It was February 16, 2005 and Edgar James, from Merrill Lynch, one of the leading investment banks, was reviewing the file regarding the leveraged buyout (LBO) of Masonite International Corporation (Masonite). A couple of months earlier, Kohlberg, Kravis and Roberts (KKR), one of the oldest and largest private equity firms, had teamed up with Masonite's senior managers and offered to take the company private via a US$2.52 billion LBO. A shareholder meeting to vote on the transaction was scheduled in less than 48 hours, but it was very likely that the deal would be voted down. Most of the major shareholders had already announced that they would reject the transaction, arguing that the premium offered by KKR was insufficient. As the head of Merrill Lynch's team working on the LBO, Edgar had to finalize his recommendation before talking to Masonite's Board of Directors. Was KKR about to walk out? After all, there were increasing concerns about the profitability and growth prospects of building products companies in general and Masonite in particular, due to the ever-increasing cost of raw materials, the negative impact of the tightening of monetary policy on consumer spending and mortgage rates, and the debatable health of the housing market. But Masonite was still one of the best-positioned companies in the industry, with strong earnings and cash flows. Would this be enough to entice KKR to increase their offer?

It was May 19, 2004, and Ralf Thomas, analyst at SBU Investment Research, was reviewing the Form 40-F that one of the companies he was covering, Masonite International Corporation (Masonite), had filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Masonite was one of the world's largest manufacturers and merchandisers of doors, door components, and door entry systems, headquartered in Mississauga, Ontario. Its latest results were very good, with strong growth as well as high margins and cash flows. The company was on track to pay down debt and be well positioned to achieve the investment-grade credit rating it was coveting. But despite all this good news, Ralf had some concerns; he was wondering whether this strong performance was sustainable. He knew that earnings of building products companies were cyclical. They were generally sensitive to the state of the economy, demand for housing, consumer sentiment, sharp increases in interest rates, changes in buyers' credit terms, and rising prices of raw materials such as wood products and steel. Most economies around the world were recording full-employment and noninflationary growth rates, but real growth was so high that central banks were mooting the idea of raising interest rates. In addition, there were now concerns that there might be housing bubbles in several geographic areas. But even more worrying, the price of raw materials, like steel, had more than doubled over the last 12 months, and there were shortages, in particular in North America, Masonite's main market. If sales were to soften in an environment marked by high production costs and rising interest rates, Masonite's margins and cash flows could be under pressure. Ralf still had a "buy" rating on the stock. Was it time to change it to a "hold" or even a "sell"?

Throughout 2008 and into early 2009, the executive team of World Communications Corporation (WCC) became deeply involved in the examination of whether it should invest in a large production and distribution operation into Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Arabian economy has grown dramatically, thanks to rising oil prices and export revenues during 2008. In early 2009, Seth Thomas, the CEO of WCC, was faced with three potential alternatives. The first one was to risk building a manufacturing plant and distribution center in Saudi Arabia, and strengthen the company's competitive position abroad. The second alternative was to expand plant capacity at home and continue to export, as the company had done so successfully for years. The third alternative was to wait and delay both decisions because of the uncertainties caused by the global financial and economic crises in 2008. Whether Saudi Arabia could manage its economy to avoid the worldwide recession was an open debate, but preliminary data were encouraging. The case examines government regulations and treatment of foreign investment and the level of education of the labor force and educational system to support the growth of local executives and managers.

In May 2008, the executive team of MLC Corporation (MLC) became deeply involved in the examination of whether it should expand its production and distribution operations into Russia. The Russian economy had grown dramatically, mainly thanks to rising natural gas exports to Europe. A sharp rise in energy prices had further accelerated the growth of the energy sector, as well as supported the expansion of the economy. Thus, in early January 2009, Mark Olexi, the CEO of MLC, was faced with three potential alternatives. The first one was to expand plant capacity at home and continue to export, as the company had done so successfully for years. The second alternative was to risk building a manufacturing plant and distribution center in Russia, and strengthen the company's competitive position abroad. The third alternative was to await and delay both decisions because of the uncertainties caused by the global financial and economic crises. Whether Russia could manage its economy to avoid the worldwide recession and an internal financial and economic crisis was an open debate. In addition, Russia had just experienced a leadership change, energy prices had collapsed, and the Russian-U.S. relationship had deteriorated.

It was late on Thursday, April 22, 2004, and Jean-Francois Dehecq, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Sanofi-Synthelabo (Sanofi), France's second largest pharmaceutical company, was sitting in his office thinking about what had happened over the last three months. On January 26, 2004, he had launched a hostile tender offer to acquire Aventis, France's largest pharmaceutical company. The merger between Sanofi and Aventis would have created the world's third largest pharmaceutical company, closing the gap with U.S.-based Pfizer and U.K.-based GlaxoSmith-Kline (GSK). Jean-Francois Dehecq had offered €48.6 billion, but his offer had been rejected by Aventis's Supervisory Board. Since the end of January, Aventis had been fighting back, launching a poison pill and inviting Novartis, Switzerland's largest pharmaceutical company, to act as a white knight.

Tirstrup BioMechanics (Denmark) was considering an investment of $410 million in the United States, and Julie Harbjerg, Assistant Treasurer International for Tirstrup, was charged with evaluating different alternatives for raising the funds for the acquisition.

It was January and Porsche-the legendary manufacturer of performance sports cars-wished to reevaluate rate strategy. Porsche's management had always been unconcerned about opinions of the equity market, buts its currency hedging strategy was becoming something of a lighting rod for criticism. Although the currency hedging results had been positive, many experts believed that Porsche had simply been "more lucky than good." There was a growing nervousness among analysts that the company was actually speculating on currency movements, and that was not in the best interests of shareholders. Analysts were estimating that more than 40% of earnings were to come from currency hedging. Porsche's President and CEO, Dr. Wendelin Wiedeking, now wished to revisit the company's exposure management strategy.