a result, what should be the company's strategic priorities?

The Apax Digital team faced important decisions as they contemplated raising a second fund. Apax Digital Fund I was a $1.1 billion vehicle focused on mid-market growth equity and growth buyouts in the technology sector. The fund had performed well, and the Managing Partners Marcelo Gigliani and Dan O'Keefe felt that demand from investors would be strong for ADF II. However, raising a bigger fund would come with several strategic implications for the team's size, investment strategy, and sourcing model. What should be ADF II's hard cap, and how should they handle the implications of a larger fund?

In July of 2021, Bessemer Venture Partners (BVP) contemplated the future of its growth investing practice, known as "Century." While still relatively new as a focused initiative, BVP's growth investing already had significant momentum. The fund's investment pace had been faster than expected, and the initial investments looked strong. But many of their VC competitors had already been operating growth funds, a new wave of growth-stage-focused investors were increasing their investment activity, and the team wondered what BVP should do. They considered three "out of the box" ideas: extending the firm's multi-stage focus to include leveraged buyouts, expanding aggressively into East Asia and Africa, and applying the BVP process to public companies through a hedge fund. Which option, if any, should the team pursue?