In early 2022, Courtney McColgan, founder and CEO of Runa, a human resources and payroll Software-as-a-Service platform, faced an unexpected tech market downturn. Founded in 2018, Runa catered to small and medium-sized businesses in Mexico, offering an affordable and easy-to-use cloud-based solution. McColgan, a serial entrepreneur from Southern California, firmly believed the platform could disrupt Mexico's vast industry, and become a billion-dollar business. After an initial period of rapid growth during its first 18 months of operations, and amidst hiring a new executive team, Runa's growth began to falter as attracting new clients became increasingly hard, and customer acquisition costs increased. In August 2021, Runa raised more funds amidst an unprecedented expansion in venture capital investment in Latin America, and it deployed additional marketing strategies and developed new products to entice customers. However, by early 2022, the venture scenario grew gloomier, and tech companies began to take cautionary measures. How should Runa adapt to a potentially more limited funding scenario and perhaps even less favorable growth prospects in the short run? Would dramatic structural and strategic changes be needed? Or should McColgan consider shutting down her business and create a new venture?
Over a 105-year span, the ErmÃrio de Moraes family built Votorantim, one of Latin America's largest industrial conglomerates, and among Brazil's topmost businesses, also credited for helping "build" the country over decades. By early 2023, Votorantim included diversified operations in 19 countries worldwide, with a net income above $1 billion. The conglomerate was privately owned by the ErmÃrio de Moraes family, with its ownership evenly split across four family branches. Over time, the family established a corporate governance structure with separate boards for ownership, business, and family affairs, leaving business operations to a professional management team. At the heart of this governance structure was the family board, viewed by many family members as the "glue and honey" bringing them together. Despite running multiple initiatives, Luciana Domit chair of the family board and a fifth-generation member, acknowledged, it was becoming increasingly hard to get its over 170 family members to spend time together and to engage in the activities they promoted. As the family enlarged and interests diverged, fostering its long-term unity could become more challenging. Were the family board's current strategies and overall governance structure at Votorantim conducive towards keeping the family united in its values and preserving its legacy? Or would a transformation be needed if the ErmÃrio de Moraeses were committed to remaining at the forefront of the Votorantim's governance structure?
In the pandemic, financial inclusion icon BancoSol faces a government-mandated year-long deferral of all loan payments, followed by the sudden Covid death of its CEO. In a Bolivia mired in political turmoil following a failed presidential election, with clients not obligated to pay either interest or principal from March to the end of 2020, the bank faces a severe cash deficit. This is exacerbated by the regulatory determination that, as the deferrals are mandated, loans must be deemed current and performing and resulting profits continue subject to income taxes that must be paid. BancoSol management must decide how to respond to this crisis. When the mandated deferrals come to an end, the bank regulators issue instructions as to how the restructuring must take place. As the total deferred amounts add up to 85% of its loan portfolio, this is a critical matter for BancoSol. Prior to the regulatory instructions, management had painstakingly designed its own restructuring program. Convinced that it is the optimal way to proceed, management strongly recommends its implementation regardless of contradicting the regulatory instructions. The deteriorating financial condition of the bank adds urgency to the decision. In the midst of these issues, in February 2021, Covid suddenly claims the life of the bank's longtime CEO, Kurt Koenigsfest, the architect of the modern BancoSol. With the bank's very existence at stake, Esteban Altschul, the chair of the board of directors, must come to grips with how the restructuring of the deferred loans will take place and how the various management gaps exposed by Koenigsfest's death will be filled. At the same time, convinced that the future leadership of BancoSol is linked to its adaptation to the digital age, Altschul must assess the efforts of the bank to-date in this area and how it should proceed in the future.
In June 2021, Nayib Bukele, El Salvador's president, surprised the world with the announcement that the country would adopt bitcoin as legal tender, becoming the first nation to do so. Bitcoin was mostly used for trading and had one of the most volatile track records among assets. Yet, crypto adoption as a medium of exchange was starting to gain pace worldwide. Bukele claimed it would be a boon for financial inclusion, investment, innovation, and economic development. El Salvador's $27 billion economy suffered from persistently low growth, high public debt, and a strong dependence on remittances, which could potentially become cheaper and faster to access in bitcoins. The Bitcoin plan was met with both enthusiasm from Bitcoin supporters and skepticism from credit agencies and multilateral finance institutions, which believed it could bring macroeconomic instability to the local economy. Was bitcoin a viable currency for Salvadorans? Or, as some observers pointed out, was Bukele's plan another sign of weakened governance in his administration?
Bodega Aurrera, serving the base of the pyramid and Walmart's main Mexican format, is considering launching a full eCommerce channel as Covid-19 has erupted in the country. In 2019, Bodega Aurrera accounted for 45% of revenues and 2,748 of Walmex's 3,416 stores. Having introduced eCommerce with the high-income segments served by its Walmart and Superama formats, Walmart Mexico (Walmex) had slated an online channel for Bodega Aurrera in the next three or four years, considering that its core clients belonged to the C and D socioeconomic segments. However, with the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, retail store sales plummeted and analysts around the world began to note that sales on digital channels were surging. In late April 2020, Lilia Jaime, the CEO of Bodega Aurrera, wondered if this was an opportunity she had to seize. If so, she had to act right away, ahead of her competition. Yet, normally, the established procedure to introduce a full online channel involved the Walmart Bentonville, AR headquarters at both business and Information Technology (IT) levels, and it would take several months. The only way to launch quickly, the experienced Walmex eCommerce team told her, was by bringing in an outside firm with an eCommerce framework already in place and mounting Bodega Aurrera on top of it. To their knowledge, this had never been done at Walmart before. Also, she would have to carve the initiative out of her own approved budgets, at the expense of projects she already considered a priority. But were the families at the base of the pyramid ready to place grocery orders online and trust paying through digital channels? And if Lilia went ahead and it didn't work, she would risk inflicting serious damage to one of Mexico's most beloved brands.
MAYA Capital co-founders Lara Lemann and Monica Saggioro raised $41.5 million through a series of closings for their early-stage Latin American venture capital fund. The two women had met for the first time in mid-2016 when Lemann was contemplating scaling her angel investing experience by structuring a fund, and Saggioro was about to start her MBA program at Harvard Business School. After founding MAYA in 2018, the pair built an investment portfolio in sector-agnostic investments across the region, providing startup founders with an on-demand, hands-on management support approach. MAYA also initiated a series of creative efforts to help develop its venture ecosystem and to source opportunities. By 2021, Lemann and Saggioro had invested approximately $21 million in 28 companies, with several completing subsequent follow-on rounds of financing to support their growth. By then, Latin America´s VC market size had more than doubled since MAYA´s inception, with escalating competition among local players. Lemann and Saggioro faced several important decisions: When should they raise another fund? How large should the next fund be? Should they alter their investment strategy? And as MAYA expanded its portfolio, would they be able to sustain their hands-on management support strategy?
By June 2021, Yummy had become Venezuela's first and largest food delivery app and last-mile logistics company. In Caracas, the nation's capital, Yummy held a 55% market share, while operations in other cities had already started to take place, including in three of the country's most populous ones. But this did not come without challenges - it had been a hectic year since the operations were launched in April 2020, when the Covid-19 pandemic broke out - with the direst one being the difficult task of raising money to start and grow a business in Venezuela, a country that ranked among the worst globally for doing business. However, the startup has just gained admission to an American seed money startup accelerator, allowing Yummy to attract institutional investors and to explore potential growth avenues. With a board meeting approaching, the company's CEO, Vicente Zavarce, reflected with co-founders on the possibilities that lay ahead. Should Yummy keep expanding geographically to other cities in Venezuela or even branch out into other countries, either in Latin America or worldwide? Should the company instead grow by expanding to new verticals, leveraging its customer base by offering additional services such as ride-sharing or financial services? And what would be the right sequence for these activities if Yummy's new vision was to become a super app?
In early 2020, 414 Capital was hired by Proteak, Mexico's largest forestry platform, to perform a valuation of its teak business, a high-grade hardwood commonly used to build boat decks, outdoor walls, furniture, doors and small objects. Teak plantations typically became commercially viable upon reaching 20 to 30 years of maturity and Proteak was two years away from reaching its final harvest period for several teak plantations in Mexico. Teak productivity could vary significantly across plantations. Ariel Fischman, founder and CEO of 414 Capital, a leading independent corporate financial services firm, recognized valuing land in Mexico was also a tricky business, and although they had previously performed a valuation of Proteak in 2014, the market dynamics had changed in the last six years, and so had the company's position in the market.
In June 2020, XP and Itaú faced intensified competition and tension in their partnership, with the latter owning a minority stake at XP. Two years earlier, in May 2017, Itaú had announced it would acquire 49.9% of XP for $1.8 billion, followed by three additional stages leading to company control. Yet in August 2018, Brazil's Central Bank, partially barred the deal, stating Itaú could become a minority shareholder. Tensions surfaced as soon as the deal was formalized, with both companies engaging in public attacks across several marketing campaigns, with Itaú estimated to lose around $27 million a day to XP from client migration. Moreover, XP faced increased competition from emerging investment platforms that were gaining ground in Brazil´s market. By mid-2020, XP´s financial results had skyrocketed, taking in $190 million in net income and $743 million in total revenues. As Guilherme Benchimol, XP´s CEO, looks ahead, he must define what strategies they should pursue to achieve further growth, considering competitive forces and market opportunities at hand.
XP, an investment platform, was on the verge of defining whether to do an IPO or selling off a majority stake to Itaú Unibanco, Brazil´s largest financial conglomerate. Under the leadership of Guilherme Benchimol, XP´s co-founder and CEO, XP had risen to become the largest independent investment platform in Brazil in 2017, reshaping the country's financial investment landscape by marketing itself as a "financial supermarket." The company offered digital seamless investment alternatives at low fees, pioneering a model leveraged across a wide network of independent financial advisors and disrupting a market dominated by large incumbent banks. By late 2016, XP raked in $71 million in net income, boasting over 340,000 clients and $20 billion in assets under custody. In turn, Itaú recorded $415 billion in total assets and net profits above $6.7 billion in 2016, serving over 55 million clients. Benchimol believed the game was just starting: Brazil presented an enormous market opportunity to offer more financial services to millions of new investment clients, but future growth would require additional funding. By the end of 2016, Brazil´s stock market began to show signs of recovery after a two-year performance slump, enticing XP to go public. Yet, Martin Escobari-an XP board member and partner at General Atlantic, the firm that owned 49% of the company by then-felt XP should explore the possibility of finding a potential buyer for XP, shortlisting Itaú among candidates. Although Benchimol openly criticized Brazil´s top banks and their treatment of clients, he realized Itaú´s privileged market position could provide XP with more credibility and, ultimately, more clients. Did it make sense to sell XP to Brazil´s biggest bank? Or should XP go public?
Under the rule of presidents Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro, Venezuela experienced one of the worst economic and political meltdowns in modern history, culminating with a massive hyperinflation. Remarkably, during this dramatic times Automercados Plaza's had grown to become one of the most successful supermarket retailers in the country. Its management team had faced all kinds of challenges, including price indexation, price controls, scarcity and stockouts, informal competitors, and an ever-shifting set of government interventions. Showing resourcefulness and the flexibility needed to quickly adapt, Plaza's had managed to survive and even thrive. The future, however, looked very uncertain. Could Plaza's keep growing in an ever-shrinking economy? Would the (now larger) company manage to continue to avoid clashing with the government? Cheap financing in bolÃvares was no longer available, and other companies had learned to operate under high inflation conditions as well. While additional growth could help fend off new rivals if the economy improved, it was not clear when (or even if) that would happen. Despite increasing domestic and international pressure, President Maduro refused to resign. Even if he did, could Venezuela's economy recover after more than two decades of Chavismo?
Private companies were being turned to for potable water in the world's megacities due to impacts of climate change including droughts and flooding. Mexico City had endured several water-related crises, with its population suffering from floods, droughts, water shutoffs and disease. Although some access to piped water services was practically universal for Mexico City residents, services were limited or discontinuous. An accommodation that most households had made was in purchasing and installing a water holding tank on the roof or in the ground, with Rotoplás, a Mexican based water product and services provider, enjoying more than 55% of tank market share in Mexico. Rotoplás had ventured into wastewater treatment and recycling in 2016 with the acquisition of Sytesa, a design, construction, financing, operation, and maintenance business for wastewater management for industry and businesses. Market segments included lighter corporate users like shopping malls and heavy users like food processors or mining companies, and maybe "water as a service" would also end up as the place to be to supplement and assist homeowner associations and even municipal governments. However, services revenue was today a tiny fraction of overall cash flow at Rotoplás. The presence of larger competitors like Suez and Veolia and as well as unfavorable pricing and regulations could potentially slow down future growth. Could Rotoplás services be part of the solution to the water crisis in the nation's capital? Or was the situation too intractable for even this local champion company to tackle? What pricing and regulatory changes might lead to financial and technical solutions for Mexico City's water crisis?
Grupo Éxito, a leading South American retailer, faced declining market shares in Colombia in 2019 with the arrival of low-cost competitors and emerging digital trends. Originally founded in MedellÃn, Éxito had over the course of its seventy-year history evolved from a small textile shop into a retail powerhouse, with 1,533 stores and operations in 2018 across four countries in South America and $18.6 billion in consolidated revenues. In its home country, Éxito had grown through a series of acquisitions, consolidating a multi-brand and multi-store format strategy to cater to customers across all income segments. By 2018, the company had a total of 554 points of sale across the country. However, with the arrival of hard discount retailers, Éxito began to gradually experience a decline in its market shares, particularly at its low-cost store brands. Colombian consumers were also changing their grocery shopping habits, as they became more digitalized. Not only were retailers beefing up their digital retail platforms by launching new applications with personalized services, but they were also allying with partners such as Rappi-Colombia's largest last-mile delivery company- to speedily deliver products to customers' homes. Carlos Mario Giraldo, Éxito´s Chief Executive Officer since 2013, and top management were faced with the challenge of simultaneously maintaining Éxito´s vast operations in the country and battle the current and upcoming threats in the competitive Colombian grocery retail market. Should the company battle head to head with discounters or bet on differentiated strategies at its more premium stores and digitalized ways to serve customers? Would these strategies pay off and allow Éxito to gain more market share in the future?
After long dominating Mexican microfinance, Compartamos Banco faces the emergence of fintech, just as for the first time its loan portfolio and clients have declined. Enrique Majós, CEO of GENTERA, the bank´s parent company, is keenly aware of the profound changes since the Compartamos IPO in April 2007, when it was valued at $1.5 billion and became the first bank wholly dedicated to microfinance to be quoted in a major stock exchange. Since then, the market has become intensely competitive, with both large established institutions and new entrants vying for the same customers. Simultaneously, the digital era has spawned fintech, threatening to disrupt Compartamos' highly successful model but also providing opportunities for the bank to reshape it. While challenged to manage key innovation within a leading incumbent, Majós must consider whether to commit his team to a major cost reduction in the next few years to his board of directors at their next meeting at the end of the month.
As a result of Mexico's pension industry deregulation, pension funds were able to invest in energy and infrastructure projects through a variety of financial instruments, particularly through Capital Development Certificates (CKDs), an asset class that served as a vehicle for investing in unlisted companies. By the end of 2017, pension funds had invested more than $16 billion in infrastructure, with CKDs as the primary investment vehicle for this sector. Motivated by increased domestic liquidity and opportunities for investment, Rodrigo Jair launched Jair Infrastructure Investments, a specialized fund with the majority of its capital raised from pension funds. Jair was approached by Felipe Duarte, head of Banorte´s Infrastructure and Energy Group, who offered him a short-term credit line to increase the fund´s liquidity during its investment phase. Jair had to decide whether he should deploy this line or rely exclusively on capital calls from his investors to fund his pipeline. Was it worth paying the commitment fees to achieve increased liquidity? What risks should he consider when making this decision? What are the upsides and downsides of relying on equity or debt for a fund like Jair Infrastructure Investments? Will techniques like this bring significantly more capital into infrastructure investing?