Top Glaciers Inc. (TG) is a Montreal-based company that emerged in early 2017 from the merger of four Quebec-based ice cream and sorbet companies - Bilboquet, Solo Fruit, Hudson, and Lambert. TG operates in the high-end "artisanal" ice cream and frozen dessert segment. Part A of the case is decisional: it asks students to conduct a business assessment of the company in June 2020 to determine TG's strategy and priorities. Part B is short. It looks at the company's evolution since the end of Part A.

Top Glaciers Inc. (TG) is a Montreal-based company that emerged in early 2017 from the merger of four Quebec-based ice cream and sorbet companies - Bilboquet, Solo Fruit, Hudson, and Lambert. TG operates in the high-end "artisanal" ice cream and frozen dessert segment. Part A of the case is decisional: it asks students to conduct a business assessment of the company in June 2020 to determine TG's strategy and priorities. Part B is short. It looks at the company's evolution since the end of Part A.

This case looks at the vagaries of Molson's corporate governance during the period from 1995 to 2003, which led to a declaration of the Molson Family Principles and a review of the board of directors' effectiveness initiated by Eric Molson, its chair. These actions proved particularly important in light of the attitudes, behaviours, decisions, and ambitions of Ian Molson, a distant cousin who sat on the board, and CEO Dan O'Neill. Patriarch of the Tom Molson (his father) clan and controlling shareholder of the company, Eric Molson needed to reaffirm the values and principles of his family by using his power of persuasion and influence and, if necessary, the (heavy) artillery to ensure the company's sustainability.

This case covers the discussions and events that took place in 2004 at the family, board, and executive levels at Molson Inc. (Molson). At that time, there was a debate between two strategic orientations: the merger of Molson with A. Coors & Co. (Coors) or the outright sale of Molson to a competitor. The case focuses on the interactions between key governance actors, including the chair, Eric Molson, the deputy chair, Ian Molson, the chief executive officer, Dan O'Neill, and other members of Molson's board of directors. Molson's status as a publicly traded family-controlled firm raises issues such as the importance of family support, the name of the entity resulting from any transaction, and the extent of family involvement in its governance.

This two-part case covers the discussions and events that took place in 2004 at the family, board, and executive levels at Molson Inc. (Molson). At that time, there was a debate between two strategic orientations: the merger of Molson with A. Coors & Co. (Coors) or the outright sale of Molson to a competitor. Case A focuses on the interactions between key governance actors, including the chair, Eric Molson, the deputy chair, Ian Molson, the chief executive officer, Dan O'Neill, and other members of Molson's board of directors. Molson's status as a publicly traded family-controlled firm raises issues such as the importance of family support, the name of the entity resulting from any transaction, and the extent of family involvement in its governance. Case B provides additional details regarding key events that followed the May 5 board meeting.

On July 21, 2004, Molson's board approved a merger of equals between Molson and Coors. For Eric Molson, chair of the board since 1988, and also head of the Molson family and controlling shareholder, this merger with a strategic partner of similar size would make the merged company - Molson Coors - the fifth-largest brewer in the world. Before this could happen, however, Molson shareholders had to be convinced that this merger would be fair to everyone, not just to the Molson family members who held Class B shares (with voting rights). The merger would require the approval of two-thirds of both the voting and non-voting classes of Molson shareholders. This was far from a done deal since a merger of equals is a zero-premium deal for shareholders. The case explains how Eric and other stakeholders managed to convince Molson shareholders to approve the merger of equals with Coors.

In 1988, Eric Molson became chair of the board of The Molson Companies Ltd. (TMCL). Founded in 1786, the company had focused on brewing beer until the mid-1960s, when it decided to diversify to promote its growth. In 1988, TMCL had four main divisions: brewing, chemicals, retail merchandizing, and sports (the Montreal Canadiens hockey team). Despite nagging doubts about diversification, Eric initially embraced the conglomerate strategy mapped out by his predecessors for the past two decades. He later realized, however, that it was time for TMCL's reign as a conglomerate to end. He firmly believed that Molson's future lay in going "back to beer" and becoming a global brewer. The case explains how, between 1988 and 1999, Eric and his board hired and fired several CEOs - John Rogers, Mickey Cohen, Norman Seagram, and Jim Arnett - in an effort to return Molson to its core business. Finally, in 1998, Molson's regained full ownership of Molson Breweries and, in 1999, Molson's sole focus returned to brewing. However, much remained to be done to secure Molson's position as a global player in the brewing industry. The case lays the groundwork for a discussion of strategy and corporate governance in the context of a large family-controlled business.

In 2011, Samuel Maruta and Vincent Mourou, two Frenchmen living in Vietnam, founded Marou to produce fine chocolate from bean to bar. Just seven years later, Marou had opened two shops in Vietnam and was exporting its chocolate to twenty countries, including the United States, France, Sweden, Japan, and South Korea. The company's brand and business model were deeply rooted in its commitment to using only locally grown cacao beans: Marou had forged close ties with small Vietnamese farmers to create a reliable supply of high-quality beans, vital to the production of exquisite chocolate. While highlighting the values and vision of the company's founders (taste, local purchasing, fair and sustainable trade, prudent and organic growth), the case outlines the company's efforts to secure its supply of cacao beans to ensure the high quality of the chocolate it produced. The case also describes the company's distribution and sales strategies both domestically and internationally. The winner of several international awards and lauded by the New York Times in March 2016 as producing "the best chocolate you've never tasted," Marou seemed to be well positioned in the high-end "bean to bar" chocolate niche.

The case describes the career path of Lebanese businessman Fadi Baaklini and traces the evolution of MEPCO (Middle East Paper Company), the enterprise he founded with a partner in 1997. MEPCO started out selling paper and later became a paper trading company, operating in markets in the Middle East, North Africa, and India. After presenting Fadi Baaklini's initial experiences as an entrepreneur and his early career in the timber industry and then the paper industry, the case focuses on MEPCO's rapid growth into a successful paper brokerage and prosperous SME. In 2005, the company opened a sales office in Tunisia and a subsidiary in India. In 2006, Fadi Baaklini bought the shares of his business partner, becoming the sole owner of MEPCO. From 2006 to 2016, MEPCO continued to expand, opening new sales offices in Egypt and Lebanon. In 2017, MEPCO employed some thirty people and had over US$100 million in sales. Fadi Baaklini has decided to put his retirement plans on hold in order to launch a new partnership with a Canadian firm specializing in biodegradable chemicals. His plan is to export these products to India for use in waste-water treatment, as well as in the agricultural, pulp and paper, and poultry industries. He sees in this opportunity the potential to turn MEPCO into a multinational company generating billions of dollars in sales.

The case looks at Ian Lambert's first year as the new general manager of ElektroSecur, a Canadian SMB with about 40 employees, specialized in the production and distribution of emergency vehicle technologies. Part A of the case focuses on his first six months in the job (September 2012 to February 2013), while Part B shifts attention to the following six months (March to August 2013). Part A: Ian Lambert took over as general manager of ElektroSecur in September 2012. The company was founded in 1997 by its two current owners, Daniel Dufour and Marc Rorty, who are respectively president and vice-president, business development. ElektroSecur had annual sales of approximately $7 million generated by some 50 in-house products and roughly 100 products distributed by it. The company was making a small net profit of no more than $20,000 a year and had always struggled to remain profitable. Part B: Contrary to what Ian had hoped after six months on the job (Part A), the company's financial situation did not improve over the following six months. Financially speaking, it was shaping up to be the worst year in the company's history. Up to the month of May, sales were more catastrophic than ever.

The case looks at Ian Lambert's first year as the new general manager of ElektroSecur, a Canadian SMB with about 40 employees, specialized in the production and distribution of emergency vehicle technologies. Part A of the case focuses on his first six months in the job (September 2012 to February 2013), while Part B shifts attention to the following six months (March to August 2013). Part A: Ian Lambert took over as general manager of ElektroSecur in September 2012. The company was founded in 1997 by its two current owners, Daniel Dufour and Marc Rorty, who are respectively president and vice-president, business development. ElektroSecur had annual sales of approximately $7 million generated by some 50 in-house products and roughly 100 products distributed by it. The company was making a small net profit of no more than $20,000 a year and had always struggled to remain profitable. Part B: Contrary to what Ian had hoped after six months on the job (Part A), the company's financial situation did not improve over the following six months. Financially speaking, it was shaping up to be the worst year in the company's history. Up to the month of May, sales were more catastrophic than ever.

This three-part case traces Carrie Wagner's career in a single, large international package delivery company over a 30-year period during which she rose through the ranks from a student's summer job to senior executive positions. Part (A) - Early Career, from Student to Manager (4 p.) - Carrie joins a large multi-national as a summer student when she is 19 years old. Upon graduation, she takes a full-time job in the budget department. After six months in this position she is promoted to manager at the age of 22. Carrie knows nothing about finance and Jim, her Executive Director, is an invaluable ally.

This three-part case traces Carrie Wagner's career in a single, large international package delivery company over a 30-year period during which she rose through the ranks from a student's summer job to senior executive positions. Part (B) - Towards Senior Management (4 p.) - This section details Carrie's career from the age of 30 to 45, where she climbed several management levels up to the position of Executive Director.

This three-part case traces Carrie Wagner's career in a single, large international package delivery company over a 30-year period during which she rose through the ranks from a student's summer job to senior executive positions. Part (C) - Cutting the Cord? (5 p.) - At 46, Carrie is seen as a potential VP, and reluctantly accepts a job as head of Human Resources, reporting to the President and his first VPs. The case describes the challenges of this new position for Carrie and how she finds it difficult to work in an advisory role that is disconnected from operations. After five years in this position, she becomes aware of an opportunity outside the company that piques her interest. This opportunity, combined with several other considerations, including professional as well personal factors, lead Carrie to wonder whether she should not give up on a possible VP position and ""cut the cord"" with the company where she has worked for 30 years.